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THIS narrative, originally mitten to uti l ize the other- 
wise vacant hours of an Afgh6.n captivity, has  been 
long out of print, having Been ~vithdrawn f r o m  publica- 
tion by the author, with a view to subsequent revision 
and reprtblication, should opportunity offer. But 
amid the vicissitudes of an Indian career, new duties 
and more attractive subjects gradually w i t h d r e ~ v  his 
thoughts from the saddening reminisceuces of the 
KA3ul catastrophe. Meanwhile the public mind seemed 
to have grown weary of thc matter, and the cotem- 
porary journal of the author's distinguished fellow- 
captive, Lady Sale, seemed amply sufiicient t o  supply 
whatever popular appetite might still su rv ive  for so 
plentiful a (' supper of horrors." 
But now that history seems to be to some  extent  re- 
peating itself, and with a new Afgh&n war actually on 
our hands, there has been naturally a genera l  rush to 
the book-ahelves in search of the dusty records  of past 
transactions and adventures beyond the Indus, and  thus 
the quondam captive of Akbar K h h  finds himself, not 
i v  PREFACE. 
without some reluctance, yielding to the newly 
awakened populay impulse and to the pressure of the 
times, and figuring, perhaps superfluously, as a " veteran 
on the stage " in the evening of life. 
The nawative was originally published simultaneously 
with Lady Sale's volume, and passcd rapidly through 
several editions before the writer himself had an oppor- 
tunity of reading it in print. His supply of stationery 
being scanty, the manuscript was crampcd into the 
smallest possible space, and thus admitted of being 
conveyed by stealth to General Polloclr.'s camp at 
Jall6lBbtid. On one occasion a considerable portion 
was lost in transit and had to be entirely re-w~itten, ' 
no copy having been kept. After perusal by General 
Pollock it was t r a n s m h d  by;, him to Lord Ellen- 
borough's private secreta~y, the late Sir I-Ienry 
Durantl, and was then, at his Lordship's suggestion, 
transmitted to the writer's Eamily in England with a 
view to immediate publication. 
I t  may, in fact, be said to have supplied the British 
public with the first regularly detailed accounts of 
the British military and political operations at Kiibul 
from the outbreak of the insurrection on the 2nd 
November, 1841, to the final catastrophe in January, 
1842. It was written under circumstances more 
than usually favourable to ensure strict historic 
fidelity; for, besides having been personally an eye- 
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close proximity with many of the chicf survivors, 
among whom were the unfortunate General himself 
and his second in command, besides several members 
of the military and political staff, I-Ie was thus in a 
position to hear and to record much that would other 
wise have been beyond his reach ; and, by a diligent and 
careful comparison of their various statements and 
experiences, as well as by access to the public docu- 
ments in their possession, to combine the whole into a 
faithful and, he hopes, impartial nanative, which has so 
satisfactorily stood the crucial test of time as to be 
deemed wortlly to be interwoven with the standard 
histories of that memorable period. 
I t  has bcen consitlcred axlvisal~le, for thc benefit of 
readers of the prescnt day, to prefix two preliminary 
chapters, the first containing a brief description of 
the geography and the inhabitants of Afghinisth, 
derived partly from his own notes, but chiefly from 
the best published sources available to him while 
wintering in Italy. 
The second chapter gives a retrospective summary 
of the first Afgh6n war, and contains the substance 
of a lecture delivered by the author at the Royal 
United Service Institution in 2869. I t  is to be hoped 
the reader will thus be aided to a more complete under- 
standing of the main narrative. 
As a plain relation of facts, he has found but little 
requiring suppression or alteration, but inasmuch as, 
PRIFAUE. 
in the fervid ardous of youth, some of his own com- 
mentaries on the acts of officers far his superiors in 
ranlr, though 'made in fearless honesty of purpose, 
do not altogether meet the approval of his maturer 
judgment, and are, moreover, no longer needed to 
instigate public inquiry, they have, in the present 
I t  is hoped that the occasional omission of those 
" youthful indiscretions " may not be found to detract 
from the vital interest of the main narrative, and that 
this revival of an " over-true tale" may be not without 
its public use, even in the midst of present triumphs, 
on account of the solemn warnings i t  conveys. The 
valuable aid so generously afiorcled by the author's 
friend Colonel Malleson in superintending this volume 
! through the press, in. the midst of his own pressing 
1 literary avocations, demands an expression of more 
than ordinary gratitude. 
VINCENT EYRE, 
Major- Gene?-all late Royal Artilles-y (Bengal) . 
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THE KABUL INSURRECTION 
CHAPTER I. 
GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION. --The country n o w  inha- 
bited by the  nulvcrous tribes known by the common 
name of Afgh6ns may be briefly said to bc bounded on 
the north and  north-west by the stupendous mountain 
range of Ilindfi-IChush, or  Indian Caucasus, on the 
south by BiMchistAn and p a ~ t  of Sindh, o n  the east 
by the g ~ e a t  river Indus, and on the west by  the ex- 
tensive desert tracts that border the Persian empire. 
The difficulties of access that AfghBnistSin opposes, 
on all sides t o  an invading army, surrounded a s  it is by 
vasC tracts of mountain and desert, the former only to 
be traversed by surmounting steep ridges and threading 
1 
narrow defiles where a Few hundreds of well armed and 
resolute men effectually oppose the passage of as 
many thousands, entitle it to be considered, in a mili- 
t a r y  sense, as one of the strongest countries in the 
whole worlcl, whilst the manly independence of its 
hayay inhabitants, their sturdy valour, and their skill 
in t h e  use of weapons of war, t o  vhich they are trained 
f ~ o m  eaxly boyhood, combine to  render them fa- from 
despicable opponents, especially on their own gro~mcl, 
f o r  even the disciplined warriors of Europe. 
c ~ ~ ~ n s . - T h e  chief cities of AfgliBnistBn a ~ e  Kribul, 
Ghazni, Kandah&r, I-Iiriit, Jall.515b6d, and Pesh&war, 
1 each situated in a fertile m d  well-watered valley, en- 
closed more or less by lofty hills, and Eortified in  the 
usud oriental stylc with high walls, either of mud, 
stone, or brick, with round or polygonal flanking 
towers. Peshiiwar became a Sikh possession i n  1823, 
and has formed part of the British Indian dominions 
since 1849. 
~ ~ U N T A I N S . - ! & ~  three principal mountain ranges, 
f r o m  which innumerable branches diverge in all direc- 
t ions,  are those of Hindii-IChush, Safaid Koh, and 
Sulaim6n. The first, under which I include the great 
Paropamisan chain which forms the northern barricr 
extending. from east to west, is a continuation of thc 
great Himdayan range of northern Inclia, the last 01' 
whose long line of giant snow-clad pcalcs, the Koh-i- 
Soha, rears its hoary head about seventy miles t o  thc 
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north-west oE IGibul. Its height is eighteen thousand 
feet above tlie sea. Thence to its termination in the 
vicinity of Hiritt this procligious rampart of mountains 
loses much of its sublimity. Tlle race of people called 
Hazitras are dispersed among its valleys, where they 
have been settled from time immemorial. 
The STJFAID Koa, or great ( 'White lMountainJJ range, 
whose culminating snow-clad peak attains an elevation 
of iiftecn thousand six hundred and twenty-two feet, 
stretches from east to west, between the Ichaibar hills 
and Ghazni, like a stupendous impassable barrier, 
whose minimum height is said to be twelve thousand 
five li~~ncbecl feet, and f ~ o m  vhose long uniform ridge 
are thrown off an iilfiility of spurs on either flanlc to 
north ancl sonth. At intervals along its conrse it sends 
fortli long mountail~ous ramifications in a soutl~erly 
di~ection towards Bil15chist611, and gives rise to several 
rivers, including ille Arghandcib (a i'eeder OF the Ilel- 
mancl), flowing west towards Ihndahk; the Kci6ul 
river, flowing llortll towards the capital 2nd thence 
turning eastward to Peshdmar ; the Kzwam and Gomd2 
rivers, flowing south and east through tlie famous 
valleys slnrl passes so named, to mingle their respective. 
waters with those of the grcat river Intlus in the vicinity 
of Isalcbel and DerA Ismitil K115n. 
The S U L A ~ ~ I A N  range runs in a direction nearly 
p ~ a l l e l  tvith the Indns and pellpendicad;~r to that of 
Sufaicl Icoli. Its lugliest peak, thc TaIrht-i-Sulaimlin, 
l *  
4 THE KABUL INSURRECTION OP 1841-4!2. 
or <'Throne of Solomon," is eleven thousancl five hun- 
dred feet above the sea, and the average lieigl~t of the 
whole range is about equal to thxt of tlle I'yrenecs. 
The valleys encloscd within these vast inomlta~ii~. 
ranges, ancl their numelpous ramificatioris, a1.c peopled 
by almost as many distinct tribes, eac:li govcruc(l. in  a 
great rncasure by its own siml)le laws r i~ i r l  cilstonis : of 
tlieae a brief account \rill be given f~on.1 t l ~ c  l~ctst sourcns 
available. 
PASSES.--There arc four principal roiltcs avni1al)lc for 
military pwposes and gcr~eral trnific bot;n~c:oii I i~ ( l i :~  aild 
ASgl~Bnistbn from :;long the liilc of our Tllrlll'i fi'oliticr, 
between Peshkwai. in t l ~ c  iioiltlt ~ L I I ~  1101.i i l l  S O U ~ ~ L .  
Tllese are lrnoml as tllc I<ltaibar, 111~ 1<11i.:uii, tllc 
Gomkl, and the Bollill pnsscs. 
Tllc direct route from Peslikwn~ to I<;il)ul lies tl~rough 
the Ichaibar pass, ovcr a total tlistul~cc ol' ollc 111~iicli'cd 
and ninety miles. T l ~ c  pass itself' is tl~irty-tl~~.c~c: iililes 
long, and is ilefeiicle(1, nt n distance of ciglit ruil(:s Crom 
its castern ei~trancc, I)y tlic l 'o~t  of illi RTns,jitl. Sixty- 
seven miles beyoiltl thnt is t11o wallrd towu :~n(l  fcrtilo, 
valley of Jallhl;il)bd, al)oul onc tliousailil 11ilic Inuidred 
and sixty-four feet abovc tlic RC:~. Tllc~i~cc~ tu 1C;i111~l 
the route l)i70sents :L ~oliti~iuo11s soiaiebs of' ;iscc:ilts all(1 
01' tedious and tliaicult passes; tliosc c!lli~lily rvorthy of 
motition being Ganddrr~uk, Jc~gdnllak, ~ Z ' Z ~ I L ,  a l t  liotl~l, 
2~11d ICILUT~ I<iBul, tlie latter only tell niilw fro111 Rlillul 
itselti and all liavc been tlic scenes of' cl(::~illy ~truggles 
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The ICUILAM valley is entered at Thal, sixty-six milcs 
from the British fortress of ICoh4t. A march of fifty 
miles along the bank of the river leads to Kurarn fort, 
a d  sixty miles bcyond that is the Paiwnr pass, at a 
height of eight thousand feet above the sea. Thence 
to the summit of the Shatar Gardan pass, on the ridge 
of the Sufaid Koh, the route lies between precipitous 
peaks and over lugged spurs of a most formidable cha- 
racter, if defended by a slrilful and resolute enemy. 
The descent t o  thc valley of the Logar on the northern 
side is of a similar character, and leads eventually 
through a comparatively easy route to Kkbul. 
The GOMAL pass penetrates the SulnimBn range 
about sixteen miles west of 'rink, through a narrow 
defile, with a continuous ascent to Kotal-i-Sarmand, 
sevcn thousand five hunclred feet above the sea, one 
hundred and forty-five miles by road. Thence f allowing 
the course of the river another easy pass leads to tlie 
final ascent of the crest of a steep mountain range, 
beyond which the city of Ghazni is reached. 
This route has been followed during many centuries 
by the mercantile clan known as Povindahs, in their 
annual journeys to and fiom India with merchanclise, 
and who boldly encounter considerable peril from the 
robber tribes that persistently beset their path through 
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the passes, obliging them to fight their way with loss of 
life' and property, and yet still adhere to their favourite 
time-honourecl route. 
The Bol6n pass has its entrance near the town of 
DStdar, seven hunclred and forty-two miles above the 
sea, and five l~undred miles south of the I i f ~ u i b a ~  pass. 
There is a continuous ascent through the EEI6ld inoun- 
tains for sixty miles to the crest of thc p:~ss, which is 
five thousand eight l~unclrerl feet above tlYc se:~, anrl 
thence to Qetta, which bas an elevation of five tllousancl 
five hundred ancl forty feet. The Boliri river flows 
th~ougll the greater portion of the pass. The last three 
miles are very contracted, between towering precipitous 
QETTA has lately become an advailced British 
frontier post, and is distant one lmnclred and fifty miles 
from KandahBr; to rcach which it is necessary to 
traverse the Pishin valley ancl the lofty IChojalc pass, 
which reaches ah elevation of seven thousanrl f o u ~  hun- 
dred and fifty feet ; whencc to the plain of ICandahk 
there is a long descent of four thousand fcet. 
CLIMATE.-The superior coolness and salubrity of the 
climate in most parts of Afghcmistiin woulcl appear t o  
be due less to the differences of latitudc than of eleva- 
tion. Thc following table exhibits the compailative 
heights of the principal places on the two grand roufes 
lately travellecl by owr armies, an& as a gcueral rule, 
the climate may be said to improve in proportion to 
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Above the sea. Al~ove the sea. 
LIGazni . . . 7,726 ,, XBbul . . . 6,247 ,, p; *. 
At Peshiwar and Jall&lrib'acl the summer heat, though 
less intense than in India, is still dreadlully oppressive 
and unfavourable iu its offccts on the European consti- 
tution. On the K6bul route thc temperate climate 
begins at  Gand&mal<, beyond which snow usually 
covers tho ground during the raiclde of winter, when 
few travellers expose themselves voluntarily to the 
rislrs and inconveniences of the road. On the route 
from ShikS;rl~ur to  Randahsr the Bo16n pass forms a 
similar boundary between the hot and cold climates ; 
DBclar, which lies on the south side, being insufferably 
hot, whilst the splendid valley of Shawl, a t  the northern 
extremity, enjoys a delightfully cool and healthy tam- 
perature. The I ao jak  pass, through which lies the 
direct line of communication between Qettah and 
Randahk, being blocked up By snow during minter, all 
traffic along that route is suspended. Nevertheless, 
the rigorous winters for which ICdbul and Ghazni are 
so notorious are unlrnowri at ICaizdahk, where snow 
seldom falls, and whcrc an army can with ease keep 
the field throughout the year. Snow begins to cover 
the hills afouncl ICiibul abont tlie beginning of October, 
but seldom visits tlie plain beibrc December, when i t  
acc~imulates fast up011 the grouizd until thc end ol' 
January or miclclle of J?cbruaily, llrom ~ v l ~ i c l ~  ~ e r i o d  to 
the end of April rain 1211s in great ab~tndance. The 
remainder of the year is dry. 
TRIBES.-Tlic 131-incipnl Afglihli tribes, of whom i t  i a  
desirable to give some account in this worlr, are com- 
prised in four great divisions, viz. :- 
1. The Abcltilis, or DdriLniu. 
2. The Glialzis. 
3. Tlie Birdfirhnis. 
4. The ICaulrars. 
The two first are clistiibutctl ovcr that portion of 
AfgliinistAn wliich lics west of the Sulaimlin range, 
whilst the two last occupy tlie lcss civilized tracts on 
the opposite side of it. 
DURANIS.-The Abdrilis, or Dfirhnis, as tliey are 
more commoiily designated, are divided into iiine great 
clans, of which tllc lour principal are the lJopalzis, 
Alakhzis, Buurikzis, and Achikcis. Tl ie~c again are 
subdivided into Khuils, or families, of mliich by far the 
most eminent is that of tlic S a d k i s ,  a, brandl of 
the Popalzis, which, from a very remote period, h w ~  
becn regnrdcd as the hcatl of all the Ddrinis. 
h&, wllere snow 
1 lvith e a s e  keep 
begins to c o v e r  
l n ing  of ~ c t o b e r ,  
s ~ e m l , ~ ~ ,  when it 
ntil the end of 
. wLich to  
abunclance. The 
t h a t  of 
SulaimGn range, 
:ivilieed t y a c t s  on 
&iis, as they are 
.eci into ]line great 
a r e  the  PopaZzis, 
These a g a < n  are 
' which by far the 
izis, a b a n c h  of 
:mote period, has 
DlirGnis. 
Prom this distinguished stoclr sprang the celebrated 
Ahmad ShQi, the founder of the DLirBni monarchy, 
by whose talents, energy, ancl pruclence, the  A.fgbin 
nation Nas for the first time united under a native 
Icing, and whose grandson, ShAh ' ~ h u j i i - u l - ~ u l k ,  was 
destined, a century later, to become a tool in the 
liands of European politicians, and to experience some 
of the most extraordinary reverses of fortune that are 
recorded i n  the annals of the world. 
The whole D6rhni population is conjectured to fa l l  
little short of one million souls. 
Tlie LhBns, or chiefs, hold their lands by military 
tenure, originally granted by their Persian conqueror, 
NBdir Shilh, on the express stipulation that they 
shoilld furnish a horseman for every plough, the per- 
formance of mhich engagement has been exacted as 
rigidly as circumstances mould admit by every sub- 
sequent occupant of the throne. Under the Sad6zi 
dynasty all the p e a t  offices of state weye monopolized 
by chiefs of the Dhirbni tribe, who having been 
nlainly instrumcntd in tlie original constitution of the 
empire, and being bound by the ties of clanship to 
their monarch, mere llnturally considered to have a 
primary claim to  honorary rewards and courtly dis- 
tinctions. Each of the great DLirknni clans has, or 
had, its owrl Sirdkr, or commander chosen by the king 
out of the head family, the S i rdk  in  his turn appoint- 
ing some of the leading Ichiins to the chief civil and 
military control of each ulzis, or subdivision of a 
clm. 
The administration of justice in crimi~lal and civil 
cases is not, however, except in lwgc towns and cities, 
entrusted to any olic iiidividu,zl, but has, from time 
immemorial, been vcsted in a jiry(4, or council, coin- 
posed, in tlie morc important cascs, of tllc lrh;ins, 
eldcrs, and mull{~s of thc ncigl~bourliood; but minor 
offences and disputes are scttlcd by village jityas, 
elected by the peoplc themsclvcs. 
This primitive system of jndicature is not peculiar 
to thc D6rdnis, but is coiumon to all thc AfgLLn 
tribes. 
! 
The title of K7~dn was held, undcr the monai-chy, by 
a patent from the king, but is l~estomed by gciieral 
courtesy on the petty chiefs of cach sinall community. 
Every such titular khlin invariably rcsidcs i11 his own. 
little fort, or castle, commonly built in a square form, 
with high m ~ ~ d  walls about twelve fcet tlliclr at the base 
and tapering to tho same number of incl~cs at thc top, 
having numerous loopholes for muslrctry, and flanlicil 
at each angle by substantial towcrs or bastious. These 
forts, scattered far and wide over the facc of thc  hole 
c6mtry1 each having its littlc orchard attacbcd, anti 
surrounded by vcrdant fields of cultivation, with per- 
chance a gushing rivulet shaded by t11c willow, poplar, 
and oleaster, in gracefnl groups, form one of the rnovt 
pleasing characteristics of Afglibn sccnery. 
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The DdrAnis, like the majority of ATghfin tribe8, 
are dividecl into agricultural and pastoral classes, the 
former having their fixed places of resicicnce, and the 
latter dwelling a l t o g e t h ~ ~  in  tents, with whicli they 
form large camps and move about with thcir I-locks and 
Iierds to find pasture. The Achibis are almosl; mliolly 
pastoral, and posscss a large portion of the mountain 
range of KhojA Amv&m as wcll as of thc ncighbouring 
plains. Tliey are greatly addictcd to plundel; and are 
thc least civilized of all tllc Dfir;inis ; yct as soldiers 
they rank high, mcl their SirdBrs have gcl~orally exec 
cised a more than ordinary share of influcncc in the 
country. 
aach Ddriini village has its mulls', or Muhamma- 
dan teacher, by whom the offices of religion are per- 
formed. Considel7able attention and regulwity is 
evinced by thc commonalty in offering up their 
daily stated prayers. I-Iospitality is onc of the most 
plcasing traits in tlie popular cllaracter, cvcry 
straager being secure of a. ready welcomc to such 
entertainment as they can provide. To these 
rernaiqlrs the Acl~ikzis form a solitary exception, 
being alike careless of the rites of hospitality a11d of 
religion. 
The personal appezradce of the Dh4nis is manly 
and prepossessing, their features are generally well 
forded and strongly definecl, and their manners are 
selclom otherwise than franlr, social, and filiendly in 
the extreme. The conversation of the upper orclcrs is 
often i~einarkal~l~ animated, intelligent, and frcc horn 
prejudice and bigotry, a freedom which constitutes 
them, on the whole, very agreeable companioxis. Tliese 
excellent traits are somewhat connterbnlnncccl by thc 
~rices common, in a greater or less degrce, to all 
Asiatics, among the most prominent of wlliclz may be 
enumerated avarice, duplicity, sensuality, meanness, 
and revenge, but in these, as in ~nost other respects, 
they exhibit a manifest superiority to a11 otller A f g h h ~  
tribes, by whom they arc in  conscqucnce regarded with 
a proportionate degree of respect. 
1 
I GHALZIS.-T~~ Ghalzis next claim our attention. - 
They were formerly the most powerlul, arid are still the 
most numerous, of d l  the Afg1i;in tribcs. Tllcir name 
is supposed to indicate a Turltish origin, but tllcir scttle- 
ment in AfghAnistiLn is referrccl to a very rcrrlotc 
period, and their military polvcr and promcvs arc rc- 
cordecl by some of the earlicvt Mu1iammad:m writcr.r. 
I n  the early invasions of India by the Afghhns thcy 
took a prominent part, bu t  t l~cir  faale rcaclicil its 
climax by their conquest of Pcrvin carly in tho lmt  
century, over which country, after having ilcfcatcd in 
succession the armies of tlie Ottonia~i empire, tllcy 
established their dominio~l undcr tllrce consceutive 
kings. 
The last of these Ghalzi rnonal*chs was driven from 
his throne by Nridir ShBI1, thcn in ihc nioriling of his 
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)ruing of his 
famc, though not without a prolonged and dcsllerate 
resistance on the  part of the former. 
With him t h e  power of the Glialeis cxl~i~cd, but tllcy 
nevertheless maintained a fiercc and obstirlntc struggle 
for their liberties in hfg.hiilist$n on tlic invasion of 
that country by the same ambitious warrior. Tl~cir 
defence of ICundah&r lastcd for eightccn ~r~ontlis, ;mrl 
was only terminated by a desperate but unsucc~csslul 
sortie, in which great nuulrlbers wcrc slain. Their 
ascendancy receivcd its final blow 1)y tlic risc of tIic 
rival tribe of DLil.:inis to supreme powcr undcr ii11nl:~d 
Sh6h. 
The rernembmnce of their supcrsc~sion still c~ii- 
bitters the minds of tllc C+llnlzinoblcs, nrl~o rc'gn~.tl tllr*ir 
success~nl rivals will1 undisgniscd jci~lousy :uitl tlislilrc:, 
although in some of thc Icnding Cnrnilics or t.11~ l )~~oh(~~i t  
day thcsc inimical fccliligs 11nvc hccn iiulicl~ ;~l):1~1~1 
juclicious iaterrnan,iages, Tlic Gl~nld cllicfs rst*l-ceisc 
but little influevcc or authority in tlicir om11 t~~iljcs 
beyond the circle of their own irnmec1i:~tc dl~pcr~(lal~ts. 
In this respect their position diiFers Prom t l ~ t  ol' illc 
Diirhni nobles, wlio clerivcd adi1ition:ll powers J'i'orn 
the crown, t h e  stability of mllich inust hoacvc:~. ill 
great measurc depend on thc m:iiiitenazic!c of :L scbttlctl 
government in the country. Urlilcr tllc monnrc+~y 
s DlirLni governor was al)poi~ltcil 1)y thc! kirlCr over 
the whole Ghalzi tribc, in wl~orn autllority mas vcstctl 
for the management of tlic rcvcnue, t11c ~ n : ~ i r l t . ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ( ! ~ :  
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of troops, and the administration of justice in all cases 
requiring his inteySerence. 
Uncle? such a system the influence of the Ghalzi 
kh&ns graclnally declined, the people becoming accus- 
torncti to act indepenclently of them, and referring 
almost every dispute to the villagejirga. 
The absence of any minor local controlling autho- 
. rities rcnders blood feuds of common occurrence, both 
between private individuals and whole communities. 
Thc Gbalzis to the west of Ghazni conform more 
nearly to the D6rinis in  their general habits than 
those to the east of that city." They are, taken as a 
mhole, a brave, hardy, warlike, and handsome race, 
simple ancl frugal in their fare, possessing great bodily 
strength, stcrn, violent, vinclictive, impatient of con- 
trol, intelligent, energetic, and ever ready to unitc 
under their own chiefs against a coinmon foe or in a 
popular cause. 
Though all are either husbandmen or shepherds, yet 
every man can, on emergency, at once transform him- 
self into a solclier. They are more ignorant and bar- 
barons than the Dbr&nis, al;td possess a large share of 
their virtues ancl vices in common. 
Uncler the restraining and improving influence of a 
strong and civilized government they might probably 
be transformed into valuable subjects, but there seems 
little likeliliood of any such desirable metamorphosis 
at present. The following table exhibits the distribu- 
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lnhn and dong 
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B ~ n ~ u n ~ ~ r s . - T h e  Bivdzirawi tribes are next to 
be considered. Thcy are strictly an agricultural 
people, and inhabit the hills and plains east and north 
of the Sulaimiin Lnange, extending &om thc foot of the 
Indian Caucasas to thc latitude oE Dera Ismdl Khh ,  
and including every imaginable variety of climate 
the bleak, wintry, and scarcely habitable regions of 
perennial snow, to  thc etlually uncom~ortablc cstrenlc 
of exccsaivc heat. 
The only clans requiring particular ulcntion licre 
n1.e tllc Yu'sztSzis and tllc IUu~iburis, thc I'ornlcr inha- 
biting the mountaills and vallcys north ol' Pcs2iGw;1r, 
ancl thc lattcr tllc liilly regions 011 tlic right 1~:~lllc of 
i ~ l c  I(;ib~ll rivcr 1)ctwccn J:lll:il;il):id tultl tllo Indns, 
Soutli ol' tllcsc arc the l</ulltaks, 13(io~!y(/rrshits, Ttiris, 
and W ( ~ z f ~ i s ,  togctllor wit11 tlir: mllizrrol1.s c1:ill.s of 
I)tinzli.nz, which I:~ttc~. :LIT csol~sitlarc!tl nltogctllcr dis- 
tinct from tlic BircZtirri~~is. To t l ~ c  lcl't 01' tllc IC:il~ul 
river are tllc Moj~ztolcls and l'ccrkrilti~is~, tho lattcr 
l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s i ~ g  thc c u i t l ~ y  c:tlIril 73(v1ir. 
Y u s u ~ ~ z ~ s . - ~ l p l i i n ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ c  cstiin:rtc:s tllo IrLiisrrS,-i pol~u- 
lation at sevcn In~nilrcil tl~tms:ti~il sorrls. Tllcly arc 
the most vicious :ulil I):l~.ljn~olrs ol' all tllc ~lfgll:ins, 
and bcing pcrpctunlly crig:::lgotl i l l  intc~stillc silbilc, arc 
in n statc but littlc i8cmovcd I'ro~ii :ui:~rcl~y, I~looil 
feuds being so numerous t11:~t tl~c~rc: :u*r I'c\r vil1:lgcs 
whencc t l ~ c  Ilusbandm:u~ ( l a w  to vcuturo fOl.tll to 
plough and sow i~~liwn~cil wit11 llis s\rortl and rifIo, 
The collcction 01: rcvcnuc I):IS g~1ic~rally 1)c(111 I 'CJ I~ ILC~  
iin~~racticablc. Yct, s~lllli : ~ s  t11c.y r1rc: ill tllc vcry tli.l)tlis 
of' dc~wwity, in 110 pal-t of AfgI~:inistLr~ :llBc: tlla ooi,\r:vrl 
observances of the M~tll:~l~inlnil:~rl rcligiol~ so stluic.tly 
ol~scrvcd and intulcn~ncc so lu~ll:q~pily prcv:~lr:ilt. 
Tlic Siklis, cluring thcil. rulu in tlic P:lnj:il~, fouuil tllc 
Ydszfzis to bc bravc and fonnid:hlo opl)oncnts, ~ ~ c i i -  
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dering the continued presence of a large force at and 
I 
around Peshkwar necessary to inspire dread and enforce 
submission. I may add that the Ytlsufzi solrliers who 
1 
were enlistecl in the British service during our first I 
campaign in MghAnistrin, l~erformed excellent and I 
1 
faithful service on various occasions under Captain 1 
Ferris and other English officers. 
ICHAI~ARIS. -Thc I<haihari tribes are so called 
I 
h o r n  inhabiting the IChaibar mountains, separating the 
valley of PesllBwar from that of Jalldkb6d. I 
This range, in fact, forms the north-eastern barrier 
of Alghzinistbn, tlzrough mhose stupendous defiles the I  
I tide of invasion mas wont to pour its predatory hordes I 
of hardy warriors from the north-west into the rich 
1 
and Iertile plains of I-Iindtlsth. The Ichaibaris, 1 
7 
firmly established as the acknowledged guardians of I 
1 
this important thoroughfare, have not failed to reap 
every possible advantage Prom their position by I 1
levying a heavy toll on every traveller, born the in- 
vacling conqueror at {he head of his armed hosts down 
to the solitary and peaceful wayfarer venturing 
with his little stock of merchandize to a distant 
market. 
Besides the toll levied on travellers, the Khaibaris 
have lor many generations past received an annual 
stipend from thc ruler of KAbd for the benefits derived 
Prom an open roacl for commerce. 
The three ~ r i n c i p d  clans are the Afii(lis, the 
2 
Sltainwaris, and the Urakzis, riumbcring altogether 
about twclve thousancl sonls. 
They are estccmcd cscellclit nlarksrlicli -cvith tlie 
Afgh&ll jnzail, or rifle, whicli Ilns an  iisor1 or lvooden 
projection at tlie cud of tlic l)nn*cl, wlticl~ t l~cg  rcxt on 
the ground, n~irl tlius takc ste;rtly a ~ i d  clli:c~Lt~al nitn at a 
distallce of eight I lut i t l~~t l  y:~~'dtc. ' l ' l ~ ' ~  :KC prover- 
bially fnitlilcss in tl~cil* cngng~:mcnts, 1)cilig co~lstantly 
tenil~tcd by tllc 11011~ of ~~lmltlor,  to nttncli l~articu 
wliosc sai'ety t1icy lli~vc l ) r~v io~ l~ Iy  g11:~1':11itl!(:d. 
'I'11ese people :Ire bnrl~nrituis of n rudr: ~r;~tri:trc*hul type 
-without any govcrumcrlt bcyontl tlic! " jirgas," or 
Councils of Elders, and ~vitlio~it  ally rcligio~l beyond 
cring altogether 
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the worst form of Muhammadanism. Blood for blood, 
and fire and sword against ill infidels, are their ruling 
ideas. They are priest-riclden, sensual, ava~icious, and 
prcdatory ; faithless, also, and bloodthirsty. Each 
tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, 
each family its hereditary blood feuds, and each indi- 
vidual his personal foes. Consequently they are 
always armed, cven while grazing cattle, driving beasts 
of burden, or tilling the soil. They will undertake 
military service, but are impatient of discipline, 
and are true to'their salt unless led away by fana- 
ticism. 
The task of establishing friendly relatiolls with tribes 
so fickle ancl treacherous is one of extreme difficulty- 
friendship with one tribe is apt to be enmity with 
another; ancl treaties ratified one clay are repudiated 
the next. Nothing unites them but a common danger, 
and a common jealousy of the intrusion of strangers. 
These tribes always resisted Sikh rule, under which , 
such heavy dutics were levied as to reduce trade to the 
lowest ebb, and heavy revenue was demanded from 
those tribes within the Sikh border. 
Conciliatory measures have been adopted under 
British rule, ttlansit duties have been abolished, tax- 
ation reduced, and fricndly relations cultivated. 
The border Pathins me freely adrnittcd into the public 
service, military, police, or civil. Charitable dispen- 
saries have been established all along the borrler. open, 
2 "  
Eree of charge, to all 11ntion;ilitics i~iid (:reeds, nlld 
p:~tients are oftcn fctl at the pnlllic: cul)ensc. Lantl and 
w : ~ t e ~  coi~~m~uiic:~tioiis ~ V L Y C  I)cI:I~ iix~~)l'ovc[l, ilew roads 
coustrnctcd, scraia and rcstil~g-plnccs ~c:t iq) mllcre 
rcqnired, nilil wccldy stc?nmers c1at:~1~lisllctl 011 tile 
T-dus. 
Satisfactory rasults havc I'ollo\~(!tl. Tlio fornlcr 
hatred g~gxinst llc ruli~lg po\vcv is ]):l~siilg :Lmay; miils, 
olice chronic, n i t  now csccptio~l:ll; cil1tir:ltiuri is rapidly 
cstcnding; nut1 nlally l'iSontiar c!l:lus pr:~y for. protcctic~n 
and pcnnission to scttlc ill Hritixl~ tc!l,r.ito~-y. !Illl(: 
trtldc througli tlic Z'cslirimni* I):ISSCS is r:il]i~lly i~ i ( : r~as-  
iilg. The tolls on t l~o  Inrlns I'ori'ic's 11:~vc: risciu flvom 
four thousand irupces i11 1857' to t~vcilty-five: tl~onsniitl 
in 1867. The toriringe on tlio TJ~)~)(:I* Irlilus lins in- 
orcascil from cigllt l~uiidrctl h o : ~ t ~  with cargoc9 aggrc- 
gating two hu~~rlrcd m ~ d  sisty-ii\lc tliol~s:~iid I ~ : L I I I ~ ~ ~ S  ill 
1855, to more tl~nri t l~rcc  tllousa~ltl 1)o:lts with lienrly 
one million and :L cjualstcr iziauulds in I HCiEi-GC,. 
Mcrcailtilc f:~ir.u arc n l~o l~ t  to he ostill~lishcd at Pceli- 
h~var and Dcr:~ Isinail R11511. Thc! stncly of I'uslltfi 
is cncouragcd by rc~val.ils, ~ultl I'uslltli scllools ill tile 
interior of frontier districts arc clitlil~g ill tho worB of 
civilizntion. 
I~%kn~s.-Tlic 1C:iltar tribas occ!npy LL lnrgc tract 
of couiltry to the santl~ of tllc Khojju rZln~(ilb mou1i- 
tnirls and to tlic noltll-~ve.rt of 13ilricl1istirll. Tliey 
arc chicily s pastoral pcoplc, yct I ) O H S C Y B ~ I I ~  ninny small 
d creeds, and 
me. Landand 
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highly-cultivated valleys. Though more rude and 
ignorant-, they are far less turbulent than other 
AfghAns, but owing to their remote position they 
are dso less lrnown and appreciated; nor are they 
of sufficient importance, in a political or military 
view, to require a more lengthened notice in this 
worlr . 
To the four great tribes alrcady described the coni- 
mon name of Afgl~iin strictly appertains, but besides 
these Afghfinisixin has othcr inhabitants, of an origin 
altogethey distinct, 01 whom it is expedient to give a 
separate account. The most important of these are 
the Tdjilcs and the Euzci~as. 
T6jiIcs.-The Tiijilrs, though now forming a part 
and parcel of the Afghiin nation, were formerly a dis- 
tinct people, and are supposed by Mr. Elphinstone to 
be descended from those Arabian soldiers of the 
Prophet who, in the f i ~ s t  century of lX~&ammadanism, 
after overrunning the whole of Persia and T6rkisttill, 
and propagating their faith by force of arms in those 
countries, carried the mar into AEghjnistiin, where 
they obtained possession of the plains, but the inhn- 
bitants subsequently, collecting their forces in the 
mountains and descending upon their  invader^, par-? 
tially reduced them to a state of dependence horn 
which they have never since emerged. 
These are now mixed up mith the Afghfin ~opula- 
tion, to whom they have become in most respects 
assimilated, and 116th whom they Frequently inter- 
marry. 
They possess but little landcd property, and reside 
principally in the neighbourhood of the large towns, 
where they employ themselves in manufactures or 
trade, or as servants to Afghhn masters. They are 
usually denominated Pn'rsiw(i?as. 
1ioAistrinis.-Of those TCljilcs who retained their 
indepenclence and lander1 possessions, the people now 
called Ko?uistn'nis are the modern representatives. 
These differ widely from their subjugated brethren, 
ancl possess the strong, fertile, and extcilsive province 
of I<oiristhn, to the north. of ICCLbul, comprising 'the 
valleys oE Panjshb., Gi~urhand, and N j ~ u ' o .  The 
I<ohisttini population has been estilnatcd at forty 
thousand. The principal town is Istitif, situated at the 
base of the Ghurband mountains, and uizsurpassed in 
picturesque beauty. 
The houses being built on the slope of a hill, and 
rising in a succession of ii*regulnr terraces, onc above 
another, form an imposing spectacle, the bcauty and 
grandeur of which is greatly augmented by the innu- 
merable orchards and vineyards that culivcn the sur- 
rounding laudscape, arid the mng~lificcnt snow-clad 
peaks of I-Iindd-Ichush, with its mountaiuous pro- 
geny spreading their mazy braaches far and wide, 
toweling in  the rear and perfecting a picture that hhaa 
but few pai~allels in nature. Istdif is celebrated for 
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oi its grapes, which are grown in prodigious abun- 
dance, and in size, flavour, and variety aye perhaps 
equal to any in the world. Apples, pears, peaches, 
apricots, phlms, cherries, and other Xuropean fruits, 
grow in the greatest profusion, but the mulberry tree 
is more extensively planted than any other, the dried 
fruit being ground into flour and converted into bread, 
which forms a cheap and wholesome article of food for 
the common people. The ICohistBnis are rude, 
violent, and contentions, their chief delight being in 
war. They are v6rl.y efficient as infantry, especially in 
mountain warfare, and can take the field in large 
l~odies, at the shortest notice, subsisting for weeks 
together on dried mulberries alone, of which each 
soldier carries a bagful. The people are more com- 
pletely under the control of their khkns than is the 
case with any of the tril~es before noticed. 
They axe regarded by their neighbours with mingled 
Feelings of drearl, distrust, and aversion. They have 
generally resisted every attempt to render them tlibu- 
tary to the lC6bul rulers, and have always enjoyed a 
considerable degree of independence. 
Hazliras . -The Bazci7.a~ inhabit the Paropamisan 
mountains between Hiriit and Khbul, and though for- 
merly composing but one people have long been 
divided by religious schism into two sects or branches, 
the Sunis and the Shiahs, the former occupying the 
. . 
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western, and the latter the eastern, hall: of theirb wild 
and rugged country. The Suni I-Iazhras are usually 
called Airn&Jcs, whilst the  SJ~iah brancll alone retains 
the name of Hazciras. 
Their square Tritnr features sufficiently distinguish 
them froin thc Afghiins, independent of their Inany 
essential differences in othcr rcspectu. The Aima'ks 
dwell almost wholly in  tents, feeding fIoclts anrl culti- 
vating the few arable strips 01 land that nature has 
allotted them. Their chiefs possess many strongholds 
in the most inaccessible parts 0-E thc mountains, and 
exercise an al~nost despotic sway ovcr their own 
tribes. 
I The IZazliras dwell i n  open villagcs defcildcd by 
- high towers, and the cliicfs in small 101%~. Tlieir 
country is inore ruggerl and bnrrczi, and its clirnate 
more inclement, than that of the Aim:iltn. Thcy are  
slmrle, good l~urnourerl, and social~lc, but hot tem- 
pered, and, when their eninity is arousccl, a t  once stub- 
born, fierce, and revengeful. Thcy are consta~ltly 
engagcd in strife, either amongst tllcmsclvcv oy against 
the Aim&lcs, U~begs, and Afghbns, sturdily resisting 
the  payment of tributc t o  the IChl~ul govcrnnient when- 
ever opportunity oBers. I n  religion tlicy are zealously 
attaclled to their own sect, and uncompromising in 
their hatred of all Sunis. Thcir chiefs arc, with a 
few exceptions, equally despotic as thosc of their 
Aim& brethyen. 
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Iiazi1hdshis.-I next proceed to notice the principal 
foreign settlers whose numbers, wealth, and influence, 
entitle them to distinct consideration. Foremost 
among these are the Iiazilbdsl~is, or Persian colonists, 
who emigrated from their own country in  the time of 
Nadir ShSh, and of whom not less than twelve thou- 
sand dwell in the city of ICSLbul alone, whcre they 
occupy a fortified quarter called the Chanclaul. They 
have smaller settlements in the towns of Kandahiir and 
Hirtit, and lime obtained several small grants of land 
in various other parts of the country. 
Many of the chiefs held situations of trust and im- 
portance under the Dfiiini monarchs. 
Amid the Prequent struggles for the empire that 
have distracted the land after the death of Ahmad 
ShBh, their usual policy has been to maintain an armed 
neutrality, cautiously abstaining from joining either 
party until the issue of the struggle seemed no longer 
doubtful, when they of coilrse declared in Eavour of 
the strongest. But although politically timid, they are 
personally brdve, and, being able to muster a strong 
force in the field, they are always certain of being wcl- 
comed as acceptable auxiliaries to whichever party they 
attach themselves. 
The sectarian differences in religion between them 
and the AfghAns must ever prevent anything like 
real cordiality on either side, the Kazilbislis being 
Shiahs, like the Persians, whilst a11 the Afghans are 
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Sunis in faith. The Kaaihiishis are vain and fond 
of display. They usually dress well, and attend more 
to domestic comfort and personal cleanliness than the 
Afghins, who are very careless of such matters. They 
also surpass thc latter in general refinement and civili- 
zation, but are inferior to them in manly virtues and 
in religious toleration. 
Arabs.-The Arabs are the only other foreign settlers 
of any importance. They arc computed at two thou- 
sand families, and a large portion of their number were 
employed under the Diirtini monarchs to garrison 
the BB& Hisk,  or royal citadel, of I(ibu1. 
Sh6.h ShujB, on his restoration to  the throne in 
1839, enlisted several hundreds in his service, who 
remained faithful to him amid his subsequent dis- 
asters. 
Description of Kdbu1.-The city of Khbul has been 
so often described that its principal features must be 
already pretty familiar to  the majority of English 
readers. The traveller who for the first time ap- 
proaches it from the direction of Jall&l&b,bSd, after 
having passed through the savage defiles and toiled 
over the barren steeps that intervene, feels both re- 
lieved and delighted, on entering the plain of KBbul, 
by the cheerful and picturesque aspect of the distant 
city, closcried afar off in a gorge between two lofty 
hills, up and along whose steep and rocky ridges is 
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of the western tribes. 
011 the left, OY eastern extremity, occupying alow 
spur of hill and commanding the entire town, the BBfi 
I-Iisgr, or citaclel, with its lofty stone walls, bulky bas- 
tions, and enclosed crowd of high-storied dwellings, 
forms R striking object. The mountains of Pughrnh 
ancl Eoh Dbmdn, covered with snow cluring two-thirds 
of the ycar, form a magnificent background to the 
scene. Green ficlcls of various kinds of grain and 
clover, blossoming orchards, and small square forts, 
are thiclrlg? interspersed over the adjacent plains, which, 
howevei~, a1.e intersected on the eastern side by low 
barren hills that somewhat injure the otlierwise rich 
and extensive prospect. On the western side of the 
city, and sepa~atecl from i t  by the gorge through which 
the I<&bul river flows, is a most beautiful valley, vary- 
I C ing in width from eight to twelve miles, encircled by a 
succession of mountain ranges whose most distant ' 
summits reflect a clazslillg glare from their mhite 
mantles of perennial snow. On the gentle slopes at 
the base axe well-stocked orchards, cultivated terraces, 
and villages embosomed in wood, whilst.; the plain 
below presents to view one vast garden of lavish plenty 
through which the river of Khlml and its tributary 
streams pursue their winding courses, clistributing their 
crystal waters, en route, among innumerable artificial 
canals that diverge in all directions t o  irrigate the 
upland fields. 
Castles, villages, orcl~ards, and plantations of poplar, 
lvilloyJ and other trecs, are thiclcl~ scattered over the 
diversified landscape, thc vicw of wlrich from an 
eminence ncnr Btibar's tomb descrvcdly coustitutes 
one of the chief boasts of IC6bd. The city is very irre- 
gularly laid out, and, wit11 cxccption of the  cele- 
brated covered bazar ancl the tomb of Taimrir Shhh, 
contained no public builclings at dl striking.* The 
streets ase narrow, and the ~ O U S C S  lofty with flat roofs. 
To many of the bctter sort of privatc dwellings a 
garden is attached. The largest portion of t h e  city 
stands on the right brink o% the river, t h e  opposite side 
being lined with walled gardens ancl private 
forts of the upper classes. 
The covercd baznr consisted of five open squares 
connected by foul. arcades, down tlie centre of which a 
marble aqueduct conveyed a small ruilniilg stream. 
The sides mere lined wit11 s h o p  exliibiting a wealthy 
display of home ancl foreign producc. 
That which most excited a stranger's admiration was 
the number of fruiterersJ sliops, wherc every variety of 
tempting and delicious fxuit was piled up in matchless ' 
profusion. 
* Tlio former no longer oxists, hnving boor1 ciostroyod by General 
Pollock in Oobobor, 1842, ns nn act of rolriBut,ivo vongeunoe for the 
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Crowds of busy merchants and lounging idlers, in 
the various costumes of Asia, thronged this favourite 
mart during the greater part of the day and night, ex- 
cepting on Fridays, when the shops of all true believers 
were shut and business suspended, whilst the inhabi- 
tants attendecl to their religious duties, or enjoyed 
their diversions in the gardens and fields of the 
snburbs. The garden that contains the tomb of the 
Emperor 136bar was their usual place of resort on these 
occasions, m d  they could not possibly have selected a 
more suitable spot. One of the strangest sights in 
IC&l~ul is that of thc lndics glicling about the crowded 
streets enveloped from head to ftet in white sheets, 
having a veiy small networlc in front of the eyes to 
peep through. This ghostly costume affords the most 
perfect concealmcnt to 110th face and figure, and has a 
tcndency to excite a feeling of curiosity in all foreign 
beholclcrs. That is, under the circumstances, very ex- 
cusable, their reputation for beauty being amply sus- 
tained by the handsome features and rosy complexions 
of their offspring. So impenetrable is the disguise of 
this out-door dress, t hc  fashion of which is never 
varied, that it is impossible for a man to distinguish 
his o m  wife when he meets her abroad. 
The facility thus afforded for intrigue may be easily 
conccivecl, although i t  is probable that even the most 
fertile imagination of an Englishman would fall short 
of the reality. 
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Tlie plains to the north and east of K6bu.l are l o w  ' 
and swampy in many places, being subject, during the 
rainy months, t o  inunclation from the river. 
Much more might be written illustrative of a couuntry 
and people that recent events have rendered so in- 
teresting to Englishmen, but I believe there is scarce ly  
anything of importance on these subjects that may not 
be found most ably and adequately described in the 
admirable work of the Hon. Mountst~~rtrt Elphiustone, 
the correctness of whose inforlnation has now been 
fully tested, and in baldly a single instance impugned. 
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THB FIRST AFGHAN WAR: 
CHAPTER 11. 
P~REAPS no Governor-Generd of India ever assumed 
the reins of office with more benevolent inclinations 
and more peaceable intentions than Lord Auclcland in 
1836; yet, within less than two years, he plunged 
i 
I 
headlong into a war to which, there is reason to believe, 1 
I 
I he was all along secretly averse, and which has been 
since stamped by universal public opinioll as the most 
* I   
I unjust, ill-aclvised, and unnecessary that had ever 
! engaged the energies of a British army, or risked the d 
I honourable reputation of the British name throughout 
the East. 
I t  is now a well-established fact that the initiative 
in the Afghrin war was taken in opposition to the 
opinion, and even in defiance of the protests, of the I 
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trustees of India; and that a large share of the respon- 
sibility belongs to Her Majesty's Ministers in Eugland, 
who, in common with Lord Auclrland's official advisers, 
believed that the stability of our Indian empire was 
being so seriously threatened by the warlilre operations 
of Persia, secyetly influenced by Russian diplomacy in 
Central Asia, as to rendcr it absolutely necessary for 
the rulers ol India to arouse themselves to ward off the 
impending danger by some outward demonstration of 
power in that quartcr. 
A new monarch had recently succeeded to the throne 
of Persia, vhose partialities had betrayed tl-lemselves in 
favour of a Rnssian alliance, in opposition to the in- 
terests of Great Britain, whose influence had heretofore 
prevailed over all rivals at the Court of Tehrhn; and 
among the earliest results of this change, was the deter- 
mination to hurl a Persian army against the fortress of 
I-IirBt, which had long been in possession of the Afghhns, 
but to which an old claim on the part of Persia was 
now conveniently revived. 
A general belief prevailed among European and 
Asiatic diplomatists of that peliod that the possession 
of Hirzit by Persia must necessarily threaten not only 
the safety of AfgGnistAn, but of the rich plains of the 
PanjiLb (at that time in possession of thc great Silrh 
rulcr Ranjit Singh) and of British India lying beyond. 
Tlzereforc i t  was bnt natural that Afghrins, Siklis, and 
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But, when it is considered what large disciplined 
forces might have been easily concentrated on any 
threatened point of our Indian frontier, horn powerful 
an army of friendy Sikhs at that time occupied the 
Panjcib' and what formidable physical obstacles thc 
intervening country presents a t  all times to the march 
of a large invading force, hampered with artillery, 
commissa~iat, and other necessn1.y impedimenta, it is 
difficult to account for the panic that so generally 
prcvailed, on any othcr rational ground than a con- 
sciousness of solve weak and combustible points in 
the heterogeneous fabric of our Indian cmpire, which 
might cause it to collapse or explode suddenly and 
disastrously on thc application of any sufficiently 
exciting forces from without. 
It is to be hoped that the interval of forty years 
which has since elapsed has gradually placed our 
moral and material hold of India upon a much sounder 
basis than then existed, 
At that time the chicf power in Afghhisthn was 
in  the able hands of Dost Muhalnlnad IChcin, whose 
capital was KSibul and three of whose brothers go- 
verned at ICandahcir. FIirSit itself was held as an inde- 
pendent principality by Shhh Khmrhn, a Bad6zi prince, 
whose father and uncles once reigned over MghAnisttin, 
betraying and supplanting each other by turns, until 
3 
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themselves betrayed and supplanted by the great 
BSrakzi chiefs, whose power now predominated, and 
whose elcler brother, Path Khjn, had long acted the 
part of minister and king-maker, until at length 
treacherously put to a cruel death by Shkh IChmr6nn, 
against whoin Dost Muhammad and the other surviving 
brothers of Fath IChkn accordingly cherished the 
bitterest feelings of hatrcd and revenge. 
To gratify this dire hostility, the 1Candah;ir brothers 
were now willing to lend themselves to the designs of 
Persia, not without hope of some benefit resulting to 
themselves. But their grcat chieftain at KAbul, more 
far-sighted and patriotic than they, had solcmdy cau- 
tioned them against the danger of incurring the cnmity 
of the British, to the superior value of whose alliance 
he was fully alive, although Russia was at that very 
time bidding high for his adherence. 
Matters mere in this unsatisfactory state when, in 
September, 1837, Sir Alexander Burnes presented 
himself before Dost Muhammad at ~ ~ b u i ,  as the 
accredited agent of thc Indian Government, on a so- 
styled (( commercialJJ mission, the r e d  ob ect of which 
was, however, suficiently transparent. 
The two men wcre already personally known to 
each other ; Burnes having, about five years previously, 
been most hospitably entertained by the KAbul chief 
when passing through that city as a private traveller 
en route to Europe; hcnce his reappearance at the 
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present momentous crisis could not but be hailed as 
a favourable omen of the friendly intentions of the 
British Government, whose represeutative he no m was. 
His reception was, accordingly, of the most cordial 
and flattering description, and to all appearance he 
had an easy game to play; and it is probable that had 
he been allowed to arrange matters in his own way, all 
clifficulties woulcl have been smoothcd over, and all 
motive for hostilities removed. 
The obvious policy of the British Government at 
that pel-iod was to conciliate the goodwill of the Mgl16n 
nation (of whom Dost Muhammdmas the aclinomledged 
and populw de facto ruler), as the most effect;ive 
barrier we could raise against present and future 
innovations of the Western powers ; and this we had 
now a glorious opportunity of effecting through the 
timely instrumentality of Burnes, than whom no agent 
could have been found so appositely qualified for such 
a taslr, or more zealous to consummate so desirable a 
result. ' 
Brit i t  was not so to be I Lord Auckland and his 
official advisers had, from the very first, conceived an 
inveterate 'distrust of Dost Muhammad for the diffi- 
culties of whose position they failed t o  make due 
allowance, and whose many sterling qualities as a 
~ d e r  they equally failed to understand and appreciate. 
In point of fact, they had meanwhile conceived a 
favou~ite policy of their own, entirely opposed to that 
3 * 
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so earnestly recommended by Bui-nes, and the result 
was his summary recal from G b u l  early in 1838, and 
the -temporary triumph of Russian and Persian 
interests in the councils of I<Abt~l and I<andalibr. 
A Persian army, with some Russian officers in  its 
train, had mea~iwhile already laid siege to Iiiyit ,  and 
d l  India looked on in wonder and alarm at the eventful 
drama enacting at lier distant portal in the north-east. 
Fortunntely, few Asiatic powers undeystalld how to 
conduct siege operations; and Persia, even with the 
aid of Russian officers, and with its own monarch in 
person at the head of a sufficiently powerful army - 
and battering train, Iormed no exception to the rule. 
The siege lingered on from November, 1837, until 
September, 1838, affording ample time for intermediate 
action on the part of the British. 
The credit of this prolonged defcncc mas clue, in 
an eminent degree, to the accidental presence within 
the walls of Hirfit of a young British officer of the 
Bombay Artillery, Eldred Pottinger by namc. His 
~rofessional skill and personal energy were of the 
utmost use in directing the defensive operations, I 
and keeping alive thc martid spirit 01 the garrison. 
On more than onc occasion Che Afghsin commancler, 
YCtr Muhammad (who was also ShBh I<hmrinJs prime 
minister), was on the point of yielding to his assail- 
ants, but was shamed into a show, at least, of fresh 
courage by the entreaties, reproaches, and even 
bl--42. 
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friendly violence of Pottinger, who would not suffer 
him to retreat from the breach when retreat on his 
part must have been the signal for general flight, but 
literally dragged him forcibly again and again to the 
front, until the enemy, in despair at the pertinacity 
of resistance enco~mtered, retued discomfited and 
crestfallen to their trenches. 
According to the authority of Russian officers en- 
gaged in the siege, the ShGh of Persia's army amounted 
to forty thousand men, with sixty guns ; and among the 
former was a Russian battalion, which I understand 
to have been composed of Russian refugees settled 
in Fersia. Not content with eighteen-pounder md 
twenty-four-po~~nder siege guns, the fire from which, 
if properly concentrated ancl sustained, must have 
speedily effected a practicable breach, the Persian 
engineer entrusted with the siege operations established 
a foundry in the midst of the camp, whercin four 
monster seventy-pounder guns were cast, from whose 
fire vast and immediate results were expected. Two 
of these burst on trial, killing ~everal bystanders; 
the other two stood the test better, and several days 
werc then occupied in hewing stone balls of the required 
calibre from the marble supplied by the monuments 
of a neighbouring burial-place; and it may have Been 
the periodical advcnt of these unfriendly, though 
fortunately harmless visitors, which Pottinger likens in 
his journal to the rr three shots a-day which the Spanish 
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army before Gibraltar 'fired for some time, and which 
the garrison called after ' The Trinity.' " 
The garrison of Hir&t possessed very few pieces of 
ordnance wherewith to return these boisterous compli- 
ments; but, happily for them, i t  was not until five 
months had elapsed that Persian self-conceit could 
bring itself to take council from the Russian officers 
by erecting regular breachiug batteries against par- 
ticular points of the fortifications. The situation of 
the defenders then became more critical, and Pot- 
tinger's professional abilities were called into constan 
The walls of NiriLt, as then existing, formed a large 
I quadrangle, enclosing a space of nearly one square mile, 
I being about one thousand six hundred yards long by one - thousand four hundred broad, each face having about 
thirty round bastions; those at the four angles sur- 
passing the rest in height and bulk ; a deep wet ditch, 
having a fausse-braye, surrounding the whole. The 
walls, which were from twenty-five to thirty feet high, 
stood on an elevated mound of earth, varying from 
forty to sixty feet above the level of the ground, and 
were of unburnt brick. There were five gates, each 
defended by a small outwork. On the north side stood 
the citadel, overloolcing the city and enclosed by lofty 
defences of a similar character, but in  a very dilapi- 
dated condition. The defenders of Hirht justly felt 
more faith in their double fausse-braye than in their 
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At length, on the 24th of June, the long-threat- 
ened assault took place, which was confidently 
expected to carry all before it. The Persian astro- 
logers, after closely consulting the stars, hacl predicted 
a signal triumph for their monarch on that day. The 
assaulting force was to  advance in  five divisions, 
each under its own independent commander. The 
Russian battalion formed the forlorn hope of one of 
them; but its leader (General BorowsBi) was shot 
down at the very first onset, and, by some accident, 
the men composing it contrived to get under the fire 
of the Persian batteries, in addition to the bullets 
and missiles of the Afghhils, and were obliged to 
beat a retreat, with a loss of four officers and two 
hundred and fifty men killecl and wouncled. Better 
success for some time seemcd in store for another of 
the storming columns, which actuallypenetrated the de- 
fences, ea-rrying all before it, but being feebly supported 
from behind, was again and again driven back, though 
more than once on the very verge of victory, but was 
as often baffled by the indomitable pluck of Eldred 
Pottinger, who, when dl seemed lost, drove the faint- 
hearted Ycih Muhammad beforc him to the rescue, as 
already related. ltussian accounts do not hesitate to 
give the young English officer full credit for the result, 
so triumphant to the Afghgns, so humiliating to their 
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opponents; and one of them adds, " Thc Sh&h was in 
a violent rage at the failure, and gave orders to encom- 
pass the placc with a high wall of mud, armed with 
2 
towers, in orcler to starve the garrison out." 
This desperate struggle was succeeded by a prolonged 
lull, duri~lg which famine and discord seemcrl but too 
likely to erect that wherein ordinary appliances of 
war had failed ; when at a most critical juncture, the 
ShAh took alas111 at some open Ilostilities of the British 
on the Pcrsian coast, and suddenly withdrew his forces, 
being careful, howcver, before his departure, to saw 
asunder the seventy-pounder guns which were to have 
accomplished such wonders, each weighing five tons, 
and which he was unwilling to leave bel~ind as an 
additional trophy for the now exulting 13ii3htis. 
As Eldred Pottinger, whom history will always 
celebrate as the " I-Iero of Hirht," was sul~sequcntly 
my honourcd friend and associate in the eventful 
episode of my own early experiences cluring the Kibul 
troubles, I have been unable to rcsist the temptation, 
at the risk of repeating what some may deem a tkrcad- 
bare tale, 01 entering into tlic above details (partly 
obtained from original sources) relating to the first 
great drama wherein he so conspicuously arid so 
honourably figured, and whereupon, in fact, the chief 
interest of the war was so long concentrated. Should 
any similar crisis occur, whether in India or elsewhere, 
let us hope that arlother such British hero as Eldred 
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Pottinger may as oyportui~ely start forth into the full 
blaze of fame, fired by his example, animated by his 
apirit, and as competent to uphold the glory of his 
conntry, and to disconcert the ambitious schcmes of 
its enemies. 
It is time I should now return to Lord Auclrland 
and his new project, whereby the future safety of our 
north-west frontier was to be secured against the desigps 
of linssian and Persian ambition. This 'consisted 
originally of a tri-partite trcaty, mherein the British 
Indian Government, ltanjit Singh, the ruler of the 
Panjiib, and Shhh Shujii, the long-dethroned monarch 
of AfghAnistAn, wcre the principal parties concerned. 
Thirty ycars had elapsed since the last-named person- 
age had been clriven froin his throne to find, d t e r  
some ycars of perilous adventure ip  Kashmir and the 
Panjiib, a hospiliable asylum in British territory; E~om 
which he twice issued forth at long intervals to engage 
in ineffectual efforts to regain his lost dominions. 
Meanwhile, Dost Muhammad, n younger brother of 
the murdered Path IChki, had risen to supreme power 
through his military ability and irrepressible force of 
character. Since 1826, he had contrived to hold his 
o w n  against all antagonists, and had, by his frank 
urbanity of demeanour, his aptitude for business, man- , 
liness, and uniform success in the attainment of his 
aims, acquired a strong hold on the hearts and minds 
of the great mass of the AfghSin people. Sh6h Shuj&, 
on the contrary, was remeinbered chiefly for the absence 
of all those high qualities as a mau and a ruler which 
shone so conspicuously in his rival ; ~ 0 1 %  was his return 
$0 power a subject of desire to any save a, few self- 
interested'.pa,rtizans and needy relativcs. I n  spite of 
these d~,awbaclrs, however, it had been determined by 
the British Inclian Goveruncnt to suit tlieir own policy 
by dispossessing the one and reinstating the other, 
without; any real deference to the wishcs and aspirations 
of the people most interested in  the mattcr. 
Accordingly, in a manifesto tlated tlle ].st October, 
1838, this new policy was publicly sct forth, whereby 
our Sikh ally, Ranjit Sin$, bcing " gu:~ranteed in his 
present possessions, bouncl himself to co-operate wit11 
the British for the restoration of SliB1.1 ShujB to the 
throne of his ancestors." On tlie 8th of November 
following, the news of the retircmcnt of the ~ers ians  
from Hirilt mas published by Qovemmcnt, but mas not 
allowed to alter the political programlnc which had 
been already cletermined, further tllail by causing a 
diminution of the numerical strerigtll of the British 
force to be employed, which. afforcled tllc Commaude~- 
in-Chief, Sir Hen17 Fanc, a prctest for withdrawing 
from i l ~ e  personal command of thc expcclition, the 
policy of which he had never npprovcd, his place being 
filled by Sir John Iceane. 
On the 10th Decembcr the I3engnl force, under Sir 
Willoughby Cotton, marched from Pnruzpur, proceed- 
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ing by the left bank of the river Satlaj to Rohri, where 
that river joins the Indus. Sh&h Shuji had already 
started in advance to Shik&pur, escorted by I-IindiistBni 
levies numbering six thousand men, raised and dis- 
ciplined by British officers for his special ,ser%ce. He 
was accompanied by Sir William MacNaghten, who 
had been appointed envoy and minister at his court, 
and who had been one of the chief promoters of the 
expedition. Another force, five thousand six hundred 
strong, moved from Bombay through Sindh to the 
I same point, whcre an admirable brid\gc of boats had 
been przpared by officers of the Bengal Engineers for 
the passage of the whole over the great river Indus. 
The entire invading force, when combined, amounted 
to twenty-one thousand, together with about Pour 
times that number of camp followers and upwards of 
thirty thousand camels. This long miscellaneous 
array, consisting of cavalry, infantry, artillery, with 
their attendant impedimenta of wheeled carriages and 
laden animals of every description, filed over the bridge 
in  perfect order, presenting a picturesque and memo- 
rable spectacle. 
Owing to  the undisguised dislike manifested by the 
Amirs of Sindh to the passage of so many British 
troops through their country, there seemed every pro- 
bability of hostilities breaking out in  that quarter at 
the very commencement of the campaign, which must 
necessarily have delayed the onward progress of the 
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army towards Afgh6nistfil~ ; but yielding to the force 
of circumstances, backed by the undeniable arguments 
of strong battalions eager for the plunder of the rich 
capitd of I-Iaidarrtib&d, they had the good sense to 
succumb before compromising themselves too far, 
although they thereby obtained but a brief respite 
from the hard and inevitable fate in store, and which 
overtook them about four years later. 
I t  is needless that 1 should dwell minutely on the 
military events of a campaign SO well known as that 
which replaced Shah Shujd on his throne ; but i t  may, 
nevertheless, be useful to glance, en passant, at  some 
of the physical difficulties which the country opposed 
to  thc passage of our army. ETaving safely crossed 
the Tndus, the vast invading host dragged its seemingly 
interminable length over one hundred and forty-six 
miles of dreary desert, bordering Biluchistfin on the 
east; and there many hundreds of poor horses, camels, 
and bullocks perisbed from weariness and thirst, leav- 
ing their skeletons to mark unmistakably to future 
travellers the traclr of the invaders. 
Then came the formidable B o l h  Pass, sixty miles 
i n  length, where fortnnately no enemy occupied the 
heights; although stragglers ran considerable risk from 
stray Bilu'chi robbers, ever on the match behind the 
rocks for passing prey. Here the animals suffered 
severely, and peiislaed by hundreds. Emerging from 
this dismal gorge into the lovely and inviting valley of 
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I Shawl, seemed like passing from purgatory to para- 
dise ; but here, owing partly to a scanty harvest and 
partly to the wanton devastation caused by some of 
the troops themselves, provisions re11 alarmingly short 
for so great a multitude, and famine prices prevailed. 
The neighbouring IChdn of Kal&t was suspected of 
aggravating these difficultics, and was marked for 
future punishment. 
Pushing on, therefore, with the least possible delay, 
the Khujalr Pass was reached, presenting a long suc- 
cession of steep and difficult ascents and descents, with 
some exceedingly narrow gorges wherc no draught 
cattle could work with eft'ect. The artillery, including 
a heavy battering-train, was therefore dragged up and 
> lowered down by the persevering manual labour of the 
Bnglish soldiers, occupying five days. The summit of 
the pass is scven thousancl four hundred and forty-nine 
feet above the sea. Here, too, much loss was sustained 
in commissariat baggage-animals, and mnch valuable 
property sacrificed in consequence. Portunately, the 
MghAns were too disunited among themselvcs to offcr 
any organized resistance, and the army reached ICanda- 
h6s on the 25th April, 1839, without any show of 
opposition. The Kandahh chiefs had fled for refuge 
to Pcrsia without striking a blom, and the inhabitants 
tendered thcir reluctant homage to the old monarch, 
mIlo was thus unceremoniously thrust upon them by 
foreign bayonets. 
On the 27th June died Ranjit Singh, the famous 
old " Lion of thc Panj$b," and our ally in the present 
expedition. On the self-same day Sir John Keane, 
leaving behind him a strong garrison at ICandahLr, and 
even the siege-train which had been brought so far 
with such heavy cost and labour, pursued his march to 
Ghazni, where he encountered his first openly defiant 
foe in the person of Prince Haidar, a son of Dost 
Muhammad, who, with a garrison of three thousand 
five hundred Afghsins, defended the fortress and 
citadel, which were of formidable strength aud suscep- 
tible of a prolonged defence. Now was discovered the 
extraordinary blunder that had been committed in  
leaving behind the battering-train, without the aid of 
which the risk of utter failure seemed imminent. At 
this crisis Major George Thomson, of the Bengal 
Engineers, came to the rescue with the happy proposal 
to blow open the only accessible gate with gunpowder. 
This was successfully accomplished in the partial 
obscnrity of early dawn by a party of sappers, headed 
by Lieutenant Durand, of the Bengal Engineers, who 
volunteered for the duty, and who survived the dan- 
gerous hazard to attain high rank and distinction among 
those illustrious soldier-statesmen whd have contri- 
buted so largely to the maintenance of our national 
honour in India.* 
+ He bec~mo wiiloly known to farno a8 Sir Henry Durand, and 
maa Governor of (;he Panjib, when an accidental death ovortook 
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The goveillor, ITai,id:lr Kliiiii, rrns tr~lrai prisoxicr, niicl 
such was the panic protlnccd :~nloiig tllc troo1)s of I)ost 
Ml~hxrnniad, wlio hail t:11~~11 up n 110siti(1n at :irgli:~~i~li 
to  clispute the British atlvnilce to  Ii:il)ul, tl~:it, nI):r~l. 
doning for the tirnc all liopc of n~aitltni~lilig his 
sovercignty, he fled with xhont two thousalid i'i~itliful 
adllercllts tomards B:imi:in. A scleot party of Ijritisli 
oftcers, licndecl by the since illustrious Outrinn,  lid CY- 
corted by two t l~ous:~l~d iifgllii~i liorvc u~ltler conlmarltl uf 
II t i j i  Iillliu I<:ilr:~r, a ilotorious t~~rrico:~t,  vol~~t i t t~r( :d  
t o  s t a r t  ill pu18snit, nu], pusliiiig tlloir w:ly lry ftrr(*ctl 
marches  over stupcndous mouuti~in p:~sscs, ul~lst Ililve 
ovcrtnkcn tlie fugitive Amir, cncui~il)~~rctl :ii; hc IV:LS 
wit11 liis fnniily niid bagg:lge, before lle 1*011ld rtl:lt*li 
, the fl+oiitiel; 1it~c1 riot tllc nforcvnitl " II;i,ji " ~jrovctl 
llimsclf a traitor, whose real ol)jact 7v:u tu illrow (wry 
obstacle in tlie may of tlieir progress a11d sltr*c.cb'-s. ' ~ ' I L I L ~  
Dost Muh:~min:icl csr:npccl to Tl~~klrLrii, not witllont tllc 
sympatliics oE niaily Uritisl~ Iit:nrts, lliitil t l ~ :  H . I I c ~ ~ I  uf 
l'ortunc sliould oncc morc giyfivc a rcvolutioii ill llis 
favour. 
On tile 6th of A u p s t ,  Slrilli Shiiji, nttc*~itlc'tl 1 1 ~  Sir 
WiIlia1,rn M:lcNaglltcn, :uid csc:ortcd 1 ) ~  thc2 Ikitish 
troops, lna(lc llis triuuq)lial entry irkto K:ibul, :~tltl t l ~ k  
up his nbotle in tile Bhli IIisCr, or iLoy:~l ('it:icicl, 
on thc 8th of Sc~)tciiibcr, IN: wils joinc'tl ~ J J '  l l i ~  
him, in the mid~t, of t ~ t l  tltioful CUIUOT that pnmlisc~d to  c-ulrnirunta in 
II stil l  lottior sghoro of mtion. 
eldest son, Prince Tim6.l; who hacl meanwhile pene- 
i trated tllrough the IChaibar Pass from PeshLvar, under 
1 
i 
the escort of a Sikh contingent furnished by Ranjit 
1 Singh, ancl under the political control of Colonel, after- 
I wards Sir Cla~lde, Wade, encountering but little oppo- 
sition. And thus was the first act of this wonclrous 
1 
, , 
drama of real life brought to a successf~ll tcrminntion. 
a 8 Sir Henry Pane, tllc experienced general .to whom 
the conduct of the Afghrin expedition had bcen origin- 
ally offered, hacl bcen also among the first to cautioll 
I~ol*cl Auclrland of tlie clangers and difficulties that 
would inevitably beset the British troops in that 
country after the first successful result shoulcl haye 
heen achieved. Sir VITilliam MacNnghten, the British 
envoy, upon whom the chief political management of 
affairs was thenceforth to fall, mas not long in expe- 
riencing the prophetic nature of that couilscl. It soon I became evident that Shill S h j 5  could only 11e main- 
I tained on his throne by the continued presencc of a - 
I British force. This was, however, recluuccd t o  a moicty 
I 
I by the return of nearly the whole Bombay and a por- 
I 
I tion of the Bengal divisions to India. Wit11 tlie latter 
I 
went Sir John Iccaue, soon to be made a pcer For thc 
I 
conquest of Ghazni, leaving Sir ~MrillongLby Cotton in 
I 
I chief command of the remaining troops across the 
I 
Indus, amounting to about ten thousand men, distri- 
buted over a wide extent 01 country, to garison the 
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protecting presence. Advantage was talren of the 
return 05 the Bombay column to punish Mihrjb ICh$n, 
the unluclcy IChh  of Icaliit, for his so-called refractory 
conduct, to which allusion has already been n~ade. EIe 
now offered a11 obstinate but ineffectual resistance to 
the attack on his stronghold, which was talcen by 
assault by General Wiltshire on the 15th October, 
wherein the brnve chief himself was killecl. His death 
must have occasioned somc pangs of remorse to Shrih 
Shujg, whom he had formerly befriended, in distress. 
The two years which followed the establishment of 
Sh611 Shujli at  K&hul mere chieily remarkable for the 
activity of our political officers, great and small, who 
were scattered far and wide over the land to assist in 
carrying out, as Far as in them lay, the policy of our 
Government, which secms to have mainly consisted in 
consolidating the power of the Shlih, and in extending, 
as Lord Auclcland himself expressed it, " the salutary 
influence of the British name.'-' The most prominefit 
of these political agents, both in ability ancl influence, 
were D'Arcy Todd at Hirlit; Rawlinson (now Sir 
Henry) and Leech ai  I<andldah&r; Eldred P o t t i n p  in 
ICoT~istrin; Macgregor (now Sir Qeorge) at JalllilfibBd; 
Arthur Conolly, on a special mission at Khukancl; 
and Sir Alexander Burnes at I<:ih111. But besides these 
was a host of minor stars, each of mliom added his 
vats to the grand morlc of "consolidation," which 
was not always synonymous with  pacification," and 
4 
very generally ended in carving out some active work 
for the military in his immediate vicinity. 
Foremost of those worthy of honourable mention 
was D'Arcy Todd, who had succeeded Pottinger as 
British representative at XIirht, on the departure of 
the latter to recruit his health after the siege. Of 
Todd's long series of political encounters with the 
arch-intriguer Ybr Muhammad, whose sole object 
seemed to be to extort money by working on our poli- 
tical fears and jealousies, I refrain from entering into 
the unedifying particulars ; but that which really 
formed the distinguishing feature of his mission to 
IIir&t was his successful effort to induce the k h ~ n  01
Iaaiva to set at liberty some four hundred and sixteen 
unfortunate Russian captives whose detention as slaves 
in Khaiva had been made a convenient and, i t  must 
be admitted, a perfectly just, prctexz By Russia for 
invading that country. This noble triumph of humanity 
and. of sound policy he accomplished by twice deputing 
a British officer, entirely on his own responsibility, to 
work on the fears and hopes of the Ichaivan chief. 
The negotiations auspiciously begun by James Abbott 
were judiciously followecl up and brought to a success- 
ful issue by Richmond Shakespear, both being at that 
time subalterns of the Bengd Artillery; and to the 
latter fell the enviable lot of escorting the whole party 
of emancipated cnptives to the Russian frontier at 
Oranburgh, where they were safely delivered over to 
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR. 5 1 
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the commandant for restoration to their friends. The 
Russians, not to be outdone in acts that grace hu- 
manity, restored to  the Khaivans me~chaadize valued 
at two millions sterling, and, more prccious than all 
beside, forty p~isoners, among whom were represen- 
tatives of the wealthiest families in  Ichaiva. Seldom, 
if ever, has a negotiation been effected in the Bast so 
creditable to all parties concerned; nor since the 
brightest days of chivalry have the honou3s of knight- 
hood which rewardcd Shalcespear been more worthily 
won. Sir Richmond Shakespear amply fillfilled the 
promise of his youth, and rose to high political position 
in India ; dying i n  1861. But James Abbott is still 
1 o the fore, with the rank of general ill the army, 
and during our subsequent struggles with the Sikhs 
in the Panjkb rendered eminently good service at 
a. critical period and in a manner well deserving 
of honourable remembrance. 
Thus thc Afgh5n campaign, with all its faults and 
drawbacks, bore some rcally good fruit, and evidenced 
in a remarkal~le manner what a store of excellent raw 
matdriel for the manufacture of heroes mcl statesmen 
had been previously lying dormant in the Indian army. 
I n  this respect, indeed; it may be said to have amalcened 
? $0 n e l ~  life the latent but laudable ambition of our 
officers, young and old, and to have transmitted a for- 
ward impulse even to the present gene~ation-an im- 
++ pulse which I earnestly hope may never cease,to operate 
4 *  
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for their own and the public good. Many remarkable the 
episodes, accompanied by gallant deeds and victorious of E 
issues, imparted an interest to t.he first year of our sudl 
occupation of Afghtinistjn, and the temporary success resc 
of our policy may be said to have reached its culmi- to n 
nating point on the defeat of Dost Muhammad at  
B&miAn, and his subsequent unconditional surrerlcler COUI 
on the 3rd November, 1840. As an old Bengal artil- sinc 
leryman, I cannot pass by in silence the successful 
'passage of Major GarbettJs troop of horse artillery 
over the stupendous passes of  hind^ Khush, at an We1 
altitude little below that of Mont Blanc, although the migl 
feat (of which we were then so proud) has very recently 
been creditably rivalled by some British batteries in 
Lord NapierJs glorious Abyssinian expedition. 
The year 1841 opener1 with a smiling prospect of 
peace and tranquillity, to  bc soon rudely disturbecl by 
rebellious risings in various directions. The faults of 
our policy nnd the real wealrness of our position began 
to grow more and more manifest to friends and foes. 
Had but ShAh Shujii, our puppet king, proved himself 
a proper man for the position into which we had thrnst 
him, all might have gone on swimmingly until such 
time as we could, with a goocl grace, have left him to 
the loyal care of his own subjects, with all the Cclat 
due to our own success and moderation. But his un- 
popularity naturally extended to us as his supporters, 





I its a 
L 









ycnr of our 
)mry Ejuccess 






i l l~~sl i ,  at an 
nlthollgh the 
very rc!ccntly 




Tilt? fi1ults of 
)o.ritiou l~cgnn 
11ds and foes. 
~ r o v c d  llii~lsclf 
MY: Ilnd thrnst 
lgly 1u~ti1 hucll 
;u lclt 11im to 
I all tl1a Iclat 
. 131it Iris uii- 
rlis ! i ~ i l ) ~ ) o r t ~ r ~ ,  
lfully blind to 
TEE FIRST AFQHAN WAB. 5 3 
the fact ; and, in the fulness of time, just as a winter 
of Siberian severity was setting in, the *popular volcano 
suddenly burst forth, and found us unprepared. The 
result is too well known and too bitterly remembered 
to need repetitioh here. I t  was my own youthful fate 
to be the first to narrate the dismal tragedy to my 
countrymen in all its miserable details. I have been 
since informed, by competent authority, that my 
humble volume had the unprecedented and perhaps 
unpardonable effect of depriving the great Duke of 
Wellington of a whole night's slumber; and severe 
might have been the penalty for the author (then only 
a youthful subaltern of artillery) had not his state- 
ments, wherein many unwelcome truths were faithfully 
though perhaps indiscreetly blurted out, been so abun- 
dantly confirmed by the concurrent testimony of trust- 
worthy witnesses as to have held their ground in the 
pages of history down to the present day. 
I have often since thought that perhaps too much 
importance has been attached to the Kibul disaster, 
viewed in  its military aspects. Politically and morally 
its awful lessons can never be over-rated, and cer- 
tainly shoulcl never be forgotten ; but regarded simply 
as a military discomfiture, it was in fact the result of 
o, surprise, somewhat like that whereby the celebrated 
Gulliver found himself tied and bound during sleep, 
and at the mercy of the Lilliputians. We English 
I went on slumbering contentedly, as though the 
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Afghjns, whose country we had so coolly occupied, 
mere our very best f~<ends in the world, and quite con- 
tent to be om obedient servants to boot, until one cold 
morning in November we woke up to the unpleasant 
sounds of bullets in the air, and an infuriated peopleJs 
voices in  revolt, like'. the great oceanJs distrwlt, angry 
roar, in a rising tempest. The best troops and the 
ablest generals in the world must ever find themselves 
placed at a great disadvantage under such circum- 
stances. I t  should always be remembered that our 
minter supplies of food, and firewood, and forage, had 
not yet been laid in; that the few daysJ supply' in 
store was indifferently and fell an easy prey 
I 
j to the enemy before we had quite recovered our senses 
from the first scare of our rudeawakening; that thence- 
forward we had to turn out and fight daily against 
greatly superior numbers, backed by the strong forts 
wherewith the U b u l  valley was studded, and which 
latter we had to batter and carry by storm one after 
the other, in order thereby to obtain the needful 
supplies for our daily wants ; so that, while our position 
was in a general sense defensive, we were obliged, in 
point of fact, to act continually on the offensive, 
which we nevertheless contrived to do with success 
until such time as w e .  had exhausted the supplies laid 
I ~ I  in the forts mithin our reach. Then, indeed, our 
position became, for the first time, hopeless ; for even 
soldiers cannot sustain life on cannon balls and leaden 
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bullets; and so it came to pass that our destiny became 
eventually dependent on the persuasive powers of our 
political officers in their attempts to treat with wily 
and embittered Afghkn chiefs. 
And this induces me to say that my own historical 
recollections and experiences have not impressed me 
with a profound confidel~ce in the efficacy of mere 
diplomacy, conducted by even the most talented an$ 
sagacious of political agents, with Oriental potentates. 
These latter are far greater proficients than oursclves 
in that peculiar use of language which consists in 
successfully " concealing the thoughts ; j J  and I entirely 
coincidc with the view taken of snch matters by the 
honest artillery gunner who was overheard, during 
one of our Indian campaigns, to say to a comrade, 
while pointing cxultipgly to  a ficld battery of big guns 
d~tawn by elephants, " I say, Bill ! Tl~em's the Politicals 1" 
At all events, matters fared very badly with us at  
K6bd when the arguments of big guns ceased to 
prevail: and we were soon made to experience the 
truth long ago enunciated by the old Roman poet :- 
"Donee eris felix multos numerabis amicos, 
Tempora si fuerinti nubile, sohls eris ! " 
While, therefore, I freely concede all clue honour 
to  the  ilIustrious garrisons of Kandahr  and JaUAl&b&d, 
which, under Nott and Sale, so gallantly held those 
important posts against all opponents during the revolt, 
I claim for the defenders of K6;bul that fair allowance 
sllould be for t he  serious disadvantages under 
which they struggled f rom the very first, and beneath 
which they succullfiecl, SO far at least as 
to become the unconsenting victims of a hollow treaty 
formed with the assasvin of our envoy-a trenty whose 
sole object on his pa r t  was to our garrison I 
outside of its defences in to  those savage and formidable 
passes which form the highway from Ic6bul to PeshAwar, 
and t~eachery, cold, and famine woulcl, they I 
well lmew, effectuaIly combine for its destruction. 
Still, their triumph was but of brief duration:-a few I 
short sufficed t o  place IChbul again i n  our 
possession. Sir George Yolloclr, with his noble army 
of retiibution, amply retrieved past disasters, and 
happily effected the liberation of those British captives 
(myself included) who had meanwhile beell the un- 
waling recipients of rough AfghLn hospitality-some- 
times confined closely to  lofty forts, sometimes hurried 
about from spot to spot on thc baclcs of horses and 
camels in narrow valleys, as nomaclic wandere~s amid 
precipitous mountain-passes ; lodging the while in 
such mde huts as they could construct for themselves 
from the branches of juniper bushes, or in  the mud 
hovels of the primitive inhabitants ; sometimes treated 
with friendly deference, at others mith systematic 
rudeness ; and finally, when General Polloclr approached 
Khbul, forced t o  fly, escortecl by a strong guard of 
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leading to Kullum, in Uzbeg Tartary, across which 
Major Garbett had in  happier times, as previously re- 
lated, dragged his horse-artillery guns. Had we once 
got into the clutches of the Uzbegs, I opine this chap- 
ter would never have been mitten, but, in a happy 
moment of inspiration, my old hero Pottinger (for he' 
was of the party) betook to mesmcrising our keeper with 
the prospect of a sufficiency of gold to keep him in 
comfort for the remainder of his life; and one fine 
morning, in  the valley of Brimitin, within sight of those 
gigantic images cut in  the perpendicular rock which 
excite the wonder of travellers, we found ourselves all 
at  once in the position of free agents. Gcneral Pollock, 
learning how affairs stood, despatched Sir Richmond 
Shakespear to our aid with six hundred I<azzilbbsh 
horsemcn from KAbbul; and thus the latter officer 
enjoyed once more the triumph and e'clat of talring a 
conspicuous part in  proclaiming "liberty to the cap- 
tivcs;" his own countrymen and countrywomen being 
this time the favoured objects of his zeal. 
Khbul reconqucrea, me might possibly have maintained 
our military hold upon AfghAnistin even to the present 
day; but our game there had been played out. Shhh 
Shnj.jb was dead, having been bascly murdered by one 
of his own trusted followers about two months after 
the  British retreat from his capital. There was no 
longer any objcct to gain by remaining against the 
 shes of the people, whilst the drain upon our Indian 
financcs caused by this war h'ad already swelled the 
public cleht by fifteen millions, and evcry month's delay 
threatened but to accelerate our financial ruin. Lord 
Ellenborough, therefore, wisely determined t o  evacuate 
the country, and to restore the exiled Amir Dost Mu- 
hammad Kh;in; an act of retributive justice which we 
have never hacl cause to ivcpent ; for he proved himself 
a most able and politic ruler till his death, which took 
place so  late as June $863. 
No one now doubts that our position i n  AfghinistAn 
was a false one-and fiaught with danger in Inore 
ways than one. Apprehensive of Russiati aggression 
and intrigue, and counting on the fears and forbearance 
of our powerful neighbours and rivals, the Sikhs, we 
had the temerity to march an army past their country 
into the wild and unknown regions of Mgh~inistiin, 
niid thus to risk our force being cut off from its base 
of operations, and from its nearest available supports; 
and although no such catastrophe actually occurred, 
and temporary success attended the hap-hazard inva- 
sion of a friendly country, still we eventually were 
taught a lesson in the school of adversity which ought 
assuredly to su6Eice as a salutary caution i n  the future. 
But matters have meanwhile become very much 
altered for the better on our north-western frontier. 
The great Sikh army no longer exists ; and British 
rule extends throughout the PaqjAb, even up to the 
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Otlr ncrrtli-wrstcrII frontier is by nature One of the 
rtrungcst ill tllr ~ , r l d ,  being -protcctcd along its 
llagtll 11y tllp ;.rp;lt ;uld r:~pid r i v e r  Indus, which 
\rulil(l, of ~cjlir~p, in pusc of necess i ty ,  be 
p~~ : i~~ lc t l  at its few ~~sr:iilallle p o i n t s  ; whilst imme- 
rli:ltuly bcyO1ld it* b;lllkr l ie  the mountains 
-1kliblisti11, oaly t(1 flcb penctrnted by  a few foymidable 
tlrtilcs, ~r.Iiiclll we ctrol(l occupy on ve1.y s h o r t  notice, 
:mtl saf(:lp hit1 ~ l ~ f i ; L l l ~ ~ :  to : L I ~  comem. The S ulsimhn- 
r:nlgc runs i ica;~~l~ p:rr;llIcl with the ~ndus ,  and its 
average 1ic)iglit iq :lilont the same as that of t h e  Py- 
rcmtw, tlic ltrfty l,(*;iks attaill ing from s i x  thousand  t o  
elcvnt t1101iv:i11(1 fiytl I l l l l \ d r~d  feet;. To these natural 
d c f t ~ ~ ~ c s  111:ty 1~ :~cl(led t hose  va s t  d e s e r t  t r a c t s  that 
bortlcr our possrr.qions ill S in t lh  c ro s sed  by our army in  
1888, :tntl of wllicoh I I1:rve d r c a d y  g i v e n  some account; 
:tlld mlirri, ill ~dd i t i o i~  to a11 ~ E ~ C S C  obstacles to  t h c  pro- 
gress of m~ i ~ i v n d i ~ i ~  army, me t a k c  into consideration 
tllc imlilciisc fiicilities at o u r  d i sposa l  for concentrat ing - 
trool~s :111tl munitions of w a r  by river ,  r oad ,  and rail, 
~ t y ,  at ally partioulnr p o i ~ l t  of attnclr,  of which we 
must nccess:~rily have nrnple means of ascertaining 
snficiently bet'urehnntl t o  afford ample time for prepa- 
ration, arid the stro~ig British rcserves w h i c h  could so 
rratlily 1)e pourcd in by sea f r o m  our vkious colonies, 
I ea1111ot briug lllysclf to believe that any Russian 
gcuerfilwould risk his own and his coun t ry ' s  reputation 
in any such Quixotic a d v e ~ t u r e .  
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But it may be urged that Russia might possibly 
count on the near approach of her army being the 
signal for a general revolt and rising among our own 
native soldiers ancl subjects. If so, I firmly believe 
she would reckon without her host. The character of 
Russian rule, as popularly described, has not failed to 
reach the ears of the inhabitants of India, who are 
gencrally very shrewd judges of their own worldly 
interests ; and when the question merely turned on a 
change of European masters, I believe their answer 
would be somewhat similar to that given by our own 
Charles ,II. to his brother James, when the latter re- 
1 I
i monstrated with the former for heedlessly exposlng 
his life by walking unguarded about the London parh.  
" Brother," rcplied the merry monarch, "don't distress 
yourself ! Rest assured that my subjects will never 
take my life to make you king ! " It may suffice to 
recur to the formidable Sikh invasion of 1845-46, and 
our subsequent desperate struggles with that nation in 
1848-49, which offered such favourable opportunities 
to our native subjects for revolt, had any such disposi- 
tion been widely prevalent; yet, even with such tempt- 
ing opportunities, they remaincd perfectly quiescent. 
No stronger proof could bc required that, for the mere 
alternative of a change of masters (and that a change 
for the worse), an insurrectionmy movement, as an 
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It cannot, however, be denied that the Russian pro- 
gress in  Central Asia since the Crimean war, and espe- 
. cially during the last' ten years,'has been of a startling 
and even of an aggressive character, so far as British 
India is concernecl. But the conditions of warfare nnd 
the ca$acity of India to resist an invader have mate- 
rially altered since Tim& and B6bar obtained their 
easy tl-iumphs, at the head of rude, undisciplined 
T&t&r hordes. They had no siege guns, mith their 
cumbrous appendages of heavy ordnance-stores, to 
impede their progress across the long succession of 
mountain ranges that intervene between Central Asia 
ventnre to predict a successful issue to any modern 
invading force from that quarter must altogether 
ignore or undervalue not only the formidable physical 
clifficulties but also the strength and efficiency of our 
I 
I magnificent army in India, which I believe to be more 
i than a match for the best troops that' could be brought 
into the field against us. 
To attack a country so situated, with any chance of \ I
success, an overwhelming force would be necessary, 1 
1 
I accolnpanied by heavy artillcry, and with supports and 
1 arsenals within moderate clistancc in its rear. But it 
I has been well said by an able miter  in the "Edinburgh I '  
Review," when referring to the clifficulty of conducting I 
military operations in AfghSnisttin : " Take a small 
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scrupulous and restless ambition wherewith Russia is 
accredited by the world at large, it may be fairly ad- 
mitted, on the other hand, that the legitimate objects 
of opening out nem sources of commerce, and its atten- 
dant civilized advantages, are suficienily worthy in 
themselves to enlist our sympthy as the consistent 
discount than in the savage wilds aud among the cruel 
slave-mnlring Khanates of Central Asia. 
With these advantages secured, and with the in- 
creased protection to life and property which the con- 
tinued presence of a dominant civilized power cannot 
I fail t o  realize, it may be confidently expected (and we a '  
English should rejoice in the expectation) that the 
long-dormant, though fertile resources of BukhRrri, 
Sama~lmnd, Rhnks~nd, and neighbouzing states, will be 
rapidly developed, and therewithnl open out new fielcls 
for enterprise and new triumphs for civilization. 
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CHAPTER 111. 
CONDITION OF ADGHANISTAN I N  1841. - FIRST SYilfPTON8 
O P  DISTUBBANCE. - EXPEDITION TO TITP ZURNAT 
VALLEY.-ARRIVAL OF MUHARUEAD AKDAR KHAN AT 
BATYTIAN.-FORCE O P  TIIE PAS8 AT BUTA-I-KHAlI. - 
TREACRERY OF HAMZA KHAN.-PERSONAL DIELIKE O F  
EUROPEANS EVINCED BY THE AFGHANS. - DURCH O F  
GENERAL SALE NO GANDAMAE. - INSURI%ECTION AT 
KABUL. 
WHEN M~jor-General Elphinstone assumed the com- 
mand of the troops in AfghBnistiin in April, 18-41, the 
country enjoyed a state of apparent trallquillity to 
which it had for many years been a stranger. This 
remark applies more particularly to those povinces 
which lie north-eaet of Ghazri, comprehending Ktibul 
proper, Kohist An, Jall616bbBd, and the neighbouring 
districts. The Ghdd tribes, occupying a large portion 
of the country between Ghazni and 'Kandahdr, had . 
* 5 
never been prope~bly subdued, and the permanent occu- 
pation of ICalivt-i-Ghalzi by our troops hacl so alarmed 
their jealous love of independence, as to cause, during 
the months of JuIy and August, a partial rising of the 
tribes, which, however, the valour of our I-IindristBni 
troops under Colonel Wymer at Haft-asir, and of the 
5th Bengal Cavalry under Colonel Chambers at Mulriir, 
speedily suppressed. Some of the principal chiefs 
delivered themselves up as hostages, and quiet was 
restored. To the west of ICandahsir, a notorious bee- 
booter, named Nrtar KMn, having collected about 
seven thousand followers, horse and foot, was signally 
defeated ncar Girishk, on the banks of the I-Ifrmand, 
in the month of July, by a dctacl~ment of the Sh6hJs 
regular troops under Captain Woodburn, consisting of 
only one infantry regiment, two horse-artillery guns, 
.under Lieutenant Cooper, besides two regiments of 
Janbliz, or Afgh&n horse : the lattcs, however, behaved 
ill, and can hardly be said to have sham& in the glory 
of the unequd conflict. Captain Grifiin, with the 
Bengal 2nd Native Infantry, was, a few days after, 
equally successful in an attack on the enemy in the 
same quarter. Alrtar KhBn fled to the hills with n 
few followers, and the land again enjoyed repose. 
ICohisthn, whose vild and turbulent chiefs had sturdily 
maintained their independence against the late ruler, 
Dost Muhammad Khhn, seemed at last to have settler1 






























adapted for malring a protracted defence, as was after- 
wards proved. The Major was, however, considered in 
the light of an alarmist, and he only succeeded in pro- 
curing a fern H6zirbish horsemen and a 17-pounder 
gun, with a small detachment of the ShfihJs Artillery, 
and a. very scanty supply of ammunition. 
About the end of September, Major Pottinger came 
to  X6bul for the purpose of impressing on the Envoy 
tha t ,  unless strong measures of pl-evention were specdily 
adopted, he considered a rise in ICohistiin as in the 
highest degree probable. His apprehensions were con- 
sidered by the Envoy as not altogether unfounded, and 
he was ernpoweyecl to retain as hostages the sol~s of the 
leading cl~iefs whose fidclity he suspccted. The first 
interruption to the state of outward tranquillity, which 
I have described above, occulrred early in September. 
Captain I-Iay, in colnmalld of some 13Bzirb5shesJ and 
Lieutenant Maule, with his Kohistiini regiment (which 
bad been relievcd at ChjLl'ikir by the Giirlrah, or 4th 
Regiment, Sh,ihJs Subsidized Force, officered from thc ' 
line, under Captain Codrington), and two 6-pounder 
guns, had been sent into the Zurrnat vallcy to collect 
t h e  annual rcvenue, with orders likewise to make an 
a t tempt  to seize cci-tain noted plunderers, among whom 
were some of the murderers of Colonel I'erring; who 
had long infested the road bctween Ghazni and ICgbul. 
The revenue was in the course of being quietly paid, 
w h e n  Captain Hay was mischievously informed by * Nov 
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Mull6 Mumin, collector of revenue in Zurmat (who 
shortly after distinguished himself as one of our bit- 
terest foes), that the men whom he wished to seize 
were harboured in a certain neighbouring fort of no 
strength whatever, and that the inhabitants would 
doubtless give them up rather than risk a rupture 
with the Government. Captain Gay immediately pro- 
ceecled thither, but found the place much strongcr 
than he had been led to expect, and the people obsti- 
nately prepared to resist his demands. 01 approach- 
ing the fort he was fired upon; and finding the 
6-pounder shot, of which he gave a few rounds in 
retu~n,  made no impression on the mud walls, he had 
no alternative but to retrcat. 
Thc Envoy, on receiving Captain Hay's report, 
immediately despatched a sufficient force to punish the 
rebels. I t  consisted of two hundred of Her Majesty's 
44th Infantry, 5th Native Infantry, 6th Regiment 
Shah's Subsidized Force, four guns of Abbot's battery, 
two iron 9-pounders Mountain Train, two companies 
of Slifih's Sappers, and two squadrons of Anderson's 
Home. These were under the command of Lieutenant- 
Coloncl Oliver, and werc accompanied by Captain G, 
13. Macgregor,* the political agent at Gandkmak, who 
happened to be then at Kkbul on business. The force 
commenced its march on the 27th September, and 
* Now Major-General Sir George H. Maagregor, K.C.B. 
reached the Zurmat valley without the slightest inter- 
ruption. On the approach of our troops the rebels had 
fled to the hills in the greatest consternation, leaving 
their forts at our mercy. The principal strongholds 
were destroyed with powder, and the force to 
return to Ickb~~l.  
Meanwhile the hydra of rebellion had reared i ts  bead 
in another far more formidable quarter. Ear ly  in  
October three Ghalzi chiefs 01 note suddenly quitted 
Khbul, after plundering a rich k&fila at Tiein, and took 
up a strong position in the difficult defile of IChurd- 
Ktibul, about ten miles from the capital, thus blocking 
up the pass, and cutting off our communication with 
Hindfistfin. Intelligence had. not very long previously 
been received that Muhammad Akhar IChiin, second 
son of the ex-ruler Dost Muhammad KhAn, had arrived 
at B6miin f ~ o m  Kllulum for the s~~pposed purpose of 
carrying on intrigues against the Government. It is 
remarkable that he was nearly connected by marriage 
with Muhammad Sh6h IChh and Dost Muhammad 
Khgn,* also Ghalzis, who almost immediately joined 
the above-mentioned chiefs. IXuhammad Akbar had, 
since the deposition of his father, never ceased t o  
foster feelings of intense hatred towards the Englisll 
nation ; and, though often urged by the fallen ruler  t o  
deliver himself up, had resolutely preferred the life of 
* Thi8 ohiof mu8t not be oonfounded with the ex-ruler of tho 
same name. 
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yhtest inter- a houseless exile to one of mean dependence on the 
e rebels had bounty of his enemies. I t  seems therefore in the 
;ion, leaving highest degrce probable that this hostile movement on 
strongholds the part of the Eastern Ghalzi's was the result of his 
prepared to influence over them, combined with other causes which 
will be hereafter mentioned. Tlie march of General 
,red its head Sale's brigade to their viriter quarters at JallLlfibbLd, 
, Early ill and ultimately to India, had only been deferred until 
enly quitted the r e t u ~ n  of the force from Zu~mat,  but was now 
in, and toolc hastened in consequence of this unwelcome news. On 
of IChurd- the 9th October the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, 
LUS blocking under Colonel Monteath, C.13., onc hundred of the 
 cation with ShQIJs Sappers, under Captain G. BToad£ootJ a squa- 
; previously dron of the 5th Cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, and 
hfLn, second two guns of Captain Abbot's battery, under Lieutenant 
had arrived Dawes, were sent on in advance to the entrance of the 
purpose of pass at Biita-i-lrhAk, where, on the following night, they 
nent. I t  is were attacked by a large number of rebels, who, taking 
by marriage advantage of the high ground and deep ravines in  the 
Muhammad neighbourhood of the camp, maintained a sharp fire 
ately joined upon them f or several l~ours, by which thirty-five Sepoys 
Akbar had, were killed and wounded. 
r ceased to On the morning of the 11th General Sale marched 
the English from Kcibul with ZIer Maj estyJs 13th Llght Infantry 
len ruler to to join the camp at B6ta-i-lrh&l~, and on the following 
1 the life of morning the whole proceeded toforce the pass of Khurd- 
r-ruler of tho K6bd. Intelligence had been received that the enemy, 
besides occupying the heights of this truly formidable 
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defile, which in many places approach to  within fifty 
yards of each other, rising up almost perl~elldicularl~ to
an elevation of five hundred or six hundred feet, had 
erected a sunga, or stone breastwork, in tlie nayrowest 
part of tlie gorge, flanked by a strong tower. The 
advance guard, consisting of the Shbh's Sappers, a 
company of I-Ier Majesty's 13th Foot, another of the 
35th Native Infantry, and two guns urlder Lieutenant 
Dawes, was met about midway through the pass, which 
is nearly five miles long, by a sharp and continued 
discharge of jaz6ils from the strong posts of the 
enemy. This was returned by our men with precision 
and effect, notwithstancling the disadvantages of their 
situation; flanking parties gallrtlltly strngglecl up the 
height to dislodge the enemy from thence, while the 
Sappers rushed on to  destroy the above-mentioned 
breastwork. Through this, however, the stream which 
flows down the midcue of the defile had already forced 
a passage, and, as the enemy abandoned it, as well as 
the flanking towel-, on the approach of OIIP troops, 
Lieutenant Dawes passed his guns through the interval 
at  fu l l  speed, getting them under the shelter of a rock 
beyond the sustained and muTclerous fire of the I 
enemy's jaziiilchis, i t  being impossible to elevate the 
guns sufficiently to bear upon them. The flanlters did 
their duty nobly, and the fight had lasted for about 
half an hour, during which the conduct of the Sh&hJs . 
Sappers, under Captain Broadfoot, wks creditable i n  
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1 tllc iiarrowest 
g ~OWCI'. The 
~ 1 1 ' ~  Sq1per8~ a 
:111otl1cr of the 
1tlcr Lieutenant 
tlkc ~ C L S S ,  which 
:nit1 continued 
pu"s of the 
I wit11  recision 
.l~t:~gcs of their 
nrgglcil up the 
~ t l ( ~ c ,  while the 
bovc-mentioned 
ic btrcam which 
I :~lreuily forced 
ctl it, as well ns 
of o11r troops, 
1 1 ~ 1 1  the interval 
hclttv of a rock 
I I R  fire of the 
to clcvate the 
I'hc fi:rnlccrs did 
ttitarl for about 
t of thc ShEhJs 
LH creditable in 
the highest degree, when the approach of the main 
column, under General Sale, who had been already 
shot through the leg, enabled Captain Seaton* of the 
35tli Regiment, who commandccl the advance guard, to 
push on. This he did, running the gauntlet to the end 
of the pass, by which time the enemy, fearful of being 
talren in rear, abandoned thei~. position and retired 
towards IChabar-i-JabAr, on thc road to Tizin. The 
35th Regiment, ShdllJs Sappess, Lieutenant Dames's 
guns, and a party of HRzirb&sh under Captain Trevor, 
encamped at Ichurd-ICkbd, I-Ier Majesty's 13th Light 
Infantry returning to Bdta-i-lrhbk. During their 
return, parties who still lurlred among the rocks fired 
upon the column, thereby doing some mischief. 
I n  these positions the divided force remained en- 
camped for several days, awaiting the return to K4bul 
of the troops from Zwmat. During this time several 
shab-khtins, or night attacks, were made on the two 
camps, that on the 35th Regiment at Khurd-IC4bul 
being peculiarly disastrous from the treachery of the 
Afghzin IIorse, who admitted the enemy within their 
lines, by which our troops were exposed to a fire from 
the least suspected quarter : many of our gallant 
Sepoys and Lieutenant Jenlrins thus met their death. 
On the 20th October General Sale moved with his" , 
force to 1Chul.d-1C6bbulJ having been previously joined 
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by the 37th Regiment under Major Griffiths, Captain 
Abbot's guns, tlie Mountain Train under Captain 
Backhouse, one hundred of Anderson's Irregular Horse 
under Lieutenant Mayne, and the remainder of the 
Shdh's Sappers and Miners. About the 22nd the 
whole force there assembled, with Captain Macgregor, 
political agent, marched to Tisin, encountering much 
determined opposition on the road. 
By this time it was too evident that the whole of 
the eastern Ghalzis had risen in  one common league 
against us. Their governor, or viceroy, EIuruza KhLn, 
had in the interval gone forth under pretence of 
bringing, back the chiefs to their allegiance; on his 
return, however, which took place nearly at the time 
at which General Sale marched from Khurd-Kkbul, 
I the treacherous nature of his proceedings had been 
i discovered, and he was placed by the ShLh in confine- 
ment; he had been suspected, indeed, before. General 
Sale remained at Tizin until the 26th October. 
I t  must be remarked that, for some time previous to 
these overt acts of rebellion, the always strong and ill- 
repressed personal dislike of the Afghjns towards I 
Europeans had been manifested in a more than usually \ 
open manner in and about Kgbul. Officers had been 
insulted and attempts made to assassinate them. TWO 
Europeans had been murdered, as also several camp 
followers ; but these and other signs of the approach- 
ing storm had unfortunately been. passed over as mere 
I 
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as also several camp 
gns of the approach- 
passed over as mere 
ebullitions of privatc angry feeling. This illcredulity 
and apathy is the more to be lamented, as it was prclty 
well known that on the occasion of the sAn2i-lch6nin, or 
first night attack on the 35th Native Infantry at 
B6ta-i-khBk, a large portion of our assailants consisted 
of the armed retainers of the different men of consc- 
quence in ICAbul itselfJ large parties 01 whom had 
been seen proceeding from the city to the scene' of 
action on the evening of the attacl~, and afterwards 
returning. Although these men llad to pass cithcr 
through the hcart or round the skirts of o u ~  cam11 at 
Siygh Sang, it was not deeined expedient even to ques- 
tion them, far less to detain thcm. 
On the 26th October, General Sale started in the 
direction of Gandhmalr,-Captain Macgregor, political 
agent, having, du~ing the halt at Tizin, half frightened, 
half cajoled, the refractory Ghalzi chiefs into mliat the 
sequel proved to have been a most hollom tiuce; for 
the term tqseaty can scarcely be applied t o  any agrce- 
ment made with men so proverbially treacherous as tlzc 
whole race of AfghLns haye proved themselves to be 
h o m  our first knowledge of their existence up to thc 
present moment. Of the difficulties experienced by 
General Sale during his ma~ch  to Gandbmalc, 'md of 
the necessity which induced him subsequently to push 
on to Jallhlkbbftd, the public are awwe. On the day of 
his departure from Tisin the 37th Native Infantry, 
three companies of the Shh11's Sappers, unde~ Captain 
Walsh, and three guns of the Mountain Train, under 
Lieutenant Green, retraced their steps towards Kgbul, 
and encamped at Ichabar-i-Jabhr, to wait as an escort 
to the sick aud convalescent. The Sappers continued 
their march back to Kibul unopposed; the rest re- 
mained here unmolested until the 1st November, when 
they brolre ground for IZhurd-Icibul. I-Iere, in the 
afiernoon of the 2nd, Major Griffiths, who commanded 
the detachment, received a peremptory order from 
General Elphinstone to force his way without loss of 
time to I<ibud, where the insurrection had already 
broken out in all its violence. Wliile striking his 
camp he was attacked by the mountaineers, who now 
I 
. began to assemble on the neighbouring heights in great 
i" numbers, and his march through the pass from Bfita-ib khik to I<ibul was 'one continued. conflict, nothing 
I saving him from heavy loss but the steadiness ahd 
gallantry of his troops, and the excellence of his own 
dispositions. He arrived in  cantonments before day- 
brealr on the morning of the 3rd November. 
The two great leaders of the rebellion were Amin- 
ullah Khin, the chief of Logae, and Abd-ullah KhGn, 
Achakzoe, a chief of great influence, and possessing a 
large portion of the Pishin valley. 
Amin-ullah I<h,in had hitherto been considered one 
of the staunchest friends of the existing Government ; 
and such was the confidence placed in  him by the 
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Humza IChfin, the lately superseded governor of the 
Ghalzis, as a prisoner to Ghazni. This man now 
distinguished himself as onc 01 our most invetey?te 
enemies. To illustrate the character of his coadjutor, 
Abd-ullah IChgn, i t  will be sufficient to relate the follow- 
ing anecdote. I n  order to  get lid of his elcler brother, 
who stood betweeu him and the inheritance, he caused 
him to be seized and buricd up to the chin in the earth. 
A rope was then fastened round his neck, anrl to the 
encl. of it was haltered a wilcl horse : the animal was 
then driven round in a circle, until thc unhappy 
victim's head was twisted from his shoulders. This 
same man is also mentioned in terms of just abhorrence 
by Captain A. Conolly in his Travels. 
But though the tmo above-named chiefs took a 
leading part in the rebellion, there can bc little doubt 
that it had its origin in the deep offence given to the 
Ghalzis by the ill-advised reduction of their annual 
stipcnds-a measure wliich had appa~ently been forccd 
upon Sir William ~ a c n a g h t e n  by the pecuniary ne- 
cessities of the king. This they considered, and with 
somc show of justice, as a breach of faith on the part 
of our Government: at  all events, that was swely 
mistalten economy which raised into hostility men 
whose determined spirit under a sense of wrong the 
following anecdote may illustrate. When oppressed 
by NBdir Sh&, the Ghdz? tribes, rather than succumb 
to the tyrant's will, took refuge in the mountains 
amidst the snow, where with their families they fed for 
months on roots alone: of these they sent a handful 
to Nidir, with the message, that, so long as such roots 
could be procured, they would contillue to resist his 
tyranny. Such were many of the men now leagued 
together by onc common feeling of hatred against us. 
A passage occurring in a posthumous memormidum 
by the Envoy, now in Lady Macnaghten's possession, 
requires insertion here. 
"The immediate cause of the outbreak in the 
capital was a seditious letter addressed by Abcl-ullah 
I<h$n to severd chiefs of influence at IGibul, stating 
that i t  was the design of the Envoy to scize and send 
them d to London ! The principal rebels met on 
the previous night, and, relying on the inflammable 
feelings of the people of I<&bul, they pretended that 
the king had issued an o~der  to put all infidels to death; 
having previously forged an order from him for our 
destruction, by the common process of washing out 
the contents of a genuine paper, with the exception 
of the seal, and substituting their own wiclred inven- 
tions.') 
Such at least is the gcne~ally received version of 
the story, though persons are not wanting who would 
rashly pronounce the king guilty of the design imputed 
to him. 
But, howevcr that may be, i t  is certain that the 
events which I have already narrated ought to have 
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lty of the design imputed 
:, it is certain tk5t the 
narrated ought to 11ave 
been enough to  arouse the authorities from their blind 
security. It ought, homevey, to be statcd that, alarmed by 
certain symptoms of disaffection in different parts of the 
country, ancl conscious of the inadequacy of the means 
he then possessed to  quell any cleterini~ied and general 
insurrection, Sir William had, a fern months previously, 
required the peesencc of several inore regiments: 
he .was, liowcver, induced to  cancel this wise precau- 
tionmy measure. But, even hacl this aclditiond force 
arrived, i t  is next to certain that tlie loss of British 
honour, subsequently sustained, co~~lcl only ]lave beeu 
deferred for a period. A fearfully sevcre lesson was 
necessa1-g t o  rcmove the veil from the cyes of tllosc 
who, drawing their conclusions from their wishes, 
2"ould consider Afgh5nist:in as a settled country. 
It is but justice to  Sir IVillimn MaenngMen to say 
that such recommendations from him as mere ineom- 
patible with the retrenching system were not rcccived 
at head-quarters in  n way encouraging to him as a 
public officer. 
CHAPTER IV. 
POPULAR OUTBREAK I N  XABUL. -MURDER OX SIR ALEX- 
ANDER BURNIS.-UNHAPPY WANT OF PROMPTITUDI I N  
CHECZING THE IZIBELLION. -ATTACK ON CAPTAIN 
LAWRENCIE AND LIEUTENANT 6TURT.-CHARACTER OF 
C+JjlNB.RAL ELPEINST0NE.-UNMILIThnY POSITION AND 
c'oNsTRU~TION OF TIIB OANTONMENT AT KABUL. 
ATovember Snd, 1841.-AT an early hour this morning 
the startling intelligence was brought from the city 
that n popular outbrealc had talcen place; that the 
shops were all closed ; aud that a general attaclrhad been 
made on the houses of all British officers residing in 
KBbul. About 8 A.M. a hurried note was received by 
thc Envoy in cantonments from Sir Alexander Burnes,* 
stating that the minds of the people had been strongly 
# Tho Envoy livod in tho oankonmont, and sir A. Burues in the 
aity. 
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excited by some mischievous reports, b u t  expressing a 
hope that he should succeed in quelling t h e  commotion. 
hbout  9 A.M., however, a mmow was circulated, which 
afterwards proved but too well founded, tha t  Sir Alex- 
ander had been murdered, and Captain .Johnson's 
treasury plundered. Flames were now seen to issue 
from that part of the city where they dwelt, and it was 
too apparent that the er~denvoui* to appease the people 
by quiet means had failed, and that it would be neces- 
sary to have recourse to strorlger mcasures. The re- 
port of fire-arms was incessant, anrl seemed to extenrl 
through the town froin end to end. 
Sir William Macnaghtcn now called upon General 
Elphinstone to  act. An ordcr was accordirlgly sent to 
Brigadier Shelton, then encainpcd a t  SiyAh Sang, 
aboui; :i mile and a half distant from cantonments, to 
march forthwith to the Bdld R . i s d ~ ,  01- coynl citadel, 
where his Majcsty Shkh ShujA rebided, comnlandilzg a 
large portion OF the city, with the following troops, 
viz., one company of Her Majesty's 4!49th Foot, a wing 
of the 548th llcgimeiit Nativc Infantry under Major 
Ewart, the 6th Regiment Sl~Ah's Infantry under Cap- 
tain EIoplrins, and four Horse Artillery guns unrler 
Captain Nicholl; and on asrival there to act according 
to his own judgment, aftcr consulting wi th  the king. 
The remaixlder of the troops encamped at Siyhh 
Sang were at the same time ordered into cantonmerlt~; 
viz., I-Icr Majesty's 44th Boot under Lieutenant- 
6 
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Colonel Maclcerell, two Horse Artillery guns under 
aieutenant VCraller, and Anderson's Irregular Horse. 
A messenger was lilrewise despatched to recall the 37th 
Native Infantry from IChurd-Khbul without delay. 
The troops at this time in cantonments were as follows : 
vie., 5th Regiment Native Infantry, ilndcr Lieutenant- 
Colonel Oliver; a wing of 541th Native Infantry; 
five 6-pounder field guns, with a detachment of the 
ShLh's Artillery, under Lieutenant Wayburton; thc 
EnvoyJs body-guard ; a troop of Slrinner's IIorse, m d  
another of local Horse, under Lieutenant Wallrer; 
three colnpanies of the ShBh's Sappers, .under Captain 
Walsh; and about: twenty men o.E the Company's 
. Sappers, attached to Captain Paton, Assistant Quarter- 
master-~eneral.  
Widely spreacl and formidable as this insurrection 
proved to  be afteraards, it was at first a mere insigni- 
ficant ebullition of discontent on the part of a few i 
desperate and restless men, which military energy and 
promptitude ought to have crushed in the bud. Its 
comrnencemerlt was an attack by certainly not t h e e  
hundred men on the dwellings of Sir Alexander .Burnes 
and Captain Johnson, paymaster to the Sh;ihJs force; t 
and so little did Sir hlcxander himself apprehend 
serious consequences, that he not only refused, on its 
fisrt breaking out, to comply with the earnest entreaties 
of the wazir to accompany him to the Brild Hish, but 
actually forbade his guard t o  fire on the assailants, 
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attempting to check what he supposed to be a mere 
riot by haranguing the attacking party from the gallery 
of his house. The result was fatal to hirnsclf; for, in 
spite of the devoted gallantry of the Sepoys, who corn- 
posed his guard mid that of the payldasterJs officc and 
trcasury on the opposite side of the street, who yielded 
thcir trust only with their latcst breath, the latter were 
plundered, and his two companions, Lieutenant William 
Broadfoot, of the Bengal European Regimcnt, and his 
brother, Lieutenant Bu~nes, of the Bornbay Army, wcre 
massacred, in common with every man, woman, arid 
child found on the premises, by theuc bloodthirsty 
miscreants. Lieutenant Br~adf'oot lrilled five or  six 
mcn with his own hand before he was shot down. 
No man, surely, in a highly responsible public situa- 
tion-cspecially in such a one as that held by tlie late 
Sir Alexander Burnes -011ght ever to indulge in a state 
of blind security, or to ncgleet stilutary warnings, how- 
ever small. I t  is indisputable that such warnings had 
been given to him; espccially by a respectable AfgIl61i 
named T6j-Muhammad, on the vcry previous niglit, 
who wcnt in person to 8ir A.  13urnes to put him on 
' his guard, but retired disgusted by the incredulity 
with which his assertio~ls were received. It is not for 
me to comment on his public character. I t  is the pro- 
perty of the civilized portion of the world; but i t  is 
due to  another, little known beyond the immediate 
sphere in which he moved, to say that, had this out- 
6 "  
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break been productive of no eBects beyond the death 
of Lieutenant William Broaclfoot, it could not be 
sufficiently deplored : in him was lost to the Statc not 
only one of its bravest and rnost intelligent oBcers, 
but a man who for honesty of purpose and soundness 
of juclgrnent, P may boldly avel', could not be sur- 
passed. 
Tlle Icing, who was in thc Bk15 Hisk,  being somc- 
what startled by the increasing number of the rioters, 
although not st the time aware, so far as we can judge, 
of t he  assassination of Sir A. Burnes, despatched one 
of his sons with a rlurnber of his im~nediate Afghsn 
retainers, and that corps of Hind6stknis commonly 
called Campbell's Regiment, with two guns, to restore 
order :  no support, however, was renilered to these by 
1 our troops, whose leaders appeared yo tl~xmderstruclc 
bv t h e  intelli~enca of the outbrealc, as to be incallable - * 
of adopting inore than t l ~ c  most. puerile defcnsive rnca- 
sures. Even Sir William Macilaghtcn sccmed, from a 
note receivecl at this time from him by Captain Trcvor, 
t o  apprehend little danger, as he therein expressed his 
perfect confidence as to the speedy and complete 
success OF B=anipbellJs Hiiiddst&iiis in putting an end to 
the disturbance. Such, however, was not the case ; 
for the enemy, encouraged by our inaction, increased 
rapidly in spirit. and numbers, and drove baclc tlle 
Iring's guard with p e a t  slaughter, the guns being with 
difficulty saved. 
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It must be understood that Captain Trevor lived at 
this time with his family in a strong bu'rj, or tower, 
situated by the river side, near the Kazilbfish quarter, 
which, on the weat, is wliolly distinct from the re- 
mainder of the city. Within musket shot, on the 
opposite side of the river, in thc direction of the strong 
and populous village ol Dih AfghLn, is a fort of some 
sizc, then used as a goclown, or storehouse, by the 
ShhhJs commissari3;tJ part of it being occupied by 
Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the ShLhJs force. 
Close to this fort, divided by a narrow watercourse, mas 
the house of Captain Troup, brigade majoy of the 
ShiihJs Porce, perfectly defensible against musketry. 
a, 
130th Brigadier Ariquetil and Captain Troup had gone 
out on horsebaclr ealbly in the morning towards canton- 
ments, arid were unable to return ; but the above fort 
and house container1 the usual guard of Sepoys; and 
in a garclcn close at hand, called the YdM-IClidna, or 
lines of the baggage-cattle, was a small detachment of 
the Sh6b's Sappers and Miners, and n party of Captain 
Ferris's jazailchis. Captain Trevor's tower was capable 
of being made good against a much stronger force 
than the rcbels at this prcsent time could havc col- 
lected, had it beerr properly garrisoned. 
As i t  was, the fIRzirbtish, or Icing's Life-guards, 
were, under Captain Trevor, congregated round their 
leader, to protect him and his family ; which duty, i t  
will be seen, thcy well performed under very trying 
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circumstances., For what took place in this quarter I 
beg to refer to a communication made to me at  my 
request by Captain Colin Macltenzic, Assistant Political 
Agent at PeshBwar, who then occupied the godown 
portion of the fort above mentionect, which will be 
found hereafter. 
I have already stated that Brigadier Shclton was 
early in the day directed to procccd with part of the 
Siyiih Sang force to occupy the 13515 IIisAr, and, if 
requisite, to lead liis troops against the insurgents. 
Captain Lawrence, military secretary to the Envoy, 
was at the same timc sent forward to prepare the king 
for that officer's reception. Taking with llim four 
troopers of the Body-guard, he was galloping along the 
main road, when, shortly after crossing thc river, he 
1 was suddenly attacked by an Afghbn, who, rushing 
from behind a wall, made a desperate cut at  liim with 
a large two-handed lmife. I-Ie dextcrously avoidcd 
the blow by spuming his horse on one side ; but, pas- 
sing onwards, he was fired up011 by about fray men, 
who, having seen his approach, ran out from tlle 
Liihor gate of the city to intercept him. I-Ie reached 
the B616 H i s k  safe, where he found the king apparently 
in a state of great agitation, he having witnessed the 
assault from the window of liis palace. EIis Majesty 
expressed an eager desire to conform to thc Envoy's 
wishes in a11 respects in this emergency. 
Captain Lawrence was still conferring with the king, 
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when Lieutenant Sturt, our executive engineer, rushed 
into the palace, stabbed in three places about the face 
and neclr. He had been sent by Brigadier Shelton to 
make arrangements For the accommodation of the 
troops, and had reached the gate oE the Diwhn Ichina, 
or hall of audience, when the attempt at his life was 
made by some one who had concealed himself there 
for that purpose, and who immediately effected his 
escape. The wounds were fortunately not dangerous, 
and Lieutenant Sturt was conveyed back to canton- 
ments in the king's own palanquin, under a strong 
escort. Soon after this, Brigadier SheltonJs force ar- 
rived; but the day was suffcred to pass without any- 
thing beirig done demonstrative of British energy and 
power. The rn~wder of our countrymeu, and the spolia- 
tion of public and private property, was prepetrated 
with impunity within a mile of our cantonment, aud 
under the very walls of the 13616 IIiuAr. 
Such an exhibition of wealcness on our pnst taught 
the enemy their strenglll--confimn~cd against us those 
who, however disposed to join in the rebellion, had 
hitherto kept aloof from prudential motives, and ulti- 
mately encouraged the nation to unite as one man for 
our destruction. 
It was, in fact, the crisis of all others calculated to 
test the qualities oE a military commander, to bring 
forth genius from its lurking place, or to  detect the 
absence of that rarest of nature's gifts. It would be 
the height of injustice to a most amiable and gallant 
officer not to notice the long course of painful and 
wearing illness, which had materially affected the 
nerves, and probably even the intellect, of Generill 
Elphinstone; cruelly incapacitating him, so far as hc 
was personally concerned, from acting in this sudden 
emergency with the promptitutle and vigour necessary 
for our preservation. lfajor-General Elphinstone had 
some time before represented to Lord Auclrland the 
shattered state of his Iical.lt11, stating plainly and 
honestly that it had unfitted him to co~itiriue in com- 
mand, and requesting permission to resign. Lord 
Auckland acceded to his wishcs; and the General was 
on the point of returning to India, thence to cmbark 
for England, when the rebellion unhappily broke out. 
No one, who knew General Elphinsto~ie, could fail to 
esteem his many excellent qualities both in p ~ ~ b l i c  anrl 
private life. 'To all under his command, not excepting 
the youngest slibaltern, he was cver accessiblc, and in 
the highest degree courteous and considcrate : nor did 
he ever exhibit, either in word or practiceJ the slightest 
partiality for officers of his own service over those of' 
the Company. His profcsvional Imomlerlge was exten- 
sive; and, before disease had too much impared his 
frame for active exertion, he llad zealously applied 
himself to improve and stimulate every branch of the 
service. I-Ie had, indeed, but one unhappy fault as 
general-the result, probably, of age and infirmity- 
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and this was a want of coi~fidence in his own judgment, 
leading him too often to prefer the opinions of others 
to his own, until, amidst the conflicting vicws of a 
mullitude of counsellors, he was at a loss which course 
to take.-% Hence much of that indecision, procrasti- 
nation, and warit of mcthod which occrtsionally para- 
lyzed our efforts, gradually dishear tened the troops, 
and ultimately proved a source of calamity to all con- 
cerned. I will nevestheless add, that during the siege 
no one exposed himseu nore  f'~a~1essl-y or frequently 
to tlie enemy's fire than General Elphinstone : but 
his gallarltry was never doubted, Unhappily, Sir Wil- 
liam Macuaghten at first rnade light of the insurrec- 
tion, and, by his representations as to the general 
feeling of the people towards us, not only deluded him- 
self, but misled thc General in council. The unwel- 
come truth was so011 forced upon us, that in the whole 
1lfgh6n nation we could not reclron on a single friend. 
But though no active measures of aggression were 
taken, all necessary preparatious were made to secure 
the cantonment against attaclr. I t  fell to my o m  lot 
* Lady Sale writes t o  the sume effect :-"We nro now in oircum- 
fltances which roqui~e a man of energy to cope with them. Major 
Thain is said to  be a good adviser, but, unfortunately, i t  is not 
always in tho multitude of connsellors that there is wisdom; and 
so many proffered their advice and oros~ed his, that Thain withdrew 
his, and only now answers such questions as are put t o  him." . . . 
" General Elphinstone vacilhtes on every point. His own judg- 
ment appoms to be good, but he is swayed by the lnsb speaker." 
to place every available gun in position round the 
works. Besides the grins already mentioned, we had 
in the magazine six 9-pounder iron guns, thrce 24- 
~ o ~ i n d e r  howitzers, one 12-pountler ditto, and thrce 
54-inch mortars : but tlle detail of artillel-ymen fell 
very short of what was 1-equircd to ninn all thesc 
. 
efficiently, consisting of only eighty Parljlibis bclongirig 
to the ShBh, under Lieutenant Wasburton, very insuffi- 
ciently instructed, an? of doubtful fiilelity. 
To render our position intelligible, i t  is necessary 
to describe thc cantonment, or fortified lines so called. 
It is uncertain to whom the blatnc justly attaches 
for the faults which I am about to dcscribe, but the ; 
I 
credit of having selected a sitc for the cantonments, 1 .  
or controlled the execution of its works, is not a dis- 1 
tinction now lilrely to bc claimed cxclusivcly by any 
one. But it must always remain rt wonder that any 
Government, or any officer or set of officcrs, who had 
either science or cxperience in the field, should, in a 
half-conquered country, fix their forces (already in- 
adequate to the services to which thcy might bc called) 
in so extraordinary and injudicious a military pbsi- , 
tion. Every engineer officer who had bccn consulted, 
since the first occupation of Kiibul by our troops, had 
pointed to the BBb IlisBr as the only suitable place 
for a garrisou which was to lrecp in subjection tile 
city and the surroullding country; but, above all, it 
was Burel$ the only proper sitc for the rnagazi~ze, 
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on which the army's efficiency depended. In defiancc, 
however, of rule and precedent, the position eventually 
fixed upon for our magazine and cantonment was a 
piece of low swampy ground, commanded on all sides 
by hi119 or forts. It consisted of a low rampart and a 
narrow ditch in the form of a thrown 
up along the line of the ICohistgn road, onc thousand 
yards long and six hundred broad, with rounrl flanking 
bastions at each corner, every one of which was com- 
manded by some fort or hill. To one end of this 
work was attached a space nearly half as lailge again, 
and surrounded by a simple wall. This was callcd the 
"Mission Compound: jJ  half of it was appropriated 
for tlle residence of the Envoy, the othcr half being 
crowded with buildings, erected without any attempt 
at  regularity, €or the accommodation of thc officers 
and assistants of the mission, and 'the Envoy's body- 
guard. This large space required in timc of siege 
to be defended, and thus materially wealcened the 
garrison; while its very existence rendered the whole 
face of the cantonment, to which i t  was annexed, 
nugatory for purposes of defence. Besides these 
disadvant~ges, thc lines were a great deal too ex- 
tended, so that the ramparts could not be properly 
manned without harassing the garrison. On the east- 
ern side, about a quarter of a mile oil, flowed the 
KAbul river in a direction parallel with the Koliistjn 
road. Between the river and cantonments, about 
one hundred and fifty yards from the latter, was  a 
widc canal. General Elphiastone, on his arrival in 
April, 1841, perceived at a glance the utter unf i tness  
of the cantonment for purposes of protracted dcfence,  
and when a new fort was about to be built for the 
magazine on the south side, he liberally offered t o  
purchase for the Government, out of his own f u n d s ,  
n large portion of the land in the vicinity, with t h e  
view of removing some very objectionable inclosures 
and gardens, which offered shelter to our e n e m y  
within two hundred yards of ourramparts; but n e i t h e r  
was his offer accepted, nor were his reprcsentatione 
on  the subject attentled wit11 any goocl result. H e  
lost no time, however, in throwing a bridge over t h e  
river, in a direct line between the cantonments a n d  
the Siy6h Sang camp, and in rendering the bridge over 
the  canal passablc for guns ; which judicious m e a s u r e  
shortened the distance for artillery and infantry by at 
least two miles, sparing, too, the necessity which 
existcd previously of moving to and fro by the  main 
road, which was commanded by three or four f o r t s  
as  well as from the city walls. Moreover, the  K & b u l  
River being liable t o  sudden riscs, and almost always 
unfordable during the rainy season (March and April), 
it will easily be understood that the erection of t h i s  
bridge was a work of much importance. But t he  most 
unaccomta~le oversight of all, and that which m a y  
b e  said to have contributed most largely to our sub- 
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sequent disasters, was that of having the commissariat 
stores detachedfiov~ cantonmeuts, in an old fort which, 
in an outbreak, would be almost indelensible. Cap- 
tain Skinner, the chief commissariat oofccr, at thc time 
when this arrangement was made, earnestly solicited 
from the authorities a place within the cantonment for 
his stores, but received for answer that ("0 such place 
could be given him, as they were far too busy in 
erecting ban.aclrs for the men, to think of commissariat 
stores." The Envoy himself pressed this point very 
urgently, but without avail. At the south-west angle 
of cantonments was the biimlr village, swrounrled by 
low wall, and so crowded with mud lluts as to form a 
pe~fect maze. Ncarly opposite, with only the high 
road between, was thc small fort of Mllhamrnad Sharif, 
which perfectly comn~anded our south-west bastion. 
Attached to  this fort was thc Sh6h Bhgh, or Iring's 
garden, anrrounded by a hi& wall, and comprising a 
spaceof about I~rtlf a s q u a i ~  mile. About t~vo hur~dred 
yards highcr up the road towards the city, was the 
commissal.iat fort, the gate of which stood very nearly 
opposite the entrance of the Shtih Btigh. There were 
variocs other forts at different points of our works, 
which will be mentioned in the course of events. On 
the east, at the distance of about a mile, was a range 
of low hills dividing us horn the Siy;ih Sang camp; 
and on the west, about the same distance off, was 
another somewhat higher range, at the north-east 
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cantonment appears to have becn purposely surrounded 
with difficulties ; indeed, a stranger might suppose that 
many of thc mud forts, approacliing so closely to the 
walls, must have been built for the express purpose of 
besieging it. With this full lcnowledge of the tliffi- 
culties of their position, it is a matter of surprise that 
our military authorities did not throw themselves into 
the Biilti I-Iislir, a movement that might have been 
effecter1 with littlc loss at any period of the siege, by 
holding the heights of Siy:ih Sang whilst passing the 
munilions from place to place ; and even had carriage 
been wantir~g for the commissariat stores, our troops, 
holding the town of IChbul at their mercy, could have 
secured provisions to any amount." 
No highcr corroborative testimony than the above 
could be wished or cupected. I t  may, however, now 
bc stated, without hesitation, that what have been 
deemed " milita~y " errors had a " political" origin, 
and were the natural result of regarding Afghbistjn . 
as a settled country, and the British force as a mere 
police establishment. When cmployed against an 
open enemy in the field, military commanders lcnow 
what is expected of them, and arrange their plans ac- 
cordingly, but when thcir every action, involving ex- 
penditure, is subject to civil control, so that not cven 
the simplest field-worlc can be undertaken without a 
reference to that controlling power, which, in its turn, 
must perhaps refer the matter to a thrifty Gove~nment 
some two thousand milcs distant, and when they are 
autl~oritatively asn~rcd that all around them breathes 
peacc and lasting quiet, even the wisest generals may 
be tempted by a love of cnsc, or by a distaste for petty 
interference, to become callolls in allowing that which 
they secretly disapprove ; and, being dependent on the 
civil authorities for information, may be imperceptibly 
ensnared into a state of fatal security. 
And thus it was at KAbul, and l;o that fruitfi~l source 
of mischief may be traccd those faulty military ar- 
I ~angements whose disastrous tendency was but too 
truly foreseen and honestly pointed out by Brigadier 
Roberts and others, while yet thcre was time to 
I 
I the evil. 
i When Sir Willoughby Cotton, on his rctuTrt march 
I from KAbul, met his successor, ~ e n c d  Elphinstone, 
1 in the Panj;ib, he congratdated the latter on. having i - obtained so pleasant a post, where all ~vxs in a state of 
peaceful repose, little dreaming that the pal-adisc of 
ease and quiet he thus conf dently bequeathed was like 
that of a mine of gunpowder to which the lightecl slow- 
match liad alrea.dy been applied.] 
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THE 3 7 ~ ~  REGIMENT ATTACKED ON ITS RITURN FROM 
EEURD-EABUL. - MURDER OF LIEUTENANTS MAULE 
AND WHEELER. - LOSS O F  THE COMMISSARIAT FORT. 
- SUCCESBFUL ATTACK ON THE F O R T  O F  MUHAMMAD 
BHARIF. - ENGAGENENTB WITH APGHAN HORS1 AND 
FOOT.-THE ENZMY'B PLAN TO REDUCI THE BRITISH 
BY BTARVATION. - BRIGADIIR SHBLTON SENT F O E  
FROM BALA HISAR. 
November 3rd.-AT 3 A.M. the alarm was sounded at 
the castern gate of cantonments, in consequence of a 
brisk file-firing in the direction of Siy& Sang, which 
turned out to  proceed from the 37th Regiment Native 
Infantry on its return from Khurd-Kcibul, having been 
closely followed up the whole way by a body of about 
three thousand Ghalzis. The regiment managed, never- 
theless, to save all its baggage excepting a few tents, 
i which were left on the ground for want of carriage, 
and to bring i n  all the wounded safe. 
A more orderly march was never made under such 
trying circumsta~ices, and it reflects the highest credit 
on Major Griffiths and all concerned. This regiment 
was a valuable acquisition to om* garrison, being de- 
servedly esteemed one of the best in the service. Three 
guns of the Mountain Train, under Lieutenant Green, 
accompanied them, and were of the greatest use in 
defending the rear on the line of march. I n  conse- 
quence of their arrival, a rcinforcemcnt was sent into 
the BBlB I-Iisk, consisting of the left wing 54th Native 
Infantry, with Lieutenant Green's guns, one iron 
9-pounder, one 24-pounder howitzer, two 5$-inch 
mortars, and a supply of magazine stores. They all 
reached it in safety, though a few shots were Gred at  
thc rear-guard from some orchards near the city. 
nrigadier Shelton was ordered to maintain a sharp 
fire upon the city from the howitzers and guns, and to 
endeavour to fire the houses by means of shells and 
carcasses from the two mortars ; should he also find 
it practicable to send a force into the city, he was t o  
do so. 
Early in the aftelnoon a detachment under Major 
Swayne, consisting of two companies 5th Native In- 
fantry, one of Her Majesty's 44th, amd two I-Iorse 
Artillery guns under Lieutenant Waller, proceeded out 
of the western gate towards the city, to eflect, if pos- 
sible, a junction at the Ljhor gate with a part of Bri- 
gadier Shelton's force from the B618 Hisk.  They 
-841-412. 
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drove back and defeated a party of the encmy who 
occupied the road near the Sh6h BBBgh, but had to en- 
counter a sharp fire from the I<ohist&n gate of the 
city, and from the walls of various enclosures, behind 
which a number of marksmen had concealed them- 
selves, as also from the fort of Mahrndd KhBn com- 
manding the road along which they had to pass. 
Lieutenmt Waller and several Sepoys mere wounded. 
Major Swayne, observing the whole line of road to- 
wards the Liihor gate sutrongly occupied by some 
Afghtin horse and jazailchis, and fearing that he would 
be unable to effect the object in view with so small a 
force unsupported by cavalry, retired into cantonments. 
Shortly after this, a l a ~ g e  body of the rebels having 
issued from thc foyt of Mahmhl K h h ,  nine hundred 
yards south-east of cantonments, extended themselves 
in a line dong the bank of the liver, displaying's flag; 
an iron 9-pounder was brought to bear on them from 
our south-east bastion, and a round or two of shrapnel ' 
caused them to seek shelter behind some neighbouring 
banlrs, whence, d t e r  some desultory firing on both 
sides, they retired. 
Whatever hopes may have been entertained, up to 
this period, of a speedy termination to the insurrection, 
they began now to wax fainter every hour, and an order 
was despatched to the officer commanding at Kandahtir 
to lose no time in sending to our assistance the 16th and 
43rd Regiments Native Infmtrg (which were under 
7 "  
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orders for India), together with a troop of Horse Artil- 
lery, and half a regiment of Cavalry; an order was 
likewise sent off to recall General Sale with his brigade 
from Gandftmak. Captain John Conolly, political 
assistant to the Envoy, went into the BQlB Hisgr 
early this morning, to remain with the king, and 
to render every assistance in his power to  Brigadier 
Shelton. 
On this day Lieutenant Richard Maule, commanding 
the Kohistrini Regiment, which on its return from 
Zurrnat had been statione8 at  Kaedara in Rohistin, 
about twenty miles north-west of K&bd, with the ob- 
ject of keeping down disaffection in that quarter, 
being deserted by his men, was, together with local 
Lieutenant Wheeler, his adjutant, barbarously mur-  
dered by a bancl of rebels. They defended themselves 
resolutely for several minutes, but at length fell under 
the fire of some jazails. Lieutenant Maule had been 
previously informed of his danger by a friendly nativc, 
but  chose rather to run the risk of being sacrificed 
than desert the post assigned him. Thus fell a noble- 
hearted soldier and a devout Christian. 
Novernbe~ 4th.-The enemy having taken strong 
possession of the SIidh Bdgh, or King's Gasden, and 
thrown a gamison into the fort of Muhammad Sharif, 
nearly opposite the b h k ,  eflectually prevented any 
communication between the cantonment and commis- 
sal-iat fort, the gate of which latter was commanded 
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by the gate oE the ShBh BBgh on the other side of the 
road. 
Ensign Warren, of the 5th Native Infantry, at this 
time occupicd the commissariat fort with one hundred 
men, and having reported that he was very hard 
pressed by the enemy, and in danger of being corn- 
pletely cut off, the General, either forgetful or unaware 
at the moment of the important fact that upon the 
possession of this fort we were entirely dependent for 
provisions, aud anxious only to save the lives oE men 
whom he believed to be in imminent peril, hastily gave 
directions that a party under the command of Captain 
Swayne, of IJer Majesty's 44th Regiment, should pro- 
ceed immediately to bring off Ensign Warren and his 
garrison to cantonments, abandoning the fort to the 
enemy. A few minutes previously an attempt to relieve 
him had been made by Ensign Gordon, with a com- 
pany of the 37th Native Infantry and eleven camels 
laden with ammunition; but the party were driven 
back, and Ensign Gordon killed. Captain Swayne 
now accordingly proceeded towards the spot with two 
companies of Her Majesty's 44th; scarcely had they 
issued from cantonments ere a sharp and destructive 
fire was poured up011 them from Muhammad SharifJs 
Eort, which, as they procccdcd, was taken up by the 
marksmen in  the ShBh BAgh, under vhose deadly aim 
both officers and men suffered severely; Captains 
Swayne and Robinson of the 4 t h  being killed, and 
Lieutenants Hallahan, Evans, and Fortye wouncled, in  
this disastrous business. It now seemed, t o  the officer 
on whom the command had devolved, impracticable to 
bring off Ensign Warren's party, without risking the 
annihilation of his own, mhich had alreacly sustainecl 
so rapid and severe a loss in  officers ; he thereEore re- 
turned forthwith to cantonmcnts. I n  the course 01 
the evening, another ilttcmpt was made by a party of 
the 5th Light Cavalry ; hut they encountcrccl so sevcre 
a fire from the neighbouring en'closures as obliged 
them to  return without effecting thcir dcsircd object, 
with the loss of cight troopers killed and fourteen 11acUy 
wounded. Captain Boyd, the Assistant Commissary- 
General, having mcanxrhile been made acqnaintecl with 
the General's intention to give up the fort, hastenecl 
to lay helore him the disastrous consequences that 
would ensue Prom so cloing. He  stated that  the place 
contained, besides layge supplies of wheat and iLt6, all 
his stores of rum, mcdiciue, clothing, kc., the value of 
which might be estimated at Eour lacs of rdpis ; that 
to  ahandon such valuable property would not only 
expose the force to  the immediate want of the neces- 
saries of life, but would infallibly invpirc the enemy 
with tenfolcl coupage. IIe addecl that we had not 
abovc two daysJ supply of provisions in cantonmcnts, 
anrl that neither himsclf nop Captail] Jolinson, of 
the Shall's  commissariat, had any prospect of pro- 
curing tliem elsewhere under existing circumstances. 
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In consequence of this strong representation on the 
part of Captain Boyd, the General sent immediate 
orders to Ensign Warren to hold out the fort to the 
last extremity. (Ensign Wanen, it must be remarked, 
denied having received this note.) Early in  the night 
a letter was received from him to the effect that he be- 
lieved the enemy were busily engaged in mining one of 
the towers, and that such was the alarm among the 
Sepoys that several of them had actually made their 
escape over the wall to cantonments; that the enemy 
merc making preparations to burn down the gate ; and 
that, considering the temper of his men, he did not 
expect to bc ablc to hold out many hours longer, 
unless reinforced without delay. I n  reply to this he 
was informed that he would be reinforced by 2 n . n ~  
At about 9 o'clock P.M. there was an assembly of 
staff and other officers at the General's house, when 
the Envoy came in and expresscd his serious coilviction 
that, unless Mtlhammad Sharif's fort mere taken that 
very night, we should lose the commissariat fort, or 
a t  all events be unable to bring out of it provisions for 
the  troops. The disaster of the morning rendered the ' 
General extremely unwilling to expose his officers and 
men to any similar peril; but, on the other hand, it 
was urged that the darkness of the night would nullify 
the enemy's fire, who would also most likely be 
taken unawares, as it was not the custom of the 
Afghrins to maintain a very strict watch at night. A 
104 THE KABUL INSURRECTION OF 1841-42. 
man in Captain JollnsonJs employ mas accordingly sent 
out to reconnoitre the ~ l a c c ;  he returned in a few 
minutes with t h ~  intelligence that about twenty men 
were seated outside the fort near the gate, smoking and 
tallring; and from what he overhcard of their conver- 
sation, he judged the garris~il to be vel'y small, and 
unal~le to l7csist a sudden onset. The debate was now 
resumed, but allother hour ~asscd ancl the General could 
not make 1113 his mind. A sccond spy was despatched, 
whose report tended to corroborate what the first had 
said. I was the11 sent to Lieutenant Sturt, the en- 
gineer, who was nearly recovered from his wounds, for 
his opinion. I-Ic at first expressed himself in favour of 
an immediate attack, but, on hearing that some of the 
enemy were on the watch at the gatc, he judged it 
prudent to defer the assault till an early how in the 
morning : this decided the General, though not before 
several hours had dipped away in fruitless discussion. 
Orders mere at last given for a detachment to be  in 
readiness a t  4 n . M .  at the Kolisthn gate; and Captain 
Bellew, Dcputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, volun- 
teered to blow open the gate; another party of Her 
Majesty's 44th were at the same time to issue by a 
cut in  the south face of the rampart, and march simul- 
taneously towards the commissaxiat fort, to reinforce 
the garrison. Morning had, however, well dawned 
ere thc mcn could be got under arms; and they were 
on the point of ,marching off, when it was reported 
3 employ mns accordingly sent 
place; hc returned in a few 
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that Busign MTwreli had just arrivcd irl cantonments 
with liis garrison, having evacuated the fort. I t  seems 
that thc Fnemy llncl actually set fire to the gate; ald 
Ensigu Warren, sceing no prospect of a reillforcemei~t, 
and cxpccti~lg the cuemy every moment to rush in, 
led out his mcn by a hole which he had prepared in 
thc mall. Being called upon in n public letter fiom 
the Assistmlt Adjutant-General to state his reasom for 
abmdol\i~ig his post, he replied that Ile 7v:ls ready to 
do so beforc :L court of inquiry, lsllicll he rcqucsted 
might be asscm1)lcd to investigate liis conduct ; it mas 
not, I io~~cvc~;  dccmcd cxpcdicnt to con~ply ioitli his 
rcqucst. 
J t  isbeyoud a donht t l l d  our feeble and irleircctud 
defeiioc of this fort, and tlic valuable booty it yieldecl, 
mas the firstJrrta1 blow to our supremacy at I<:ibul, and 
at once cletc~~minecl those cliicfs-and more particulally 
the 1Cexilb;ishes-who had hitherto remained neut~*al, 
to join in the general combillation to drive us fi.on1 the 
country. 
Captain Trcvol', having hcld out his house against 
the rebcls until all hope of relief mas nt an end, was 
safely escorted illto cmtonnlents this inorniiig, with 
his wife and seven chilcll.eu, by his I-IliairbAsh horsemen, 
who behaved faithfully, but nowJ out of regwcl for 
their fi~milies, dispersed to their houses. Captain 
Mackenzic, lilremise, after defending liis fort until liis 
ammunition mas expended, fought his way into canton- 
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,cnts late last night, having received a slight mound 
tile road. His men had behaved with the utmost  
bra1y=ry, and made several successfid sallies. (See his 
ol r~ l  account.) 
,\rovernbcr 5tl~.-It no sooner became generally lrnorrm 
tl,:,t tile commissariat fort, upon which me mere clc- 
pclldent for supplies, had been abandoned, than o n e  
uliivel-srtl feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison ; 
nor car1 I describe the impatience of the ti*oops, but 
espccialIy tlie native portion, to be lecl out for its re- 
cnpt~zre-a feeling that was b ~ r  130 means diminishecl by 
tlleir seeing the Afghiins crossing and rc-crossing the 
between thc commissaimiat fort and the  gate of the 
Shhh B6gh,  laden with the piqovisiona upon which had 
dcpendcd our ability to make a protmcted defence: 
Observing this disposition among the troops, and feel- 
iag the importance of checking the triumph of l;he 
c11cn1.y i n  its infancy, I st~ennously urged the Genera] 
to  scrlcl oxit a  arty to capture Muhammad Sharif's 
fort by blowing open the gate, and volunteered myself 
to  kccp the road clear from any sudden advance of 
cavrtlry, with two Horse Artillery guns, under cover of 
w l ~ o s e  firc the storming party could advance along the 
road, protected from the fire of the fort by a low w a n ,  
mhicll lined the road the wholc way. The Gene ra l  
tigreed ; a storming party fi-om the 5th Native Infantlqg 
was ordered; tlie powder Bags were got ready; and 
at a b o u t  12 mid-day we issued from the western ga t e  : 
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the guns led the may, and were brought into action 
under the partial cover of some trees, within one hun- 
dred yards of the fort. For the space of twenty 
minutes tlie artillery continued to work the guns under 
an excessively sharp fire from the walls of the fort; 
but the storming party, probably in uncertainty as to 
an entrance having been secured, had in the meantime 
remained stationary under cover of tlie w d  by the 
road side. The General, who was watching. pyoceediags 
fi~om the gateway, observing that the gun ammunition 
was running short, and that the troops Lad from some 
~mlcnown cause failed to talre advalltage of thc best 
opportunity for aclvvnncing, recalled us into canton- 
ments : thus the enemy enjoyed their triurnplx undi- 
mhished. 
November 6th.-It mas now determined to talc; the 
fort of Muhammacl Sharif by regular I~reach ancl assault. 
At an early hour, tliree iron 9-pouncler guns. were 
brought to  bear upon its north-east bastion, aiid two 
howitzers upon the contiguous curtain. I took charge 
of the former, and Lienteaant Warburton of the latter. 
I r .. In  the space of about two hours s practicable breach 
. was effected, during which time a hot f i ~ e  was poured 
upon the artillerymen from the enemy's sharpshooters, 
stationed in a couple of Iiigh towers which com- 
pletely commanded thc battery, whereby, as the em- 
brasures crumbled away from the constant concussion, 
it becme at length a difficult task to work the guns. 
A storming party, composed of three companies, viz. 
one company of Her Majesty's 44th under Ensign 
Raban, one company 5th  Native Infantry under 
Lieutellant Deas, one company 37th under Lieutenant 
Steer, the whole commanded by Major Griffiths, 
' speedily cul,ied the place. Poor Raban was shot 
through the heart, when conspicuously waving a 
flag on the summit of the breach. 
As this fort adjoined the ShAh BBjgh, i t  was deemed 
advisable to dislodge the enemy from the latter, if 
possible. Learning that there was a large opening in 
the wall in the north side of the garden, and being left 
to exercise my own discretion, I took a 6-pounder 
gun thither, and fired several rounds of grape and 
shrapnel1 upon parties of the  enemy assembled within 
under the trees, which speedily drove them out; and 
had a detachment of infantry been ordered to take 
advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to throw 
themselves into the building at the principal entrance 
by the road side, the place might have been easily 
carlied permanently, and immediate repossession could 
have been then taken of the commissariat fort opposite, 
which had not yet been emptied of half its contents. 
While this was going on, a reconnoitring party under 
Majol. Thain, Aide-de-camp, consisting of one Horse 
Artillcry gun, one troop 5th Cavalry, and two companies 
of infantry, scoured the plain to the west of canton- 
ments; and having driven the enemy from several 
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enclosures, were returning homeward, when large 
numbers of A f g h h  horse and foot mere observed t o  
' 
proceed from the direction of the city towards the 
sonth-west extremity of a hill, which runs in  a diagonal 
direction horn north-east to soutli-west across the 
plain, to  the west of cantonments. A risA1ah of 
Anderson's Horse had been stationed on the summit 
of this hill all thc morning as a picket, whence they 
had just been recalled, when a largc body of the 
enemy's horsc reached the base, and proceeded to crown 
the summit. Major ThdnJs .pmty, observing this, 
came to a halt; and a few minutes afterwards a rein- 
force~nent oppo~tunely arrived, consisting of one risiilah 
of Irregular EIorse under Captain Anderson, one tyoop 
of ditto uncler Lieutenant Wallcel; and two troops 5th 
Cavalry uncler Captains Collyer and Rott. I now 
considered it my duty to join the Horse Artillery gun, 
which had no officer with it, and I nccorclingly left the 
6-pounder gun under the protection of Captain Mac- 
Irenzie, who, with a fern of his jazailchis, had now joined 
me, having been engaged in skirmishing across the 
plain tomai,ds the west end of the ShAh BRdgh, vhere, 
finding au opening, he had crept in with his mcn, and 
cleared that part of the garden, but, not being sup- 
ported, had been obliged to retire with a loss of fifteen 
ldled out of ninety-five. 
I now advanced with the Horse h t i l l e ry  gun, sup- 
ported by a troop of the 5th Cavalry, to the foot of 
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the hill, and opened fire upon the enemy, while the 
rest of the cavalry, headed by Anderson's Horse, rode 
brislrly up the slope to force them off. The officers 
gallantly headed their men, and encountered about an 
equal number of the enemy, who advanced to meet 
them. A hand-to-hand encounter now took place, 
which ended in the Afghhn Horse retreating to the 
plain, leaving the hill in our possession. I n  this affair 
Captain Anderson personally engaged, and slew the 
brother-in-law of Abd-rdlah ICh6nin. Meaizwhile the 
enemy began to munter strong on the plain to the west 
of the Shhh BBBgh, whence they appeared to be gradually 
extending tl~emselves towards the cantonments, as if to 
intercept our return; i t  was therefore deemed prudent 
to recall the cavalry from the height, and show front 
I 
! 
in the plain, where they could act with more effect. A 
reinforcement of two companies of infantry and one 
Horse Artillery gun was sent out, and the whole force 
was drawn up in order of battle, anticipating an attaclr, 
with 'one gun on either flank. I n  this position a 
distant fire was kept up by the enemy's jazailchis, which 
mas answered principally by discharges of shrapnell 
and rouud shot from the guns ; the heights, too, were 
again crowned by the Afghan horse, but no disposition 
was manifested by them to encounter us in open 
fight, and, as the night gradually closeh in, they 
 lowly retired to the city. On this occasion about 
one hundred of the enemy fell on tlie hill, while the 
- 
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It will be rcmcmbered that I left a 6-pounder gun 
at the opening in the mall of the Slllih BAgh. After 
my departure, large numbers of the enem yJs infantry 
had filled tlie mest end of the Shill BAgh, and, stealing 
up among tlie trees, and close to the high ~vall, towards 
the gun, Irept np so hot and precise a fire as to render 
its removal al~solutely necessuy. Captain Mackcnzie 
had been joined by a party of Hcr Majesty's 44th ; 
with mllom, and vivith a f e ~  of his o m  men, he cndea- 
voured to covcr the operjtion, wllicli vas extremely 
diffic~~lt, it heing necessasy to dsng tlze gun by hand 
over l a d  ground. Several of the ShAhJs gunners mcre 
Irilled, a~id maiiy of the covering p a ~ t y  liaoclred over, 
the gun being barely saved. I may here add, that 
from this time forwalqd the jazailchis, under thc able 
direction of Captain Maclrenzie, wlio volunteered to 
Iead them, mere formarc1 to disl;inguish themselves on 
all occasions, niid continued to the very last a most 
useful part of our force. 
Novem6er 8th.-An attempt was made by the enemy 
to minc one of the towers of the fort me captured on 
the 6thJ which could not Izave happened had we talren 
possession of the gate of the Sh6h 136gh at the same 
time. Our chief cause of anxiety now mas the empty 
state of our granary. Even with high bribes and 
liberal payment, the Envoy co~dd only procure a scanty 
112 TH1 KABUL INSURRl3CTION OF 1841-42. 
supply, insufficient for daily consumption, from tlie 
village of Bemhli, abont half a mile down the Kohistjn 
road, to the north. The objcct of the enemy un- 
doubtedly was to starve us out; to effect which, the 
chiefs exerted their whole influence to prevent o u l  being 
supplied from any of the neighbouring forts. Their 
game mas a sure onc; and so long as they held 
firmly together, it could not fail to be sooner 
or later successful. Dwing the short interval of 
quiet which ensued after our capture of the fort, the 
rebels managed to rig out a couple of guns which thcy 
procured from the work-yard of Lieutenant Warburton 
(in charge of the ShBhYs guns), situated, unfortu~ately, 
in the city. These tllcy placed in a position near 
MahmGd KhfLn's fort, opposite the south-east bastion 
of cantonments. All this time a cannonade was 
daily lrept up on the town by Captain Nicholl of the 
Horse Artillery in  the BAlA IIisSir; but, though con- 
siderable damage was. thereby done, and many 01 the 
enemy killcd, i t  required a much more powcrfill battery 
than he possessed to ruin a place of such extent. On 
the morning of the 2nd, when the rebellion comme~~cecl, 
the two guns, which were sent with Campbell's Hindti- 
stanie into the city, had been left outside the gate of 
the B616 H i s k  in the confusion and h u n y  of retreat, 
where they had ever since remained. So jealous EL 
watch was kept over these by the enemy from the houses 
of the Sh5h BBLzk, that it was found impossible to get 
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ossible to get 
them back into the fort; and it was necessary for our 
troops to maintain an equally strict watch to pllevent 
thcir being removed by the enemy, vho  nlade several 
desperate cfforls to obtain them. An attempt of this 
kind toolr place to-day, when the rebels were driven back 
into the city with considerable loss. 
November 9th.-The General's weak state of health 
rendeying the presence of a coadjutor absolutely 
necessary, to relieve him from thc cornmalld of the 
garrison, Brigadier Shelton, the seconcl in command, 
was, at the carncst request of the Envoy, s~unrnonetl 
in from the BQ& IIisb, in tlze hope that, by heartily co- 
operating with the Envoy and General, he would 
strengthen their hands and rouse tlze sinking confidence 
of the troops. I-Ie entered cantonments tliis morning, 
bringiug with him one Horse Artillery gun, one 
Mountain Train ditto, one company of Her Majesty's 
44thJ the Shah's GthI~ifanti-y, and a small supply of Atit. 
[The following memorandum of Brigadie~ Shel- 
toliJs services, extracted from the "Naval and Military 
Gazette " of the lollowing year, bears strong evidence 
of his previous exyerience in w a ~ ,  and gallantry in 
the field :- 
" General Sheltoll entered the Army in November, 
1805. In 1808, he was p~esent at the battles of RoleiFa 
and Vimiera. I n  1809, in the retreat t o  Corunna, and 
in the expedition to Walcheren. In  1810, at the battle 
of Busaco. I n  181 1-12, at the sieges of Baclajos. I n  
8 
1812, at the battle of Salanlanca, the taking of Maclrirl, 
and in the retreat from Burgos. I n  1813, at thc battle 
of Vittoria, and at the siege of San Sebastiau, where 
h e  lost his right arm. In  1814, in operations before ' 
Bayoune. In Canada (Lake Onta~io) . In 1824, 
employed in the operatiolls and capture of Arracan. 
In 18411, he marched with a brigade to Afgl16nist6nin, 
and in February mas despatched to the Nazian Vdley, 
and undeytook military operations them, after which 
he marched to K6bul. Except three monthsJ Ieavc 
on account of his wound, he servecl during the whole of 
the Peninsular war; and, as he was a Captain in 1812, 
hehad more than Subaltern experience in that war ! 
At the end of the war he went to Sanclhurst, and 
obtained the usual certificate. I-Ie has becn twenty 
I years in India."] 
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CH.APTER VI. 
DIFFEItENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN BRIGADIER SHELTON 
AND SIR WILLIAIC MACNAGHTEN.-ANNOYAWE FROM 
TLIE F I R 3  OF  T H 3  ENEMY OUT OF SEVERAL FORTS,- 
STORMING OF THE RIKA-BASH1 PORT, UNDER BRIGA- 
DIER SHELT0N.-PERILOUS SITUATION ANSI BRAVERY 
OF LIEUTENANT BIRD.-FURTHER ENGAGEMENTS WITH 
THE ENEMY.-SUPEXIORITY OF THE AFGHANS I N  THE 
USE OF FIRE-ARMS. 
Novenzber ~ ~ ~ ~ . - ~ - I E W C E P O R W A X D  Brigadier Shelton 
bore a conspicuous part in the drama upon the issue of 
which so much dcpended. I3e had, however, from the 
very first, seemed to despair of the force being kble 
to  hold out the winter at Kfibul, and strenuously advo- 
cated an immediate retreat to Jsilltildbfid. 
Sir William Macnaghten and his suite were alto- 
'gether opposed to Brigadier Shelton in this matter, i t  
8 #I 
bciug. in his (the Envoy's) estimation a duty we owed 
the Government to retain our  post, a t  whatsoever risk. 
This difference of opinion, on a cluestioll of such vital 
imyurta~~ce,  was attended mitll unhappy rcsultq inas- 
much as it deprived the General, in his hour of need, 
of the s t rength which u n a n i ~ n i t ~  imparts, and 
an uncom~~uuicat ive a i d  disheartening reserve in 
emergency which demanded the freest intel.ciange of 
cou~lsel and ideas. 
[Actiilg on the principle audi alte~am parteln," I 
Here insert  the ugumellts used by one of Brigadier 
Shelton's ablest apologists :- 
ccTTe arc told that he fi-om the first advocated all 
immediate r e t~ea t  o  Jall&kAbiid, and  that Sir IVilliain 
Macnnghten and his suite mere altogether opposed to  
Brigadier Sbelton in this matter. We find General 
Shelton never dtering this opinion, but at last 
L i e u t c n a ~ t  St~~zz.t, upon 20th  December, and Major 
Pottingel; 28th December, advocating it, the  chief 
military authoriLies having also adopted it. Tlze Envoy 
hacl, howevcr, opposed it-and Lieutenant Eyre con- 
demns it. But the Duke of Wellington is reported 
to have said in the Honse of Lords:  <After the first 
few days, paYticulal.ly after t h e  negotiations a t  ICiibul 
had commenced, it became hopelcss for him (Geueral 
Elg l~ins to~le)  t o  maintain his position : it became evi- 
dent t h a t  sooner or later a movement, which might pou- 
sibly fail, t o  march the troops from K&hul, mast he 
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br liim (Gcneral 
: it bccr~me evi- 
a l i ic l~ niiglit pas- 
Ii8l)ul, must be 
~mclertalren, and that an attempt must be made to 
lnovc them to a plnce of safety.' I-Icar, also, what that 
@ant soldier, Sir Robert Sale, says, ello had a few 
clays previously left ICAbul, and evidently lmew that 
such a move ought to have been made on JalKlribbd, 
for in page 1 7  of the Blue Boolr, he writes fivom that 
place, so early as the 15th November, U~lder these 
circunzstances, u regard for the Izoizour and interest 
qf our Governm,ent compels me to udhere to my plan, 
(flready formed, of putt in.^ this place into a stnts of 
defence, and holdiwg it, $ possible, until the IidbuZ 
,force ,falls baclc upon me.' The natural conclusion of 
thc above is, that had General Shelto~z bcen in corn- 
mancl, he would, regardless of the opinion of the 
Envoy, have retreated at an early period on Jallh- 
lAbLbiLc1, and there is every reason to  believe that he 
would have saved the greater part of the force. 
" The facts appear to  be these-Brigadier Shelton 
~vas  ordered into. the cantonment by 1% supeilior 
officer, Major-General Elphinstone, when the difficul- 
ties, dangers, and deranged discipline of the force under 
that officer's command appear to hnve abeady attained 
a power beyond the energies of his failing health to 
contend with; but tlie Major-General did not resign 
llis command nor quit the cantonment ; and, although 
the Brigadier's advice may have been asker!, and even 
talcen, yet no responsibility could have justly attached 
to that aclvice, even though it were bad and unsound, 
so long as his superior officer continued in the com- 
.nand. The great fault attending the fearful crisis 
appears to have been (what in moments of hazard and 
danger is almost always the case) too many advisers; 
and it is a surprise to me that the step was not taken 
of.removing all the non-ekl'ectives to the BBlfi Hisfir. 
At the head of these was Sir W. Macnaghten. Why 
cvas His Excellency in the military cantonmeilt instead 
of being at the DarbAr of ShBh ShujB-ul-Mullc, at which 
he was the representative of Her Majesty? I-Iad the 
sick General, the Envoy, and all the womcn and chil- 
clrerl, beer1 removed, as so many embarrassments to R 
place already exposed to the constant attaclrs of a 
vigorous enemy, discipline lnight have been restored to 
the British forces ; but was the Brigaclier in a situation to 
adopt this energctic step? or, had he suggested it, is there 
any reason to believe that it  would have been obeyed? 
c r  Some say the Brigadier ought to have assumed the 
commancl. If the Envoy thouglit 'so, he might have 
interfered. The assuming command must be at  the 
risk of an officer's commission, if he fails ! The defect 
in the General, Lieutenant Eyre points out; before 
Brigadier Sllelton was consulted dl our supplies were 
gone-the enemy were on the 9th November too strong 
to be attacked and tlie cantonment defended at the 
same time. Let people recollect Ruenos Ayres, in 1807, 
and a crowded city; K8bul having, also, flat-roofed 
houses-fancy t h x e  thousand men even (Wllitelocke had 
in t11e corn. 
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a much larger force), entering a city, with twenty 
tl~ousand to thirty thousand men, armed to the teeth- 
guns could not fire on those oL the tops of houses- 
the streets migllt be clear, but even at Ghazni it was 
so-but the Iionse-tops were crowded with men-we 
took them by smprise. We had ei~riched the people, 
and the chiefs, become rich, could pay nurne1,ous fol- 
lo~vers; the fccling against us was too strong to be 
changcd after eight clays of rebellion; and soldiers be- 
come dispirited when they find the prospect of starva- 
tion, and no means of averting their destruction. Tlie 
delay of' Sir John Moore's retreat, and through a 
dreadful winter,-because political expediency advised 
n march on Mncl~id,--in the horrors of which General 
Sheltoii shared, and the tcrrible retreat from Moscow, 
, 
must have been in his recollection; and he therefore 
wished to retreat before the snow should fall, and 
before the last day's provisions were served out."] 
B L L ~  I am &gressing.-About 9a.n~. on tlle 10th the 
cnemy crowned the heights to the west in great forcc, 
and almost simultaneously a large body of horse and foot, 
s~~pposcd to be Ghalzis, who had just arrived, made thcir 
appearance on the Sjy&h Sang hills to the ps t ,  nncl, 
after firing a feu-de-joie, set up a loucl shout, ~vhicli 
was answered in a similar way by those on the oppo- 
site side of us. This was supposed to be a preconcerted 
signal for a joint attack on the cantonments. No 
movement was, howevor, made on the restern side to 
molest 11s) but 011 the eastern quarter parties of the 
.ellenlg, moviug down ipto the plain, tool< possession 
of all the forts in that direction. One of these, called 
tElc Rili6-bGsK fort, mas situated di~ectly opposite thc 
Missiou Compound, at thc north-cast angle of canton- 
.merits, witlliin muslict-shot of our works, into ~vhich 
tlze enemy soon began to  pour a very annoying fire ; 
party of sharp-shooters at the same time, concealing 
tliemselvcs among the ruins of a, housc immediately 
opposite tlzc north-east bastion, took deadly aim at thc 
European artillerymen who vere x~orlring the guns, 
one poor fellow being shot through tlle temple in thc 
act of sponging. From two howitzers and a 54-inch 
mortar, a discharge of shells into tlie fort mas kept up 
for two hours. 
At this time not above two days' supply of p~ovisions 
remained in garrison, and it was very clear that, unless 
the enemy wc1.e quickly driven out from their. new 
possession, we should soon be completely hemmed in 
on aU sides. At the Envoy's urgent desire, he taking 
thc cntixe responsibility on himself, the Geizeral ordered 
a force to hold themselves in reaclincss, uiides Brigadier 
Shelton, to storm the Rik&-bdshi fort. About 1 2 ~ ~ .  
the following troops assembled at the eastern gate :- 
two 1-Iorse.htilIery guns, one Mountain Train gun, 
Wallter's Horse, Her Majesty's 44th Foot under 
Colonel Mackerell, 37th Native Infantry under Major 
Griffiths, 6th Regiment of ShLh's Force under Captain 
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,)u~ltnin Train gun, 
18l~th Foot utilder 
li~iltry nrirlor Major 
orcc uudcr Caytain 
Hopkins. The whole issued from cantonments, a 
storming party consisting of two cornpallies from each 
regiment taking the lead, preceded by Captain Bellelv, 
who h m i e d  forward to blov open the gate. Missing 
the gate, however, he blew open a wicket of such 
sniall dimensions as to  render it impossible for more 
than two or three men to  enter ahyeast, aud these in 
a stooping posture. This, i t  will be seen, was one 
cause of discomfiture in tlie first instance; for the 
hearts of the incn failed them allen they saw their forc- 
tnost comrades struck down, endeavouring to force an 
entrance under such disadvantageous circ~~mstances, 
withont being able to help them. The signal, however, 
was given for the storming party, headed by Colonel 
Maclrerell. On nearing the wicket, the cletacl~mel~t en- 
countered an excessively shaiy fire from the walls, and 
the small passage, through wli ic l~ they enrleavoured to 
rush in, merely served to expose the bravest to almost 
certain death from the hot fire of the defenders. CoIoncl 
Maclrerell, however, and Lieutenant Bird of Sl~ih's 
6th Infafitry, accompanied by a handful of Europeans 
and n few Sepoys, forced their may in;  Captain West- 
macott of the 37th being shot do~vn ontside, and Cap- 
tain MrCrae sabred in the entrance. The gal-rison, 
supposing that these few gallant men were backcd by 
the wllole attacking party, flcd in consternation out of 
the gate, which was on the opposite side of thc fort, 
and which onght to  have been the point assailed. Un- 
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fortunately, at this instant a number of the Afgh&n 
cavalry charged ~uddenly round the corner of the fort 
next the wicltet : the cry of (( Cavalry ! " was raised ; a 
bugler sounclcd the retreat, and it became for the time 
a scene of sauve qui peut. The officers, lmo~ving the 
fearful predicament of their commander, exhorted their 
Inen to,charge forward ; but a private of the 44th, named 
Stewucl, who was af ter~ards~romotcd for his gallantry, 
alone obeyecl the call. At this critical juncturc Briga- 
clier Shelton's aclrnowledged courage redeemed the day ; 
for, exposing his owrl person to a, hot fire, lie stood firm 
amicht the crowd of fugitives, and "by his exhortatioils 
alid example at last rallied tbcm ; advancing again to 
the attaclr, again our men faltered, notwithstanding that 
the fire of the great guns from the cantonments, and 
that of Captain MtlclrenzieJs j aeailcllis from t l ~ c  north- 
east angle of the Mission Compound, together with a 
demonstration on the part of our cavalry, hacl greatly 
abiited thc slrdour of thc Afghhn horse. A thircl time 
did the Brigadier bring on his men to thc assault, 
which now proved successful. We became masters 
of the fort.* But what, in  tlie meantime, hail been 
* Tho followi~~g remn~ks of the "Naval and Milital~y Gazette" 
are worthy of aonsiclorstion :- 
" Wo would hero observo, with ro~pect to the ~ n n i c  amongst the 
troops at  the Rikh-bSshi fort, although not in~medi 'atol~ connected 
with o w  subjecl;, that, whilst it is the oSp~~i&l  ofice of dis- 
~ i l l l i n ~  to correct tho tcndetlcy to such disnsto~s, instances of the 
uort may be adduced, even in tho ranks of the bravost of tho brave. 
Nitpior tolls us, ' tha t  no age, no nation, ever sent forth braver 
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passing inside the fort, vhere, it mill be remembered, 
several of our bravc brethren had been shut up, as it 
were, in tlze lion's dcn ? 
On the first rctres~t of our mcn, Lieutenant Bird, 
with Colonel Maclccrell and scve1,al Eu~opeans, had 
hastily shut the gate by which the garrison had for 
the most part evacuated the place, sccnring the chain 
with n bayonet; the r ep~~l s s  outside, hotve~rer, en- 
couraged tbc enemy to r e t ~ ~ r n  i  great numbers, and, 
it being impossible to remain new the gate on account 
of the hot fix ponrecl i n  through the creviccs, our 
fcw heroes speeclily had the mortification to see 
their foes mot . only re-entering the wicket, but, 
having drawn the bayonet, i*llsh i n  with loud shouts 
through the now re-opened @te. Poor Maclrerel1,having 
fallcn, was literally liaclrecl t o  pieces, although still 
alive a t  the termination of the contest. Lieuteaant 
Bird, with two Sepoys, retreated into a stable, the 
door of which they closccl; all the rest of the men, 
encleavouriug to cscape th~ough thc wiclrct, mere met 
troops to 11attle than thoso vho storu~ed Badajos.' Yet, tho sumo 
omineilt vritor rolatcs, that, dnrillg tho raging of that storm, 'some 
of the soldiers, porcoiviug a IigLtod ma,Gch on tho ground, oried out, 
A millo ! " At that word, such is the power of imagint~tiou, thoso 
troops whom noithor tllo shro~~g burlie', nor cloop ditch, uor tho 
high walls, nor tho donclly fi1.e or tlie onemy, coulcl stop, fitnggerecl 
back, appalled by a chimora of thoir own raising; and, i n  this clis- 
order, a Frencli resorvo drove on tlleul with a firm au(l ri~pi<l charge, 
and pitching Rome men ovor the ~ d l s ,  and killing others outright 
again clea~ecl the ramparts, ovon to tho St.  Vhcent.' " 
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and slanghtered. Bird's place of concealment a t  first, 
i n  the con.lusion, escaped the  observation of the tern: 
-porarily triumphant AfghAns ; at last i t  was discovered, 
and an attack comrnenced a t  the door. This, being 
barricaded vith logs of wood, arid whatcver else the 
tenants of tlie stal~le could find, resisted their eflorts, 
~vliile 13ircl and his now solitary coinpa,nion, a Sepoy of 
the 37th Native Imfantry (the other having been struclc 
down), maintained as hot a, fire as they coul.d, each shot 
taking deadly effect from tile proximity of the party 
engaged. The fall of their compnnions deterred the 
mass of tlie assailants froin a simultaneous rush, which 
must have succeeded; and thus that  t ruly cllivalrous 
young officer stood at bay mith his equally brave com- 
rade for upvards of a quarter of an hour, mhen, having 
only five cartriclges left, i n  spite of having riflecl the 
pouch of tllc dead man, they Tvcre rescned as related 
above. Our troops literally found the  pair r r  prim and 
lonely there," upwards of thirty of the enemy having 
fallen by theh- uullassistecl prowess.* 
Our loss on this occasion was not less thm two hun- 
I 
dred lcilled and wounded. Four neighhouiing forts 
weTe immediately evacuated b y  the enemy, and occupied 
by ouil troops : thcy were found to  contain about one 
thousand four hundred mauncls of grain; i n  removing 
:* Lioutenrtnt Bird's promising career was tragically closed on 
tho subaequont ~e t rca t ,  when almost within ~ i g h t  of Ja11616b&d. 
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which no timc was lost, but as i t  was not fo~uld prac- 
ticable to bring off morc than half before night-fall 
Captain Boyd, tlie Assistant Commissary-Gcneral, 
requested Brigadier Shelton that a guard might be 
thrown into a, sinall fort, where it  must be left for 
tlie night; this was, homcvcr, rcfusecl, and on tlie 
following morning, as might have bee11 expected, the 
grain was d l  gone : permanent possession was, however, 
talten of tlle Riltg-bBshi and Zulfilrk Por~s, the towem 
of the remainder being blown up 011 thc following day. 
3Jurnbel.s of Ghalzi horse ancl foot still maintaining 
their positioll on tllc SiyAlill Sang heights, Brigaclier 
Shelton moved his force towards that quarter. On 
reaching the base of the hill, firc was ol~ened from the 
two Horse Artillcry guns, which, with the firm fiont 
presented by olir troops, caused the enemy shortly 
to i*eti.re towards the city, ancl ere we tul~ned homeward 
not a man remained in sight. 
~ o u e q n b e y  13lh.-The enemy appeared in great forcc 
on the western heights, xvhere, haviug posted two guns, 
they fiised into cautoninents with considerable precision. 
A t  the earnest entreaty of the Envoy, i t  mas determined 
that a party, under Brigadier Shelton, should sally forth 
to  attack them, ancl, if possible, capture their guns. 
[Lady Sale observes :- 
"lt vas with great difficulty the Envoy persuaded 
the General and Brigadier to consent to a force going 
out; and it was late before the troops werc ready." . . 
"The General again (as in the late attack on the 
Rik&-BRslii fort) asked the Envoy if he would take the 
responsibility of sending ont the troops on himself; 
and, on his concecling, the force was scnt. The Envoy 
had also much angry discussion on this point with 
Brigadier Shelton. 
But all these delays of conference lost much time, 
ancl i t  mas between 4 ancl 5 p.nf. bcfore operations 
commenced .,'I 
The force orderccl for this sciivce was not ready until 
3 p.nl. I t  co~isisted of the following troops :-two 
squadrons 5th Light Cavalry, under Colonel Chambers ; 
one squadron Shiih's 211d Irrcgrdar Horse, under Lieu- 
tenant Le Geyt ; one t ~ o o p  of Skinner's Horse, under 
Lieutenant Walker ; tllc Bocly Guard ; six companies 
Her Ivlajestg's 44tl.1, under Major Scott ; six companies 
37t11, under Major Smayne ; follr compai~ies Sh611~s 6th 
Illfnntry, under Captain Iloplrins ; ancl one Rorse 
Artilleiy gun and one Mountain nain (10. under myself, 
escorted by a company of 6th SMhJs uilcler Captain 
Mashall. After quitting cantoilments, the troops took 
thc direction of a gorge betwceli the two hills bounding 
the plain, rlistant about a mile (the enemy's horse 
crowning that to the left), and advanced in separate 
columns at so brisk a pace, that it seemed a race which 
should arrive first at the scene of action. The infantry 
had actually reached the foot of the hill, and welt on 
the point of ascending to the charge, ere the Horse 



























Artillery gun, which had been detaincrl in tllc rcnin by 
sticking fast in a ca~ial, could be got rcxcly for action ; 
nor had more than one roulid of grape been iii.etl, crc 
the advance, lcd on by the gallant Major 'L'llairi, llad 
closed upon tlie foe, who rcaolutcly stood tlleir gromid 
on the s ~ ~ m m i t  of tllc ridge, nnd mdlincliing1,ly rrccivcrl 
the rliscliargc of our musketrj, which, strmlgc to say, 
even at  the short rangc of tcn or twclvc yards, sccinctl 
to do littlc execution l From this cause tlic enemy, 
growing bolder evcry moment, advniiccd close up to 
the bayomts of o ~ ~ r  infantry, upou wliuln tllcy pi~csscil 
so pcrscverillgly, as to succccd in rll0iving tllcrn 11:~ck- 
wards to thc foot of tllc Ilill, wnundirlg Major '1'11;~ill 
on tlie lcft slloulder and s:~l)ring scvcrnl of tllc nlon. 
Scvcral rouiids of grape  rid sl.lral)ucll wort now l ~ o ~ ~ r c d  
iu, and thrcw tllern into some confusion, wlic!l~cul~on a
timely charge of o11r cavalry, Auilcrson's IIorsc tnltilig 
the lead, drove tlicln agnill up the llill, when our ill- 
fantry once morc advancing' cal*ricd thc heigllt, thc 
enemy retreating along the ridge, closcly followctl 1ly 
our troops, and ~~bnnrloni~ig their guns t o  us. Thc I-Iorse 
Artillery gun now took lip a position in tlle nlidillc of 
the gorge, whence it played wit11 effect on a large 
bocly of horse asscmblcd on tlle plain wcst of thc hill, 
who fortllwitl~ retreated to a distance. 
[Lady Sale, eye-witness to this scene, writcs tlms :- 
" The Afghhn cavc~lry charger1 furiously ~ O I V I I  the 
hill upon our troops in close columll. Tlic 37th Native 
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Infaxtry were leading, the 441th in the centre, and the 
Sh6hJs 6th in the rear. No square or balls were 
formed lo receive thcm. All was a regular confusion; 
my vevy Iiea~-tjelt as i t  leapt to m y  teeth wlien I saw 
the Afyhn'ns ride cba~l, tl~rouyh them. The onset was 
fearful. They looked like a cluster of bces; but we 
beat them, and chove them L I ~  again. 
"The 5th Cavalry and Anderson's Horse charged 
them up the hill again, and drove them along the ridge. 
Lieuteni~nt E v e  got the Horse Artillcry gun 
illto the gorge, between the Bemhrti hills and that to 
the left (the gorge lcading to the plaiu towards thc 
lake). From this position, he soon clearcd that plain, 
which mas covered with horsemen."] 
O w  troops had now got into ground where i t  was 
"*I" 
impracticable for Horse Artillery to follom. I accord- 
ingly forward with one artilleryman and a 
supply of drag-ropes and spikes, to look out for the 
deserted guns of the enemy ; one of these, a 4-pounder, 
mas easily removed along the ridge by n party of the 
ShBli's 8th Infantry; but the other, a 6-pounder, was 
awkwardly situated in a ravine half-way domn the 
side of the hill, our troops, with the Mountain Train 
3-pounder, being drawn up along the ridge just above it. 
The eveuing mas now fast closing in, and a large bocly 
of Afghhn infantry occupied some enclosures on the 
plain below, mhence they kept up so hot a fire upor1 
the gun, as to render its l'emoval by no means an easy 
mtre, and thc 
Ir balls were 
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taslr; but the Envoy having sent us a message of 
entreaty that no exeytions miglit be spared to coml~lete 
tlie triumph of the day by bringing off 60th the 
enemy's guns, and the furtller detention of the troops 
being attended a i th  risk, as the enemy, though driven 
from tlle hill, still maintained a threatening attitude 
below, I descended with the Horse ht i l lery gunner, 
and, having driven in  a spike, retusrted to assist in 
making sure of the captured 4-pounder. This, from 
the steepncss of the hill, and the numerous water-cuts 
which everywhere intersected tlic plain, provcd % some- 
what troublesome business. Lieutenant Macartney, 
however, with a company of the Sh:ihJs 6th Infantry, 
urged on his men with zeal, and we at last liad thc 
satisfactioil to deposit our prizc sr~fe within the canton- 
ment gates. Meanwhile tlie enemy, favoured by the 
darlmess, prcssecl hard upon our returning troops, and 
by dint of incessant firing and shouting rendered their 
homeward march somewhat disorderly, effecting, how- 
ever, but little damage. 
I t  mas no s~nall clisadvantage under which we la- 
boured, that no temporary success of ow troops over 
those of the enemy could be followed up, nor even pos- 
session be retained of the ground gained by us at the 
point of the bayonet, owing to the necessity of with- 
drawing our men into their quarters at night. On 
reaching the cantonment, we found the garsison in a 
state of considerable alarm, and a continual blaze of 
9 
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mzlslcetry illuminating the whole line of rampart. Tlik 
had arisen from a demonstration of attaclr liaving been 
by the enemy on the s ~ ~ t h - ~ ~ s t  bastion, which 
had been immediately checlred by a few rounds of grape 
from the guns, aiid by a wcll-dirccted fire from the 
jagailchis under Captain Maclrcnzie; but it mas long ere 
quiet be restored, the men corl t inui l~~ to c l i scha~~e 
their pieces at they lrnem not what. 
Our infantry soldiers, both Eui~opca~l ancl Native, 
might have taken a sah"ary lesson from thc Afglikiis 
in tlle use of their fire-arms; thc latter, as a general 
rule, taking steady rleliberate aim, and selclorn illrowing 
away a siugle shot; ~vhercns our men sceined to  fire 
entirely at random, without ally aim at all ; licilcc the 
impunity with wliich the Afghhn horscmcn bravccl tlie 
discharge of our nluslrctry in this day's action within 
twelve yards, not oiic shot, to all a~pea~allce,  t i ~ l r i n ~  
effect. 
[Lady Sale rema~lrs as follows :- 
Tllere is also a peculiarity in tllc Afglldii motla of 
fighting-that of every liorscman carrying n foot- 
soldier behind him to tllc scene of action, wllcrc hc 
is clropped, w i tho~~ t  the fatigue of wallring to his post. 
The horsemen have two or tlirce match-locks or jazsils 
each, slung at tlicir baclrs, and arc vcry expcrt in firing 
at the gallop. Thesc jazails carry much f~1rt;lier than 
our rn~slrets .~~] 
I n  this affair Captain Paton, Assistant Quartermaster- 
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General, had the misfortune to receive a mound in thc 
left arm, which rendered amputatiolz necessalSy, ancl the 
valuable services of one of ouy most efficient staff officers 
were tlius lost. This mas the last success our arms 
were destinecl to experience. Heucefo~ward it becorncs 
my weary tslslr to relate a catdogue of misfortunes and 
difficulties, mhich, follovi~~g close upon cach other, dis- 
heartened our officers and soldiers, and finally sunk 
us all into irretrievable ruin, as tl~ough I-leaven itself, 
for its own inscr~~table purposes, hail doolned our 
dowilfdl. But here it  is fit I should relate the scenes 
that had all this while been enacting at our solitary 





EVENTS I N  KOHISTAN, AS RELATED BY MAJOR POTTINQER. 
-TREACHERY OF THE NIJRAO CHIEFS. -MURDER OF 
LIEUTENANT RATTRAY. - GALLANTRY OF LIEUTENANT 
HAUGHTON. -ATTACK BY TUB ENEMY ON THE CHAR- 
IKAR CANTONMENT. - MAJOR POTTINQER WOUNDED. 
- DEATH OF CAPTAIN CODRINGTON. - DEPLORABLE 
SCARCITY OF WATER.-DIBAPPEARANCE OF DR. GRANT. 
- R I T R I A T  TOWARDS KABUL. - PIlEILS OF MAJOR 
POTTINUER AND LIEUTENANT HAUGHTON. - THEY 
ESCAPE TO CANTONMENT. 
ON the 15th November, Major Pottinger, C.B., and 
Lieutenant I-Iaughton, A rljutant of the Sh611's 4th or 
' G b r l r a h  Regimen%, came in from ChBril&r, both severely 
wounded, the former in the leg, and the latter having 
]lad his right hand amputated, besicles several cuts in 
the neck and left arm. Their escape was wonderful. 
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in I<ol~ist,in, from the commencement of the insurrec- 
tion up to the present date. 
It appears, from Major PottingeyJs account of the 
transactions of that period, that it was not without 
reason he had so urgently applied to Sir William Mac- 
naghten for reinforcements. Towards the end of Octo- 
ber, premonitory signs of the corning tempest had 
become so unequivocally threatening as to confirm 
Major Pottinger in  his worst suspicions, and in his 
conviction that order could not possibly be restored 
~vitl~out a departure on the part of Government 
from the long- suff erilig system which had been obsti- 
nately pursued with respect to Nijnio in particular; 
bnt his conviction aloiie could do little to stem the 
torrellt of coming events. 
A b o ~ ~ t  this time Mir Masjidi, a contumacious rebel 
against the ShfihJs authority, who had been expelled 
from ICohist6n during General Sale's campaign in that 
country in 1840, and who hacl talrcn refuge in Nijr;io 
after the fashion of many other men of similar stamp, 
obstinately refusing to make his submission to the Sh&h 
even upon the most favourahle terms, openly gut him- 
self at the head of a powerful and well-organized party, 
with the avowed intention of expelling the Pilingis and 
overturning the existing government. He was speedily 
joined by tlie most influential of the NijrfLo chiefs. A 
few of these made their appearance before LaghmBni, 
where Major Pottinger resided, and proffered their ser- 
vices towards tlie maintenance of the public tranquillity. 
I t  will be seen that their object was the blaclrcst 
treachery. 
I shall here relate Major PottirlgerJs story, almost in 
his own words, as given to me. 
I n  the course of the forenoon of the 3rd of No- 
vember, Major Pottiiiger had an interview with a 
ilumber of the more influential chiefs in his house or 
fort, ancl, about nooil, went into the gardeli to receivc 
those of inferior rank, accompanied by his visitors : 
here they were joined by Lieutenant Charles Rattray, 
Major Pottinger's Assistant. I n  discussing the ques- 
tion of the rewards to wliich their services might entitle 
them, the head men declared that, although they were 
willing to agree to Major PottingerJs prol~ositions, they 
could not answer for their clansmen, and the above- 
mentioned petty chiefs, who were awaiting tlie expected 
conference at some little distance. Mr. Rattray, ac- 
cordingly, in company with several of the principal, 
joined the lattcr, and, shortly after, proceedeil wit11 
them to an adjoiliing field, wherc n ~ ~ m l ~ e r s  of their 
armed retainers were assembled, for the purpose of 
ascertaining their sentiments on the subject of the con- 
fe~ence. Whilc thus engaged, this most promising ancl 
brave young ofticer apparently became aware of intended 
foul play, and turned to leave the field, when he was 
immediately shot down. At this time Major Pottinger 
was still sitting in his garden, in company with several 
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of the above-mentioned chiefs, and had just received 
intelligence of the purposed treachery from Muhammad 
1Cgsim XhiLn, a clibRahi of I-I&sirbQsh, a small detach- 
ment of which composed a pal% of his escort: he had 
with difficulty comprehended the man's meaning, which 
was conveyed by hints, when the sound of firiug was 
heard :-the chiefs that vere wit11 him rose and fled, 
and he escal~ed into tlie fort by the postern gate ; which 
having secured, he, from the terre-plein of the rampart, 
saw poor Mr. Rattray lying badly wounded in the field 
at the distance of some thrce lnuldred yards, and the 
late pretended negotiators making off in d directions 
TVith the l~lunder of the camp of the H$r~irbiish detacli- 
ment. Of these plunderers a payty passing close to 
Mr. Rattray, and observing that life was not extinct, 
one of them put his gun close to his head, and blew 
his brains out,-several others discharging their pieces 
into diEerent parts of his body. 
Major Pottinger's g~mrd, being by this time on tlie 
alert, opened a fire, ~vhich speedily cleared the open 
space ; but the enemy, seeking shelter in the numerous 
watercourses, aiid under tlie low walls surrounding the 
fort, harassed them incessarltly until the appearance of 
Lieutenant H a ~ ~ ~ h t o n ,  Adjntant of the Gkrlcah 1Eegi- , 
ment, who, advancing from ChSrilcBr, where the corps 
was cantoned, distant about t h e e  miles, speedily drove 
the assailants from their cover. Captain Codrington, 
who commanded the regiment, chanced to be in Lagh- 
m&ni at this very time ; and, on Mr. Haughton's ap- - 
proach, he led out a sortie and joined him : the slshmisl~ 
mas sharp, and the enemy suffered severely, Captain 
CocKngton remaining in possession of an adjacent 
canal, the banls of which was immediately cut to supply 
the  tank of tlie fort vith water in case of accidents. 
The evening had now closeci in, and the enemy hacl 
retired, talciag up a position which seemed to khreateil 
the ChArilrAr roacl. Captain Corlrington accordingly 
left LaghmiLili in haste, strengthening Major Pottinger's 
party to about one hundred men, these having to gar- 
risoll four small forts. H e  promised, however, to relieve 
them the next morning, and to sencl a further supply 
of ammunition, of which there only remained one 
thousand five hundred rounds. Captain Codringtoil 
rcached ChjLrik&r unmolested; and the enemy, retarn- 
ing to their former point of attnck, casriecl off their 
dead wit11 imp~mity, the gaiqrison being too weal< to 
lnalse a sally. On the morning of the 4t11, Captain 
Coclrington despatched four companies with a 6- 
pounder g~m, according to promise. Their march 
caused numbers of the enemy now assembled on all 
sides to reheat; but one lwge body remained in posi- 
tion on the skirts of the mountain range to their right, 
and threatened their flank. Lieutenant I-Iaugfiton, who 
commanded, detached Ensign Salusbury mith a company 
to disperse them, which, in spite of the disparity of 
numbers, was effected i n  good style. Unhappily the 
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Gfk~l~ahs, being young soldiers, and flushed mith success, 
pressecl forward in pursuit with too much eagerness, 
regrrsdless of tlie recalling bugle, vhen at last Mr. 
Sdusbury with difficulty halted them, and endeavol~~ed 
to retrace his steps. The enemy, observing the error 
they had committed in separating themselves too far 
from their main body, rallied and followed them in 
their retreat so closely, as to oblige Mr. Salusbury 
. .  to halt his little band fi.ecl~iently, and face about;. 
Lieutenant l-Iaughtoli, conseq~~ently, in order to extri- 
cate the compromisecl company, haltecl his convoy, ancl 
despatched the greatest p a ~ t  of his men in the direction . . 
of the skirmish. All this el~couragcd the other parties 
of the enemy who had retirccl to return, against whom, 
in llulnbers not less than four thousand men, I-Iaughton 
maintained his gl+ound until rejolnecl by his subaltern, 
when, seeing tlie hopelessness of making goocl his m a y  
to LaghmQni, he retreated, and regained in safety the 
fortified barraclcs at Chfirilcill.. Many of the men fell 
in this expedition, which would have proved infinitely 
more disastrous, from thc number of the enemy's 
cavalry, who latterly seemecl to gain confidence at every 
stage, but for the extraordina1.y grillantry and conduct , 
of Lieutenant Harighton, who, wit11 a handful of m e n  
and a @In, protected the rear of our over-matched 
troops. Mr. Salusbuy was mortally wounded, and the 
trail of the gun gave may just as the party reached 
Chkrikhr. 
This disappointment lecl Major Pottinger to believe 
that no second attempt would be made to relieve them ; 
and as he had no nmmunition beyond the supply in the 
men's pouches, he determined to retreat on Chirikkr 
after dark : the better to hide his intention, he ordered 
g a i n  to be brought into the fort. Meantime the 
Chh ikk  cantonment was attacked on all sides, and in 
the afternoon large bodies of the cnemy were detached 
thence, and joining others from that part of the valley, 
recommenced their investment of LaghmAni. That 
part of the Major's garrison, which occupied the small 
fort to  the east of the principal one, defended by him. 
self, altllough their orders were not to vacate theb 
posts until after clarlr, being panic-striclren, did so at 
once, gaining the stronger position, but leaving behind 
several wounded comracles and their havildiir, who re- 
mained staunch to his duty : these, however, were 
brought off. Major Potthger then strengthened the 
garrison of a cluster of' adjacent huts, which, being sur- 
rounded by a sort of rude fortification, formed a toler- 
ably good outworlr ; but the want of European officers 
to control the men was soon lamentably apparent, and 
in a short time the Gdrkahs, headed by their native 
officer, abandoned the hamlet, followed as a matter of 
course by the few Afghin soldiers attached to Captain 
Codrington's person, who had remained faithful until 
then. This last misfortune gave the enemy cover up 
to the very gate of the maiu stronghold, and before 
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c1a71< they had succeecled in getting possession of a 
gun-shed built against its outer wall, whence they com- 
menced mining. 
AS soon as night had failsly closecl in, Major Pottinger 
drew together, the G6l.kah garrison outside the postern 
gate, under pretence of making a sortie, and thus scpa- 
ratacl thcm from tlic Afgl~fins and their followers, who 
remained insidc; he then marched for Cli,irilr&r, the 
garrison of the remaining fort joining liim as lie drew 
on ; he passed by the investing posts in perfact silence, 
talcii~g liis route along the skirts of the mountains to 
avoicl the main roacl, and axrived in safcty at  ChiLrikiir; 
In Luglirndrii he abandoned the hostages whom he had 
talcell from the ICohistBn chiefs, tvro boxes of treaswe 
containing two thousand rnpees, about sixty stand of 
ja~ails, all his office rccords, Mr. Rattray's, Dr. Graiit's, 
ancl his o-vvn persolla1 property, and a numbcr of horses 
belonging to himself, and the above-meutioned two 
officers, and to some hprselvlen who llad not deserted; 
for the greater part of his mountCrT escort had fled 
in the beginning of the affray. The Hirhtis, and 
seven or eight Pesh6\1larisJ were the only Afghhns 
~vho adhered to him ; the I<,ibulis had deserted to a man 
immediately on the murder of Mr. Battray; they 
had bcen much disgusted tlie ~rececling month, as 
well as their comrades who proved unfaithful too, 
by the audden reduction of 'a portion of I~ is  escort; 
which naturally led them to apprehend that their 
Livelihoocl from the British service was of a precarious 
nature. 
On the morning of 5th November large bodies of the 
enemy closecl in rouncl the Ch6rilc;il. barracks, and 
abont 7 oJcloclc they attaclced the outposts with a spirit 
engendered by the success of the preccdirig evening. 
Captain Codrington requested Major Pottinger to take 
charge of what artillery he had, and to move a squadroil 
'r 
in support of the skirmisl~ers, wliich he did. The 
slrirnlishers were driven in, and, wliile rctreating, Major . 
Pottinger was woundcd in the leg by a muslcct-shot. 
Encouraged by this, and by the unfinished state of the 
vorlrs round the barracks, in the eutrance of which 
there was no gate, the enemy advancer1 with great de- 
termination to the attack, and clislodgcd the Gdrlcahs 
from some mud huts outside, which were still occupied 
by a part of the regimcnt. I n  this affair Captain Cod- 
rington, an officer of whose merits i t  is difficult to spealc 
too highly, fell mo~..tdly mounded. T l ~ e  main post 
was, howevcr, successf~~lly defcndecl, and the enemy 
driven back with considerable loss ; upon which Lieu- 
tenant I-Iaughton (who had now succeedecl to the com- 
mand, the only remaining  office^ being Mr. Rose, a I 
mere youth), made a sortie and drove the cnemy out 
of the gardens occupied by them in the morning, main- 
taining his ground against their most despcrnte efforts 
until after dark. Relief was then sent to the garrison 
(consisthg of about fifty men) of Klloja MirJs fort, 
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of Klloja Mir's fort, 
because it commalldcd the interior of the barracks on 
the southern side. 
From tbis time the unfortunate horses and cattle of 
thc gar.l.rison vere obliged to enclwle the extremity of 
thisst, there beillg no vatcr for them, and the slipply 
for even the figl~ting-men scanty in the extreme, ob- 
tained only 'on1 a fern pools in the ditch of tbe ram- 
p a ~ t ,  wllicb hacl bcen formed by a seasonable fdl of 
rain. II~wing the 6th the enemy renewed their attaclr 
in augmcntccl numbers, the lvhole population of the 
country aPparcritly s~varming to the scene of action. 
Notmitlistnncling two successful sorties, all thc outyosts 
mere clriven in hy darlr, ancl thenceforth the gal~ison 
mas coufined to the barrack itself. 
On thc 7th the enemy got possession of I<hoja Mir's 
fort : the regimental m6nshi had been gained over, and 
through him the native officer  as iliduced to surrender. 
l+om the towers of that fort, on the 8th) the enemy 
offered terms, on tlie colldition that all the infidels 
shoulil embrace Muhammadanism. Major Pottinger 
replied that they had come to aicl a Mnhamnlaclan 
sovel+cign in the recovery of his rights; that they con- 
sequently were within the pale of Islftm, and exempt 
fsom coercion on the score of religion. Tlie enemy 
rejoincd, that the king himself had ordered them to 
attaclr the I<&fitfirs, ancl wished to know if Major Pot- 
tinges would yield on receiving an order. I-Ie refused to 
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do so, except on the production of a written docnment. 
All this time the garrison vas sorely galled from the  
post of vantage in possession of the enemy. 
On the 9thJ the enemy were enabled by the careless- 
ness of the guard to blo~v up a part of the sonth-west 
tower of the barracks; but, bcfore they could profit by 
the breacll and the panic of the men, Mr. I-Iaughton 
rallied the fugitives, and, leading them back, s e c ~ ~ r e d  
the top of the parapct wall with a barricade of boards 
and sand-bags. 
On the loth, the officers bevrr their last pool of water, 
and served out hay  a wineglass to each fighting-man. 
On the l l t h ,  all could not share even in that miserable 
proportion, and their sufferings from thirst wcre dread- 
ful. During the night r7, sortie was madc, mcl some of 
the followers~ljrought i n  a little water fi701n a distant 
place, the sight of which only served to aggravate the  
distress of the majority ; still, however, the fortitude of 
these brave and hardy soldiers remained unsl~alcen, 
although apathy, the result of intense suffering, espe- 
cially among I-Iindiis, began to b e n ~ ~ m b  their faclllties. 
On the 12thJ after dark, Mr. Haughton ordered out 
a party to cover the vater-carriers in an attempt t o  
obtain a supply ; but the over-harassed Se JOYS, unable 
to restrain themselves, dashed out of the ranks oil ap- 
proaching the coveted element, instead of standing t o  
their arms to repel the enemy, and, consequently, the 
expedition failed in its object. Another sortie, consist- 
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owcvcr, t l l c  fortitude of 
rs ren~:tinccl nrislirrl~en, 
intcnso sllffel*ing, espc- 
)m1tit1111 t l i r i r  fncul t ies .  
I I a u g l i t o ~ ~  ordcrecl o u t  
'rim% i ~ i  XU a t t e m p t  t o  
1:lrnssed So )oys, ~xrlnble  
uf; of tlic rnlilis 0x1 ap- 
illstcar1 of s t a n d i n g  t o  
nnrl, consequent ly ,  the 
Aliothcr sortie,  consist- 
ing of two cornpanics under Ensign Rose, mns then 
ordered out, one of which, liaving separated from the 
other, dispersed in search of water ; that under Mr. Rose 
llimself fcll on a post of the bcsiegcrs, every mall of 
which they bayoneted ; but, being unaccountably strnck 
with a panic, the men fled back to the bai,racks, leaving 
MY. Rose almost alone, who was then obliged to return, 
having accomnl~lished his object but partially. These 
circumstances mere co~nmnnicnted by Mr. Hnugliton to 
Major Pottinger (whose mouncl had disnblecl him from 
active bodily co-operation in these last evc~lts), together 
wit11 the stai-tling intelligence that the corps \rras dmost 
wholly disorgaaized from the large nmount of lcillcd 
and wonndcd, tlle hardsllips it had undergolle, thc 
utter inefficiency of the native officers, who had no 
sort of control over the solclicrs, the cxhanstion of thc 
men from constant cluty, and the totnl want of water 
and pl-ovisioas. 
Relief from IC&bul, for which Major Pottinger had 
written repeatedly, seemed now l~opcless, and an attempt 
at  protractecl defence of the post appeared likely to 
cnswe tlle ctestruction of its l~rave defcnclers. Alajor 
Pottinger considel~ed that the only remnining chance 
of saving any portion of tlie ~cgirnellt was a retreat to 
1CAl~ul; andJ although that was abuudantly pel.iiousJ 
he entertained a hope that a fern of the most active 
men who were not encnmbered with wives and children 
might escape. Then mas felt most bitterly the impolicy 
of tile encomqement ~vhich had been helcl out  to all 
the recruits to bring their families with them, 011 
what, even at the time of their being raised, was 
lookcci 011 by tllc most able officers as likely t o  provc 
a c:t~n~aigi~ of several years. Mr. Haughton coincided 
iu tlie Major's viems, ancl it was agiseed, to ensure 
sccrecv, that the men sli0111cl not be informed of their 
intentions u~itil pnrrtdecl for the march. 
Tl~is  ~vretcliecl state of things continued until theafter- 
noon of the 13t11, mllcnAfr. Haugliton cliscovered amongst 
tllc Parijil~i artillerymen two who had deserted a few 
clays Iwcviot~sly, ancl mlio appai-eatly had returned for 
thc purpose of seducing t l i e i~  com~acles. H e  imme- 
diately scizecl them ; but, while he mas in the act of 
tlicir apprehension, thc jemad:ir of tlie artillery, himself 
a Pniijii1,i Mussulmiin, snatched a smord from a by- 
stander, arid cut domil that officer, repeating his blows 
as lie lily on tllc ground. Before the astonished 
Glirlcalls coulcl draw their knives or handle tlieb - muslcets, this miscreant, follomecl by all the artillery- 
mcil aud the greater number of the Muhammadans 
in the bnrmch, rushed out of tlie gate and escaped. 
The tumult and confusion occasioned by this im- 
pressed Major Pottinger with the idea that the enemy 
]lad rlriven the men from tbe walls; under this 
impression he caused himself to be carried to  the 
maill gate, but on his arrival he found that Dr. Grant 
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ic21 2lnd hcen Iielcl out to all 
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ncl i t  mns agreed, t o  ensulc 
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Ha~lglkto~i discolrererl ~lrnoilgst 
two mlio liar1 cleserted a fen7 
appn~.e~ltly had  returned fo r  
their co~urntles. I-le imme - 
wliilc lie was i n  t h e  act of 
narl:'L~* of tlie arti l lery, himself 
sword from a by- 
?pentiiig liis blows 
z t h e  astorlisherl 
or lla~lclle their  
.>llomcd by all  the artillery- 
)ut of the gate axid escal~ed. 
011 occasiolled by tliiis im- 
:it11 tlie idea that t h e  enemy 
nm tlie malls ; u n d e r  this 
rnself to be carried to tlzc 
ival lie found that Dr. Grant  
and 1.allied the  men. The 
native officers iinmediatcly gail~crccl routid him, with 
many of the Scpoys, to assert tlicir fidelity ; I ~ u t  de- 
morrtlizatio~l liad cvidciitly progressed fearfully, as 
m:~y be judged from tlie fitct tliat tlie ganison had 
11lmldered tlie trcasurc and the quarters of tlic deceased 
C:~ptain Cothington the iiivta~lt the Xajor llad left 
them, alld tliat in the face of the ciictny's fire tlicy Iiad 
plllletl dolm the officers' hoses, wllich liad 11eei1 piled 
11p ns traverses to 1~1'0tcct the doorw:~y, brolccu them 
open, arid pillaged tllcm. Dr. Grant. tlieil niiiputatcd 
Mr. Ilaugl~ton's right hand, and hastily dressed the 
sovere wou~ids 11rhic1i he lind reccived mil liis lcft a rm 
and on 11is necl;. I11 thc cvcniiig the doctor spiked 
all the gulls with his omn htmds, and tht! g;lrrisoii 
t l ~en  left t l ~ e  barraclrs by the postenl gate. Tllc ndvullce 
nns led by Mnjor Pottirlger (Alr. I-laugllton, who 
accom1lniiied him, being una1)lc to do lilore than  sit 
~nqsively OIL his liorse), Dr. Grnllt brouglit out tllc 
miin body, and Ensigll IEose, wvitll tllc Qu:~rtormnstcr 
Scrgea~it, coinmanded tlie real*. 
Notwitlistanding the prcvions suKeriiigs of tllese 
unfortunate men, it rnay be said that beye conimcnced 
their red disasters. I n  vain did Mnjor Pottiuger 
attempt to lead his men to seizc a buildirig generally 
occupied by the enemy after night-fi~ll, by the 
possession of which tlie exit of the mail1 body from 
the barYaclcs might be covered. 111 fact, it was with 
rnIlch difficulty that he eventually auccecded in h d t -  
, 10 
ing them at about half a mile from the barracks 
until the main body and rear should close up. T h e  
mcn were naturally occupied entirely with their 
families, and such property as it had been impossible 
to  prevent theb bringing away; and discipline, t h e  
only source of hope under such cbcumstances, was at 
an end. 
After the junction of the main body and rear, Dr. 
Grant suddenly disappeared, and was not afterwards 
seen. 
The regiment then proceeded dong the road to Sinj i t  
Dara, where Major Pottinger ]mew that water could 
be procured. On reaching the first stream t h e  las t  
remnant of control over this disorderly mob mas l o s t  ; 
much delay took place, and, in moving on, the advance 
bccame suddenly separated from the main body. Af te r  
an anxious search Major Pottinger effected a rejunction. 
At Sinjit Dara they quitted the road, to avoid alarm- 
ing the villages and any outposts that might be  sta- 
tioned there; and much time was lost in regaining the 
track from the other side; at IstBlif the same man- 
aeuvre was practised. Major Pottinger now found very 
few indined to push on; exhaustion from the pain  of 
his wound precluded the possibility of his being of a n y  
further use as a leader ; and he determined to push 
on with Mr. Haughto~l towards KLbul, although -6th 
faint hope that the strength of either would prove 
adequate to the exertion. Having no guide, they go t  
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. from the pain of 
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~u l ,  altllougl~ .with 
thcr would prove , 
.lo pide,  they got 
into many difficulties; and day was breaking by the 
time tliey reached the range of mountains half way 
between ChBrilrBr and Kribul. Men and horses mere 
by this time incapable of further endurance : the latter, 
it m~is t  be remembered, liad bcen ten days without 
water previously to star,rf.ing, and fire days without 
food; tliey mere still upwaiads of twenty miles from 
any place of safcty ; their sufferings from tlieh wounds, 
fatiguc, hunger, and thirst, macle life a burden, and at 
this time despair liad almost obtaiiied a victory-bul 
God sustained them. 13y Mr. Hnughton's advice 
they sought shclter in a very deep but dry ravine, 
close to a small village, hoping tlint tlieir proximity 
to dangcr might prove a ,  source of silfety; as it was 
probable that tlie inhabitants, wlio by tliis time must 
have been on the alert, would scarccly tliinlr of looking 
for their prey closc to thch own cloors. The com- 
panions of Major Pottinger and Mr. Haughton werc 
a Sepoy of the regiment, a mcnshi, and the regimcntd 
haniail. I n  the forenoon they were darmed by n 
firing on the mountains above them; the cnuse of 
this, as it appeared afterwards, was tliat a few of the 
fugitive Gdrkalls had ascended the hills f o ~  safety 
(which, indeed, i t  was Major Pottingcr's wish to do, 
until he yielded to the arguments of his compaGon), 
whither they were pursued and massacred by the 
. country people. The rcst of the day passed in traltll- 
quillity; and again, under the friendly shroud of 
* 10 * 
darkness, having previously calc~~latcd thcir exact 
position, did this sorely-bcstcad little party resume 
their dangerous routo. I t  wa8 providential tlint Major 
Pottingel* had, from his habits as a tr:wrllcr tllrough 
u~~known and dificult regions, n c c ~ ~ ~ t o m e d  liirnsclf 
to ascertain :md rcincmbcr tlic l~carings of the niost 
co~~spicuous 1aridrn:~rk~ of tho conntrics 11c travcrsedJ 
i t  mas thcrt:forc coml~nralively cnsy for l i in~  to lcntl t l ~ c  
way over the stcnp anrl n~ggetl p c i ~ l ~ ~ ,  1)y wl~ich alone 
tlicy might llopc to fi~ld a s:rfc pntl~,-for tlict main 
road, and cvcn tllc more ncccssible tri~clrs atn.oss tllc 
tops of thc mountaius, were closcly bcsct, nncl w:~tcli- 
fircs glcamed in all dil.cctions. Indeed G11ul;inl-Muy:tn 
ud-dir, a distinguisl~cd partiza~i ill t l ~ c  S O I ' V ~ C ~  of tlic 
rebels, had been clcspatclictl from IC;il)ul, wit11 n 1n1m1)cr 
of his most active followers, pnrposcly to intc:rr:cpt 
I and scizc tlic Major, of ~vlvllosc fligl~t iiltclligrncc l ~ a d  
bccn carly rcceivcd, and :1ctll:111y 7vas :it t11:tt tinie 
patrolling those very I~oights over wllicll thc fi~gitivcs 
pawed. But t l ~ e  protci!tiilg 11:lnd of I)roviiloi~cc: T V : ~  
displayed not only i11 leading t l~cm un11:irmed tl~rongh 
tlic midst of thcir oncmics, but in supplying tllcm 
with mental Sortitudc and 1)odily strcngtli. Wcak aiid 
exhausted, tlicir hardy i ~ ~ i d  usually sure-footed Tarkmhn 
llorses could ficarccly strain 111) tlic almost irnpractioa1)le 
~ i d c  of the mountain, or plleserve t l~e i r  equilibrium in 
t l ~ c  sharp, suddcn desccnts wliicli t l~cy  cncountc!rcd, 
for path thcrc was none. On onc occasio11 Mr 
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Haughton, whose desperate wounds I have already 
described, fell off, and, being unable to rise, declared 
his determination of awaiting his fate w h e ~ e  he lay. 
The Major refused to desert him, ,md both slept for 
about one hour, when) m t w e  being a little restored) 
they pushed on until they descended into the plain 
of Alifgt, which tliey crossed, avoiding the fort of that 
name, and struggling up the remaining ridge that 
separated them fkom the plain of Kribul, they entered 
i t  by the southern exid of the IC6bu.I lake. Intending 
now to cross the cultivation, and to reach cantonments 
by the back of the Shhh's garden, Major Pottinger 
missed his roacl close to Qila-i-buland, and found 
himself within the enemy's sentries ; but being un- 
willing to a l a ~ m  them by retracing his stcps, after 
discoveilng his mistake, he led the wdy itwards Dih 
AfghLn. Here they were challenged by various out- 
posts, t o  whom they answered after the fashion of Argh:'Ln 
horsemen; but they were compelled, in order to 
avoid suspicion, actually t o  enter the city of Kkbibul, 
their only hope now being in  the slumberous security 
of the inhabitants at that hour (it being now about 
3 A.M.), and in the protection of their ilfgllsin dress m d  
equipments. The Gfitkah sepoy, who, strange to say) 
had kept up with them on foot, had his outwarcl man 
concealed by a luge  posthin, or sheep-skin cloak. They 
p r s u e d  their way though the lanes and bfisiir of the 
I city, without any interruption, except the occasior~d 
1 
gruff challenge of a sleepy watchman, until they 
gained the skirts of the city. There they mere like 
to  have been stopped by a picket which lay between 
them and thc cantonment. The disposition to a 
relaxation of vigilance as the morning approaches, 
which marlrs the AfghAn soldier, again befriended 
them; they had nearly passed the post befo~e they were 
pursued. Desperation enabled them to urge their 
nrearied l~orses into a pace, which barely gave them 
the advantage over their encmies who were on foot; 
and they escaped with a volley from the now aroused 
picket, the little Ghlrah freshening his way i n  the 
most snrp1,ising manner, considering his p~evious 
journey. A few hundred yards further brought them 
Pcitliin the ramparts of our cantonment, where they 
werc received by their brctlwen in arms as men risen 
from the dead. 
[The gallant Haughton still survives, as a Major- 
General and "Companion of the Star of .India," in  the 
Bengal Staff Corps, having fillcd with great credit 
sevcral important posts. 
Majoy Eldred Pottingel; C.B., the hero of I-IirM, 
having been compelled by failing health to seek a 
change of climate, was attacked by malignant fever at 
Hong-kong, where he died, aged 32, on the 13th 
November 1843, the anniversary of his retreat from 
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Chkik4r. A monument was erected to his memory, in 
the cathedral of Bombay, by public subscription, "in 
token of the admiration and respect in which his 
character as n, soldier and his conduct as a man are 
held by his friends in the Presidency."] 
152 THE KABUL INSURXtEUTION OF 184142. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
CONTEWPLATED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CANTONMENT  AT^ 
KABUL, AND REMOVAL TO THE BALA HIBAR.-THIS 
MOVENENT OPPOSED BY BRIGADIER 8HELTON.-DIS- 
APPOINTED EXPECTATION O F  REOBIVING AID FROM 
GINIRAL SALE. - MAEMUD KHAN'S PORT STRANGELY 
ALLOWED TO REMAIN I N  THE POSSESSION OF THE 
ENEiWY.-LETTER FROM THE ENVOY TO THE GENERAL. 
-UNPROFITABLE OPERATIONS AT THE VILLAGE OF 
BEMARU.-ARRIVAL OF MUHABINAD AKBAR IIHBN AT 
KABUL. 
November 16th . -T~~ imprcssion made on the enemy 
by the action of the 13th was so far salutary, that 
they did not venture to  annoy us again for several 
days. Advantage was taken of this respite to throw 
magazine snpplies from time to  time into the BLl6 
His&, a duty which was ably performed by Lieutenant 
Walker, with a ris6lah of Irregular I-Iorsc under cover 
of night." But even in this short interval of corn- 
parative rest, such was the wretched construction o 
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lorse under cover 
interval of com- 
I construction o 
khe cantonment, that the mere ordinary routine of 
garrison rlnty, and the necessity of closely mannirlg 
o m  long line of rampart both by day ancl night, was 
a severe trial to  the hcaltli and patienoe of the troops ; 
especially now that the winter began to slio~v symptoms 
of ~snusual severity. There seemed, indeed, every 
probal~ility of an early fall of snow, to which all loolred 
forwarcl with dread, as the ha~biiiger of fresh difficul- 
ties and of augmented suffeiing. 
These considerations, ancl tlie manifest superiority 
of thc I3516 Hisrir as a, military position, led to  the ewly 
discussion of thc exl~cdicncy of akandoning the can- 
tonment arid consolidntiiig our forccs i11 tlie above- 
mentioned stronghold. Tlie Erivoy himself was, from 
the first, grcatlyin favour of this movc, until over-ruled 
by the rnany objections urged against it by the milita~y 
authorities ; to which, as will be seen by a letter f ~ o m  
him presently quoted, he learnt by degrees to attach 
some weight himself; but to tlie vcry last i t  mas a 
measure that  had many advocates, and I venture to 
state my own firm belief that, had we at this time 
moved into the BLlh HisAr, I<tibul might have been 
still i n  our possession. The chief objections urged 
were, lst, the  dificulty of conveying our sick and 
wounded ; 2ndly, the want of fire-wood ; 3rdly, the want 
of forage for the cavalry; 4thly, the triumph that 
our abandonment of cantonments would afford the 
enemy; Sthly, the risk of defeat on the may +ither. 
On thc other hand i t  was advanced, 1st) that, though 
to carry the sick would be dificuZt, it still was not 
impossi6le ; for so short a distance two, or even three, 
men could be conveyed on each d a ;  some might 
manage to wallr, and the rest could be mounted on 
the y;ibfis arid camels, on top of their loads; 2ndly, 
although wood was scarce in the I3616 EIisiir, there was 
enough for purposes of coolring, and for the want of 
fires the troops would be amply compensated by the 
comparative ease and comfort; they would cnjoy in other 
respects; 3rdly, the horses must, in  the case of there 
being no forage, have been shot; but the want of 
cavalry would have been little felt in such a situ 
ation; Liithly, as we should have destroyed all that was 
valuable bcfbre leaving, the supposed triumph of the 
enemy would have been very short-lived, and would 
soon have given way to a feeling of disappointnlent at 
the valueless natul-c of their acquisition, and of dismay 
at the strength and security of our new position; Sthly, 
the distance did not exceed two miles, and one-half 
of that distance was protected by the guns of the Bait 
' EIisk. If  we had occupied the Siy;ih Sang hills with 
a strollg party, placing guns there to sweep the plain 
on the calltonment side, the enemy could have done 
little to impede our march, without risking a battle 
with our whole force in  a fair field, to whiclr, they 
were generally averse, but which would, perhaps, have 
been the best mode for us of deciding the sti+uggle. 
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vancccl, Ist, that,  though To remove so large a force, clogged with so many 
dificult, i t  still .rvi~s not thousands of camp followers, without loss of some 
ta~tce two, or even three, kind, was, of com*se, next to impossil~le; but ought l 
each cliili ; some niight wch , considerations to have interfered with a step 
t could be molinted 011 which would have been attended in the long run with 
bp of their loads; 2ncllyJ such great military and political advaiitages?. Our 
the 'B;ild I-Iislir, there ]\?as troops, once collected in the BBB Hislr, could have 
~ g ,  a ~ l d  for t h e  want of 
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ve destroyed all  that havc bcen ere long formed in oni, favour. Such were 
supposed. triumph of the thc chief arguments employcd on eitl~er side; but 
r short-lived, and rp-ould Brigadier Sheltoa having firmly set his face against 
ng of disappointment at tlie movement from the G~+st moment of its proposition, 
:quisition, ar~d of clismay all serious idea of i t  m m  gradually abandoned, though it 
l our lrcw position ; bthly, continued to tlie very last a subject of common d i -  
two miles, and one-half 
by the  guns of the B&ld Novembe?. 18th.-Accounts were this day received 
hc Siyhh Sang lrills with from Jall6l&bBd, that General Sale, having sallied 
.liere to sweep the plain from the town, had 'repulsed the enemy mith con- 
sideral~le loss. At the beginning of the insurrection, eneln y could have done 
without risking a battle General Sale's brigade mas at Gaudkmalc ; and I have 
air field, to which they already mentioned, that an order recalling it  to KEIgbul 
!ich would, perhaps, have was imqediatcly despatched by the Envoy. General 
xiding the struggle. . Sale, on receipt of it, summoned a council of war, by 
156 THa KABUL INSURREUTION 03' 1841.-42. 
which i t  was unanimously agreed to be impracticable to 
obey the order. The circumstances of llis march to 
Jall616bGd are already well known to tlic public. lllle 
hope of his return had tended ruuch to support uur 
spiiits ; our disappointment was therefore great to learn 
that a11 cxl~cctation of aid from that quarter was at ail 
end. Our eyes were now turncd towards tlic Kanclalt6r 
force as our last rcsourcc, though ail advance from that 
quarter sccmcd scarcely practicable so late in thc ?car. 
Mucll discussion took pl:~ce this evcrli~ig regarding 
the cxpedic:ncy of taking Mi~lllll~id 1<1rinYs foi't. Tllcre 
were many rcasons to urge in fl~vour of making the 
attempt. I t  was one of the cbicf resorts of the 
rebels during the day, and they had cstablishcd a 
battery of two guns under thc walls, from which t h y  
constantly fired upon our foraging pa~tics, and upon 
tlle south-cast bastion of cantonments. It was  bout 
nine hundred yarcls distant from our rampart, which was 
too far for breaching with t l ~ e  9-pounders, l ~ u t  n dry 
canal, which ran towards i t  in a zigzag direction, 
afforded facilities for u, ~cgu la r  approach within three 
hundred yards, of wliich advantage might 1i:rve beer1 
talccn to enable the artillery to nlake a hrcach. 
Secondly, this fort cornmandctl the road all tbc w:~y 
up to the 3616 EIisiir and the posscssior~ of it would 
at  ouce have sccurcd to us sn c:tsy connn1111ic:~tion 
wit11 tllat placc, and with t l ~ c  city. Thirdly, tlic 
Envoy dccli~rcd liis opinion that ' the moral offcct 
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derived. fiom its possession mould be more likely to 
create a diversion i11 our favonr, than any otller blow 
we could strike, aa the Afglihns llntl always attnclled 
great i~nportallce to its occupation and 'had n super- 
C stitious opinion that whatcver party held possession of it mere sure to bc ~ n a s t e ~ s  of ICAbul. Tliese 
consirlerntions had decided tlie General in favour of 
malcillg the attempt this vcry night, by l~lowing 
opcn the gate, and n storming party mas actually 
married for the duty ; but sane sudden ol~jections 
being raised, thc plan was given up, and llcver aftcr- 
wards resumed by the military. I t  was, liowcver, t11e 
cause of no small astonisliineiit to the oIficers ill t l i ~  
B:il;i IrIisAr, who, from tlleii* commandiug situation, 
could obsei,vr. all that took place on 110th sides, that 
Mahmdd TChhn's fort slioulcl llavc bccn suIferct1 to 
remain in the hancls of tlie enemy, tllough at night 
it was often garrisonecl by a mere handful of men. 
This fort, nevertheless, gavc abundant occupation 
to the ai*tiUeYy, who, when nothing elfie mas going on, 
were frequently ernployed in disturbing the enemy 
in that qnarter with one of the iron 9-pounders, and an 
h 
occasional shelling from the mort ar. 
November 19th.-A letter was this day received by 
the General from the Envoy to the following eft'ect :- 
That, all hope of assistance fiom Jall;iliCMd being 
over, it behoved us to take our future proceedings into 
consideration. He himself conceived it our imperative 
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duty to hold on as lollg as possil)lc in our prcucnt 
position, and Ile tliougllt wc inight even fitrugglc 
througll tllc wllolc winter by n1:ikili~ illc & ~ ~ h O l l l ~ ? ~ l : l ~ k ~  
and Christians live cliiclly up011 fl('sll, ~ t l ~ l [ l ~ ~ i l l ~  O U r  
supplies of to fail; 115' which II1(':LIlH, 35 tll(' 
essentials of woo(l ;~ll(l w:L~c~ '  H'CL'C! :~~lllll(l;lllt, 111: 
considcrcd our ~~ositioil ~nigllt l ~ c  rt~rltlorcltl iulprc~gt1al)lt~. 
A retreat ttownrtls d :ill;il:ihbd mould tc:r!~u riot r]rl\y wit11 
disaster, l ~ u t  dislionour, ant1 ougllt tiot tu 11o r:c111tc:111- 
platetl until tlic rcry Inst cstrcltiity. Tri tight or tcbtl 
days we slioul~l be bcttcr aljlo to judge: 1vli~t1ic:r sl~cll 
extremity slionld be rcsortcd to. Tu tli:11 coast:, n.(: 
should have to sacrifice not oiily tho vul11:~111(~ prol)i.I*ty 
of Govcm~~~cnt ,  but liis mnjcsty Slilil~ S11uj5, to N I I I ) ~ J I J L ' ~  
whose autliority me wcrc cniployotl by 0ovt:nil~icri t ; 
and cveu wcre we to make good our rctrc1ut; to J:~ll:il- 
Abfid, we should linve no sl~cltcr for our troops, : L I I ( ~  
our camp follo~vcrs mould :dl Ijc sacriiiced. I Ie  h;ul 
frequently tliougl~t ol  ucgotiating, but Iherc u.:~ 110 
party of suficiclit power arid iiiflucnae to protect 11s. 
Another nltcniativc ~vould to l ~ c  tliro\v oursclvc~ ilito 
the Bil6 I-Iis:ir ; but llc? feared that woulcl bc nho :L 
disastrous rctrcnt, to effect wliiall lnudl ~ ~ r ~ p c r t y  r lust 
bc r~eccssxrily ancriIicci1, Our hr:airy gull8 ~ ~ i ~ l i t  
be turned ngninst ne, nrld foot1 and fuol migllt I)c sr:lrtoc:, 
for a fllrthcr srtp~)ly of \vIiioli wc 111igllt 1 1 ~  clel,c!ntl(*llt 
on sorties into tlic city, ill which, if 11ct\t.cn, wu ulllst 
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of opinion that we should hold out; it mas still possible 
that reinforcemei~ts might arrive from Kanddlrir, or 
something might turn up in our favour; there weye 
hopes, too, that on the setting in of winter the 
enemy would disperse, R e  had been long disposed 
to recommend a blow being strucls to retrieve our 
fortunes such as talriilg Mahmdd KhiLn's fort ; but he 
had since reason to believe this would not answer. 
I n  eight or ten days, he concluded, it mould remain 
for the militmy authorities to  cleterrnine whether 
there was any chance of impltovmg our position, and 
to decide whethcr it wonlcl be morc prudent to attempt 
a retreat to Jall&l&bLcl, or to the Bd8 I-Iishr. I f  
provision sufficient for the winter could be procured, 
on no account would hc leave the catitonmelzt." 
November 22ncl.-The village of Bem;ir6 (or " hus- 
bandless," from a beautiful virgin who mas buried 
there) was situated about half a mile to the north of 
cantonments, on the Rohistjn road, at the north- , 
I 
east extremity of a hill which bounded the plain to tlie 
west. As it mas built on a slope, and within musket- 1 
shot, the  upper houses commanded a large portion of 
the  Mission Compound. Prom this village we for a I 
long time drew supplies, the Envoy largely bribing the 
proprietor, t o  which, however, the enemy in some 
measure put a stop, by talring possession of it every 
day. This morning, large bodies of Afg2l6n l~orse and 
foot, having again issued from the city, proceeded to 
crown tlle summit of the above-mc~ltioned hill. I t  
was determined, at the rccommendntion of the Envoy, 
to send a party of our troops to foreslall tlic cncmy in 
thc occupation of the villagc, and Major Sw:~ync, 5th 
Native Infantry, was appointed to t11:~t illltp, with n 
detachment colnposcd as follows :-a Wing 6th N;ltivc 
Infantry, two risillas Irrcgl~lar IIorse, orlo riu;il:i 6th 
bight Cavalry, and orlo Monntt~in Trnirl gull. 'I1llc 
piwty had already rcaclled thc village, wl~cn it was 
deemed proper to send after it a Horse Artillery 
grin, whicli I was req~iested by thc Gc~lcrnl to nccoin- 
pany. Mqjor Swnyne, howcvcr, it would sccm, found 
the village already occupied by a body of ICollistlinis, 
and the entrance bloclred up in such a malnicr t1m.t 
he considered i t  out of his power to force a paa- 
sage. On arriving at the place with the Horsc 
Artillery gun, I found him in nn orcllaril on the 
road-side, the trees of whicli partially protcctcd tlle 
men from a very sharp fire, poured in :~mongst 
them from the houses. TIlere being no sllclter for 
the gun here, nor ariy rllotle of cn~~~loging it to 
advantage; it was ordered to cross some field8 to 
tlie right, and talrita up a position wllcre it co~lld 
best fire upon the ' villngc, sad upon thc lleight~ 
above it, wllic11 were now crowded with thc encmyJs 
infantry. I n  ordcr to protcct the horacs, 1 drew up 
tlic gun near the foyt of Zulfn ICll:ill, ullclcr tlle 
wnlls of which tllcp had sl-icltcr; b11t for the gun 
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itself no other position could be found than in the 
open field, where it was exposed to the full fire of 
the enemy posted in the village and behind the 
neigl~bouring walls. The Mountain Train gun mas 
also with me, and 110th did some execution among 
the people on the summit of the hill, though to 
little purpose. 
Major Swayne, whose orders were to storm the 
village, would noither go forward nor retire; but con- 
cealing his men under the cover of some low wall, 
he all day long maintained a musketry fire on the 
houses of BemArLJ but without satisfactory result. The 
cavalry were disamn up in rear of the gun on the open 
plaiu, as a conspicuous mark for the Kohistinig and 
where, as there mas nothing for them to do, they accord- 
ingly did nothing. Thus we remained for five or six 
hours, during which' time the artillery stood exposed 
to tlie deliberate aim of the numerous marksmen w.ho 
occupied tlie village and its immediate vicinity, whose 
bullets continually sang in our ears, often striking the 
gun, and pazing the ground on which we stood. Only 
two gunners, llowever, out of six were wo,undedJ but 
tlie cavalry in our rear had many casualties both 
among men and horses. 
Late in the evening, s party of Afgh6n horse moving 
rouud from #behind Bembni, proceeded towards a fort 
in our rear, whence a cross fire was opened npon us. 
Brigadier Shelton now joined, bringing with him a 
11 
reinforcement fr'om the 5th Native Infantry, under 
Colonel 0liver. Major Swayne, with two companies, 
was then sent to reconnoitre the fort wlience the 
fire proceeded, and the Horse Artillc1.y gun mas at  
the same time moved round, so as to bear upon the 
AfghAn cavalry, wlio hovered among the trees in  the 
same quarter. While engaged in this operation, I 
received a, bullet through thc left hand, whicli for the 
present terminated my active services. Shortly after 
this the troops were recalled into cantonments. 
I t  was worthy of note, that Muliammad Alrbar 
K h h ,  seconcl son of the late Amir Dost Muliammad 
Khan, arrived in K&bd this night from Bdmiiin. 
This man was dcstined to exercise an evil influence over 
our future fortunes. The crisis of our struggle was 
already nigh at hand. 
CHAPTER IX. 
A SECOND EXPEDITION TO BEMARU. -MAJOR SWAYNB 
TAKES A WRONG DIRECTION.-INCREASING NUMBERS 
AND VIGILANCE OF THE ENEMY.-OUB DORCE D.EIVEN 
BACK WITH SEVERE LOSS.-TIIE ENEMY CARRY OFF A 
GUN. - REINFORCEMENTS UNFORTUNATELY COUNPEB- 
MANDED.-OBSBRVATIONS. 
November 23rd.-TIIIS day decided tllc fate of the 
KSbul force. At a council held at the General's house 
on the night of the 22nd it was determined, on the 
' special recommendation of the Envoy, that, in con- 
sequence of the inconvenience sust Jncd by the enemy 
so frequently taking possession of Bemirli, and in- 
terrupting our foraging parties, a force, undcr Briga- 
dier Shelton, should on thc following morning take 
the village by assault, and maintain tlle hill above it 
against wlmtever number of the encmy might appear. 
11 " 
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Accordingly, at 2 A.M. the under-mentioned troops* 
moved out of cantonments in perfcct silence by the 
Kohistin gate, and slrirting the masjid immediately 
oppositc, which was held by a company of Her 
Majesty's 44tl1, toolr the direction of the gorge at 
the further extremity of the Beinrirli hill, which they 
ascended, dragging the gun to the top with great 
dificulty, from the rugged ancl steep nature of the 
side, which labour was greatly facilitated by the 
exertions of two hundred commissariat sarwiins, who 
had volunteered for tlie occasion. Tlle whole force 
then moved to the lrnoll it the north-east ex- 
tremity of the hill, which overhung the village of 
Berngrii. The gun was placed in position command- 
ing an inclosure in the village, which, from its fires, 
was judged to be the principal bivouac of the enemy, 
and a sharp fire of grape commenced, which evi- 
dently created great confusion, but i t  was presently 
answered by a discharge of jazails; the enemy for- 
saking the open space, and covering themselves in 
the houses and towers : to this we replied in the 
* 1 H. A. gun, under Sorgt. Mulhal. 
5 00s. H. M. 44t11, u11der Capt. Leighton. 
6 Cos. 5th N. I., under Liout.-Col. Oliver. 
6 Cos. 37th N.I., undor Najor Eorshnw, H. M. 13th. 
Gappars, 100 men, under Lieut. Lning. 
1 Gquodron 5th LL. Cnv., under CUIJ~. Bott. 
1 Do. Irregular Itorso, u ~ ~ d o r  Liout. Walker. 









intervals of the cannonade by discharges of rnu;Jlretry. 
I t  was snggested by Captain Bellew and others to 
Brigadier Shelton to storm the village, while the 
evident panic of the enemy lasted, undcs covcr of the 
darkness, therc being no moon : to this the Brigadier 
did not accede. 
When the day brolce, parties of the enemy were 
descried hurrying from the village, and malcing across 
the plain towards the distarit fort, thcir fire having 
previously slaclcenc(1 from the failure of thcir ammu- 
nition. At this time, certailily, not nbove forty men 
remained in the village. A storming party, consisting 
of two companies 37th Native Inft~ntry, and some 
Europeans, undcr Majors Saaytyne and TZershaw, were 
ordered to carry the village; but Major Swayne, 
talcing a wrong direction, missed the principal en- 
trance, which ~vas open, and arrived at a small 
khirkhi, or wiclcet, which Tpas barricncled, aud which 
he had no means of forcing, so that he was obliged to 
cover himself and his men as well as he could fsom 
the sure aim of the enemy's msrlcsmen, by whose fire 
his party suffered considerably, himself being shot 
through the neclr. 
After remaining thus for about bnlf an hour, he was 
recalled by the Brigadier, who observed large bodies 
of armed men pouring out from tlie city towards 
the scene of conflict. Mean~vhile I~ieutennnt Walker 
hail been directed to lead his Irregulm Horse down 
into the on thewest side of thc hill, to  cut off 
such fugitives from the village as lie might 11e able to 
intercept, and to cover himsclffrom the fire of ialantry 
under the walls of an old fbrt not far from tlic basc 
of the hill. Brigadier Slielton, leaving tlirec companies 
of the 37th Native Infantry in thc lrnoll abovc Ucmdrfi 
as a reserve, undcr Major ICersliaw, moved baclc wit11 
the troops and guns to the part of tlic hill which 
overloolrecl Lhc gorge. 
Shortly after tliis i t  was suggested to raiso n snnga, 
or stone breastworlr, for tlie protection of tllc troops 
wholly exposed to tlic distant fire of tho cnemy's jnzails, 
but this, proposition was not acted on. Im~nense 
numbers of tho enemy, issuing from the city, had now 
crowned the summits,pf tlie hill opposite tlle gorge,- 
in all, probably tell tlionsand meu. Tlie plain oil tlie 
west of tile two hills was swept by swarms of tlieir 
cavalry, who evidently designcd to cut off the small 
party of I r r eg~~ la r  I-Iorse under Lieuteriant Walker; 
while tlie failure of our attcmpt to storm tlic vi1l:lgc 
had rendered it easy for tlle elielny to throw strong 
reinforccmcnts into it, ancl to supply the ammunition of 
which they liucl bcen in grc;~t want. 
About 7 n.nr. tho firc from tlic eilemyJs hill was 
so galling tliat tlic fcw slrirmishers scnt to tlie 
brow of our liill could ~ri t l i  clificulty rclain their posts. 
As an instance of the bacliwarclriess wliicli now began 
to develop itself nriiorig our rrierl, it must bc nlcn- 
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tioned that Lieutcnant-Colonel Oliver endeavoured to 
induce a party of his own regiment to follow him to 
the brow of the hill, to keep down the sharp fire of a 
numbcr of tlle enemy, who had ensconced themselves 
in  a, small ravinc commanding the foremost square ; 
riot a man would fullow him,-and it was only after 
t l ~ a t  brave oilicer had gone forwarci himself into the 
thiclrcst of the fire, saying, " Although my men 
dcscrt me, I myself mill do my duty," tliat about a 
dozen wcrc shamed into performing theirs. The 
remaindcr of tlic troops (the infantry formed into 
two srluarcs, arid the cavt~lry being dramri up en rnasse 
immcdiatcly in tlicir scar,) suffered severely without 
being I L ~ I C :  to rct:~lintc, from the comp~atively short . 
range of t l ~ e  musltct. Our ~ i u g k  gun maintained as 
hut a firc on tllc masses of the cnemy as possible, 
doing grcst cxccution; but thc want of a scconcl gun 
to tnkc up the firc -was sensibly felt, inasmuch as after 
a sliort timetlie vcnt became too hot for the al.tillerymen 
to scrve. Tliis state of' things contiuued until. betmeen 
9 aud 10 o'clock, wllcri a large  arty of the cnemy's 
cavalry tlircatencd our right flanli, and, t o  prevent 
his tlcstruction, Lieute~iailt Wallrcr was rccdled. 
This dernonstratiorl, howevcr, whs repulscd by a. 
~vcll-cli~cctcd i~ischzrgc of shrapnel1 from tlre Horse 
Artillcry gun, by orlc of wllich a chief of consequence, 
t~upposd dto bc Abd-ulla,li Khhn, Achnlrene, was' mor- 
tdly woundcd. 
By the recall of I~ieutenailt Wallrer thc encmy wcre 
enabled to surround our position nt all points, csccpt 
that facing the cantonments ; our gun ammmiition 
was almost expended, and tlie me11 mc'rc faint wit11 
fatigue and thirst (no ~vatcr bcing pn)cunJ~le), while 
tile number of ltillecl and ~ounclcd  mas smellccl cvcry 
instant. 
About this timc (11ctmcen 10 a11d 11 A.M.)  lnrgc! 
bodies of tlic cnemy's infantry ndvnnccd :\cros.q tlie 
plain from the Shhb B6gli to tlie cncl of tlic hill, to 
cut off tllc supplies of ammunition coming froni can- 
tollments, as also tlic dl~u'lis on wldcli mc enrlcn- 
voured to send off a few of thc wou~lclcd. Tlicsc, 
howevcr, were checlted by a pality of o m  troops i n  
the masjid, opposite the I<oliisthn gate, ant1 by about 
fifty jazailchis under the teinporary comnland of Cap- 
tain Trevor, (Captain Macltenzie, thcir lcadei; having 
been requested by Brigadier Sllelton to act O I ~ C  
of the staff for tlic day,) who lined some low walls niid 
/ 
watercourses, as well as by frequent disc11:larges of 
round shot and shrapnel1 from the cantorimciit gulls 
under Lieutenant Warbuyton. 
Previously to this, nnmbcrs of the most daring 
Ghbzis had descended into the gorge, and, taliing 
advantage of some liillocl~s on the ascent towards our 
position, had crept gradually up, rnai~~tainirig a clcndly 
fire on our sltimislicrs, wlio mcrc, ut i f~rtunntcl~,  wliolly 



























way. At this moment the Brigadier offered a reward 
of one hundred rfipis to any man who should talce 
a flag of the enemy wyich had been planted behind 
a tumulus about thirty yards in front of the square, 
and he fruitlessly endeavoured to indnce the rncn to 
charge bayonets ; several of the officers at the same 
time advanced to the front, and actually pelted the 
enemy with stones. All attempts, however, to 
encourage our men were in vain. The attacking party 
were now emboldened to make a rush upon our gun; 
our cav:tlry were ordercd to charge, but again in vain, 
for the men would not follow their officers. The 
panic spread, and our troops gavc way, except the 
second sqnare, which had been formcd about two 
hu~ldrecl yards in the rear, and three companies under 
Major Iiershaw at the other extremity of thc hill; 
behind this second square the officers with great diffi- 
culty rallied the fugitives, leaving the gun in the 
hands of the enemy, who lost no time in wallring off 
with the limber and horses. 
By this time the news of Abd-ullah Kh6n's wound 
had spread among the ranks of the enemy, causing 
great confusion, which extended to the GhBzis now 
in possession of the gun. This, and the tolerably 
firm attitude resumed by our troops, induced them 
to content themselves with the limber and horses, 
and retire. Their retreat gave fresh courage to our 
disheartened soldiers, who again took possession of 
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tlie gun, and advanced to the brow of the hill, where 
were io~uld the bodies of Captain Maciritosli 2nd 
Lieutenant Lning, as wcll as tllose of the soldiers 
slain in the onsct, including two I-Iorse Aytillery mcn, 
wlio, with a devotciliiess wortl~y of British soldicrs, had 
perished while vainly endeavouring to dcfcnd their 
charge. Some fs.csli gun-ammunition having now 
arrivcd from can~l;onmcnts, carried by Lasc:~rs, :L fire 
was again opcncd on tllc razllcs of t l ~ c  erlen~y ; but wc 
were unablc to pusli tlic ndvniitagc gniilcrl by the 
momentary disorder alluded to above, bcc:~use, in fact, 
the cavalry would not act. I n  the obucrvntions 011 
this action, made hereafter, there will bc ftound some 
palliation for the baclcwardness of thc cavalry on this . 
occasion, in spite of tlie gallant bearing of tlicir 
leadem;. thc infantry were too few, and too mucli 
worn out and disheartened, to bc able to ll~alic a for- 
wwd movemeut. Tlze conscquellce was, tlilut not only 
clid lhe tvhole force of the enemy conlc on with 
renewcd vigour and spirits, mni~itainirig at the same 
time the fatal jazail fire wliicli liad alrcady so grie- 
vously tliirined our rlunlru, Lut frcsh nun ill err^ l~oured 
out of tlie city, and from the surrounding vill:~gcs, 
until the hill occupied by tllcm scarccly affordccl rooln 
for them to stand. 
This uncqunl conflict having lastcd until 11:rst noon, 
dwing wl~ic l~  period reinforccmcl~ts and an atlilitionnl 
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 st noon, 
~dditiond 
o~irnents, 
Brigadier Shelton sent Captain Mackenzie to request 
Major Kershaw to mow up his rcserve (which could 
scarcely so be callcd, having been the whole rlay hard 
~resscd by large bodies of the eilcmy in  the village, 
and by parties occupying ruins and broken ground 
on tlle slfits of his position).  he Major, fearing 
that, if he abandoned the lrnoll on wliich he had been 
stationed, our retreat to the cantonments (then be- 
coming more and more imnperatively necessary) might be 
cut off, made answer, that " he begged to suggest that 
the Brigadier should fall back upor1 him." Before 
this message could be delivered, the front ranks of the 
advanced square, at the Brigadier's cxtremity of the 
hill, had been literally mowed down;--most of the 
artillerymen, who performed their duty in a manner 
which is beyond praise, shmed the samc fate. The 
rnanmuvre practised by the Ghii~is previously was 
repeated by still greater numbers. Thc evident un- 
steadiness of our troops, and the imminent danger 
to which the gnu was a second time exposed, induced 
the Brigadier, after rcpeatcd suggestions from Sergeant 
M~~lhall,  who comlnanded the battery, to order the 
grin to Be limbered up-a second limber having arrived 
from cantonme.nts-and to retire towards Major 
Kershaw's position. Scarcely had this movement 
been commenced, when a rush from the Ghdzis com- 
pletely broke the square ;-all order was at m end :- 
the entreaties and commands of the officers, endea- 
vouring to rally the men, wcrc ilot cvcn listencd 
to, aucl an utter rout cnsued ilo\vn the hill i n  tlie 
direction of cantonments, tllc erlcmy closely following, 
whose cavalry, in  particular, matlc a fen~fiil s ln~~ghtcr  
among tlic unrcsisting fiigitives. Maj or I<crslia.rv's 
party, ycrcciving this disaster, c1~tlc:~vourcd to cscayc; 
but strong parties, issuing from the villagc, cut off 
their retreat, and thus grcnt numbcrs of oar Scpoys 
pcrisl~cd : tlie grcnndicr company, cspccinlly, 1v:is all 
but anniliilxtecl. Tlic ~ninglcd tidc of figlit alld 
pursuit secmcd, to those wlio manned tlic 1vn11s of 
cantonmcnt, to be about to cntcr tllc gntc togctlicr ; 
and, hy some fatality, tlie ammunition of the grcat 
guns in battery within tlic canto~imcnts mas alniost 
expendcd. A heavy fire, homcvcr, was opcncd from 
the ShBh's 5th Infantry in tlic Mission Compouncl; 
a fresh troop of tlie 5th Cavalry, under Lirutcn:mt 
I-Iardyman, charged . across tlie plaiii tolvnrds the 
cnemy, joined by Lieutenant Walker, who had r:~llicrl 
fifteen or twenty of llis own men; during mliicli gallant 
effort this most promising ancl brnvc young ofIiccr 
received a mortal wound. TIiesc opcratiouu, assistcd 
by a sl~nrp discl~argc from thc jazailcliis untlcr Cap- 
tain Trevor, contributed to chcclc tlic p~iruuit ; 2nd it 
was observcd at tlle time, ancl aftcrwnrds auccrt:~iried 
to be correct, that a chief (Usrnhn I<han) vo11u1t:~rily 
halted Iiis follo~vers, ~ ~ 1 1 0  wcrc among tlic Sorc~nost, 
aiid led tlicm off; which niay bc rcclconcd, indced, 
ven listened 
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the chief rcason why the mass of our people w11o on 
that day went fort11 to battle were not destroyccl. Our 
loss was tremendous ; the principal part of the wounded 
having been left in the field, including Lieutenant- 
Colonel Oliver, where tliey were miserably cut to 
\ pieces. Oiir gun and second limber, whicli, while 
endeavouring to gallop down thc hill, had orrertnrned 
on rough ground, we had the mortification to behold 
triumphant1 y ca~ried off by the encmy. 
About half an hour previous to the Right of our 
troops, a note had been -written to the Assistant Acl- 
jutaut-General by Captain Tronp, earnestly requesting 
that the Mountain Train gun, wliich bail by that time 
been repaired, miglit be sent out with the least possible 
delay, and the first idea that suggested itself to that 
officer after our defeat was, that by quickly bringing 
this gun to bear upon the Horse Artillery gun, then 
in the hands of the enemy, the latter miglit still be 
saved. Be therefore galloped with speed to canton- 
rncnts, vhere fincling the MonntainTrain gun just ready 
to start, he wns on the point of leading it out 6f the gate, 
when his progress was interrupted by the Assistant 
Adjutant-General, on the plea that it would now be - 
of no use. This is the more to be lamented, as from the 
spot occupied by Captain Trevor's jazailchis, who, pro- 
tected by alow wall, still kept up a slzarp and effectual 
fire on the enemy, t lg  range to the side of the hill 
whence the AfghLns were endeavouring to carry off the 
captured gun, about which they clustered in tliousands 
was so short, that grape, even from a small calibre, 
must liave ~~even te r l  the execution of their intciitions. 
Had the company of Desh infantry wliich was drawn 
up outside the gate, urider command of Licutcnant 
Alexander, moved for~vard in coinpariy witli tllc moun- 
tain gun to tlic support of the above gallant llaiidful 
of jazailchis, cxcellciit service miglit liavc been ren- 
dered. But it secmed as if we were undcr the ban of 
I-Icaven. 
I n  this miserable and disastrous affair no less than 
six great errors must present themselves, even to the 
most ~~npractised military eye, each of n~liicli contri- 
buted in no slight degree to tlic defeat of our troops, - opposed as they were by overwliclining numbers. 
1st. The first and perhaps most fatal mistalce of a11 
was the taking out a single gun. Tlie Gencral Order 
by tlie Marquess of I-Iastiugs, expressly Eoi,bidding less 
than two guns to talte thc field, under any circumstarice.u 
or on any pyctence whatever, wlien another is available, 
must be well ltnowii at lcast to every officer wlio liav 
served in India. Tllis positi&e prohibition was tlie 
offspring of dearly-bought experience, and the action 
a ' -. 
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of Bernfir6 affords another convincing example of the 
rislc to mhich a single gun is exposed when unsupported 
by the fire of a second. I t  was certainly the Brigadier's 
intention to take the mountain gun also; but this had 
unfortunately been disabled on the p~evious day, and 
it had been twice specially reported, both to the 
Brigadier and to the General the foregoing night, by 
Captain Troup, that i t  could not be got ready before 
12 A.M. on the following day. 
2nclly. Thc secbnd error is scarcely less evident 
than the first. Had immediate advantage been taken 
of the panic which o u ~  unexpected cannonade created 
among the possessors of the villagc, whose slaclc fire 
afforded sufficient evidence of the actual fact that 
they were not only contemptible in numbers, but sho~ t  
of ammunition,-had, I say, a stormiilg party been 
led to the attack under cover of the clarltness, 
which would liwe nullified the advantage they pos- 
sessed in- b e i ~ g  undcr cover, the place r a ~ ~ s t  inevit- 
ably have fallen into our hands, and thus would the 
principal object of the sally have been gained, and a 
good line of retreat secured for our troops in case of 
necessity. 
Srdly. The third error was so manifest as to be quite 
unaccountable. A party of one hundred sappers had 
accompanied "the force for the express purpose of 
raising a sanga. The fittest place for such a work 
would have been half-way along the ridge occupied by 
us, where our troops would then have been wholly 
protected from tlic fire of the jazails from the opposite 
hill, whilc the enemy could not have advanced to the 
attack without exposing themselves to the full effects 
of our muslretry and grape. I t  mould, in fact, have 
infused into our troops a sense of sccllilrity from any 
sudden charge of the cnemy's horse, and at the same 
time have enabled our own pavalry to issue forth wit11 
the assurmce of having in their rear a place of de- 
fence on which to fall back if hard pressed by the 
enemy. I t  has bccn scen that no such defence was 
raised. 
4tlily. All have heard of the British SQUARES at  
Waterloo, which dcfied the repeated desperate onsets 
of Napoleon's choicest cavalry. At Uema'rzi we 
formed squares to resist the distant $re o j  infintry, 
thus presenting a solid mass against the aim of per- 
haps the best marksmen in the world, the said squares 
being sccurely pcrched on the summit of a steep 
and narrow ridge up wl~icll no cavalry could 
charge with effect. A Peninsular General would co~i- 
sider this to be a novel fashion; yet Brigadier Slielton 
had the beucfit of Peninsular experience in  his younger 
days, and, it must be owned, was nevcr surpassed in 
dauntless bravery. 
6thly. Our cavalry, instead of being found upon 
the plain, where tliey might have bccn nseful in 131.0- 
tecting our line of commuriications with tlic canton- 
ments, and would have been able to advance readily 
to m y  point where their services might lzave been 
required, were hemmed in between two infantry squares, 
and exposed for several hours to a destrqctive fire from 
the enemy's jazails, on ground where, .even under the 
b most favourable circumstances, they could not have 
acted with cffect. This false and unsatisfactory position 
of course discouraged the troopers; and, when the 
infantry finally gave way, the two arms of the service 
became mixed up in a may that greatly increased the 
general confiision, and rendered it impossible for the 
infantry to rally, even hacl they been so disposed. Tlie 
trutlz is, that .the cavalry mere not allowed fair play, 
and such a position must have disgusted and dispirited 
any troops. 
6tlily. Shortly after o w  regaining possession of 
the gun, one of the BrigaclierJs staff, Captain Mac- 
kenzie, feeling convinced that, from the temper of the 
troops and from the impossibility of rectifying the false 
.position in which the force was placed, not only was 
success beyond hope, but that defeat in its most 
disastrous shape was fast approaching, proposcd to the 
v Brigadier to endeavour to effect a retreat while it mas 
yet in his power to do so with comparative impunity. 
His reply was, "Oh, no! me will hold the hill some 
time longer." At that time, even if the slaughter of 
the soldiery, the loss of officers, the evident panic in 
our ranks, and the worse than false natwe of our 
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position, had not been sufficient to open all cyes as to 
the impossibility even of partial success, (for the 
real object of the expedition, viz. the possession of the 
village of Bemk6, had been, as it mere, abandoned 
from the very first,) the weakness and exhaustion of 
both men and horses, who were not only worn out by 
bodily fatiguc, but suffering grievously from extreme 
thirst and the deljility attendant on long fasting, ought 
to have banished dl idea of further delaying a movement 
in which alonc lay the slightest chance of preserving 
to their country lives, by the eventual sacrifice of which 
not even the only solace to the soldier in the hour of 
misfortune, the consciousness of unimpaired honour, 
was likely to be gained. 
[These criticisms gave rise to much discussion in the 
English paperg. On behalf of Brigadier Shelton they 
may be summed up as follows :- 
1. It is admitted in the nasrative that the Brigadier 
r r  in vain solicited an additional gun " to be sent from 
cantonmeuts, and ought not therefore to be held respon- 
sible on that score. Owing to the paucity of European 
Artillery gunners only one of the Eorse Artillery 
guns could he manne'd for field operations at one time, 
as it was considered by the General esscntial to retain 
a small reserve of European artillerymen for defensive 
purposes within the long extent of ramparts. IIence 
the Mountain Train gun was usudly substituted, but 
chanced on this occasion to be out of repair. 
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2. The Brigadier seems to have objected to risk a 
night attack, 011 principle, and; cannot be held respon- 
sible for the failure of the storming party at daybreak, 
which arose solcly from missing the proper entrance 
to the village, which was open, and time mas thus 
givcn to the enemy to pour forth from the city in 
overwhelming numbers. 
3. With regard to the omission to raise a c(sanga," 
or breastwork, for which purpose one hunched sappers 
had been sent out with the force, it has becn dleged 
that "t7~ese nzen were too busily employed i n  jighting to 
be available .fir such a work." 
4 and 5. It has becn asserted that what the author 
has termed "Squares" mere not squares at  all. ((The 
enemy mere t ~ y i n g  to tw11 our flardcs, and the Afghhn 
l~orscmen mere pushing up hill, so t71e Jlunlcs were 
thrown back to give a fiunking fiae "-the odds against 
ns being about 15,000 to 800 ! 
On the other llatid Lady Sale, who was an eye-witness 
of the day's procecdings, describes what occul~ed as 
follows :- 
"I had talcen up my post of obselvatioml, as usual, 
on tlze top of the house, whence I had a fine view of 
the field of action, aild whcre, by lrce~~ing behind the 
chilllncys, I escapcd the bullets that c o n t i ~ l ~ ~ d l y  
whizzed past me. Brigadier Shelton having brought 
for~~arr l  diirmisbers to tlle brow of tlie hill, formed the 
remainder of Elis infantry into two squares-the one 
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about two hundred yards in rear of the otller, the inter- 
vening space being crammed with our cavalry, who, 
from the nature of the ground, were exposed to the 
full fire of the enemy without being able to act them- 
selves." 
"The number of thc enemy's footmen must have 
been upwards of ten thousand (some say fifteen thou- 
sand), and the plain, on the north-west of the hills, 
was swept by not less than three thousand or four thou- 
sand Afghiin cavalry. . . . The figlit continued 
till about 10 o'cloclc, by which time our lrilled and 
wounded 11ecamc very numerous. I n  spite of the 
execution done by our shrapncll, the fire of thc enemy 
told considerably more than ours [lid, from tlle supe- 
riority of their jazails and jingBs over our muskets. 
. . . They also fought from behind sangas and 
hillocks, whilst our men were perfectly exposed ; our 
troops also labouring under the disaclvantage of being 
drawn up in square, from an apprehension of an attack 
from thc AfghLn cavalry." 
'(The vent of the gun became too hot for the 
artillerymen to servc it. 
"At this time (half-past 9 A.M.) a, party of GhAziiis 
ascended the brow of the hill. . . . I t  is possible 
that the Brigadier might not have seen their aclvailce; 
but when they had nearly attained the summit, they 
had an evident advantage over us, as their sllots 
generally told in firing up at our men, whose persons 
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I were wholly exposed, mhilst only a fern of their heads 
were visible to our troops, and the old fault of Jiring 
too high most probably sent all our shots harmiessly 
over their heads, for to hit them it was reqnisite to 
fire on thc ground. When they fairly appeared above 
ground, it was very cvident that our men werc not 
inclined to meet them. Every field-glass was now 
pointed to the hill with intense anxiety by us in can- 
tonments, and we saw the officers urging their men to 
advance on the enemy. Most conspicuous mere 
Mackintosh, Laing, Troup, Mackenzie, and Layton; 
who, to encourage the men, pclted the Gh&ziSs with 
stones as they climbed the hill; and, to do the 
fanaticsjustice, they returned the assault with the same 
weapons. Nothing would do; our men would not 
advance, though this party did not appear to be a 
hundred and fifty in number. At length one of the 
GhiLzibs rushecl forward, waving his sword over his head ; 
a Sipsihi of the 37th darted forth and met him vith hie 
bayonet ; but instead of a straight charge, he gave him a 
kind of side stroke with it, and they both fell, and ~ o t h  
rose again. Both were killed eventually, thc Ghkzi6 r was shot by another man. I t  was very like the scencs 
depicted in the battles of the Crusaders. The enemy 
rushed on-drove our men before them very U e  a flock 
of sheep, with a wolf at their heels. They captured 
one gun. The artillerymen fought like heroes; two 
were killed at the gun; Sergeant Mulhall received three 
Y 
wounds ; poor Laing was shot whilst waving his sword 
over the gun, and cheering the men. . . . Brigadier 
Shelton says that when our men ran he orclered the 
halt to be sounded ; at which the troops mechanically 
arrested their flight, and fell into their plac6s I 
"They ran till they gained the second square, which 
had not brolren ; and the men finding a stand, turncd 
about, gave a shout, and then the GhSLziRs were, in 
their turn, panic-struclr, abandoned the p n ,  but macle 
off with the limber and horses. On this we re-took 
the gun, without resistance. . . . At this time I 
was stancling on the ramparts, and hearcl the Envoy, i n  
my presence, ask the General (Elphinstone) to pursue 
the flying troops into the city, which he refused, 
saying, ( i t  was a wild scheme, and not feasible.' " 
This account coincides exactly with the statements 
made by those officers engaged in the action whom 
I had opportunities of consulting. The reader can 
therefore form his own judgment. 
6. I t  must be admitted, in Brigadier Shelton's favour, 
that the odds were fearfully against him, although had 
reinforcements been sent out to his aid at the critical 
time the result might have been widely different, and 
he would have been deservedly extolled as a hero.] 
CHAPTER X. 
OUR PASSIVENESS. - CONBERENCES AND NBGOTIATIONB 
WITH THB INBURGZNT CHIEFS.-LOSS O F  MUHAMMAD 
IHARIF'S FORT.-TERMS AGREED ON. 
NovemBer 24th.--Ov~ troops had now lost all con- 
fidence ; and even such of the officers as had hitherto 
indulged the hope of a favourablc turn in our affairs, 
began at last reluctantly to entertain gloomy fore- 
bodings as to our future fate. Our fo~ce  resembled 
I a ship in danger of wrecking among rocks and shoals, 
t for want of an able pilot to guide it safely through 
them. Even now, at the eleventh hour, had the helm 
of affairs been grasped by a hand competent to the 
important task, we might perhaps have stee~cd clear 
of destruction; but, in the absence of any such de- 
liverer, it was but too evident that Heaven alone could 
save us by some unforeseen interposition. 
I have already mcntionecl thc new bridgc thrown 
over the river by General Ell)hinstonc : this the enemy, 
advancing up the bed of tlic river under cover of the 
banlr, to-day began to dcrnolish. I must do Brigadier 
Shelton the justice to say that he, secirig the vast 
importance of the briclge in casc of a rctrcat (an alter- 
native of which he never lost sight), had strongly wgecl 
the erection of a field-morlr for its protection ; in fact 
there wm a small uniinisllcd fort near at harid, mliicich one 
night's work of' tlie snppers would hnvc rcnclerecl fit for 
the purpose, and a small detachment tlirown into it 
woulcl have perfectly commanded tlle bridgc. But 
this simple 11rcc:~ution was neglected, and tlic rcsult 
will be seen in the sequel. 
Captain Conolly now mote  ill from the U615 I'IisCLI; 
strongly advising an immediate retreat thithcr, on mliicEi 
movement several of the chief military and all tlie 
political oofficers considered our only hope of lioldiilg 
out through tlie winter to depcnd. But the old objec- 
tions wcre still urged against the measure by Brigadier 
Shelton a i d  others ; and th i  Gencrd, ill a lcttcr this 
day adchesscd to the Envoy, exprcssecl his opinion that 
" the movemcnt, if not altogctlier impossil~le, mould 
be attended with g ~ e a t  difficulty, cncumbcrpd ns we 
should bc with numcrous sick and ~voundctl. The 
enemy would cloubtless opposc us wit11 thcir ~vholc force, 
and the grcater part of tlic troops would 11c rcrluired 
to cover thc operatio~i, t l ~ u s  leaving the can tolrn~cnts 
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imperfectly defended ; that the men Ivere harassed, 
dispirited, and greatly reduced in numbers ; and failure 
mould be attendccl with certain destruction to the 
whole force. To reillove the ammunition and stores 
would be the m o h  of several days, duwing mhiclz the 
euemy mould hover around, and offer every obstacle 
to  our operations. Oul. ~ m d c d  were increased, 
whilst OUT mcans of conveying them vcre diminished. 
Would the Bd8  I-Iisiu: hold the force mitli a l l  the fol- 
lowers? Water was already saicl to be sclling there at a 
high price." MJe had barely twenty days' s~~pply  of 
provisions in the cantonments ; and, eve11 supposing we 
could find means to carry it 116th us, there was no 
prospect of obtaining more in the 13616 I-Iis&r. A retreat 
thence would bc morse than from om present position, 
aftcr having abandoned our cattle; and tlie sick and 
wounded must be left behind us." In tliese opinions 
Brigadier Shelton entirely concurred. An appalling 
list of objections, it must be confessed, but insufficient 
to shake my bclief that a removal of the force into 
the BhlQ I I i s b  was not only practicable but necessary 
for our safety and honour, while the rislrs attending it, 
though formidable, mere only such as we ought, as 
soldiers, to have unhesitatingly incurred. Shhh ShujB 
had moreover declared himself impatient to receive us; 
and, cven had thc dreaded ruin overwhelmed us in 
* This report was entirely untrue. 
the attempt, would it not have been a more manly 
and honourable course, than the ingloiious treaty we 
shortly afterwards entercd into with a treacherous band 
of rebels, by which we deserted the sovereign whom 
i t  was our duty to protcct to the last ~ ~ 0 1 3  of our blood? 
Hacl we boldly sallied forth, preferring death to clis- 
honour, would not the fate of our poor fellows have 
been a 11undl.edfold happier than that they subse- 
quently experienced, in their miscrablc retreat, inas- 
much as they would have died in the consciousness of 
having bravcly done tllcir duty? Never were troops 
exposed to gcater  hardsl~ips and dangers; yet, sad to 
say, never did soldiers shed their blood mlth leas bene- 
ficial result than during the investment of the British 
lines at ICLibul. 
But, to return to my narrative. 
A letter to the address of the Envoy mas this day 
received f ~ o m  UsmBn I(hBne, BBralczi, a near relative 
of the new Icing, and generally supposed to have a 
favourable leaning towads us, wherein he took credit 
to  himself for having " checlred the ardour of his fol- 
lowers in their pursuit of our flying troops on the pre- 
ceding day, when, by following up thcir success, the 
loss of our caritonments and the destruction of our 
force was inevitable ; but that it was not the wish of 
* This cldof hnd slioll;oroc2 Oa11tai11 Drumlnond in Ilia o m  honso 
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the chiefs to proceed to such dl-eadfd extremities, their 
sole desire being that we should quietly evacuate the 
country, leaving them to govern it according to their 
own rules, and with a Iring of their omn choosing." 
On the receipt of this friendly communication, the 
f Envoy requested the General to state his opiuion re- 
garding the possibility, in a military point of view, of 
retaining our position in the cantonments ; as, in case 
of a negative reply, he might be able to enter into 
I negotiations vith the existing rulers of the country. The General replied to the effect that "we had now 
I been in rt state of siege for three weeks; our provisions 
were nearly expended, and our forage entirely con- ' sumed, without the prospect of procuring a fresh 
supply; that our troops mere much reduced by 
casualties, and the large number of sick and wounded 
increased almost daily ; and that, considering the 
difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated 
cantonment, the near approach of minter, the fact of 
OW communications being cut off, and that we had no 
prospect of reinforcement, with the whole country in 
. 
arms against us ; he did not think it ~ossible to retain 
our present position in the country, and therefore 
thought the Envoy ought to avail himyelf of the offer 
to negotiate, which had been made him." 
November 27th.-Nothing else of consequence took 
place until this morning, when two deputies from 
the assembled chiefs, having made their appearance at 
the bridge, were ushered into cantonments by Captains 
Lawrence and Trevor, the Envoy having apccd to 
confer with them, on condition that nothing should be 
proposed which i t  would be derogatory in him to  
consider. The iiitervie~v took l~lace in  the oficersJ 
guard-room at the eastern gate; thc exact particulars 
did not transpire, but the demanrls made by the chiefs 
mere sucli as it was impossible to comply with, and tlie 
deputies toolr leave of tlie Envoy with the cxclainntiom 
that " wc should meet again in battle ! " " W e  shall 
at d l  cvents meet," replicd Sir William, " at  thc day 
of judgment." At niglit the Envoy rcccivcd a lctter 
a 
from the chiefs proposiilg terms of so disgraceful and 
insulting a natureJ as seemcd at once to prccludc all 
hope of terminating our difficulties by treaty. The 
tenor 01 them was as follows : 'cTl~at we should deliver 
up Sh&h SShujA and his whole family; lay down our 
arms ; and make an uncoilditional surrender ; when 
they might perhnps be induced to spare our livcs, and 
allow us to leave thc country on condition of never 
returning." The Envoy's rcply was such as well 
became the representative of liis country's honour. 
"1-Ie was astonished," 11c said, " at their dcpnrting 
from tliat good faith for which lie had giver1 them 
credit, by violntiiig thc co~iilitionv on ~vllich hc hat1 
bceri lcd to cntcrtain proposals for u pacific arlsatigc- 
mcnt; tliat tlic terms tlicy proposed mcre too dis- 
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if they persisted in them, he must again appeal to 
arms, leaving the result to the God of battles." 
Decemhr 1st.-No active renewal of hostilities took 
place until to-day, when a desperate effort was made 
by the enemy to gain possession of the BQA Hisk, 
which they endeavoured to effect by a night attack, in 
the first instance, on the BLrjS-i-likh, an isolated tower 
forming an outwork to the fortress, ancl from its 
elevated position commanding almost the entirc works. 
This point was, however, strongly reinforced mithout 
delay by Major Ewart, commanding the garrisou, anrl 
notwithstantiig the determined spirit exhibitecl by the 
enemy, who made repeated charges up the hill, thcy 
were repulsed with considerable slaughter. 
December 4th.-At an early h o u ~  the enemy moved 
out in forcc from the rcity, and, havillg crowned the 
Bem6r6 hills, posted two guns in the go18ge, from 
which they maintained a tolerably brisk fire for several 
hours into the cantonments, effecting fo~%unately but 
little mischief; in the evening they, as usual, retired 
to  their respective haunts. During the night a rush 
was suddenly made by a party of Afgh&ns to the gate 
of Muhammad Sharif's fort, gar1,isoned by our troops, 
which they attempted, in  imitation of our o m  mcthod 
at the taking of Ghazni, to blow open with powder 
bags, but without success: 
Decem6er 6th.-This day the enemy completed the ' 
destruction of our bridge over the river, which they 
commeilced on the 24th ult., no precaution having 
bcen tnlren to prevent the evil. Day after day me 
quietly loolrcd on witliont an cffort to savc it, ordcrs 
bcing in vain solicited by various ofIiccrs for preventive 
measures to bc adoptcd. I n  corisei~ucnce of thc 
enclny 1i:~ving com~ncnccil ~ l i i ~ i i ~ i g  one of t l ~ c  tomcrs 
of Mul~i~tnmi~d Sliarif's fort, tlic g:~r~*isoti mas rei~~torccd, 
nud Lieutenant Sturt succcedctl during tlic 11ig11t ill 
dcstroyi~ig tllc mine. Tliis, ho~vcvcr, conltl otily be 
cffcctcil t ~ t  t11c cxpciise of opcning a pnssngc u~idcr  tlic 
walls, ml~icl~ it l~ccainc ncccssary to 11n~ric:~tlc ; :u1(1 
nltl~ougll tldu xncnsure of prcc:lution was cfficic~ltly 
cxccntcd, such mas tllc nervous state of t l ~ c  party 
composing thc garrison, that no reliance could bc 
placctl on tlicir sta1)ility in cnsc of an nttaclr. 
Dccentber 6th.-l%e garrison of Muhammad SharifJg 
fort was relieved at an carly houi~l by one compaiiy of 
I-Icr Majesty's 4-hth, untlcr Licutcn:~llt Grcy, and o l~c  
company 37th Nativc Inhiltry, undcr Licntcnallt 
IIawtrcy, an :~nlply sufiicicnt forcc for tlle dcfc~lcc of 
thc place against aiiy suildcn onsct ; but, ui~l~al)pily, . 
tlic fc:lrs of t l ~ c  old garrivoti mcrc comm~inicaterl to tlic 
ncw, and, owing to the rcpiscscntations of Licntcti:t~lt 
I-Ia~vtrcy, t l ~ c  defences mcrc ~ ~ ~ i n u t c l y  sa~nil~cil l ~ y  
Licutcnant Sturt, thc gi~l~rirjon c i~gi~~ecr ,  auil ljy liirrl 
prot~omlccrl to 1)c con~plctc. Scarcely, ho~vcvcl., 11ntl 
that  oliiccr l.t!tnr~icd tc~ a~ntontnciib, are ii~f'or~z~ation 
wae convaycil t o  the C1cncr:d that the dct:~cliu~cnt, 
having been seized with a panic, had taken flight 
oveil tlie walls, and abandoned thc fort t o  the enemy. 
I t  would appear that a small party of jazailchis, having 
crept up to thc undermined tomcr under cover of 
the trees in the Sh6h Bfigh, had fircd upon the gailrison 
through the barricaded breach which I have above 
described, unfortunately wounding Lieutenant Grey, 
upon whose departure for medical aid, the Europeans, 
deprived of thei? officer, lost what little confidence 
they had before possessed, and collecting their bedcling 
under the walls, betrayed symptoms of an intention 
to retreat. The enemy meanwhile, emboldened by 
the slackened firc of the defenders, approached mo- @ 
mentarily nearer to the malls, and, making a sudden 
rush to the barricade, completed the panic of the 
garrison, who now made their escape over the walls 
in thc greatest consternation, deaf to the remon- 
strances of their gallant commander. The Sepoys, 
who at first remained staunch, contaminated by the 
, bad example set them, refirsed to rally; and Lieutenant 
Hawtrey, finding himself deserted by all, was obliged 
reluctantly to follow, being the last to leave the 
4 fort. 
The ehemy, 'though at first few in numbers, were 
not slow to avail themselves of the advantage afforded 
them, and their banner was soon planted in triumph 
on the malls. 
December 7th.-The European garison was this day 
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withdravn from the baztir, and three colllpnnies of 
the 37th Native Infantry substit~~tecl in their room. 
[This deplolsahle affair of Muhammt~cl Shal,{f's fort 
mas made the subject of much censorious comment and 
of mutual recrimination a t  the time; and writing, as 
'I did, before the excitement caused by tllese clisastrous 
events hacl been calmed down, and when it seemed 
inevitable that nothing less tvoultl satisfy tlle public 
mind than a thorough sifting of facts, I felt in a 
manner compelled, as a faithful narrator of events, 
and in  the cause of truth. and justice, to lay bare 
what then seemed a serious evil, regardless of un- 
pleasant consequences. But  now thc  case is altogether 
diBerent, and I feel that I should not bc justified i n  
reviving needlessly a n  ungracious topic which had best 
Moreover, while looking bnclc calmly, through a 
long vista of years, on  thosc sad cvcrlts of my younger 
days, and wit11 a more ripe militnry cspcric~ice than I 
then could boast, I feel persuaclcd that tliei,c mas 
a natural tendency among the  actors in those trying 
scenes (myself includecl) t o  view what mere in reality 
acciclental ancl exceptional errors or baclrslidings, on 
- the part of officers or  men, through an exaggerated 
r n e z ~ m .  For, after all, there mas nothing veiy sur- 
prising i n  the occupants of a small fortified outpost 
being seizecl with a temporary panic on discovesing 
that their enemies ontside mere secrctly undermilung 
the walls, with the pyobable intent ,to blow up the 
interior garrison at any moment ! Such incidents are 
by no means so rare as might be supposed iu time 
of war, even among the bravest troops in the world, 
and when we consider the continuous hardships and 
trials which these harassed and half-starved soldiers 
had undergone during the previous seven wcelrs, we 
ought not to marvel if their nervous systcm had 
become temporarily unstrung. Let it the rather be 
remembered, to their lasting credit, how these self- 
same men fought their way, only a few days subse- 
quently, under the personal leading of t l~eir  brave 
brigadier, during the fatal and ever-memorable retreat 
from K:ibul, tlirougll a loug seiies of difficult mountain 
passes, atid opposed on a11 sicles by a countless host of 
fanatical AAfghAns, as he~eaflter recorded in these 
pagcs ; and-let the voice of a worn-out opprobrium be 
silenced for evennore I *] 
Tlie alarming discovery having been made that 
our supply of provisions had bcen materially over- 
rated, and that not even a sufficiency for one day 
remained in store, Captain I-Iay vas clespntched with n 
convoy of ~nilitaiy stores into the B51$ IIisk, wit11 
orders to bring back the animals laden with grain. 
* Tl~ougll  Ron~owlur~t lrlto in tho day, I rojoico in tho op])orkuniby 
nolv nflordorl IIIG of offori11g tlio abovo tributo of tho  roqjoct duo 
alilco to  tho doad a1111 to tho living. 
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I-Ie started scvcral hours before dayl)rc:~lc, but, on 
reaching the Siy5h Sang hill, a few straggling s21ots 
being fii-ed upon his rcar, tEic rneii riding t l ~ c  1:ldcn 
ya'bds (A Fglitin ponics) mere panic - stricken, :~n(l, 
hastily casting tlic loads to tllc gro~ulil, g:~llopccl for 
safety to the I1,ont. Much privatc l)isopcrty was lost 
at  the same timc, for, not~vitlist;mding all t11c ol~po- 
sition that had bccn inatlc to tlic proposal of a rctrcnt 
to the B:il:il. I-Iis:ir, tlic Goncr:~l in some dcgrcc dcfcrrcd 
to tlie opiriions of tlioac who favourctl tlic movciilc?nt, by 
adoptilig t l ~ c  half-mcasnro of scrlrliilg ill ii~:igaeiiic 
snpplics from time to tiinc by driblets. Tliia led 
many to supposc that tlle wllolc foiorcc would aooiicr 
or latcr retrcrtt thither, and accordingly advantage 
was talcen of cvery opportunity to send in a fcw 
private neccssa~ies in atlvance. 011 this occasion tlia 
attempt failed in  the manricr I have abovc rclatccl ; but 
Captain EIay nevcrthcless accomplished tllc primary 
object, of liis journey, by bringing back as rnucli 
provisions as could 1)o collcctctl oil so sliort a noticc. 
Dccembel- 8tl~.-Tlic Envoy, having aclt1ressi:ti a 
public letter to thc Gcncral, requcstctl him to st:ti;e 
" whether or not it mas his opiilioii that any furthcr 
attempt to hold out against tlic crlcilly vrroulrl mcrcly 
have the effect of sacrificing both His Majesty ShQi 
ShujL and ourselves; :~nd mhctlicr, supposi~ig tliis to 
be so, the only i~lterxlntive lcft was rlot to ncgotiate 
for our safe retrcat out of thc country, oti tlic rrlost 
favoura1)le te1.m~ possible?" The General, in reply, 
stated his conviction that " the present situation of 
the troops was such, froln the want of provisions and 
the impracticability o l  procuring more, that no time 
ought to be lost in entering into negotiations for a 
safe rctreat from tlie country : That, as regarded the 
troops at IIIandah.Lliir, and tlie rumours of their approach 
to our assistance, he would 11e sorry, in tlie al~se~lce of 
all autlientic infoi,mation, to risk tllc sacrifice of the 
troops by waiting for tlicir arrival, wheil we were 
ignorant cven of their having corn~nenced their mnrcll, 
and were rcduccd to thrcc days' supply 01 provisions 
for our Scpoys at lialf ratioils, and almost witllont any 
foragc for our liorscs and catilc : Tliak our numnl~cr 
of sick anil wouiided i11 hospital cscceclcd six lilindrcd, 
and onr 1iie:uls for tllcir transport Tverc far from 
adcquatc, owing to tlic tlcath by starvntioli of so 
1na1~11y of our camels, iiam which ca~isc also we should 
11e obligccl, at this inclclncnt season, to leave their 
tents and bcddiiig beliincl, with such a marc11 belore 
us : That, xq rcgnrded tlic king, he must be excuscd 
from entering upon that point of the Envoy's lettcr, 
and leave its consideration to his better Bnodcdge 
and judgment; but he might be allo~vcd to sny that 
i t  little 11ecalnc him, as commanding the 13ritisli troops 
in Afgli;inistilii, to  regard tlic ncccssity of liegotiation 
in any otllcy light t1la11 ns concernccl tileir horlour 
and welfare, Tor both of zvhicll lie shonl(1 11c answer- 
13 * 
3 96 THE KABUL INSURRECTION OF 184142. 
able, by a further stay here, after tlie suclden and 
universal rebellion against I-Iiu Majesty's authority 
which hacl talren place tliroughout his dominions : 
That the whole of the grain and forage in  tlie vicinity 
was exhausted, and the defcnce of tlic cxtc~lvive and 
ill-selectecl cantonment would not admit of distant 
expcditions to obtain supplies fyoin thc strongly 
Eortiiicd dwellings of an ar~med and hostilc population ; 
our present numbers being insufficient .€or its defcnce, 
and obliging the whole of the troops to bc allnost 
constantly uncler arms. I n  conclusion, hc could only 
repeat his opinion that the Envoy sl~oulil lose no 
time in entering into negotiations." This letter was 
countersigned by Brigadiers Shelton and Anquctil, 
and Colonel Chambers, who entirely concurrcd in  the 
opinions i t  expressed. Meanwhile starvation stared us in 
the face, and it becnme necessary to adopt immediate 
measures for obtaining a further supply of provisions. 
A consultation was accordingly lield with this object a t  
the GeneralJs house, and i t  mas determined that an 
attack should be madc on tlie neiglibouring fort of 
Khojn Ruwash at an early hour the followirig morning. 
Decemher 9tl~-The morning dawned, but no signs 
of preparation appcared for thc proposed enterprise; 
no bridgc was laid down for the passage of the guns 
and cavalry; no troops were in readi~lcss to marcli; 
and it mas plain that either 'no orrlcrs had bcer~ 
given, or no attention had been paid to them, Thus, 
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notwithstanding the importance of its object, the 
expedition was suffered to die a natural death. 
Upon this subject I shall only remark that Brigadier 
Shelton commanded the garrison, and that with him 
the necessary arrangements rested. 
[The following explanation has since been giien in 
an English paper :- 
('The real fact $9, the Envoy found from his in- 
formant that there were plenty of provisions in the 
village, (and in another, Khadabud, near it,) but it 
was fully armed, and it was declared that the whole 
armed force of the city would sally out to resist our 
march to the place ; and hence the Envoy and General 
decicled on the force not being sent. Was this the 
Brigadier's f a d t  ? "1 
Intelligence having been this day received of a 
decisive victory gained over the enemy by General 
Sale at JallJlril,ibiicl, the Envoy conceived it might 
have the effect of modifying the General's opinion 
regarding the immediate necessity of negotiating 
with the rebel chiefs, and addressed him a letter on 
the subject. The General, however, declared in 
reply, that, pleasing as the intelligence was, it coukl 
not in the slightest degrce influence our position, 
so as to affect the expediency of our treating; in 
forming which opinion he was much influenced by 
the joint representations that had been jnst made 
to him by Captaius Boyd and Johnson, the respec- 
tive heads of the Company's ancl ShilhJs commissariat, 
wherein they declared thcir ~ l t t c r  inability to procure 
grain or forage within threc or four miles, and that, 
although three days' supply of (it4 (ground wheat) 
might still be procurable from the BQA I-IisAr, yet 
every aclditional day's delay iiow cripplccl tllc cd t le  
more and more, and reridered our position more 
perilous. Not~vithstnnding these :~pp:~z.cntly conclu- 
sive argu~ncnts, thcrc existcd styorig grountls for 
I~elieving that tlie B61A Histir colztairicd n much larger 
supply of provisions thau was generally sup~~oscd. 
December 10th.-Another convoy of military stores 
was despatched to thc RB16 Hisbr this morni~ig under 
command of Lieutenant Le Geyt, by whom a further 
supply of u'tu' was brought back in  return. 
December 11th.-The rebel chiefs having manifested 
an inclination to treat, the Envoy, accorrlpnnied by 
Captains Lawrence, Mackcnzie, and Trcvor, went 
out to mect them on the plain towards SiyAliE1 
Sang. Them werc present Muhammad Akbar IChAn, 
Usmhn 1C116nJ Mullanlmnd K h h  Nail) Amir (corn- 
monly called Naib Amir), 13tirakzis ;-Mulinnlnlad Sll(L1~ 
IChBn, Hnmza ICl~bzl, ICli~tda IChtin, Ghn1zis;-Jay-:it 
Ulal IChim, Pupa1zi;-IChAn Shnri~i RhGn, ICnxill~fidi ;- 
and seveyal o the~s  of inferior notc, 1)ut all hcails of 
tribes. After tllc e ~ ~ l l a t l g c  of ~;1~Ltt:lti01lH, s i r  William 
addrcsscd thc nssernblcd ICllAns, alluding to past timcs, 































ship had existed between them and the Znglish. 
He greatly lamented that feelings of so pleasant 
and mutually bcneficial a nature should have been 
thus rudely interrupted; but professed himself wholly 
ignorant of the causes of such interruption. He pro- 
ceeded to state that sentiments of good will towards 
the AfghiLn nation hacl principally induced the British 
Government to lend their aid, in restoring to the 
seat of his ancestors a king, who, notwithstanding 
his misfortunes, oiiginating in causes to which he 
mould not then allude, hacl ever reigned in the hearts 
of the mass of his people; that the restoration of their 
monarch had apparently given the utmost satisfaction 
to all classes throughout his dominions. If, however, 
that satisfaction had passed away, and given place 
to emotions of a wholly contrary nature (and he 
supposed that the assembled Sirdks and K h h s  
might be considered the mouth-piece of the peoplc), 
i t  no longer became the British Government to per- 
sist in a course so displeasing to those chiefly in- 
terested in the result. On this account he was willing 
to enter into negotiations, for the smoothing over of 
present difficulties, and for the adopting of such 
measures as were likely to be the most conducive 
towards the re-establishment of that mutud friendship 
between the British and Afgl16n Governments, the main- 
tenance of which, he felt assured, must be earnestly 
deaired by both parties. To all these propositions 
I 
Muhammad Akhar Kh%n and Usmdn IChAn, as the 
principal personages present, expressed, with the hearty 
concurrence of the inferior chiefs, their entire assent, 
adding many expressions of their personal esteem 
for the Envoy himself, and their gratitude for the 
way in which the exiled Amir had bccn used. The 
Envoy then requested permission to read to them 
a paper containing a general slcetch of the proposcd 
treaty. This being agrecd to, the articles of the 
tiaeaty were read and discussed. Their genaral purport 
was to the effect-That thc British should cvacuate 
AfghdnistLn, including Kandah&r, Ghaeni, ICSbul, 
JallBhbrid, and all tlie other statiolls n1)solutcly 
within the limits of the country so called;--that tllcy 
should be permitted to return not only uiimolestcd 
to India, but that supplies of every description sliould 
be afforded them in their road thither, ccrtnin 
men of consequence accompanying them as liostagcs; 
-that the Amir Dost Muhammad IChLn, his family, 
and every Afgl16n now in exile for political offences, 
should be allomed to retuTn to tlicir country ;-that 
ShiLh Shuj6 and his lamily should be allowed thc 
option of remaining at  KLbul or proceeding wit11 tlle 
British troops to Ludihna, in either case rccciving 
from thc A f g h h  Government a pension of one lalc11 
of nipis per annum;-that means of tra11spoi.t for 
the conveyance of our baggage, stores, kc., in- 
cludiug that required by thc royal family, in case 


























of their adopting the latter alternative, should be 
Iurnished by the existing Afghjn Government;-that 
an amnesty should be granted to all those who had 
made themselves obnoxious on account of their 
attachment to Sh&h ShujB and his allies, the British; 
-that all prisoners should be released;-that no 
British force should be ever again sent into Afghhn- 
istjn, unless called for by the Afghfin Government, 
between whom and the British nation perpetual friend- 
ship should be established on the sure foundation of 
mutual good offices. 
To all these terms the chiefs co~dially agreed, with 
the exception of Muhammad Akbar, who cavilled at 
several, especially that of the amnesty, but was over- 
ruled by his coadjutors. He positively refused to 
permit the garrison to be supplied with provisions 
until i t  had quitted cantonments, which movement 
he clamorously demanded should take place the 
following morning. His violence caused some con- 
fusion; but the more temperate of his party having 
interfered, it was finallym'agrced that our evacuation 
of the cantonments should ta le  place in three days- 
4 that provisions should be supplied-and that to all 
the above-mentioned articles of this new treaty a 
formal assent in writing should be sent, with all v the usual forms of a restored peace. The chiefs, on 
! returning to the city, took with them Captain Revor 
I 
I as a hostage for the sincerity of the Envoy. During 
', 
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the whole of this interview, which took place not 
far f ~ o a  the bottom of ihe Siytih Sang hills, great 
anxiety was felt in the cantonments from the apparent 
danger to which the Envoy was exposed,-he being 
accompanied only by a fcw troopers of the Body- 
guard,-and hom the circumstance of large bodies 
of the enemy's horse and foot bcing sccn to pass 
towards the scene of conference from the city, their 
leaders evidently with much diibculty restraining 
their advance beyond a certain point. Sir William, 
however, although not unaware of the ljerfitlious 
nature of those he had to deal with, nor insen~ible to 
the risk he ran, (a shot, in fact, from the fanatic 
multitude, having whistled over the heads of the 
gentlemen in attendance on him, as thcy advanced 
towards the rcndeevous,) wisely imagined that a dis- 
play of confidence was the best modc of begetting 
good faith. I t  is, however, pretty certain that the 
tumultuary movements of the AfghiLn troops, whose 
presence was in direct violation of the stipulations 
under which the conference was held, wcre not without 
their cause, it having been the eaixcst desire of 
Muhammad Akbar to seize upon the Envoy's person 
at that very meeting, from which step he was with 
difficulty restrained by the other Ichiins. But no sense 
of personal danger could have deterred a Inan of 
Sir William's truly chivalrous and undaurltcd chnractcr 
from the performance of any duty, private or public. 
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Woulcl that he had becn more alive to the appre- 
hensions which infl~~eaced common men ! We might 
not then have to mourn over the untimely fate of 
one whose memory must be ever cherished in 
the hearts of all mho h e w  and were capable of 
appreciating him, notwithstanding the disilstrous ter- 
mination of his political career, as that of a good, 
and, in  many essential points, a great man. 
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CHAPTER XI. 
PREPARATIONS FOR EVACUATING.-NORE CONFERENCES.- 
MORE DELAYS. - MORE DIWICULTIIS.  - LIUIIAMNATJ 
AKHAR'S PLOT AGAINST THE INV0Y.-HIS TrIURDER. 
December 12tA.-IT is undeniable that Sir William 
Macnaghten was forced into this treaty with men 
whose power lie clespisecl, and wliose trexcl~ery was 
proverbial, against his own judgment, by the prcssing 
reprcscntations of our militmy heatls. I t  is no less 
true that, whatever inay have bccn his political re- 
missness or want of forcsiglit before tlic rebellion 
brolce out, he liarl, througliout tlie perils that after- 
wards besct us, displaj~ed a truly Iji,itisll spirit of 
unflinching fortitude and intlefatignl~le energy, cnl- 
culated, under . more auspicious lcaclcrs, to have 
stimulated tlie zeal and v,zlo~u~ of the troops, anil 
to have cliecretl them under the trials and liartl~l~ips 
they were callcd on to endure ; :ultl I can safely add, 
Sir W i l l i a m  
y w i t h  m e n  
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the pressing 
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without fear of contradiction, that scarcely an enter- 
p ~ i s e  was undertaken throughout the siege but at the 
suggestion, and even the entreaties, of thc Znvoy, he 
volunteering to take on himself the entire respon- 
sibility. Justice demands this tribute to the memory 
of one, whose acts, as they will assuredly undergo the 
severe scrutiny of his countqmen, it therefore becomes 
the duty of every eye-witness, who bears testimony 
on the subject, not only to shield from misrepre- 
sentation, but, where they are deserving of it, to  hold 
up to public admiration. I am led to write this 
solely by my public knowledge of the man. If 1 
could bring myself, on matters of such vital impor- 
tance, to follow the dictates of mere private feeling, 
my bias would be altogether on the side of my late 
lamented militmy chief, and for whose infirmities 
every allowance ought, in  common justice, to be 
made. With a mind and talents of no orciuary 
stamp, and a hitherto unsullied fame, he copnitted 
the fa td  error of transporting himself suddenly from 
a state of prolonged luxurious reposc, at nu advanced 
age, to undertake the fatigues and cares insepar- 
able from high military command, in a foreign, 
uncongenial climate; he thus not only ruined his 
already shattered health, but (which to a soldier was 
a far worse calamity) grievously damaged that high 
reputation which his early services had secured for 
him. 
The terms of the new treaty were immediately 
made known to ShLh ShujL, by which that unfortu- 
nate m o n a d  found himself once more doomed to 
an old age of exile and degradation. The first step 
towards its fulfilment was the withdrawal of our 
troops from the BB16 EIissr, which was to have taken 
place this very day, but was postponed for a short time 
longer to admit of the necessary preparations being 
made. A deputation of chiefs had an interview i n  
the close of the day, who were the bearers of a most 
unexpected proposition, to the effect that Shhbh ShujiL 
should continue Icing, on condition of intermarrying 
his daughters with the leading Afghlin chiefs, and 
abandoning the offensive practice of keeping the 
chief nobles of his lringdom waiting for hours at 
his gate in expectation of audience. The Afghgns 
hate cwemony, which Shhbh Sliuj& carried at all times 
to an absurd extent, hence much of his unpopularity. 
This. arrangement was not intended to annul thosc 
parts of the treaty which related to o w  immediate 
evacuation of the country, for the fulfilment of which 
some married families were demanded as hostages. 
December 13th.-Such was the inveterate pride of 
the king, that he yielded a most reluctant consent 
to the above-mentioned proposals, notwithstanding 
that the only alternative was thc instant resignation 
of his kingdom. Little confidence was, however, 







whose hatred of the Dhiini ruler was notorious. As 
o w  retreat was now fully decided on, and o w  well- 
stocked i~iagazine was shortly to fall a prey to our 
enemies, the General ordered that some ammunition 
should be distributed to certain of the camp-followers ; 
and commanding officers were directed to indent for 
new arms and accoutrements, in exchange for such 
as were old and damaged. The reins of discipline 
had, howevel-, by this time become so terribly relaxed, 
and so little attention was paid to superior orders 
by either officers or men, that many of the officers 
in  command of companies rested content with sending 
their men to the magazine, to help themselves at will, 
the stores l~cing unfortlmately, in the absence of any 
finished building for their reception, ar3ranged under 
the trees of an orchard, in charge of a sinall guard. 
The consequeuce was, as might have been expected, 
a scene of conFusion and plunder, which was rendered, 
worse by a iwsh of camp-followers, who, imaginbg 
that a licence hnd been given for every one to take 
whatever he pleased, flocked in hundreds to the spot, 
and terribly increased the tumult ; insomuch that 
the authol~ity of several officers, who, observing what 
was going on, exerted themselves to restore order, 
was for aevcrd minutes set at naught.. At last, 
however, the place was cleared of the intruders, and 
the g rea t e~  portion of the atolen articles was recovered 
the same evening. 
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At 2 P.M. the troops in the BAIL I-Tislir, consisting 
of the 54th Native Infantry, haE of Captaiu Nicholl's 
troop of Horse Artillery, and a dctachmcnt of the 
Mountain Train, with two howitzers, under Lieutenant 
Green, commenced their evacuation of that fortress. 
They were also encumbered with an iron 9-pounder 
gun, and a 24-pounder brass howitzer, drawn by 
bullocks, whicli i t  was the Gcllerill's wish should Lave 
been left bchind, but his order to tllnt cffect llad by 
some accidcnt missed its destination. As tllc utmost 
scarcity of provisions prevailed in cantonmcntu, Cap- 
tain ICirby, the commissariat officcl; h:~d zealously 
exerted hirnseLE. to collect a supply of about one 
thousand six hundred mauncls of whcat nit1 flour 
to carry thither. Much delay, howevcr, occurred in  
packing and loading; and, the bcst part of t l ~ c  day 
being nearly spent ere above onc-tliirtl of that (luantity 
was ready, Major Ewart deemed i t  advisable to  illove 
off Tvithout lurther loss of time. I-Ic fonlid Muham- 
mad Alrbar Khan in waiting with a smnll 11ody of 
followers outside the gate, for the purpose of cscorting 
him to cantonments; md, as the evening dscw nigh, a 
dense crowd of armcd AfghLns had bceu obsertved to 
collect on the Siylih Sang hill, along t l ~ c  base of 
1 I 
which our troops must pass, giving rive to suspicions C 
of some meditated treachery. Wllilc tlie rcnr-guard, $ 
with the Mountain Train gun and rb poiti011 of the 
baggage, was leaving the gate, some of Mullammad 
Akbar's followers, pushing quietly past them, en- 
deavoured to effect an entrance into the fort; but on 
their being recognized by the Iring's guard, the gates 
were immediately shut, and a rouncl or two of grape 
fired upon the intruders, with so indiscriminate an 
aim as to endanger the lives of Captain Conolly and 
several of the Sepoys, of whom some weye severely 
wouncled. It call scarcely be doubted that Muhammad 
Alrbar's intention was to havc seized the gate with a 
few of his men, until a rush of the Afghrins from 
the hill should have enabled him to  carry the body 
oE the place by storm. The vigilmce of the garrison 
having cleEeated this plan, the wily chief, imagining 
that ihe gates mould again be opened to re-admit 
ouT troops, informed Major Xwart that, owing to 
tlie lateness of the honr and the threatening attitude 
assumed by the crowrl on thc hill, i t  would be ne- 
cessary to postpone his mwch until the following 
morning. I n  consequcncc of this sudden, ill-timed 
announcement, Major Ewmt applied to tlic king for 
tlie immediate readmission of his troops for shelter 
during tlie night ; but tlie monarch, whose suspicions 
of foul play on the part of Muhammad Alcbar were 
now fillly n~valrened, positively refused to accede to 
the request. Tlie prospect of passing the night in the 
low ma~,sliy ground undcr the walls, without tents, 
bedding, fire-mood, or food for officers or men, was 
suificicntly cllecrless ; while tlle fcar of treachery on 
14 
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the part of Muhammacl Alcbar, and tlie dangerous 
vicinity of an armed m~tltitude, ~vhose match-fires 
already on the adjacent hills, tender1 but 
little to relieve the discomforts of sucli n sitnntion. 
The cold mas intensely bitter, nncl pcrhaps so rrliacral~le 
a night had nevcr beforc bccu spcnt hy Indian troops. 
December 14th.-At an early hour tliiv morning, 
Muhammad Akbar having dcclarod Ids readiness to 
proceerl, the troops comlncnced tl~eir u1;1ivcIi. 'J'lie ad- 
vance-guarrl was sl~ffered to proccctl ~uiniolestctl; but 
tlie rear-guard, on rcacliii~g the base of tllc SiyAh 
Sang hill, was iired upon by t l ~ c  cncmy, ~vlio crow~icd 
the ridge; and the iron 9-pountlcr being i i ~ r  :L fcw 
moments accidentally separated from tllc colum~i in 
crossing a water-cut, azi instantaneous rush mas nlacle 
u11on it by a number of Afglulns, and a poor sick 
European artilleYjrman, ~ ~ 1 1 0  for w:t,nt of n more 
suital~le conveyance had been lashcd to tllc gun, 
was unmercifully butchered. The aplwol~ch of the 
rear-guard, and a round or two of grnpc from the 
Mountain Train howitzer, drove oiT the ass:lilant.u ; nud 
they were restrained from offcring ally ac1ilitio~i:~l 
annoyance by the exertions of Mullammad lilcbar 
himself, who, galloping in  amongst them with a fcw 
followers, threatened to cut down any rvho darcd to 
be guilty 01 further opposition to the progrcss of tllc 
detachment, which accordingly reached carltonnicnts 




























DecemBer 16th.-ShBh Shujh having, for reasons best 
lrnown to himself, withdrawn his consellt to the 
arrangement which was to .have continued him in the 
possession of his rights, the treaty resumed its original 
form; but the chiefs positively refused to snpply 
provisions or forage, m t i l  we should further assure 
them of our sincerity by giving up every fort in  the 
immediate vicinity of cantonments. Forage had for 
many days been so scarce, that the horses and cattle 
were kept alivc by pwing off the bark of trees, and by 
eating their own dung over and over again, which 
was regularly collected and spread before them. The 
camp-followers mere destitute of other food than the 
flesh of animals which expired daily from starvation 
and cold. The daily consumptioll of kt2 by the fighting- 
men mas about one hundred ancl Uty maunds, and not ' 
above two daysJ supply remained in store. By giving 
up the forts in question, aJl of which commanded the 
caatonment, we should place ourselves entirely 'at the 
mercy of the enemy, who could at any time render our 
position untenable. But our leaclers now seemed to 
consider that wc had no other chance left than to con- 
cede to the clembds of the chiefs, however unreason- 
able ; and our troops were accordingly withibrawn from 
the Rilribishi, Magazine, and ZulfikirJs forts, and from 
the Masjid opposite the western gate, all of which were 
forthwith occupied by the Mghhns, who, on their part, 
sent in Nassar-ullah K h h ,  a brother of Naw4b 
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ZamBn Ichfin, as a hostage, and n supply of allout one 
lluntlred and fifty nialmila of At5 for tllc troops. 
Thcy likewisc promiscd us two tl~ousnnil canicls and 
fo~u. hundred ydl~ds for t l ~ c  niarcll to Ja11:il :il);id. 
Dece?r~ber 1 8th.-Tlic delay of thc clliors ill furnishing 
the necessary carringc, and t l ~ c  Sl1ril~'s ililutoritiess in 
deciding on liis luturc coursc, colllllcllctl na fi'om 
day to day to 11ostl)oiic our i1cp:~rturc. hlcnilrvliilc tlic 
increasing scvcrity of  tllc winter rc~itlr!rc!tl c:v~ry hour's 
procmstiiiatioii of tlic ntlrlost co~isccluc!nc:e ; and this 
morning our situation mas rcntlcrctl liiorc ilcspcrate 
tlinn cvcr by a 1lc:~vy of snorv, wllicli covcrctl t l ~ c  
ground to the deptli of five inclics, :uld licvcr nf tc i~  
wards disappcarcd. Thus a iicw eiicnly c~itci.erl on 
thc scenc, whicli wc mcrc ilcstiiletl to filitl c:vcn rnore 
formidable than an nriny of rcl~cls. 
December 19th.-Thc -E~ivoy wrote nrl ordcr for the 
evacuation of Ghazni, nnd it mas arrnllgotl t1i;~t tlie 
27th Nntivc Infantry, ivllic!ll g~rriaonctl the l)lacc, 
should marc11 tlirougll tlic Zurmnt valley, ant1 pursuc 
tlie route of Dcril Iahma51 ICl1;ill. '1'11~ 29nd was fixed 
for our departure. 
Decemder 2Ot?~.-Thc Xnvoy had an intc:rvicw with 
the chiefs, nrlio now dcmandcil that n portion of 
our guns and ammunition should bc ininicrli:itcly 
given up. Tlicy also rcilnirctl 13rig:iilicr Sliolton na 
a liostngc. It mas proposcd by Liclltclialit Sturt to 
tlie Gcncrnl to 11rcak ofF the treaty, arid ~liarcli fortll- 
with to Jall&l&11Bd, devoting all the means of transport 
wc possessed to the service of the sick, and the con- 
veyance of such puldic stores as were absolutely 
necessary. But neither the General nor his immediate 
advisers could bring themselves to adopt a course 
which would have saved thc nationd honour, at the 
risk of sacrificing our whole force. 
I t  has been truly said that a council of war never 
fights. A door of hope had, until this day, still 
remained open to us in the approach of Colonel 
Mnclaren's force to our assistance from ICandahLr; 
we now heard with despair of its retreat &om TLzi, 
in consequence of the snow. 
Dece~n-lzlrer. 2lsf.-The Envoy mct Usllllin IChdn ancl 
Muhammad Alrbar IChrin on t l ~ e  plain, when four 
hostages were fixecl upon, two of whom (Captains 
Conolly and Airey) were at once given over. Brigadier 
Shelton, having expressed a decidecl objection to under- 
talcc the duty, was not insisted upon. In the evening 
Captains Trevor and Drummond were permittecl to 
return to cantonments, the lattcr officer having been 
concealed in the city since the 2nd of November. 
Decenzber 22nd.-I was ordered to conduct an officer 
of NawBb Zamkn ICh6n over the magazine, that he 
might make choice of such stores as wonlcl be most 
acceptable to the chiefs. I rccommcnded a lmge 
pile of 8-inch shells to his notice, wliich I knew 
would be of no use to thc chiefs, as the mortars 
were with Captain Abbott's battery at JdlBBbAd. 
He eagerly seizcd the bait, and departed in great 
glee, with his prize laden on some old ammunition- 
waggons. 
The Envoy at the same time sent his carriage as 
present to Mullammad Alrbar IChAn. That same 
night the last-named chic! spread the net, into which 
Sir William Macnaghteii was, on the following day, 
so miserably lurcd to his destruction. Captain Slrin- 
ner, at this time living under Mnharnmad AlrbarJs 
protection, was made the bearer of proposds to the 
Envoy, of so advantageous a nature, as to prove, in 
his forlorn circumstmces, irresistibly tempting. 
Amin-ullah KhAn, the most influential of the rcbels, 
was to be seized on the folloving day, and delivered 
up to us as a prisoner. Muhammad IChiLn's fort was 
to be immediately occupied by one of our regiments, 
and the 13616 I-Iish by another. ShAh SliujB was to 
continue Iring; Muhammad Altbar was to become 
his wazir, and our troops were to remain in their 
present position until the following spring. That il 
scheme like this, bearing impracticability on its very 
face, should have for a moment deceived a man of 
Sir William's usual intelligence and penetration, is 
indeed an extraordinary instance of infatuation, that 
can only be accounted for on the principle that a 
drowning man will catch at a straw. Our fortunes 
were now at their lowcst ebb; thc cliiefs werc appa- 
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rently delaying o w  departure until the snow slould 
have formed an impassable barrier to the removal of 
our troops, who, even in the absence of an enemy, 
cnl*ringc ,: would but too probably perish from cold and famine. 
11. That same . A treaty formed mith men famed for falsehood and 
! Q(:t, illto \vhich treachery, and who had already shorn an utter dis- 
? lidlo~viu~ da regard of some of its most important stipulations, 
C:lphili Skin. could be regarded as little better than so much waste 
~ l l ~ l m n t l  ~ \ ] ~ b ~ ? ~  paper; added to  which conside~ations, Sir William 
! ~ I ' " I ) ( I N ~ ~ H  to the felt that his own fame was deeply involved in the 
'1" ti1 I)pove, in issue of that policy,* of which he had from the very 
first been the prime advocate and upholder, and that 
with i t  he must stand or fall. The specious project 
of Muhammad Akbar offered a solution to the diffi- 
culties that beset his path, at which he grasped mith 
an eagerness engendered by despair. The strength 
0111' r(!gi]nonts, of the rebels had hitherto lain in their unanimity; 
11 Sl~rijh mas to the proposed stroke of, policy would at once dissolve 
v" "to ~ I C ~ ~ ~ ~  the  confederacy, and open a road by which to retrieve 
('lrltlit~ in tlleir our ruined fortunes. On either hand there was 
[~ ' i~lg .  That a danger; anrl, miserable as Sir William's life had 
been for the past six weeks, he mas willing to stcake 
his d l  on the issue of a plan which seemed to offer 
a faint hope of recovering the ground we had lost. 
I n  a fatal hour he signed his name to a paper con. 
senting to the arrangement. His doom was sealed. . 
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The whole was a schcme got up by thc chicfs, to test 
his sincerity. 
December 23rd.-At about noon Sir William Mac- 
naghten, attended by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and 
Mackenzie, left the mission-house to attend a con- 
ference with Muhammacl. Alrbar KhSn on thc plain 
towards SiyBh Sang. Previously to this hc had re- 
quested the General that two ~egimcnts and two guns 
might be in readiness for sccret scrvice, and that, as 
the intcrview would be of' a critical ~iature, thc garrison 
might bc 1ccpt.well on the alert, and the walls strorigly 
manned. I n  leaving the cantoamcnts, Sir Wi1li:~m 
expressed his disappointment at thc paucity of nlcu 
on the ramparts, ancl the apparent incrtrless of tlle 
garrison at such a critical moment, saying, " I-Iowevcr, 
i t  is all of a piece with the military arrangemerits 
throughout the siege." On liis lcaving the gatc only 
sixteen troopcys of the Body-guard mcre in attend:u~ce, 
but the renidndcr shortly alter wards joined, under 
Lieutenant Le  Geyt. 
Sir William now for the first time exl~laincd to tlie 
officers who accompanied him the ohjccts of the 
present conference, and Captain Lawrcnce was warned 
to be in readiness l;o gallop to thc Bdlri Hisbr, t o  
prepare the king for thc approach 01 a rcgimcnt. 
Apprehensions being exprcsscrl of the clangcr to 
wliicli the selleme miglll; cxposc him, in casc of 
treachery on the part of Mullammad Al~bar, he rc- 
plied, Dangerous it is ; but if it succeeds, it is 
worth all risks: the rebels have not; fulfillccl cvcn 
one article of the treaty, and I liavc no confidence 
in them; ancl if by i t  we can only snvc our honoilr, 
all mill be well. At any rate, I would ratlicr su~ffcr 
a hundred deaths than live the last six ~vcclts ovcll 
again." 
Meanwhile crowcls of armccl Afglihs wc1.e observcd 
hoverillg near tlie cantonment anrl about Muhammad 
ICh6n's fort, causing misgivings in tlie millds of all 
but the Euvoy himself, whose confidcncc 1,cnlnincd 
unshalten. On ai.l.iving rical, tlie bridgc, tllcy wcre 
met by Muhammad Altl~ar IC11ki1, Mullnrnrunrl SliA11 
IGin, Dost Muhammad I<ll&n, I<lmd:~ 13dcsli IC112it1, 
Azild IChLil, and other chief's, a~norlgst mliolil was the 
brother of Amin-ldlall K115i11, wliosc ~ ) ~ C S C L ~ C C  might 
have beeii suficient to convilicc Sir Williarn t h d  hc 
hacl been dupcd. 
The usual civilities 11:~ving pnssecl, tlic Errvoy p1.e- 
sented Alrbnr Khhn with a valuablc Arab horsc, wliich 
had only that morning been yurcll:~sccl Tor three thou- 
sand r ~ p i s .  Thc whole party then sat do~vrl ncnr sorllc 
rising ground, wliich pa~ltially coriccnlcrl tlic~n froni 
cantonments. 
Captain La~vrencc having calletl attention to the 
nunlbcr of inferior followers aromld tlicni, wit11 tb 
view to tlrcir being ordc~*ecl to a dist;:n~cc, Muhnn~mnd 
Akbar exclaimed, "No, they nrc all in t l ~ a  sccrct; " 
I I 
l 1  which words had scarcely been uttercrl, when Sir 
11 William and his three companions found tlicmselves 
1 1  suddenly grasped firmly by the hands I'rotn bcliind, 
I  ' whilst their swords and pistols were ruclely snatched 1 away by the chiefs and thcir followers. The three officers were immediately pullcd forcibly along and 
j compelled to mount on lzorscbaclr, cacli llchind a 
I t  Ghalzi chid, escorted by a nnrnbcr of armcil retainers, 
I 1 who with difficulty repellecl tlic cft'orts of n crowd of 
1 I fanatic GhRzis, who, on seeing tlic aiTr;~y, Lad rushed 
1 to the spot, calling aloud for the blood of tlie hated 
; I  infidels, aiming at them clespcrate blows with their 4 ; long lmives and other weapons, and only clcterred 
t i  I '  
from fil'ing by tlie fear of Billing a chief. 'Phc ml- 
fortunate Envoy was last secn struggling violently 
with Muhammad Akbal; " consternation m d  liorror 
depicted on his countenance." 
On their nearing Muhammad I<hBri)s fort, renewed 
attempts were macle to assassinate the time captive 
officers by the crowd there assembled. Captain Trevor, 
who was seated behind Dost Muhammad I<h:in, un- 
happily fell to the ground, and was instantly slain. 
Captains Lawcnce ancl Maclrenzie reaclicd thc fort in 
safety, but the latter mas much bruised in various parts 
of his body, ancl both were greatly exhausted from the 
excitement they liad undergone. 
At thc entrance 01 the fort, n furious cut was aimed 
at Cal~tdri Maclrcnzie's hcarl by a ruflinn 11amed 
>red, when Sir 
lllld tliemselves 
9 from behind, 
rudely snatched 
:rs. The three 
Illy along and 
each hcldud a 
rlnctl retainers, 
of n crowd of 
:LZ; had rushed 
1 of tlle hated 
1w.r with their 
o ~ l y  deterred 
hicf. The un. 
cling violently 
11 and holror 
fort, reliewed 
tlirce captive 
q ~ t a i n  'hevor, 
~d Rhdn, un- 
str~ntly slain. 
:d the fort in 
various parts 
ted from the 
l t  was aimed 
[Hnn named 
JiI~illah M~imin, which was warded off by Muhammad 
Sh6h Ichhn, that chief receiving the blow on his own 
shoulder. Being talien into a small room, they found 
themselves still in  continual jeopardy from repeated 
assaults of the Ghhzis without, who were with the 
greatest difficulty restrained from shooting them 
through the window, where the hand of some recent 
Emopean victim (aftemards ascertained to be that 
of the Envoy himself) was insultingly held up to 
their view. Throughout this trying scene they re- 
ceived repeated assurances of protection from the 
Ghalzi chiefs; but Amin-ullah KhBn coming in gave 
vent to a torrent of angry abuse, and even threatened 
to blow them from a gun. It is deserving of notice, 
that, amidst the congratulations which on all sides met 
the ear of Muhammad ShLh II(h&n on the events of 
the day, the solitary voice of an aged Mull& was 
raised in condemnation of the deed, which he  solemnly 
pronounced to be "foul" and calculated to cast a lasting 
disgrace on the religion of Muhammad. At midnight 
they were rcmoved to the house of Muhammad Alrbay 
Ichin. As they passed through the streets of K&bul, 
notwithstanding the excitement that had prevailed 
throughout the day, it resembled a city of the dead; 
nor (lid they meet a single soul. 
By Alrbslr I-Chgn thcy were received courteously, 
and were now informed for the first time by Captain 
Skinner of the murder of the Envoy and Captain 
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Trevor. That Sir William Macnaghten met his 
cleath at the hands of Muhammad Alcbar himself 
therc can be no reasonable doubt. That chief had 
pledged himself to his coacljutors to scize the Envoy 
that day, and bring him into the city, when the chiefs 
hoped to have been able to  dictate their own terms, 
retaining him as a hostage for their fidfilment. Finding 
it impossible, from thc stre~iuous resistance Sir William 
offerecl, to carry him off alive, and yet determined 
not to disappoint the public expectation dtogethcq- 
influenced also by his tiger passions, and the remem- 
brance of his father's wrongs,-Muhamm~d Alcbar 
i 
drew a pistol, the Envoy's own gift a few hours before, 
and shot him through the body, which mas imme- 
diately hacked to pieces by the fei-ocioas GhLds, by 
- vhom the dismembered trunk mas afterwards carried 
to the city, and publicly exposecl in the Chiir Chauk, 
or plincipal m a t .  The head was taken to the house 
of NawLb Zam&n Khiin, where i t  was triumphantly 
exliibited to Captain Conolly. 
Such was the cruel fate of Sir William Macnaghten, 
the accomplished scholar, the distinguished politician, 
and the representative of Great Britain at the court of 
ShAh ShujB-ul-Mullt . 
I t  cannot but be acceptable to my renders, if I here 
present entire the interesting and important letters of 
Captains Macltenzic and Lamrence on this melancholy 
subject. 
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Lettw adcZ~essed by CAPTAIN C. MACKENZIP to L1auTPNANT 
VINCENT EPEE. 
MY DEAR EYRXI, 
You ask for a minute account of the circumstances 
attending the assassination of the late Sir Willia~n Mac- 
naghten, and my own cletention and imprisonment on 
that occasion. You may remenlber that, for many days 
previous to the f a t d  23rd December, the poor Envoy had 
becn subjected to more mew and tear, both of bocly and 
mind, than it was possible for the inost iron frau~e and 
the strongest intellect to bear without deeply feeling its 
effects. He had fulfilled all tlle preliminwy conditions of 
the treaty which had been proposed between the British 
and the Afghkn insurgents, mhereas the KhAns had in no 
one particular adhered to their engagements. Bad faith 
was evident in all their proceedings, aiid our condition 
was a desperate one ; more especially as Sir Willi1~1u had 
ascertained, by bitter experience, that no hope remaiucd 
in the energies and resources of our military lcaders, 
who had formally protested that they could do nothing 
more. Beset by this disgraceful imbecility on the one 
hand, and by systematic treacheiy on the other, tho unfor- 
tunete Envoy was driven to his wits' end, and, as will 
be seen, forgot, in a fatal mornent, the wholeso~~le rule 
mhich he had theretofore laid down for himself, of re- 
fusing to hold co~n~nullication with individuals of thc rebel 
party, eepecially withhim who was notorious, even alnongst 
his villanous countrymen, for ferocity and t~eache~y,  
to wit, Muhammad &bar KhCn. Late in the evening 
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of the 22nd December, Captain James Skinncr, who, aftcr 
having been concealed iu K a u l  during the greatcr part 
of the sicgc, had laLterly been the gucst of Muhammad 
Akbar, arrived in cantonments, accoulpanied by M~thanl- 
mad Sacliq Khin, a first cousin of Muh:lmmacl Akl~nr, nilcl 
by Sirmk K h h ,  the Arhini inerchaut who in the bc- 
ginning of the campaign had furnishccl thc ariny mitli 
camels, and who had bccn much in thc conhdunce of 
Sir A. Burnes, being in  fact onc of our stmincliest 
friends. Thc two latter rcmainecl in a different :lpa,rL- 
ilzent, while Slrinner dined with tho Envoy. During dinnor, 
Slcinncr jestingly remL~rked that lle felt ~ L S  i f  li~deli with 
coinbustibles, being charged with a ilzessage froin Muh:tm- 
mad Akbar to the Euvoy of most portentous naturc. 
Even then I remmkod that the Envoy's eyc glanced 
ertgerly towards Skinner with an expression of hope. 
In fact, he was like a drowning man catching at, straws. 
Skinner, however, referred him to his Afghirn conllmnions, 
and aftcr dinner the four retirecl into a, room by them- 
selves. My knowledge of what there took place is gaincil 
from poor Skiuner's own relation, as given during my 
subsequent captivity with him in Akbar's house. Mu- 
hammad Sadiq discloscd Muhammad Akbar's proposition 
to the Envoy, which was, that the follomng day Sir 
William should meet him (Muhammad Akbar) ancl n few 
of his iinmediate friends, viz. the chiofs of thc Eastern 
Ghalzis, outside the cantonments, when a final agrcernc?id 
should be madc, so as to bo fully understoocl by 110th 
partics ; that Sir William should have :L considcrabl~? 
bocly of troops in readiness, which, on a given signal, wuro 
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IC thl? greatel* part 
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~l:u~icd by ~ , ~ h ~ ~ .  I 
Mlm:lrl Akhar, and ' 
n t  WIIO iu the be. j 
11~11 tlle arlny mith 
the confidcnco of 1 
'f oar staunchest 
:L different ana1.t. 
I)uring (Tuner, 
11 w if 1~den'~itk 
'"$' from Muham. 
r*lltolls nature, 
")J"H CYO glanced 
frc88iou of hope, 
~trliing at stlbams, 
khh  coll~pmion~, 
:b root11 l)y them. 
)k: l~lncc is gained 
I :iv~ln during my 4 
lr'u house, MU. , 
.Irar18 pro~oaition I 
~llowiug day Sir 
Ik.1):~) u ~ d  a fern 
I of thc Eastern 
, iinal agreeuut 
uretood by both 
n con~idorable I 
ivcn signal, were 
to join with those of Muhammad Akbw ancl the Ghalzis, 
assault ancl take MahmGcl BLn ' s  fort, and secure the 
person of Ainin-ullah. At this stage of the proposition 
Muhammad Sadiq signified thrtt, for ti certain suln of 
money, the head of Ainin-ullah should be presented to 
the Envoy; but froin this Sir William shrunk with 
abhorrence, declaring that it mas neither his custom nor 
that of his country to give a price for blood. Muhammad 
Sadiq then went on to say, that, after having subdued 
the rest of the Khcins, the English should be peimittcd to 
remain in the country eight months longer, so as to save 
their pu~da7~ (veil, or credit), but that they mere then to 
evacuate Afghinistin, as if of their own accord; that 
Shbh Shujh was to continue Iring of the countiy, and 
that Muhainmad Akbar was to be his wazir. As a 
further reward for his (Muhammad Akbar's) assistance, 
the British Government were to pay hhn thirty lacs of 
iupees, and lour lacs 01 rupeea per annum cluring his 
life ! To this extraorilinaxy and mjld proposid, Sir 
William gave car with an eagerness which nothing can 
account for but the supposition, confirmed by many 
other circumstances, that his strong mind had beell 
harassed, until it had, in some degree, lost its equipoise ; 
and he not only assented fully to these terms, but 
actually gave a Persian paper to that effect, written in 
his o m  hand, declaring as his luotives that it mas not 
only an excellent opportunity to caily into effect the 
real wishes of Government, which were to evacuate the 
country with as much credit to ourselves as possible, 
but that i t  would give England time to enter into a, 
treaty with Russia, defining the bounds beyond which 
neither were to pass in Central Asia. So endcd this 
fatal conference, the nature and result of which, contrary 
to his usual custom, Sir Wdfiam communicated to none 
of those who, on all former occasions, were fully in Ilia 
codidence, viz. Trevor, Lawrence, and myself. It seemed 
as if he feared that we might insist on the impracticability 
of the plan, which he must have studiously concealed 
from himself. All the following morning Ilis manner 
was distractecl and hulmied in a way that none of us had 
ever before witnessed. It seems t h t  Mullammad Akbar 
had demandcd a favouritc Arab horse, belonging to 
Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant-Gcncral of the force. 
To avoid the necessity of parling with the animal, 
Captain Grant had fixed his price at the exorbitant 
sum of five thousand rupees; unwilling to give so large a 
price, but determined to gratify the SirdLr, Sir William 
sent me to Captain Grant to prevail upon him to take a 
smaller sum, but with orders that if he were peremptory, 
the five thousand rupees should be given. I obtained the 
horse for three thousancl rupces, and Sir William ap- 
peared much pleased with the prospect of gratifying 
Muhammad Akbar by the preseut. 
After breakfast, Trevor, Lawrence, and myself were 
summoned to attend the Envoy during his conference 
with Muhammad Alrkar Khdn. I found him alone, when, 
for the first time, he disclosed to me the nature of the 
transaction he was engaged in. I immediately warned 
him that i t  was a plot against him. He replied hastily, 
"A plot ! let me alone for that, trust me for that ! " and 
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I consequently offered no further remonstrance. Sir 
William then arranged vith General Elphinstone that 
the 54th Regiment, under Major Ewart, should be held in 
readiness for iillmediate service. The Shhh's 6th, ancl 
two guns, were also warned. It is a cuiious circunistance, 
and betrays the unhappy vacillation of poor Elphiustone, 
that, after Sir William hacl actually cpitted the canton- 
ment in full expectation that everything had been 
arrangecl according to his desirc, he (the General) ad- 
dressed a letter to him, which never reached him, remon- 
strating on the danger of the proposed attack, and strongly 
objecting to the eniployment of the two above regiments. 
About 1 2  o'clock Sir William, Trevor, Lamreace, ancl 
myself set forth on ow ill-omenecl expedition. As me 
approached tho Siyhh Sang gate, Sh Willialll obsei~ed 
with much vexation that the troops mere not iu readiness, 
protesting at the s m c  time, however, that, desperate as 
the proposed attempt was, it mas better that it should be 
made, and that a thousancl deaths were preferable to the 
life he had lately led. 
After pnssing the gate, he remembered thc horsc 
" which he had intended as a preaent for Afiar,  and sent 
me back for it. When I rejoined hill1 I found that the 
small number of the bocly-guard who had accompanied 
him, hacl been ordered to halt, and tlial he, Trcvor, ancl 
Lameace, had aballced in the direction of Mahmiid 
Kh&nls fort, being some five hundred or six hundred 
yards horn the eastern rampart, and werc there avaiting 
the approach of Muhammad Akbx and his party, mllo 
now made their appearance. Close by were some Ellocks, 
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on the further side of mhich from the cantonment a 
carbet was spread where the snow lay least thick, and 
there the Khins and Sir William sat down to hold theis 
conference. Men talk of presentiment ; I suppose i t  was 
something of the lirtd which came over me, for I could - 
scarcely prevail upon myself to quit my horse. I did SO, 
hornever, and mas invitecl to sit clown among the Sirdirs. 
After the usual salutations Muhaininad Alrbar corn- 
mencecl business, by asking the Envoy if he was per- 
fectly ready to carry into effect the proposition of the 
prececling night ? The Envoy replied, " Why not ? " 
my attention was thcn called off by an old Afghin 
acquaintance of mine, fornlerly chief of the R&bul police, 
by name Ghu1;im Muyan-ud-din. I rose fsom my re- 
cumbent posture, and stood apart with him conversing. 
I afterwards remembered that my friend betyayed much 
anxiety as to where my pistols were, amd why I dicl not 
cnrry thenr on my person. I ansmcrcd that although I 
more my smorcl for form, i t  was not necessary at  a, 
fiienclly conference to be wmed cup-a-pie. His discourse 
was also lull of extravagant compliments, I suppose for 
the purpose of lulling me to sleep. At  length my 
attention was called 01f from what he was saying, by 
observing thbt a llulnber of men, a m e d  to the teeth, 
had gradually approached to the scene of conference, 
and were clrawing round in a sort of circle. This Law- 
rence and myself pointed out to some of the chief men, 
who affected a t  first to  drive them off mith whips ; but 
~ u . h ~ a d  Alibar obsorved that it w ~ s  of no conse- 
quencc, as they were in the secret. I again resumed 
conversation n i t l ~  Gl~uliuii lfripil-ud-din, mhcn s\i&denly 
I. heard Xulia~niuad Akl)ar call ont, " nigir ! Rigir ! " 
(seize ! seize !), atid trirnilig round, I s:uv liiiu ~ c i s p  tlie 
Envoy's left hmd with all cxprcssion ill l i i ~  f:icc of the 
1uost di&bolic~l ferocity. I thinli it was Snltl'tn Jdn who 
laid hold of the Envoy's riglit h:~nrl. 'flipy clraggr.d lli111 
in a stooping posturo dowil tliu l~illuclc, tlie only words I' 
heard poor Sir Willii~m uttcr baing " Az I)r~r:ii Xhudh ! " 
(for God's st~lcc !) I saw his fncc lion.crr:r, and it was 
full of horror and astcsnisliu~icnt. I did llot scbe what 
becaiue of Trevor, but T~nmrcuce w:is d~nggeil lnst me hy 
severd Afghims, who111 I H ~ W  wrmt his TV-VI!:L~~OI~S froill 
him. Up to this ~noinent I m;~s so c:ngrosst'il ill ohscrvirig 
wlvllat mas tnlring pl~~ce, that I actually mas not amarr 
that my own right ariu mas innaterecl, that iny url~ano 
friend held L pistol to my teiiil~lc., aiid tlii~t I NnY s t~ r -  
rounded by a circle of Ghhxis with dram1 sworils a i ~ d  
coclcecl jaeails, Resistance mas in ,vnin, so listening to 
the exliortations of Gh11li~la Muynu-lid-din, which wore 
enforced by thc whistling of divers hnllcts 0vt.r illy hencl, 
I hurried tllrough the snow with luiiil to the placc wllerc 
his horse wrLs standing, being despoil~d t . 1 ~  ro?lte of my 
s:~bre, and ~ i n ~ r o ~ ~ l y  escapiug Jivers attempts rimdo on illy 
life. As I mounted bohind lily chptor, now lily onorgetic 
defender, the crowd increased around us, tlie cries of 
" Kill tlie Xi~fii* " became more vohcmcuit, i~lid, although me 
hurried on at a fast canter, it was with tlic utmost diffi- 
culty Ghulilm Muyan-ud-din, although assisted by one 
or two friends or followers, could mal'd off and avoid 
the sword cuts aimed a t  me, the rascals being afrrtid to 
15 * 
fire lest they should kill my conductor. Indeed he was 
obliged to wheel his horse round once, encl taking off 
his turban (the last :~ppeal a Mussolmrin can make), to 
implore thelll for God's sake to respect the life of his 
friend. A t  last, ascencling a slippery bank, the horse 
fell. &Iy cap had been snatched off, and I now received 
il h c a ~ ~ -  blow on the head from a bludgeon, which for- 
tunately did not quite deprivc me of my senses. 1 had 
sufficic~lt sense left to shoot ahead of the fallen horse, 
where lily 11~0tcctor with another man joined me, and 
clasping nle in their arms, hurricd mc towards the wall 
of Muhamiilad Khlin's fort. How I reached the spot 
where M~thninmad Akbar was receiving the gratul a t' 1011s 
of the multitude, I know not, but I remember a fanatic 
I 
rushing on me and twisting his h n d  in  my c o l h  until 
I becaulc exhausted from suffocation. I must do Mu- 
- h m ~ i ~ i d  Akber the justice to say, that, finding the 
GhiLzi~ bent on iny slaughter, even after I had reached 
his stinup, h0 drew his sword and laid about him right 
mimfully, for my conductor and Mirza Bahb-ud-din I Q L A ~  
were obliged to press me up against the wall, covering 
]lie with their own bodies, and protesting that no blow 
should m c h  me, but through their persons. 
Pride, however, overcame Muhalnmad Akbar's sense 
of courtesy, when he thought I was safe, for he then 
turned round to me, and repeatedly said in a, tone of 
triumphtlnt deri~ion, ' l  Shum$ mulk-i-nd me-gired ! 
(You'll seize my country, will you !) He then rode off, 
and I was hurried towerds the gate of the fort. Here 
new dangers ameited me, for MuDL M h i n ,  fresh from 
or. Indeed he mas 
:e, and taking off 
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the fort. Here 
u in ,  fresh from 
the slaughter of poor Trevor, who mas Billcd riding close 
behind me,-Sultbn Jiln having the credit of h:lving 
given him the first sallre cut,--stood hcre with hi8 
lollowers, whom he exhorted to slay me, setiing them 
the example by cutting fiercely at  me himself. Fortuuately 
n, gun stood between us, but still he mould have effected 
his purpose, hed not Muha~nrnad Sh:ili Khim at that 
instant, with sonle followers, come to m y  assi~tanco. 
These drew their swords in n1y defence, tho chief liirnself 
throwing his arril round my neck, and rcceivir~g on his 
shoulder a cut aimed by MulW Mi~lllin : ~ t  my head. 
During the bustle I pushed forlvard into the fort, and 
wis immediately taken to a sort of dungeon, wheru I 
found Lawrenee safe, but somcwhat exhaumteil by his 
hideous ride and the violellee he had sustnincd, although 
unwounded.' Here the Ghalzi chiefs, Mnhi~~llmad SbLh 
Khi~n, and his brother Dost Muha~nnzad Kll!~n, prcsently 
joined us, and endeavoured to cheer up our flagging 
spirits, assuring us that tho Envoy and Trevor \yere uot 
dead, but on the contrary quite well. They stayed with 
us during the afternoon, their presence being ~bsolutcly 
neces sary for our protection. Many attenipts were ~nade 
b y  the fanatics to force the door, to ncco~iiplivh our 
destruction. Others spit at us and abused us though a 
smdl window, through which one lellom lcvcllccl e blun- 
derbuss at us, which was struck up by our keepers and 
himself thrust back. At last Amin-ullah made his appear- 
ance, threatened us with instant death. Some of h i a  
people most officionsly advanced to make good his word, 
until pushecl back by the Ghalzi chiefs, who renlonstrated 
with this iniquitous old monster, their nlastel; whom they 
~ersuaded to relieve us from his hateful presence. During 
the afternoon a human hand was held up in nlockery to 
us at  the endow. We said that it had belonged t o  an 
European, but were not aware at  the time t h ~ t  it was 
~ctual ly  the hand of the poor Envoy. Of all the Muhala- 
rnadans assemblecl in the room discussing the events of 
the day, one only, an old Mu116, opedy and fearlessly 
condemned the acts of his brethren, declaring that the 
treachery mas ahominable, ancl a disgrace to IsliLm. At 
night they brought us food, and gave us each a postin to 
sleep on. At m i b i g h t  me were awalrenecl to go to the 
house of Muhammad Akbar in the city. Muhammad Shhh 
Khlm then, with the lueauness common to all hfghhns of 
rank, robbed Lawrence of his match, while his brother did 
me a similar favour. I had been plunclered of my rings 
and every thing else, previously, by the under-strappers. 
Reaching Muhammad Akbar's abode, we were shown 
into the roolu where he lay in bed. He received us  ~ 6 t h  
great outward show of courtesy, assuring us of the welfare 
of the Envoy and Trevor, but there was a constraint in 
his manner for which I could not account. We were 
shortly taken to another apartment, where we found 
Skiuner, who had returned, being on parole, early in the 
morning. Doubt and gloom marked our meeting, and the 
latter mas fearfully deepened by the intelligence which we 
now receivecl from our fellow-captive of the base murder 
of Sir William and Trevor. He informed us that the 
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triumph, We of course spcnt a ~lliscral~le night. Thc 
next clay mc mere taken uuder a strong guard to the house 
of Za~nLn KltBn, mhore a, council of the Kh:ins was being 
held. Hero me foulid Captains Couolly and Aircy, mllo 
had some clays l)reviously beell sent to tlic Nawhb's house 
as hostage for tho l~e~forn~ance of certain parts of tho 
trei~ty which was to have been eut~red into, A violent 
discussion took plmcc, in mhich 3Iuhammacl AIil~ar bore 
the most prominent part. Wc were veheuleutly :~ccnscd 
of treachery, am1 everything that mas l~acl, I L I ~ ~  told that 
the mllole of tlie ty:~nsactions of the niglit previou.~ had 
bccn n, tricli of Mu1larnnr:d Akbnr, ;nid Aiuin-ulldl, to 
~scertain the Envoy's sincerity, They decln.red t lu~t  lley 
mould now g~iuit  us 110 terius, ti'ave 011 the BUP~EILC~PP of
the wliolc of thc marrieil fainilics ns liostagcs, all the gulls, 
nmnni t ion,  and trensure. At this tinie Coiiolly told 1110 
tllat 011 the prccerling day the Envoy's head had beon 
paraclecl about in  thc court-yarcl ; that his and Trevor's 
bodies hncl been himg up in Lhe public LiLsLr, or clnzlk ; 
and that it was with the greateat difficulty that the old 
NawLb, Zamrin K h h ,  had savecl hiill bnd b r e y  from 
being ~nurderecl by a body of fanatics, who hnd :~ t t eu~~) ted  
to rush h t o  tho room where they were. Also that pre- 
vious to the arrival of Lawrence, Skinner, and myt;clf, 
Muhan~mad Al~bar had Leen relating the eveuts of the 
preceding day to tho Jb.ga, or council, and that he had 
ungumcledly avowed haying, mllilc endeavouling to force 
the Envoy either to inount on horseback or to move more 
quickly, struck him, and that, seeing Collolly's eye fastelled 
upon him with an expression of illtense indignation, be 
hail altered the phrase and said, '' I mean 1 pushed him." 
After an immense deal of gabble, n proposal for a renewal 
of the  treaty, not, however, demanding all the guns, mas 
determined to he sent to the cantonments, ancl Skinner, 
Lawrence,and myself, wore marched back toAllhar's house, 
enduring en ?.oute a11 manner of threats &nd insaltls. Here 
we were closely collfincd ill an inner apartment, which was 
indeecl. necessary for our safety. That evening we received 
I 
1 ;  
a visit from Muhammacl Akbar, Sx11iBb JBn, and several 
I 
other Afghhns. Muhamlnad Akbar exhibitecl his double- j 
banellccl pistols to us, which he had worn the previous I 
day, requestiug us to put their locks to rights, something 1 
being amiss: Two of dhe b w ~ e Z s  had bem recently discharged, 1 
which he ende~vourecl, in a most confuse& way, to account 
for by saying that he bad been charged by a hnvilclbr of 
the escort, ancl had fired both barrels at him. Now, dl 
the escort had run away without even attemptiug to 
charge, the oilly man who advanced to the rescue ha;ving 
been a Hind6 JemaclAr of Chapritsis, who was instantly 
cut to  pi.eces by the assembled Ghhzis. This defence he 
made without any accusation on our part, betmying the' 
anxiety .hf a liar to be believed. On the 26th, Captain 'I 
Lawrence mas taken to the house of Amin-ullah, whence 1, 
he  did not return to  us. Captain Skinuer and myself 6: 
remainecl in Akbar's house until the 30th. During this I/ time we were civilly treated, and conversed with numbers I, / g  
of Afghitn gentleinen who came to visit us. Some of them 
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asserted that the Eiivoy hacl boon murdered by the unruly 
soldiery. Others could not deny that Akbai. himself vas 
the assassin. For tmo or three days we hnd a fellow- 
piisoner ' i n  poor SirwAr who had bee11 deceived 
throughout the whole matter, ancl out of whom they mere 
C 
then endeavouring to screw money. He of course was amre 
fi.om his countrymen that, not only hed Akbar conlmitted 
the murder, but  that he protested to ithe Ghhzis that he 
gloried in the cleed. On onc occasion a m h s h i  of Major 
Pottinger, who had escaped from Ch:l~rikiLi*, named Mohan 
Bir, came direct from the prcsence of Muhxnmed Akbm 
to visit us. He told us that Muhammad Akbw had begun 
I 
to see the impolicy of having murilered the Envoy, mhich 
fact he had just avowecl to him, shedcfag many tenre 
either of pretended remorse, or of vexation, nt  having 
committed himself. On seve~ttl occasions Muha1111nail 
I 
I Akbar personally, and by deputy, besought Xlrinner ancl 
nlyself to give him attvice as to how he wes to extricate 
himself from the dilemma in which he was plwed, more 
than once encleavouring to excuse himself for not hwing 
effectually protected the Envoy, by saying that Sir millimn 
had drawn a sword-stick upon him. It seems that menn- 
while the renewed negotiatioiis with Major Pottinger, who 
had assumed the Envoy's place in cantonmel~ts, had becn 
brought to a head, for, on the night of the 30th, Akbar 
f umished me with an AfghiLn dress (Skinner already wore 
one) ancl sent us both back to cantonments. Several 
Afghirns, with whorh I fell in d t e i ~ a r d s ,  protested to me 
that they hnd seen Muhammad Akbar shoot the Envoy 
with his own hand; amongst then1 Mirza Bah!r-uld-dill 
lKh&n, who, being an old acquabtance, always retained a 
sneaking Knclness for the English. 
I am, my dear Eyre, yours very truly, 
C. MAOKENZIE. 
Kibul, 29t7~ July, 1842. 
Letter addressed by CAPTAIN G. ST. P. LAWRENCE, late 
Nilitary Secretary to the Envoy, to MAJOR POTTINGIBE, 
C.B., lcde in c7~arye of the Kcibul Mission. 
SIR, 
IN compliance with yow request, I have the honour 
to cletail the particulars of my capture, mcl of the death 
of my ever-to-be-lamented chief. 
On the morning of the 23rd December, at 11 A.M., I 
received a note from the late Sir W. H. Macsaghten, 
warning me to attend, with Captains Trevor and Mac- 
kenzie, an interview he was about to have with Sirdhr 
Muhammad Akbar =tin. Accorciingly, with the above- 
named officers, at about 12, I accompanied Sir William, 
having previously heard him tell Major-General Elphin- 
stone to have two regiments of infantry and two guns 
reecly for secret sewice. In passing through cantonments, 
on my observing that there were more Afghkns in cantoii- 
ments than usual, or than I cleemed safe, the Envoy 
directed one of his Afghtin attendants to proceed and 
















strange it mas that, although the General was fully ac- 
quainted with the then very critical state of affairs, no 
preparations appeared to have been made, adding, " How- 
ever, it is all of a piece with the military arrangements 
throughout thc siege." He then said, ' "There is not 
4 enough of the escort with us," to which I replied, that he 
hnd only ordered eight or ten, but that I had brought 
sixteen, and that I would send for the remainder, which I 
accordingly did, asking Lientenant Le Geyt to bring 
them, and to tell Brigaclier Shelton, who had expressed a 
wish to attend the next interview, that he might accom- 
pany thcrn. On passing the gate, we observed some 
hundreds of armed Afghhns within a, few yards of it, on 
which I callccl to the ofiicer on duty to get the reserve 
under arms, and brought outside to disperse them; and to 
send to the General to ham the wi-rison on the alert. 
Townrcl~l Wahmi~d Khin's fort were a number of armed 
Afghi~ns, but wc observed none nearer. 
The Envoy now told us that hc, 011 the night previons, 
had received a proposal fro111 SirdAr Muhammail Akbar 
K h h  to which he had agreed, and that he had every 
reason to hope it would bring our prescnt difficnlties to 
an early and happy termination ; that Muhammad Akbar 
7 KhAn was to give up Naib Amin-ullah JKhAn as a prisoner 
to us, for which 1)urposc a rcgimenf was to proceed to 
Ma;h~iiild KhAn's fort, aud another ~011)s was to occupy 
the BhlL HisAr. Sir William then wained me to be reacly 
to  gallop t o  the king with the intelligence of the approach 
of tho regiment, r~iid to acquaint hiln with Akbar's pro- 
posal. On one of us remarking that the scheme seemed 
7 
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a dangerous one, ancl aslrillg if he did not ap1)rehend any 
treachery, he replied: " Dangerous i t  is, but, if i t  suc- 
ceecls, i t  is mortll all rislrs ; the rebels havc not fulfilled 
even one article of the treaty, aucl I have no confidence in  
them, and if by it me can only save our honour, all will 
be well ; at any rato, I mould rather suffer a h u h r e d  
deaths than live t1ie"last six weelrs over again." We 
proceedecl to near the usual spot, and met Sirdhr Mu- 
ham~lzad Alrbar ICh611, who was i~ccoml~:~nieil by soveral 
Glialzi chiefs, Muhammad ShLh K h h ,  Dost M~lliainll~ad 
Khirn, Ehuclil Babsh Ehirn, AzLd KhLn, kc. After the 
usud salutations, thc Elivoy l~rescnted a vnhiablc home 
which Akbar had nslrccl for, and which hacl becn that 
moriiing p~achased from Captain Gmnt for thrcc thous;~lid 
rupees. The Sirclh :~clrnowledged tlie attention, alld ox- 
p~essed his thnnlrs for a haudsome brace of doulble- 
barl'relled pistols which the Envoy had purchnsed from 
me, and sent to him, with his caryiage nnd pair of liors(?s, 
the day before. 
The party dismounted, and horse-cloths were spread on 
a small hilloclr which partially concealecl us from canton- 
ments, and which was chosen, they said, as being free 
from snow. The Envoy threw himself on the l~anlr with 
M ~ h m m a d  U b a r  and Ca1~t:~ins Trevor and M:wkcnzie 
beside him; I stoocl bohind Sir Williaiii till, pressed by 
Dost Muhainmad Kliiln, I knelt on one Imee, having Grst 
callecl the Envoy's attention to the nmnber of Afghirns 
arouncl US, saying that if tlio s~lbject of the coilfcrcilce 
was of th t~ t  secret naL~u.u I l~eliovcil it to l ~ c ,  they had 
better be rcmovcd. Ho spoke to WuL~~~li i lad Altbar, who 
replied, " No, they are all in the secret." Hardly had he 
so said, when I found lny arms locked, my pistols m d  
sword mrellched fro111 my belt, and myself forcibly raised 
from the ground and pushed along, Muhammad Shith 
IChh, who held me, calling out, " Come along, if yo11 
value your life." I turned, and saw the Envoy lying, his 
head where his heels had been, and his hands locked in 
Muhammad Akbar's, consternation and horror depicted in 
his countenance. Seeing I could do nothing, I let illyself 
be pulled on by Muhalumad Shhh IChkn. Some shots 
were fircrl, r~nd I was hurried to his horse, on which he 
jnmped, telling me to get up behind, which I did, and we 
l)rowwlcd, escortcd by several arnled men who kept off a 
crowd of Ghkzis, who sprang up on every side shouting 
fur ino t o  be givcn up for them to slay, cutting at me with 
their swordu and knives, a i d  polxing me in the ribs with 
their Eg11ns : they w r e  afraid to fire, lest they should 
injure their chief. The horsemen kept them pretty well 
off, but not snificicntly so to prevent my l~eing much 
bruisod. I n  this manner we hurried towards Mnhnmmad 
Khbn's fort, near which me met soilzc hundreds of horse- 
nien who were 1ii:eping off the Ghbzis, who here mere ill 
greater ~iunllrcrs, :illcl more voeifer01~s formy blood. We, 
homcver, reached the fort in safety, and I was pushed 
illto i~ 8111;~ll room, Muh~mmad Shlih Khi~n returning to 
tlio gate of tlie fort ;~nd  bringing in Captain Maclrenzie, 
wlloso horsct hncl thero Ii~llen. This he (lid, receiving a 
cut t11rongh his llirnclia (Scother coat) OIL his arm, which 
JV:LS ainlcil at  t1i:~t oiIicc:r, who w:ls ushered into the room 
jvith 1 1 1 ~ ~  much cxhansted ;~ncl bruised from bloms on his 
head ancl body. We sat clown with some solcliixs who 
I 
I were put over us with a view to protect us fro111 tho mob, 
I who now surrounded the house, and who till dnrli con- 
, tiliucd execrating and spitting at  us, calling on the  nlrhn to 
give us up to be slaughtered. ~ One produced a hand (European) wllicli Z ~ P C : L ~ "  to 
have been i.ecently cut off; anotlicr prcmi1tt"d :L l~l~iildcr- 
1 
buss, ancl was about to fire it, when i t  was Irllo(!Iit~d itfiidc 
1 
I by ono of our guarcl. Several ol thc Sircliirs o:~mc in 
i during the day, and told us to be assured that; 110 h:~i~nl 
i should befall us ; that the Envoy and Tr~voi* vt!r\: R : L ~ ( :  ill 
the city (a falsehood, as will bc :~fterw~rcls ~ r c a ) .  N:~il] 
\ Amin-ullah Ichiln and his soils came also. The fornl~.r, in 
great wratll, said thht we either sliould be, or c l c s c r ~ d  to r be, blown away from a gun. Mnhamlmd Shhh KhArl and 
1 Dost Mnhammad K h h  begged he would not so talk, and 
I took him out of the room. Townsds night food waH given 
I 
, to us, and postins to sleep on : our watches, rings, nxld 
I silk handkerchiefs were taken fronl us ;  but in a11 other 
I 
I respects me were ulnmolested. The lollowers of Illu11:~in- 
mad Shhh Khhn repeateclly congratulated him 011 the 
events of the day, with one exception, viz. :In 01~1 Mullil, 
who louclly exclaimed that " thc nauic of the faithful W:LY 
tarnishedJ and that in future no belief could be placccl in 
them; that the deed was foul and coulld never be of ail- 
vantage to the authors." At midnight ~ v c  mere t,nlten 
throng11 tho city to the house of Muhammad A k l ~ r ~ r  Xliiln, 
who received us cou~.teously, 1:~ineilting the ncourrcbIica~ 
of the day : here we found Captain Slriniicr, alltl fol* t11e 
first time heard the dreadful and nstoullding intolligcnco 
of the murder of the Envoy and Captain Trevor, and ihat 
our lamented chief's head had been paraded through the 
city in triumph, and his trunk, after being dragged 
through the streets, stuck up in the Chilr Chauk, the lllost 
conspicuous part of the t o m .  Captain Skinner told us, 
that the report was, that on Muhammad Akbar ITh6nYs 
telling Sir William to accompany him, he refused, re- 
sisted, and pushed the SbcliLr from him; that in conse- 
quence he was immediately shot and his body cut to pieces 
by the GhLzis ; that Captain Trevor had been conveyed 
behind Dosi Muhammad Khhn as far as Muhammad 
EhLn's fort, mhera he was cut down, but that his body 
was not mangled, though carried in triumph through the 
city. On the following morning (24th) we (Captain 
Slrilmer, Maclrenzie, and self) were tnken to Nawib ZamiLn 
Khilu's house, cscorted by SultiLn JBn and other chiefs, to 
protect us from the GhLzis; there we met Captains 
Conolly and Airey (hostages) and all the rcbel SiraLrs 
assembled in council. The Envoy's death was lamented, 
but his conducl, severely censured, and it was said that now 
no faith could be placed in our words. A new treaty, 
homcver, was discnqsed, and sent to the General and Major 
Pottinger, and towards evening we returned as me came 
to Muhammad Akbar's, where I remained a prisoner, but 
well and courteously treated till the morning of the 26th, 
when I was sent to Naib h i n - u l l a h  Khhn. On reaching 
his house I was ushered into his private apartment. The 
Naib received me kindly, showecl me the Envoy's oyiginal 
letter in reply to Muhammad Akbar's proposition, touch- 
ing his being made ShAh ShujL's Wazir, receiving a lalrh 
of rupees on giving the Naib a prisoner to us, thirty laklis 
on the final settlement of the insurrection, kc .  To this 
the Naib aclded that the Envoy had told &hihnlnixiad 
Akbar's cou~sin that a, lakh of rupees mould be givcn for 
his (bin-ul lah KhAn's) h e d .  I pron~ptly rcl)licil, " 'lL1is 
false," that Sir William had never done so, t1i:~L it; was 
utterly foreign ancl repugnant to his naturo, ;LI~CZ to D13l'if;isli 
usage. The Naib expressed himself in strong tor~iis 
against the Envoy, contrasting his own fni.r nntl opcn con- 
duct with that of Sir William. He tuld 1110 tlmt G~1ici,i~l 
Elphinstone ancl Major Pottinger 11:~d beggucl 1 liiiglit IN: 
released, as my presence was necessary to cnal)lo thc!m t;o 
prepare bills on India, which it  had Loen an.i~ngc:cl tllc! 
Sirdhs were to get. After some delay, conscqnont oil llly 
asking for Captain Mackenzie to 11e rcleased with nlc, :~nd 
Muhammad Akbar78 stoutly refusing the relcnse of citlicr 
I of us, I was sent into cantonments on the nlorniug o% th,! 29th, escorted by the Naib's eldest son and a strong 1):~rt~y - of horse and foot, being disguised as an AfghAn fur lily 
peater protection. I must; here record that nothuig coulil 
exceed the Naib's kindness ancl attention to  rlic wllile 
under his roof. 
I have, Ac. &c., 
(Signed) G. ST. P. LAWEBNCE, 
Military Secrdary, 
Latc Envoy and Miiiistcr. 
Cam-p Ziid6.7t, 
Ten wiles sout7t of Tizilz. 
10t7~ May, 1842. 
CHAPTER XII. 
SUSPENSE I N  UANTONNBNT. - COUNCIL OF WAR. - TBRMS 
ACCEPTED. -- HOSTAQES GIVEN. - POSTPONBMINT O F  
DIPARTUIEE. 
1.30~ what were om troops about all this time ? Were 
no steps trtlren to rescue the Bnvoy and his friends from 
their perilous position ? Where was the body-guard 
which followed them from cantonments ? These ques- 
tions will naturally occur to all who read the foregoing 
pages, and I wish it were in my power to render 
satisfactory answers. 
The Native body-guard had only got a few hundred 
yards from the gate in their progress to the scene of 
conference, when they suddenly faced about and came 
galloping baclr, several shots being fired at them in 
their retreat. Lieutenant Le Geyt, in passing through 
thc gate, exclaimed that the Envoy had been carried off, 
rind i t  mas understood that, finding his men would not 
nrlvance to the rescue, he came back for assistance. 
16 
Intense was the anxiety and wretched the suspense 
felt by all during the rest of the day. A xiumber of 
AfghAns, wlio were trafficlcillg in cantonineilts at the 
time of the conference, on hearing the report of fire- 
arms in that direction, endeavoured to escape, but were 
detained by tlie oiHcer at tlic gate. NO ccrtain tidings 
regarding the Eiivoy could be obtained : many confi- 
dently affirmcd that he mas alivc and unharmed in 
Mullarnmad's fort; but Lieutci~ni~t Warrcn stoutly 
maintained that Ize had Icept his eye upon Sir William 
from the moment of his leaving tlie gate, and had dis- 
tinctly seen him fall to the ground, and the Afg11:ins 
hacking at his body. The agony of his poor wife during 
this dread intervd of suspense may bc imagined. 
December 24th.-The fntc of tlie E~ivoy and his tluec 
companions remained a mystery, until the arrival of a 
note from Captain Conolly notifying his death and that 
of Cafitain 'fievor, aiid the safety of Captains La~vrence 
and Maclcenzie. 
Thc tvo latter officers hat1 heen that morning escorted 
to a conference of chiefs at the llouse of Namhb Zam6ii 
IChdn, where tlic late EnvoyJs conduct was sevcrely 
commented on ; but Ids decltli mas neve~theless lcm~ented. 
The treaty was again discussed; and, after a few alter- 
ations and additions llad bcen made, it  was sent to 
General Elphinstone, wit11 an explanation of the breacli 
of faith ~vhicll had cost the Elivoy his life. 
General Elphinstone now requested Major Pottinger 
to assume the office of political agent and adviser, which, 
thougli still suffering greatly fTom his wound, and in- 
capacitated from active bodily exertion, that gallant 
officer's strict sense of public duty forbade him to de- 
cliiie, although he plainly perceived our affairs to be so 
irretrievably ruined as to 1.enc1er the clistillction any- 
thing but enviable, or lilrely to improve his hardly-earned 
fame. 
The adilitional clauses in the treaty now proljosed for 
our renelvcd acceptance were-1st. That me shoulcl 
leave behind all our guns excepting six. 2nd. That 
we should immediately give up all our treasures. 3rd. 
Tliat the hostages should be all exchanged for married 
men, wit11 tlieir wives and families. The difficulties of 
Major Pottinger's position will be ~eadily perceived 
wllen it is borne in mind that he had before him the 
most coiiclusive evidence of thc late Envoy's ill-qdvisecl 
intrigue with Muhammad A l r l ~ a ~  Khin, in direet viola- 
tion of that very treaty rvhicli was uow once more 
tendered for consideration. 
Dccclnber 25t?~.--A more cheerless Christmas-day 
perliaps never darned upon British soldiers in a strange 
land; and the few whom the force of habit urged to 
exchange the customary greetings of the season, did so 
mitli countenances and in tones indicative of anything 
but merriment. At night thcre mas an alarm, and the 
d r ~ r u m  beat to arms, but nothing occurred of any con- 
sequence. 
16 * 
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Becemher 26th.-Letters were received from Captain 
Mackeson, political agent at Peshiiwal; announcing the 
march of strong reinforcements from India. An offer 
was made by Mullammad Usivtin IChBn to cscort us all 
safe to Peshii~var for five lnlrlis of rupees ; and shol.tly 
after this tlic Nail, Amir nrrivcd, wit11 a vcrbal agree- 
ment to certain ameudinents wliicll had becn proposed 
in the trcaty bp Major Pottinger. I-Ic wns accom- 
panied by a I<;ishmir merchant and several Hindti 
sharofs, for the purpose of negotiating bills to the 
amount of fourteen lalchs of rupces, payable to the 
scveral chiefs on the promise of the lntc Envoy. 
Major Pottinger bcing altogetlier averse from tllc 
payment of this money, and indeed strongly opposed to 
any treaty binding tlle Indian Government to (L course 
of policy whicli i t  might find inconvenient to adopt, a 
council-of-mar mas convened by the General, consisting 
of himself, Brigadiers Sliclton and Anquetil, Coloncl 
Chambers, Captain Bellcm, Assistant Qual'termaster- 
General, and Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant- 
General. I n  tlie presence of this council, Major 
Pottingcr declased his convictioil that no confidence 
could be placed in ariy treaty formed wit11 the Afglihn 
chiefs; that, under such circumstai~ces, to bind the 
hands of Covcrnment, by promising to evacuate tlie 
country, and to rcstore tlic dcposcd Amir, and to mastc 
inorcover so nlncll public money, merely to save our 
own lives a~id property, woulrl be inconsistcrit wit11 tllc 
duty we omecl our country and the Government we 
servcd ; and that the oiily honourable course would be 
either to hold out to the last at I<&bul, or to force our 
immediate retreat to JallBbb6d. 
This, however, the officers colnposing the council, one 
and all, declared to be impracticable, owing to the 
want of provisions, the surrender of the surrounding 
forts, and the inshperable difficulties of the road at 
the present scason ; tliey therelore dcemed it preferable 
to pay any sum of money ratller than sacrifice the 
wholc lorce in a hopeless proloi~gation of hostilities. 
I t  was accordingly determined, nem. con., that Major 
Pottinger should at once renew the negotiations which 
had been commcnced by Sir William Macnaghten, 
and that the sums promiscd to the chiefs by that 
f ~ ~ n c t i o n a ~ y  previous to his m~irder should be paid. 
M%jor Pottinger's objectio~is being tlius over-ruled, 
thc tendered treaty was forthwith accepted, and a re- 
quisition was made for the release of Captain Lawrence, 
whose presencc mas necessary to 1)~ep;tl.e the bills on 
India. lpour married hostages, with their wives and 
children, being required by the chiefs, a circular was 
sent round, to ascertain if that numbcr would volun- 
teer to remain, a salary of two thousand rdpis per 
month being guaranteed to each as an inducement. 
Such, hornever, was the liorror entertained of ATghAn 
treachery since thc late tragical occurrence, that some 
officers wcnt sofar as to say they would sooner shoot their 
wives at once, than commit them to the chargc of meii 
vho had proved themselves clevoid of comnion honour 
and humanity. Therc wcrc, in Eact, but onc or two 
~vho consented to stay, if the General coilsirlcreil that 
by so doing they would bcnefit tlie public scrvice. 
[Tlie folloving arc thc replics, as given by Lady 
Sale :- 
(( Lieutenant Eyre said, if i t  zoas to beproiluctivc o j  
p e a t  good he would stay u ~ i t l ~  his zoqe and child. Tlie 
others all refusecl to rislr the safety of thcil. Snmilics. 
Captain Anderson said lie mould rathcr pnt a pistol to 
llis wife's llead and shoot her; aucl Sturt, that his . 
vife and mother shoulcl only be talren at thc point of 
the bayonet : for himself, he was ready to perform any 
duty imposed upon him." 
Tlie simple fact is, that on the question being put 
officially, Lieutenant Eyre replied that lic was ready 
to do whatever tlie General might tllinlr most conducive 
to the public good under the circumstances."] 
December 27th.-The chicfv mcrc irlformccl that it was 
contrary to tlie usages of war to givc LIP ladies as 
hostages, and tliat tlie Gcneral could not conseiit to an 
nsr~ngemcnt which would branil liim with perpetual 
disgrace in his own countiy. 
December 29th.-Tlie Nail, Amir came in horn tlie 
city with Captain L:uvrcnce and the sliarofs, ~vlicn 
the bills were prepared wil;llout fartlier rlclay. Cap- 
tains Drnmmoncl, Walsh, Warbm.ton, and Wel~h, 
having beell acccpted as hostages, wcre sent to join 
Captains Conolly and Airey at 'thc house of Nawhh 
Zamlin KliAn. A portion of the siclr and rno~uldccl, 
anlongst wlionl was Licutcnallt I-Iaugllton of the Gdrlrnh 
1 regiment, wcrc lilrc~vise coriveycd to the city, and 
placc(1 uridcr tlic protcctioii of the chieh. Three of 
the SlililiJs g~uls, with tlie greater portiori oP our 
trcasnre, wcre ninclc over cluring the day, much to 
the cvident disgust of tlic soliliery. 
December 30th.-Tlie rernr~inder of the sick went 
into the city, Lieuteriant Ev:ms, MnjestyJs 44th 
Foot, bcing ~)lacc(l i11 cr)mmanil ; Dr. Ct~mpbell, 5111th 
Natvc 1nfa1,ntl-y, svitll Dl*. Be~rniclr, of the Mission, 
ill mcrlical ch:~rgc of tlic ~v1,vllole. Two mom 01 tlie 
ShQl's giills wcrc giveu up. I t  snolvcd hal~l  the 
mllolc day, A crowtl of armed C11:llzis and Gh5zis 
took up :L tllrc:~tcning position close to the castcrn 
gate, ancl cveu attempted to force :m entr:incc into 
ca~ltonrncnt~. Mucll allnoynnce was daily expcrienccd 
from these pcoplc, who wcrc in thc linbit of plunde~ing 
tllc peeccnblc clc:Jcl*s, mllo flocltccl in  f'i*orn the city 
vith grain :md for:igc, the monlcnt thcy issuccl from 
tllc c;ultoiimciits ; tlicy even committed I'rcqilcnt r~ssaults 
on OUT Scpoyn, and orrlcrs to fire on them on such 
occasioris 1~11cre rcpc:~tetlly solicited in vain, althougli 
i t  TVRH WCII know11 that tllc chief's tllcniselves aclvised 
us to do yo,  :~nd tllc Gcner:~l 11:~d given Brigadier 
Shclton positive ir~structiorls to that cflect, wlienever 
T 
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circumstances might render it advisable. The conse- 
quence mas that our soldiers were daily constminecl 
to enclul-e the most insulting arid contemptuous t:tunts 
and treatment, from iello~vs whom n single charge of 
bayonets mould have scattered lilx clin8, hut nrlio 
were emboldened by the appncnt tainc~lcss of om. 
troops, vliicli tliey doubtless attributed to tllc rn:nlL of' 
common pluclr tllnri to t11c rcstr:~iiits of discilrlinc. 
Captains Maclrcrlzie and Slrillilcr ol~taincil tlicir rc- 
lease this evcning, tlic latter ofGcer liaviilg, fiiiicc tlic 
outbreak of the 1.cbellior1, passecl tlirongli sorilc curious 
ndvcnturcs in tlic disguise of an Afgliliil fc1n:~le. 
January 5th.-Affairs contiiluccl ill tlle saine 1.111- 
settled statc llntil this datc. The cliicfs post1)oiiccl our 
departure from day to day on divers prctcxts. I t  had 
been agreed that Naw&b J n b h  ICliAu. sl~ould escort 
us to JallLlilBblid with d ~ o u t  two tliousand followers, 
who were to be entcrtnined for that purpose. 
I t  is sul~posed that, up to tlie very last, tile majority 
of chiefs doubted the reality of our intcntiori to dcpnrt : 
and many, fcarEul of the civil cliscorcls for wliicli our 
retreat woulcl be thc signal, would liave gladly cIetairic(1 
us at Kdbul. Attcmpts wcrc matlc, contilrually by 
Alrbar IChhn to wean tlie Hirid6st;inis fro111 tlicir 
allegiaace, 2nd to induce tlicm to desert, Nulncrous 
cautions mcyc receivcil from v:trious well-mislicrs, to 
place 110 corifidcricc i11 tllc profcssiori~ or tlic cliicftr, 
mho 11:lil smorri togctlicr to accornplial.1 our cntirc. 
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destruction. Sh:*tli SllujG liin~sclf sent nlort.: tll;kll olle 
1 solemn mnming, rind, fi~idiiig me vcrct llclit 011 t:lliillg 
I 
I our own course, used liia utnlost cilde:tvo~rrs to l)t.rs~l;tc\e 
Lady Macnaglitcii to talie advatitage of liis protcc:tio~i 
i n  the Bhlilli Hisfir. R c  also nppc:~lcd to l'lrig;i~lier 
Anquetil, who commandetl tllc Shill's force, " if it were 
me11 to forsake him iu the lionr of ncctl, :uid to dcl)rivc 
him of tlie aid of tliat force, mllicll it had hitherto 1)ren 
taught to consider as his own ? '' 1111 w : ~ ,  liowc~\-er, 
unavailing. 'I'he Gcnei*al aiid his counctil-of-wur 11:td 
determined that go .wc rmlst, anrl go ~ v c  ac!corrliiiglp did. 
I n  tlle foregoing cliaptcrs I linvc offorrd w11:it 1 
i honestly believe to  bc a faithful 11:nr:ltion of t l ~ c  tis~iial 
1 train of events 1vhic11 preceded tllc cvacu:ltioi~ of li;il)ul, ! 
and  the abandonment of ShRh Sllujfi, I)y t l ~ c  '13ritisli 
army. In taking a retrospcctivc view of tliosa un- 
precedented occurrences, it is cvidcnt tlint our rcvcrscs 
i 
may be mainly attributed to n lack of ordin:iry f01,c- 
sight and pelletration on tlie part of the cllicf iriilitary 
and civil autliorities, on their first eti tcri~~g on t l ~ c  
occupation of this eountry ; n comitry wllosc innimlcr- 
able fortified stro~igholds and dificult mountain passes, 
1 h the hands of s proud and marlilie popl~lntion, licvcr 
really subdued nor reconciled to our rule, though 1111- 
able to oppose the march of a discipliilcd army tllrough 
their. land, ought to have induced a Inore tlian colllrnotl 
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degree of vigilance and circumspection in  making 
adequate provision against any such p o p ~ ~ l a r  outbreak 
a v occur. as might haye been mticipatecl, arlil clid actu 11- 
But, instead of applying his undeniable talents to the 
completion of that co~lquest which gaincd liiin an i l l ~ ~ s -  
trious title anrl a widc renown, Lord ICcanc contcntcd 
lzimself with the superficial success which attciided liis 
prog~ess tlirough a country hitherto ui~trnvcrsecl by 
an European aymy since tlie classic days of Alcxarnder 
the Grcat ; he hurriecl off, wit11 too gi-cat eapci~r~~ss  to 
enjoy tlle apl~lause which awnitecl liim in England, 
and left to lzis successors tlie far inore arcluo~is task 
of securing in their grasp tllc unwicldy prize of ~vhicli 
Ize had obtained the nornilid possession. ' 
On his return to Irlclia, Lord Iccane took wit11 hirri 
a large portion of the Bengal force with ~vliich hc 
had arrived at IcBbul; tlie wl~ole of the Boml~ay troops 
made a simulta~ieous homeward movement; and the 
army> with which hc had entered Afgllknistrin, was 
thus reduced to a misc~ahlc moiety, bcforc any steps 
bad been talren to guard against suilprisc by the 
erection of a strongholil on the approvccl princil~lcs of 
modern warfare, or tlic establiulimcnt of a line of 
military posts to lreep open our comrnunic:~tions with 
India, on which c o ~ n t r y  t l ~ e  army must iiccessnrily for 
a long time have bee11 cntircly dcpcndcnt for tlie muni- 
tions of war. lYic diatancc filom ICBhul to Firozpur, 
our nearest Indian fitation, is al>out six l~ui~clrcd miles. 
,+ 
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Between KAbul and Peshicwar occU the stupendous 
aud dangerous dcfilcs of Khnrd-ICBbul, Tizin, Paridaral, 
Jagdallak, and Khaibar, thronghout whose whole extent 
food and forage are proc~u.able only at loug intervals 
and even then mith mnch difficulty. 
From PeshAwar to Rrozpur is the PanjAb, or country 
of the Sikhs, traversed by five great rivers, and occu- 
pied by a powerful nation, on mllose pacific professions 
no reliance could be placcd. Along this extended line 
of communication Lord ICeane established but one 
small solitary post? in the fort of Ali Masjid, in the 
heart of the Khaibar pass. EIe left behincl him, in 
fact, an army whose isolated position and reduced 
strength offered the strongcst possible temptation to a 
proud and restless race to rally their sc~ttercd tribes 
in  one grand effort to regain thcir lost independence. 
IJ I n  Lorcl KeaneJs successors may be secn the same 
dispositioil to be too easily satisfied 114th the outma~d 
semblance of tranquillity. Another brigade was ere 
long withclramn from a force already insufficiellt for any 
great emergency ;' nor was their position for holding in 
I subjection a vanquished pcople much iinproved by their 
establishment in an ill-situated and ill-constructed 
cantonment, mith their commissariat stores separated 
from their lines of defence. To the latter-mentioned 
I error may be mainly attributed the evacuation of 1Ctih.l 
i and the destruction of the army; for there can be no 
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position, had tlle cantonmelits been wcll supplied \pit11 
~rovisions, the troops co~llcl have c:isily licld out uritil 
the arrival of reiiiforccrncnts from India. Tlic real 
cause of our dcreat Tvas, beyoncl all qncstion, ,f(~nliIle. 
W e  mere not drbcn, but stavz>ed,* out of 1liLl)uil; and 
evcry al1om:mce ought in  comn~on justice to l)c madc 
for men who, fi.0111 thc vcry colllmciiccmcnt of tlic 
conflict, saw tlic coinl,iiiccl liorrors of starvatioii ni~cl a1 
rigorouu minter frowning in tlicir fncc,--no succonrs 
within rcacl1,-tlicir rctrent cut off,-a11d all tlicir san- 
guinary cflorts eitllcr altogcthcr fi'uitless, or at bcst 
ilcfcrriiig for n few sllort clays tllc ruin wllicli 011 cvcry 
side thrcatcncd to overwhelm tlicm. 
In connection with tllia subjcct, I may be cxcusccl 
for quoting, in conclusion, t11e powerful reasoning of a 
recent ~vritcr in tllc " Bombay Times : "- 
"When a soldier finds that liis every movenicrit is 
directed by a mastcr mind; tllnt, wlien hc is apparc~itly 
tlnust into the grcatcst cln~iger, lie finds, in  truth, llis 
grcatcst security; that his march to cngagc an appn- 
rently superior force is not a ~vild sacrifice, but thc 
* Tlio Envoy, in n, roporL t o  tho Gororninont of Indio, writton 
just aftorwards, but ~~11iclr  dicl not ro:icll Intlin ill d11o ColirRo, stntuu, 
plmagrnph 12, tliora is " noL 0110 L ~ I L Y ' H  1?riwiui011s loft ;  " rind, 1wm- 
g rnp l~  17, " iVo had boon iigliting forty i l ny~  ngn i~ l~b  V O I ~  11110rior 
mimbors, nnllor grcnt disnclvnnttr~os ; ill n clny or two TVO munt l~r~vo 
porisllod from hungor, t o  H I L ~  notl~ing of tho ndvnncod Bentroll of Lhu 
yonr, anrl tho oxtromo cold, from which our Nativo trooljs woro 
t l l l f f~ l i l l~  H O V O ~ O ~ ~ . "  
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h result of a well-calculated plan; when he Icnows that, 
i l  however appearances may be, he is sure to come og  
tl with honour, for his brethren i n  arms are already in 
s. progress to assist him, and mill not fail to be fortll- 
d coming at the liour appointed; when he sees that there 
e is a watchful eye over him, providing for all his wants, . , 
.e assisting him to overcoine a11 his difficulties, and e11- 
a abling him to reap the fruit of all his successes; wheu 
'5 he finds that even retreat is but a preparation for vic- 
tory, and, as if guided by Providence, all his movements, 
though to him incomprehensible, are sure to 'provc 
steps to some great end;-when the soldier finds this, 
he rises and lies down in security, and there is no 
rlauger which he will not brave. But when, in every- 
a thing they undertake, they find the reverse of the 
picture I have drawn; when they are marched, as they 
imagine, to glory, but find it is G ~ Y  to slaughter; when 
even victory brings no fruit, and retreat they discover 
to be flight ; when the support they hope for comes not, 
and they find their labours to be without end or pur- 
.e pose; when the provisions they loolr for daily are 
issued to them no more, and tliey see all their ,efforts 
paralysed ; the stoutest heart will fail, the bravest sink; 
for the soldier lrnows that, clo what he mill, his efforts 
>I' 
can only end in ruin and dishonour." 
re [An intercepted letter from one of the I G b d  chiefs 
LO i 
'I3 . f -  to a fiiend at KandahBr throws some light on the losses 
sustained by tlie Afg1161is up to thc  time of the Envoy's 
murder. I-Ic writes as follolvs :- 
c c  A11d-nld~ I<liiln and his two soris are dcncl; also 
Tbz N1~1inmm:~tl 1<11611, tlic SOIL of Alnil: JT111i:~mmntl 
IChB1. Greut wcaebors o j  the cJ~ i ( f s  of the Klibulis and 
I<azilbdsJ~i,~ J~ave been killed ~ I L  the various actionsJ ~ 7 r t l  
above tzoo thousand ~ n e n  7~c1ve been killed and w a ~ ~ d ~ l  
?= 
g[ t fie Mz~sst~lmcins."] 
CHAPTER XIII. 
THE RETREAT O F  THE ARMY, AND ITS ANNIIIILATION. 
January 6th.-AT last the fatal morning dawned, which 
was to witness the departure of the ICtibul force from 
the cantonments, in which i t  had sustained a two- 
months' siege, to encounter the miseries of a winter 
marc11 through a country of perhaps unparalleled diffi- 
culty, where every mountain defile, if obstinately de- 
fended by a determined enemy, must inevitably prove 
the grave of hundreds. 
Dreary indeed was tlie scene, over which, with 
drooping spbits and dismal forebodings, we had to bend 
our unwilling steps. Decp snow covered every inch of 
mountain and plain with one unspotted sheet of dazzling 
white, and so intensely bitter was the cold, as to pene- 
trate and defy the defences of the warmest clothi~g. 
No signs of the promised escort appeared : but at an ' 
cnrly hour tlic prepnratioils commenced for our march. 
A cut mas rnnde tllrougli the eaatcrll rampart, to ope11 
a11 adc1ition:~l passage for tlze troops and baggageJ a 
sutficiont n ~ ~ ~ n b c r  of gmi-mnggons slid platform planlcs 
wcrc t:~lccn (low11 to tllc river for the formation of a 
tcrn1)ornry bridge, aud cvcry nvnilnblc cnmcl and y6116 
(thc ~vholc amounting to two thouuai~d) mas ladeli with 
militnry xtu~os, col~~~nissnrint supplies, and sucli small 
prol~o~tiou of c:~11111-ccl~1il)agas mns indispcusably ncces- 
sary to ~licltcr tllc troops in a climate of extrnordirlnry 
rigour. 
Tlic strength of the whole force at this time mas, so 
far ns call ilow bc ascertainedJ very ne:wly as follows :- 
5.11 1 1  I '  I .  d o o  - - 600 1 
37th do. - - 7  - 600 
6 1 tll do. - - - - 050 
O t l ~  t;hi~11'~ In f i t t~ t ry  - . - - 600 
Rnppwil ctod Nincrs  - - - - 20 
Fihall'e (lo. - - - - - 2 4 0  
IInlS tho Molmtnin Trnin - - - 30- 
Total - 
6 IIor~o Art i l t o y  ~ I I ~ B .  
8 Mountain Train do. 
.2,840. 
4,600 fighting-mon. 
Besides tlie abovc, the camp-followers amounted, a t  
a very rrnot1er:~te computation, to about twelve thousrtrld 
men, bc~iclcs worncn nlld children, These proved from 
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the very first mile a serious clog upon our movements, 
and were, indeed, the main cause of our subsequent 
misfortunes. I t  is to be devoutly hoped that every 
future commancier-iu-chief of the Indian army will 
adopt decisive measures to prevent a force employed 
on field service from being ever again afflicted with such 
p curse. 
Tlie order of march mas as follows :- 
H.M.'s 44th Foot - - - - - -7 
Suppers and Minera - - - - - [ The advance, under 
Ii-rog. Horse, 1 squad. - - - - - Brigadier Anquetil. 
8 Mountain Train guns - - - - - 
Tho escort, with tho laclios - - - - 
The invalids and sick - - - - - 
2 lIorse Artille~y guns - - - - - Main colu~m, uuder 
Anclerson's Irreg. Horse - - - - Brigadier Sholton. 
37th Native Infantry, with troosuro - - 
5th Native Infantry, with baggage - - 
54th Nativo Infantry - - - - - 
6thShab'sInfontry - - - - - Roar-guard, under 
5th Light Cavalry - - . - - - Colonel Chambers. 
4 Horse htillei,y guns - - , - - - 1 
All being ready at  9 A.M., the advance commenced 
moving out. A t  this time not a single Afgh6n was to 
be seen in any direction, and the peaceable aspect of 
affairs gave rise to  strong hopes that the chiefs intcnded 
to remain true to their engagements. 
A t  10 A.M. a message was brought from NawAb 
Jabfir KhAn, requesting us to defer our departure 
another day, as his escort was not yet ready to  accom- 
pany us. By this time, however, the greater part of 
the force was in motion, and a cromd of Afghins, who 
had issued from the village of Bem6rd, impatient for 
17 
plunder, had forced their way into tlie nortlleril canton- 
ment, or Mission Colnpouncl (wliicll, owing to some 
mistake, llad beell evacuated too soon by tlie Shiih's 
6th Infantry), and lvcre busily engaged in  the work 
of pillagc ancl d~s i~uc t ion .  Tlle aclvailce was clclaycd 
for U ~ I W ~ T ~ S  of nn horn at tllc rivcr, liaving fouiicl tlie 
tempo1,ary bridge incomplctc ; ancl i t  was noon ere the 
.rvliolc llad crossecl ova; lcnviiig a clcnr road for the 
main columii to follow. 
The order of ninrcli in wliicli tlie troops stnitcd 
mas, however, soon lost, and the camp-follotvers mitli 
tlie public and privatc baggngc, oiicc out of cniitonrnents, 
conld not be p~evcntccl from i~iiring tlieinselves np with 
the troops, to the uttcr confusioii of the wliole column. 
The main body, with its long train of laden camcls, 
co~itinued to pour out of tlic gate until the evening, by 
which time tliousands of .Afgli6iis, tlie majority of whom 
..rrreilc fanatical Ghiieis, tlirotigecl the wliole area of can- 
tonments, rci~dit~g tlie air .rvitli their ex~~l t ing  cries, atid 
committing every kind of atrocity. The rear-guard, 
being unable to restrain them, was obliged to provide 
for its own safcty by t:lking up a positio~l outside, on 
tlie plain; where a grcat quantity of thc 11:lggng-e had 
11ecn brouglit to a stand-still at tlie canal ((mithin one 
liuiiclred aiid fifty y,~rcls of tlic p t e ) ,  ~vliosc slil~pery 
sides rlfforded no safe footing for tllc beasts of Lurclen. 
T l ~ e  bridge'aci~oss tlic rivcr, being by this time imprnc- 
ticable, occ:~sioilcd :~dclitionnl dclay. 
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The Afghlins, who had hitherto been too busily en- 
gaged in tlie morlr of plunder and destruction to take 
much notice of the troops, ilo~v bcgan to line the ram- 
parts, and annoy them with a mischievous fire of 
jazails, undcr wllich many fell ; and i t  became neces- 
sary, for tlie preservation of those who remained, 
to spilre and abandon two of the IIorse Artillery 
guns. 
Niglit had no\v closcd aro~uid ;b ~ t  the Gldzis, having 
firetl thc residency ancl dmost every other b~ilding in 
thc cantonment, tlie conflagration illuminated the sur- 
rounding cowltry for sevcrcll miles, presenting a spec- 
taclc of fea~ful s~~blimity. I n  tlle mad fervour of tlieir 
religious zeal, tlicsc ignorant fanatics even set fire to 
tlic gun-cnltriages hclongilig to tlic various pieces of 
orclnaiice, whicli wc liad lcft in position round the 
~ v o ~ k s ,  of wliosc use tlie Afglilin chiefs Ivcre thus luclrily 
ilclxivcd. The gcue r~ l  had been oftcn urged to destroy 
tliesc guns, rather than suffer tliern to fall into the 
enemy's hantls, b11t hc  coi~siclered that i t  would have 
hccn a hreach of tlie treaty to do so. Bcfore the rear- 
guard commenced its inarch, Lieutenant I-Iardyman of 
tlie 5th Light Cavalry, with fifty rank and file, meyc 
s.tretclied lifelcss on tllc snow. Much baggage was 
nl~andoncd a t  starting, and much was pl~~ildered on tllc 
ronil. Scorca of morn-out Scpoys and camp-followers 
lined the way, having sat do~vn in desprtir to perish ill 
tlie snow. I t  mas 2 A.M, crc the rear-guard reached 
1 7  * 
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camp at Bdgrbm, a distalice of only fivc miles. I-Icrc 
all was confusion. Tlie tciits liatl bccli pitcliccl without 
the slig1;lltest regard to yegularity, tliosc 01 r1iKci1crlt 
regilncnts being liuddlcil t o g c t l i ~ ~  in one intricate m:lss, 
'mixer1 up with bnggagc, carlip-followers, <::~~iicls, and 
horses, in R way ~vliicli 1)cgg:~ru r1cscril)tioli. 'J'lii: l l i t~~sy 
canvas of tile snldicrs' tcnts was l ~ u t  :L l)oor pvotoatioii 
from tlic cold, wliicli townrds iiiorniiig bc!c:~ruc: rticrc! 
and morc iiiteiisc; aiid t1luus:uiils of poor mrctolictl 
creatures wcrc obliged to lic clown oil tlia 1):~ro snow, 
without eitlicy sliclter, firc, or food. Scvcrnl rlictcl 
i during tlic night ; ainoligst ~vlioln mas all l(:urol)o:rii conductor of orilllance. 
About t~vcnty jazailcliis, ~vlio still hcld f:ritllfully by 
Captain Maclcenzie, suffered lcss than tlic rcst, owing 
to tlicir systematic moilc of proceeding. Tliair first 
step on reaching the grouild wiis to c1c:rr a sni:~Il sp:tcth 
from tllc snow, mllcre tllcy tlicii Inid t l i c ~ n ~ o l v ~ s  110wv11 
in a. circle, closely packcd togctlicr, with tllcir feet 
meeting hi tlic ccutre ; all tlic wrrnii clotliing tlicy 
could muster among tliem ljcing sprcxd cclua~lly over 
tlle mhole. By tllcsc simple nicails snfficiciit n11irn:~l 
warmth was g:.cner:ltcd to prescrvc tTlc~n from boirlg 
frost-bitten ; arid Capt:iili M:lclrc~lzic:, who himsclf 
sliared tlicir lioniely bccl, dcclnrcd that 11c lind felt 
scuccly any inco~iveiiieucc from t l ~ o  cold. I t  was clif- 
fcrcnt with our Scpoys aiid camp-followers, ~vlio, h a v i ~ ~ g  
had no fonncr crpcrierice of sue11 liarildiips, wcrc 
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ignorant how they might hest provide against tliem, 
and the proportion of those who escaped, witho~lt suffer- 
ing in some degrce from frost-bites, was very small. 
Yct this was but the beginning of sorrows ! 
Junuary 7th.-At 8 A.M. the force movecl off in the 
reverse orclcr of yesterday-if that could be called order 
ml~icli coiisistcd of a mingled mob of soldiers, camp- 
follomcrs, arid baggage-cattle, preserving not cven the 
f:intcst seinblancc of that reg~llarity and cliscipline on 
ml~icli clepcncled OLW only cllance of escape from the 
clangers which thrcatencd us. Even at this early stage 
of thc retrcat scarcely oiic-half of the Sepoys mere lit 
for duty ; hullrlreds had, from sheer inability to keep 
thcir ranks, joillcd tlie uon-combatants, and thus in- 
crcnsed the confusion. 11s for tlic Shil?s 6th Infantry, 
i t  m;u ~io~vlicrc to be fomid ; oiily a fc~v straggling files 
were pcrccptible llcrc and there; and it was generally 
believed that tElc majority of the rcgimeiit had absconded 
during tlic iiiglit to IC6bul. 
At starting, largc clorls of hardciicd snow adhercd so 
firmly tu the lioofs of OUT horses, that a cliisel and 
liarnnicr mould lime hcen recl~iisite to dislodge them. 
Thc vcry air mc brcatllcd froze ill its passagc out of the 
inoutll :uid nostrils, formiiig a coating of sniall icicles 
on our moustnclics and beards. 
T l ~ e  ;~dvanco ljrocccded onward mitliout molestation, 
tliongli nurncrous small bodics of Afgli6n liorse and 
foot were obsei*vcd hanging ahout our flar~lcs, and 
moving in a parallel direction with ourselves. These 
were at first supposed to form a part of,"our escort, but 
the mistalre was soon discovered by their attacltirlg the 
rear-guard, commanded by Brigadier Anclnetil, consist- 
ing of Hcr Majesty's 44tl1, Lieutenant Green's Mountah1 
I'rain guns, and a sq~~aclron of Inegulay I-Iorsc. h'lncl~ 
baggage fell into the cnemy's hands, 1~110, though in 
some degree lrept in chcclr by the glins, cshil~ited a, 
r 
bold front, and maintained a harassing fiipc oil our 
troops, whose movemeilts wcre terribly cripplcd by tllc 
disorderly multitude that thronged the 19o:id in front. 
! 
The latter being for several minutcs byougllt to a 
stand-still by a deep water-cut wliicll iiitcysccted thc 
road, the Mountain Train guns endeavowcd to pass clear 
of thcm by ma11ing a short detour, in doing which they 
got separated from the infantry, ancl-one hnl~peniug at 
this unluelry moment to ul~sct-the enemy seized the 
opportunity to rush for~varcl and capturc them, before 
I ler  Majesty's 44th, who saw too late their awltward 
predicament, could render cffcctual assistance. 
A gallant example was, howevel; shown by Lieutenant 
Green and his few artillerymen, 1)-110 lnacle a suclderi 1 
charge upon the foe, and spilred thc guns, but, not being 1 
supported, they were obliged a sccond time to abandon 
them. Lieutenant Wllite, the Adjutant of Hcr Ma- 
jesty's 44th, reccived a sevcre wound through the face on 
this occasion. 
Brigaclier Anquetil now sent to {lie front for win- 
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forcements, mhicli, however, i t  was found impracticable 
to furnish, from the crowded state of tlie road. The 
Afgliiin liorsc shortly after this charger1 into tlie very 
~iiiclst of tlic columrl of baggage, and carriecl ofl large 
quantitics of plunder, creating the greatest collfusioil 
and dismay. Numbers fell from wounds, arid still 
greater numbers from inerc bodily wealmess produced 
by cold, fasting, and fatigue. I t  was found necessary 
to spike aricl al~anclon two more I-Por~le Artillery gmis, 
~vhich the horses were fo~incl perfectly incapable of 
t21-agging any furtller through tllc decp snow. 
011 the arrival of the advance at Kta-i-lrh;'iIlr, the 
Gcncrnl, having been iilforlncd tllnt tlle rcar was hi 
tlai~gcr of bcing entirely cut off, ordered a halt, and 
sent back all tllc troops that conlcl bc spared, togctlier 
wit11 tllc t~vo  remcli~ling gulls, to clrive off the enemy, 
~vlio liar1 now assembled in grcat numbers in tlie rear, 
and were proceecling to crown some heights on tlie 
riglit coinmniicling the road. This was, however, pre- 
vcntccl by our troops under Brigadier Slielton, wlio tooli 
possession of the nearer hciglits, anrl lrept the enemy in 
c*liecli for ul~wards of ail houi-. 011 tliis occasion, 
Lieutenant Slia~v, of the 54th Native Infantry, was 
~vomidcd scve~cly in tlie thigh. Mean~vl~ile Captail1 
Slrinricr had fallen in with s follower of Muhammacl 
~ l k b a r  1<11;;11, filom ~vliom liaviilg leal-nerl that tlle cliief 
mas cncnrrlpcd ricar at hand, he  accompanied tllc man 
to his masker's prescncc. M~thammad all,^ now in- 
formed Captain Slrinner that hc llad been sent by thc 
chiefs to escort us to Jalliil&b6d, and declared that we 
had becn attaclrcd in coilscquencc of having marclled 
contrary to their wishcs. IIe insistcd on our halting 
at Bdta-i-lrhA1r till thc following morniug, in  ~vllicll 
case he would providc food, forage, and fire-woorI for 
the troops; but lie said that be should cspcct sis 
hostages to insure our not marching bcyond Tiziri he- 
fore tidings should bc reccivcd of Qcncral Sale's cvacu- 
ation of Jalliil&biid, for .cvhicl~ an ordcr liad bcen alrcady 
despatched to that officcr, in compliaricc wit11 tlic 
stipnlatioiis of thc trcaty. 
.These terms having becn agreed to, thc firing ccascd 
for the present, and thc force came to a halt on somc 
high ground near thc cntrance of thc 1Chuz.d-IChbul 
pass, having in two days accoinplished a distancc of 
only tcn milcs from I(ilbu1. 
Here, again, tlie conf~~sion soon hecamc indescribablc. 
Suffice it to say that an immcnve multitude of from 
fourteen thousand to sistecn thonsancl mcn, wit11 
several hundred cavalry horses and baggagc cattle, 
were closely jammcd together in one monstrous, nn- 
manageable mass. Night agairl closcd over us, .cvith 
its attendant train of horrors,- starvation, cold, cx- 
haustion, death; and of a11 deaths I call imagine 110110 
more agonising than that wliere a nipping frost 
tortures every sensitive limb, mltil the teriacious spirit 
itself sinlrs ~ n d e r  thc cxtreme of l~urnari ~ufi'cring. 
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.Tusi.ciuv?/ hl/~.-At an early hour the treacherous 
11lglikrl.r again commancctl to molest us with tlieir lire, 
nnil scvc:rnl li~~iidrcds liaviilg i~sscmblctl in liostilc array 
to the sontli of tlia c:imp, the troops mcrc drawn I ~ I  
ill expectation of : ~ n  attack. M a j o ~  Tliain, putting 
Eliniself : ~ t  tllc llcnil 01' tlir: 4 bth Foot, and cxliortilig 
n ~ c u  to follow Iiiin, let1 tllcin boldly on to tlie 
attack; hut tlii: oriciny (lid rlot tliinli proper to await 
tlic? fiIio(:k of' I):~YOILC~S, :ind c.ifccted a hasty retreat. 
Tl i  this l~llsiilcss IIer Mr~jcsty's 4.l'tli Foot behavc?d wit11 
:I, resolutiou :~11d g:ill:~litry mortliy ol Britisli soldiers. 
Ca~'ltiiii Sliixii\(~r :lgai~l ~ v e i ~ t  to conim~lili~ate wit11 
hIu11:~~nmatl Altllar Iilllin, ~vlio ilcmandcd tliat Major 
Yottingor i u d  Captailis L:~rvrencc aiiil &Iaclieiizic 
sliould i~xirnctli:~tcly be madc ovcr to hiin, wliieli was 
aecortlii~gly donr, xitl liostilitics :igain ccnsed; the 
Sirilhi* l)romisi~ig to sr:itd furward some ilifiueiitial mcu 
to cle:~r tlicl pass fiom tlla C~halzie, .ir~ho occupicd it, 
:uld merc lying in ~rvnit for our al>proacli. Once more 
tllc l i ~ i n g  iuass of nlcli arld animals mas in motion. 
At tlle cntr:uice of thc parjs an attcmpt was made to 
scl)ar:~tt: tlie troops f ~ o m  the lion-combatants, wliicli 
mas but partially sncccusful, and created c~nsidcr:ible 
duli~y. Tlie rapid cffccts of two nightsJ exposure to the 
frost in ilisorganiziiig tlic force call hardly be conceived. 
I t  had so nippet1 tllc llnilds aud fcet of cven thc 
rjtrorlgcst men, a8 to completely prostrate tlieir powers 
and iuciq~ncitate thcm for service; eveu the cavalry, 
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wlin sufl'crccl lcss t l ia~i tlle rcst, mcrc ol~ligcd to be 
liftcd ou tlicir horscs. I n  fact only a fc~v hundred 
schrvict::rl~lc fightii~g-mmi rwnained. 
Tlic idcn of tlircading tlie stupendous pass before 
i us, in tlic fncc of an nrmcd tribe of blood-thirsty 
L I)nrl~clrinns, wit11 such n dense irregular multitude, was 
, liligl~bl'ul, ancl the spcctnclc t l lel~ presented by that 
~vztving so:^ of :uiiiiiated beiiigs, tlic majority of ~vliom 
:L f i : ~  ilcctir~g liours wo~lid t ra i~sibl~~n illto a line of 
lif(:loss ~:~rc:isses t o  guidc tlie fuuture traveller on his 
WILY, ( ' i~ i i  icv~i, 11e forgnttc~l by tllosc ~vlio mitncsscd 
it.#: -Mrc Iiad so of1e11 bcci~ deceived by AfghLn pro- 
" W11cu tilo nvoiigin~ ~ ~ r n l y  nudor Goncr:ll Pollook wns in prOgrCSE 
lo K b u l  in tllo Sol~lciul~or follo\~ii~g, T~ioutonant Greenwood, of 
Ilcr hfnj rhly '~  3181 ILogiii~cnt, writos :- 
I' 011 0lll~rinji tilo 1il1l11~1l-Ii~bi11 pas8 \YO wort all fltrucli ~vit11 the 
utn~i~hl  ri!ilonial~n~c~~t. Tho otl~or 1i:issorc aim as notl~iilg in corn- . 
~~nrisoil  ~villl Illis nlnlohl iniprcgnnblo dclilo. Tlio dond of Gonorol 
E l l ~ l ~ i n ~ t o u o ' ~  msniyltiy iri 11cnpu ; in ~olno places tlioy eecmod to bo 
niomc!tl down in ~v11olo Iiattalions. Altl~ougl~ oiglit nlo~~tlis had 
olnp~cll, tl~c?p llritl bcon l~rrecrvod in tllo mow, and their ghastly 
flrce~ hco~r~ctl to call opo~i 118 for rovongo." 
IInjr~r Slnitl~, of IIor &l:~josty'u 9tli Foot, llius dosoribos tho same 
ACOIlO :- 
"Next morniny: wo nlnrchcd tllrough tho Ul~urd-Kibul pass to  
t 
Bfida-i-kliirk. Tho wcc~lc wo wit~~oaeotl xVns full of tho niost painful 
i~~tcroclt. l i t  this fat:~1  pol iiat lea8 tl~irrl three thousand incliriduols 
of tlio I<dl)nl nrr~ly ~ o r o  mnurtaorod by tho Afgliilns. Nino English 
i ladios, mitlr o i~ l~ toe l i  or tncnty yo~inji ohildron, witnossod tho friglltful u~~cotr~clo, ~und ~hnrerl its dnngors. Tlioro in a grandour 
I ill tho Rcmcry of this pnfls wllicli soolnorl to accord mith tho hideous rlsl~oct of tlio ronil tilong mllicll \YO t~*avollod, ~ t ro~vod  for two miles 
liko n charnol lron~o wit11 nlcnldoring ukoloton~. What feeling was 
oxcitod in our troopn by ~ a c h  oLjoc&~ nlay readily be concoivod." 
fessione, tliat little or no corlfidcncc uraR placcd in the 
tlie dretltlcd pass in no \.cry stnlguinc: tcnlpcr of nliutl. 
This truly i'onniclnblc clcfilo is t111o11 t i i ~ c  tllilcv froln 
cncl t o  cncl, ntitl is a l t ~ t  ill 011 citll~19 I I ~ L I I ( ~  by ;L lint 
of lofty Ilills, l~otwce~l  v l~oxc  prccipitoux ~irles tllc: sun 
tllc ccnt1.c daullcil a ~nomlC;liu torraiit, ~vllosc inq~etuoos 
conrse t l ~ o  Crust in vain ;~ttc:it~ptccl to rurrc:st, tliougli i t  
~tucccctlod i r k  l i r~ i r~g  thc cdgcv will1 tlticalr, layers of icc, 
ovcr wllicl~ tllc finow Lly cousolidi~tetl it1 s1ippc:ry 
masscs, :~fl'oi)l'~liiig 110 veyy onsy footing for onr j:rtlcd 
animals. Tllis strcaitl me l~ t~c l  to  crow I L I I ~  recross 
. Tho Ilov. J. N. Allon, U l ~ a ~ ~ l a i l l  to  tho army uildor Gonoral Nott, 
writes on tho 14lh October 1 B l Y  :- 
I "Mural~ccl n t  6 A.M. thrclngll tho ICll~irtl-Kirlr111-u ~tuy~ontl(~un IIILBA. I t  i~ ~lose(1  in  Iry l r i l l ~  ~ ~ u d  ororlln~lgiug rockn, ml~icl~,  if 
tlofondotl, wonltl 110 oxccodingly ( I IL~~~~OL.OI IH,  nllllf~st irrlpi)~nihlo to - cro~vn,  ant1 rL CILIIRO of i ~ l l i ~ l c r l s ~  tlqs C V ~ ~ I I  t(r 1110 IIIOHL ititl.olri11 1lr1i1 
wcll-orgr~l~izocl fol.co with fcivo~rrirl~lr! t \entl ic~.  [ t  will alrsily Lo 
cunccivc!tl, thorcforc, wlu~L i t  I I ~ I I S L  IIILVO lrt>[:rl ( 1 1  1110 tro1111~ u ~ ~ t l o r  
Gonorril I ~ l l ~ l l i ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ i e ,  t ~ t ~ v ! ~ l ,  ~liql~il.it.i~I, rl~i(l I ~ ~ R I J P ~ : L I ~ ~ % C I ~ ,  ill tho 
n ion t l~  of ,It~nlt:~~.y ; tl~cl ~ I * I ) I I I ~ I I  tlucy i r ~  H I ~ ~ I V ,  irl~d c~rlrosotl to tho 
ilro of crol~rly of Afgllin~a. 
" Thcj L ~ I I ~ ~ I L I I C O  to tho  1111s~ ~o111i1 IISLVO f0r1110rl IL fi~lo ntik~jcct for 
Salvator I ~ J H ~ .  '.l'11(! gol.go 100k0(l ~ l ~ ~ r k ,  ~~Ool t ly ,  I L I I ~  t l ~ r o r ~ t ( \ ~ ~ i r ~ ~ .  
'1'110 C ~ I ~ ~ ~ K C , ' ~  nnrl itr~~tltxtic r13olrg towcare11 I I I I I I O H ~  110 r~101~d io~~ lu r l~  C J I ~  
llotll H ~ I ~ O H ,  lrliLllJ' 01' t,tllllll tlllit0 H(1, to 1111 ~?111J~I11011H I10ir;hk. TI10 
forcgrtr~l~ltl ISIIH occnl)iotl 11y tho n k ~ l i l l o ~ ~ u  of t11(! i l l - f ~ ~ ~ o ~ l  L L , ( I O ~ H ~  
t ~ n d  \rtil,ll 1110 Itbrginr I'ornis of cs i~lncl~  cult1 IIOI'HOH. . . . All a~+o,~rld 
1 1 1 o ~ .  h " v1~110y of LIMJ H I I I L ~ ~ W  of iIc~11111 " i t  IIILH illtleod ; 
rrmd ovaryorru rolt norisiLly ruliuvod \YI IUI I  \VU O I I I O P K O ~  frorn it." 
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wards, the defile gradually narrowed, and the  Ghalzis  
were observed hastening to  crow11 the heights ill 
considerable forcc. A hot fire mns openecl on tho 
advance, wit11 wlioln tvei9e several liidies, wlio, seeing 
their only clinricc mas to kcel) t~iemselves in rapid 
motion, gnllopccl fortvmcl a t  the head of all, rtuiniug 
the gauritlet of the enemy's bullets, wliicli ~vhizzeil in 
hundreds abont thcir cws, mltil they wc1.0 fairly o u t  of 
the pass. Providci~t;i,zlly tlie whole csc:~ped, ~v i th  the 
exception of Lady Sale, wllo rcccivcd n slight w o u n d  
in tlic arm.* I t  ougllt, however, to bc meutionecl, that 
several of Mullammad Ak11a~'s cliief adherents, wllo 
11ad pycceclcd tllc ndvn~icc, escrterl tlicniselves s t renu-  
ously t o  l<ccl) ilowii tllc fire; hut rlotliiilg could res t ra i l ,  
tlle Glialzi~, mllo sccilicrl fully tlctcrmiueil tlint noboaY 
sliould iiltcrferc to ilisnppoiiit tlicm of' their prey.  
Orlward lnoved tlic cro~vcl irito tlie tliiclrcst of the f i l ~ ~ ,  
nnd fcnrfiil tvas tlic slaughter that ensued. iln uni- 
versal panic sl)cedily prcvniled, a i d  tliousnnds, seelci~lg- 
refilgc in fliglit, hnrricd ior\vnrcl to the front, &an- 
dotling bnggage, arms, nmmmiition, womcn, and 
cliilill.ca, rcgarcllcus for tlie moment of every th ing  
hut  thcir ow11 livcu. 
Tlie rear-guarcl, consisting of I-Ier Majesty's 44th 
# Tho ~l i thor ' e  liLtlo boy (now LL Mojor of Artillory in Bollgal),  
who wnn ~tnyqio t l  on  tho lmck ti[ n, fuitl~ful Afg1~Ln ~orvant, had o, 
vory nurrow OMC(IIIO, u ~ ~ i l l g  to t110 a~linlal ful l i~ig u ~ i d  throwing them 
off iu. tho ~iiicltllo of Ll~o 11nfls. 
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and L$tli Native Infantry, suITercd severely; and at 
last, finding that delay was oilly dcstruction, they fol- 
lowed the general eekamplc, ant1 made the best of tlieir 
way to the Iront. Another I-Iorse Artillery gun was 
abandonccl, and thc whole of its urtillcryrncii slain. 
Captain Anderson's cldest girl,* nncl Captain Boyd's 
youiigest boy, fell into tlie liancls of tlic Afglilil~s. 
It is supposcd that three i,housantl souls pcibishcd in thc 
pass, amongst whom wci-e Captain Puton, Assistaut- 
Quartermaster-Gcllernl; ancl Licutcriallt St. Geovge, 
37th Native Infantry; Majors Gvi&tl~s, 37th Native 
Infantl-y, ancl Scott, liter Majesty's 44,tli ; Captains Botl, 
5th Cavdry, and T r o y  , Brigadier-Major Slfilh's force. 
Dr. Cuvrlew and Licutcnant Xturt, ciilgincei,~, wcrc 
wounded, the latter mortally. This fine you~ig officer 
had nearly cleared tlie defile when he ~eceived his wound, 
'ancl would have becn left on tllc grouiirl to bc liaclcccl 
to pieces by the G1i:izis who i'ollomcrl in the rear to 
coml~lete tlie work of slaughter, bnt for tlic gelierous 
intrepidity of Lieutenant Meiri of IIer Majesty's 13th 
Light Infantry, who, 011 learning what liar1 befallen him, 
went back to his succour, and stoocl by llim for several 
minutes, at tlie i~nmirient risk of his own life, vainly en- 
treating aid from tlie passers by. I-Ie was at lerigtli 
joined by Sergeant Dean of tlic sap per^, witli vlioac 
* 6110 ma8 rocovororl on  tho lot11 of &f&y following, 11nving I,OQII 
mcnnwhilo mout 1;indly truntocl in tho fttn~ily of NnwiLb Bimirn 
IChdn &at; Kdbul. 
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assistauce he dragged his friencl on a q~tilt hrough the 
remainder of the pass, when he succeeded in mounting 
him on a miserable pony, ancl coilductcd him in safety 
to camp, where the unfortunnte ofTicer lingerecl till the 
following morniag, ancl was the only inwi of tlie whole 
force ~vlio received Cliristian bu~ial.  Lieutenant Mein 
mas liimself at this very time suflcriug. from a dangerous 
wouncl in the liead, received iiz the previo~~s October, 
and his lieroic ilisrcgard of self, ancl ficlelity to liis friend 
in thc llonr of ilnnger, are well deserving of a record ill 
thc annals of Bviti~jli vnlour nncl virtue.;{: 
On tlie force reacliing IClit1l.d-IC6b~11, snow began to 
rail, and coiitinucd till morning. Only four small 
tents mcre saved, of \vhicli one belongcd to thc General : 
two mere dcvotcd to the lnilics and cllildren, nud one 
\vas givcn up to tllc tiiclr ; but all irumciise numllcr of 
poor ~vouudcd wretclics wnndcrecl about tlic camp dcs- 
titute of sheltcr, aud llerishcd duririg tlie night. 
Groniis of iliisery and distrcss assaileil tlic car from all 
quarters. 'VVe had ascelided to a still colder climate 
than nre liad leCt bchincl, and were without tents, fuel, 
or food : tlic sno1~~ was tlie only bed for all, nncl of innny, 
crc morl~ing, i t  provcd tElc zoindin,q-sheet. I t  is olily mar- 
rellout.1 that :my ~lioulil hnvc survived tlint fearS111 night ! 
Jr~x7lary St?&.-Anotlicr moriii~ig da~vncd, nnralrening 
* Tlio nbnvo l~a s~n f io  'vnR r ~ ~ l o t a ~ l  l)y Sir Robert I'rol, tlloll Plriliio 
Minislor of Engl:iild, in tho 1 1 0 ~ ~ 0  of Comn~one. LionLcna~~i,, nonv 
Colonol, Moin still ~ u r v i v o ~  n tho activo lint. 
tliousands to increased misery ; and many a wretched 
survivor cast loolrs of envy at his comracles who lay 
stretched beside him in the quiet sleep of death. 
Dayliglit was the signal for a renewal of that con- 
fusion wliich attended every movcmeiit of tlie force. 
The General had intended us to marc11 at 10 A.hI., but 
a, large portion of the troops, with nearly all the 
camp-followers, moved off without orders at 8 a . ~ . ,  
and had advanced about a inilc from the camp, when 
they were recalled by tlie Gcneral, in consequence of 
a comrnullication from Mulinmmad Alrbar I<h&ii, who 
promiscd to use every endeavour to furnish us with 
supplies, but strongly recommended us to halt until he 
could make some proper arrangemellts for escorting us 
down safely. Therc can be no doubt that the geiierd 
feeling in camp was adverse to a halt, t l~ere being 
scarcely eveti a native soldier who dicl not plainly pcr- 
ceivc that our only chalice of cscape consistcd in 
moving on as fast as possible. This additional rlelny, 
therefore, and prolongation of their sufferings in tlle 
snow, of wliicli one marc march mould have carried 
them clear, made a very ulifavourablc iml~rcssioil 011 
tlic minds oC the native solrliery, who now for the first 
time began verj genei..ally to entcrtaiu thc idea of de- 
serting; nor is it at all astonislling that these symptoms 
should have first developed themselves amo~igst the 
ShrihJs native cavalry, who were, for tlie most part, 
exceedingly young soldieys, ancl foresaw full well tlie 
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fatal result of all these uscless and pcrnicious delays. 
The love of life is strong in every brcast. 
Tliese men had hitherto behaved remarkably well, 
notwithstanding the numerous efforts that liad been 
made to detach them from their duty; and, if their 
fealty at last gave place to the instinct of self-preserva- 
tion, be it remembered in their favour, that it was not 
until the position of the force, of which they formed a 
part, had become altogether desperate beyond the reach 
of cure. 
Towards noon Captain Slcinner arrived in camp with 
a proposition from Muharnmacl Alcbar ICldn that all 
the widowed ladies and mwu.ried families, whose destitute 
situation ill camp rendered them objects of universal 
pity and sympathy, sliould at once bc made over to 
his protcction, to preservc thein horn further hardships 
and dangers ; in  this case he promiserl to escort them 
down safely, lreeping them one dayJs march in rear of 
the army. Tlie General, though not himself disposed 
to placc inucli confidence in Muharnmacl Alrbar's friendly 
professions, mas strongly recommended by Captain 
Slcinner to trust him on the present occasion, as he 
felt assured that such a mark of confidence would 
be attended with happy results to the wllolc force. 
Anxious at all events to save the ladies and children 
from fwthcr suffering, tlie General gave his consent 
to the ai~angcment, and told Captain Slcinncr to pre- 
pare all the married officers and ladies to depart imme- 
18 
diately with a party of Afghgn horse, who were in 
wai t i~g  to receive them. His intention also was that 
all the wounded officers in camp should have had the 
option of availing themsdves of the same opportunity to 
seek Muhammad AkbarJs protection; but the others 
were hurried off by the AfghBns before this had become 
generally known, and o d y  two were in time to join 
them.* 
Up to this time scarcely one of the ladies had 
mated a meal since leaving KiLbul. Some had infants 
a few days old at the breast, and were unable to stand 
without assistance. Others were so far advanced in 
pregnancy, that, under ordinary circumstances, a walls 
across a drawing-room would have been an exertion; 
yet these helpless women, with theh young families, 
: had already been obliged to rough i t  on the baclss of 
I camels, and on the tops of the baggage yfib6s : those 
who had a horse to l-icle, or were capable of sitting on 
one, were considered fortunate indeed. Most had been 
without shelter since quitting the cantonment-their 
~lervants had nearly all deserted or been killed-and, 
'with the excel3tion of Lady Macnaghten and Mrs. 
Trevor, they hacl lost all their baggage, having nothing 
* Cnptdn Troup, Brigadier-Major, Bhbh'~ forco, and Lieutenaiit 
Mein, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, who went as Lady Snle's 
protector. 
LieuLenants Wdlap and Eyre were likewise suffering from severe 
and painful wounds received in notion at  Khbnl, which totally 
disabled them from active service. 
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in the world left but the clothes on their backs; those, 
in the case of some of the invalids, consisted of night- 
dresses in which they had started from IC6,bul in their 
litters. Under such circumstances a few more hours 
woulcl probably have secn some of them stiffening 
corses. The oEer of Muhammad Albar was conse- 
quently their only chance of preservation. The hus- 
bands, better clothed and hardy, would have infinitely 
preferred taking their chance with the troops; but 
where is tlie man who would prefer his own safety, 
when he thought he could by his presence assist and 
console those near and clear to him 1 
It is not therefore woncle~ful ihat, from persons so 
circumstmced, the General's proposal should have met 
with little opposition, althougll it was a matter of 
serious doubt whether tlic whole were not rushing into 
the very jaws of death, by placing themselves at thc 
mercy of a man who had so lately imbrued his hande 
in the blood of a British Envoy, wl~om lie had lurecl to 
clestruetion by similw professions oE peace and good- 
will. 
But whatever may have beell the secret intent of 
Akbas's heart, he was at this time our professed friend 
and ally, having u~ldertalcen to escort the wl~ole force 
to  JallilAbfid, in safety. Whatever suspicions, there- 
fore, have becil cntcrtained of his hypociisy, it was not 
in tlie character of an enern9 that he gained possession 
of the married families ; on the contrary, he stood 
18 * 
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pledged for their safe escort to Jall6lBbitd, no less 
than for that of the army to which they belonged; 
and by their unwarrantable detention as prisoners, n o  
less than by the treacherous massacre of the force, 
. he brolce the universal law of nations, and was guilty of 
L 
an unpardonable breach of faith. Shortly after fie 
1 
departure of the married families, it was discovered t h a t  
the troopers of the ShBh's Irregular Cavalry and of the  
Mission Escort were deserting in great numbers, having 
been enticed away, as was supposed, by Mnhammad I 
Akbar, to whom a message of remonstrance was in I 
consequence sent. He assured the General, in reply, 
that not only would he refrain from enticing the men 
away, but that every futwe deserter from our camp l i 
should be shot. 
Meanwhile a large body of Afghjn horse had been I I 
observed in the vicinity of camp, in  company with I 
the cavalry descrters; and, fears being entertained 
that it was their design to attack the camp, a general 
parade of the troops was ordered for the pwpose of Y 
B repelling them. The 44th Foot at this time was 1 
found to muster one hunched files, and the native 
infantry regiments, on an average, about sixty files 
each. Of the Irregular I-Iorsc not abovc one hundred 
I 
effective troopers remained, and the 5th Light Cavalry, 
though more faithful to their salt, had been reduced by 
casualties to about seventy fighting-men. On the 
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mcssage, the opportunity was tdren of the troops being 
paraded, to explain to them its purport, and to warn 
them that every inan ~ r h o  might be discovered clesert- 
ing would be shot. At this very time, a clmprassi 
of tlic Mission, being caught in the act, was instantly 
shot, as an exainple to the rest, by order of the 
General, nncl the crime thus rcceived a salutary check. 
Captain Maclray, having becn chosen to convey to 
General Snle a, hesh order for the evacuation of 
JalltllBfiid, was sent over i n  thc evcning to the Sirdir 
with that view. The promiscs of Muhammad Alrbar 
t o  provicle food and fncl mcrc unfulfilled, and another 
night of starvation and cold consigned more victims to 
a miserable death. 
J u n u u ~ y  1Otl~-At brcali of day all mas again coii- 
fusion, the troops aiid camp-followers crowding pro- 
miscuously to the front so soon as tlie ordcrs for a 
march mcrc givcn, evcry oiie dreading, al~ove all things, 
t o  be left in tllc rear. The Europcail soldiers were 
now almost tlie only cfBcicrit nicn Icft, thc IIincllist~nis 
having all sufferccl more or less from thc effccts of 
frost iii thcir huiids and fcct ; fern mere able even to 
hold a musl;ct, much less to pull a trigger ; in fiact, 
the  prolorigcd clclny in tlic sriolv had paralyscd tlie 
mcntnl and bodily polvers of tlic stro~igcst men, 
&ring tllcnl iiicapal~lc of any uscful exertion. I-Iope 
seeixiccl t o  liavc died ~ I L  evcry breast. 
The advancecl gnard (conuistirig of l I c r  Majesty's 
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44th Foot, the sole remaining Horse Artillery gun, 
and about fifty troopers of the 5th Cavalry) having 
managed witli much difficulty to push their way to 
the front, proceeded a couple of miles without mo- 
lestation, as far as a narrow gorge between the pre- 
cipitous spurs of two hills, through which flowed a 
smaU stream. Towards this point numbers of Afghhn 
foot had been observed hurrying, with the evident 
intention of opposing the passage of thc troops, and 
were now found to occupy the height on the right in 
considerable force. NO sooner did the advance ap- 
proach within shot, than the enemy, securely perched 
on their post of vantage, commenced the attack, 
1 ' 
pouring a destructive fire upon the crowded column, as 
it slowly drew nighto the fatal spot. Fresh, numbers 
fell at every volley, and the gorge was soon choked with 
the dead and dying : the unfortunate Sepoys, seeing 
no means of escape, and driven to utter desperation, 
cast away their arms and accoutrements, which only 
clogged their movements without contributing to their 
defence, and along with the camp-followers fled for their 
lives. The Afghfins now rushed down upon their helpless 
; and unresisting victims, sword in hand, and a general 
massacre took place. The last small remnant of the 
Native Infantry regiments were here scattered and 
destroyed; and the public treasure, with all the re- 
maining baggage, fell into the handa of the enemy. 
Meanwhile, the advance, after pushing through the 
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Tangi with great loss, had reached Kabar-i-Jabfir, 
about five miles aheacl, without more opposition. 
Here tliey halted to enable the rear to join, but, from 
the few stragglers who from time to time came up, the 
astounding truth was brought to light, that, of all who 
had that morning marched from Khurd-ICitbul, they 
were almost the sole survivors, nearly the whole of 
the main and rear columns having been cut off and 
destroyed. About fifty I-Iorse Artillery men, with one 
12-pouncler howitzer, seventy iilcs Her Majesty's 4$th, 
and one Elunclred and fifty cavalry troopers, now com- 
posed the whole 1C:ibul force; but, notmitl~standing 
the slaughter and dispersion that had taken place, the 
camp-followers still llormed a considerable l~ody. 
The app~oach of a party of AfghAn liorse induced 
the General to draw up his little force in line, prepa- 
ratory to an expected attack ; but on its being n.scer- 
taineil to be Muhammad Altbar IChLn and his followers, 
Captain Skinner Tvas despatched to remonstrate with 
him on the attack on our troops after a treaty had 
been entered into and their safety guaranteed. 
I n  reply, hc expressed his regret at what had oc- 
curred, but saicl that, notwithstanding all his endeavours, 
he found i t  impossible to restrain the Ghalzis, who were 
in such a state of cvcitement as to be l~cyond the con- 
trol cvan of their own chiefs. As a last resource, he 
recommended that tlie few remaining troops should lay 
down their arms, and place themselves entirely under 
his safe-guard, in which case he could ensure their safe 
escort t o  JallBliil,Bd; but that as the camp-followers 
still amountcd to some thousands, aild far out-nurnl~crc~l 
his own people, there was no altcrnativc but to leavc 
them to tlxcir fate. To tliese terms the General could 
not bring himself to consent, aiicl tlie desperate marc11 
was resumed. IIerc Captain Maclcay rejoined the 
troops, as the Sirdiir considered i t  impossible for him at 
presen-1; to iualce his way safe to J:~llBl$bAd. 
About five more rnilcs led down tlie steep descents of 
the 13dt  ICotal, into a narrow dcfilc, or coniii~cd bcd 
of a mountain strcam. 
A ghastly sight here met the eye, the ground being 
strewn with the bodies of a iiumber of camp-followers, 
with whom were several wounded officers and solcliera, 
who, having gone on ahend of tlie columii, were attacked 
on reaching the foot of the hill, and massacred. Tlie 
hcights commanding tlie defile (mhicli was about tlircc 
miles long) were fou~ld crowned with the cnemy. 
Muhammad Alcbai, and his train llad talcen a short cut 
bver the  hi11s to Tixin, and were followed by the few 
remaining troopers of thc Irregular Cavalry. Dr. Ma- 
grath, seeirig them talcc, ns hc thought, a wrong dircc- 
tion, lmstened to recall tliem, and was t:Jcen prisoner 
by a Ghalzi cllief. I n  tlicir passage rIowii tlie rlcfilc, a 
destructive fire was niainta~iricd on tlic troops from tlic 
heights on cithcr side, and frcsli nu~nbcrs of dcad and 
woundecl lined tlie course of the stream. Brigndior 
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Sllclton commanded the rear with a fcw Europeans, 
and but for his persevering energy and unflinching 
fortitucle in repelling tlie assailants, it is probable the 
~ 1 1 0 1 ~  would have becn therc sacrificed. 
Tlie diminislied remnant rcachcd the encamping- 
ground in the Tiail1 valley at about 4 P.M., having lost 
sincc starting from ICLbul, inclusive of camp-followers, 
about t~vclve tl~onsnnd men ; no less than fifteen officers 
jvcre Billed and woundcd in tlzis day's disastrous 
marcll. 
Altllougli i t  was now sufficiently plaiu that Muham- 
~ n a d  Aliba~ citlicr could not or ~rrould not act up to 
 hi^ fric11(11y profcssio~is, the General eendeavonretl to 
rencw his Tvorsc than uscless negotiation with that 
chief, i11 tlic Saint liope tlii~t something might still bc 
done to 11cltcr tllc situation of tlic troops ; but Cal~tain 
Ski~iilrr, \vllo was dcputcd on tllc occasion, retwned 
~vitli precisely the sallic arlslver as before; and as the 
Qcncral could not 111 lioilour accccle to his prollosal, all 
Iiol~c of sic1 from that y a r t c r  was at an exid. 
It ~vas xiow clctcrmined to ~naltc an cffort, under 
covt:r of d:~i'lillc~~, to rcacli Jagdala~lt, a c1ist:~nce of 
twenty-two rnilcs, by an carly hour on tlic following 
moniing, tlic principal ol~jcct 11cixlg to gct tlirougl~ the 
strong and dnngcrouw pass of that ~ ~ l n c c  b fore the 
crlcrlly slioultl havc sufIiciciit iioticc of thoir intention, 
to occnl)y it ill any forcc. Arj tllcrc csistcd a sliort cut 
from 'l'iziil to Jilgclrrlalr ovcr tllc hills, tlic success of 
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the attempt was very doubtful ; hut the lives of all de- 
pencled on the issue; and at 7 P.M. the little band 
renewed its forlorn ancl dismal mnrch, word having 
been previously scnt to M~~harnmacl A cbar tlint i t  mas 
the General's intention to move only as fir as Sch 
B&bii, distant scven miles. On moving off" the last 
gun was al~andonccl, and wit11 it Dr. Cardew, wllo 
hacl becn lnshcd to it in tlie liopc of savitlg him. This 
gentleman Ilacl rcndcrcd llimself consl~icuouu from the 
commencement of tlie siege for his zeal and g:~lla~~~ltry, 
and had become rt grcat favourite mith thc soldicry in 
coneequence, by whom his llaplcss fatc was sinccrcly 
lamented. Dr. D d ,  tlie superintending snrgcorl of 
the force, experiencccl no better fort~~ne,  being left in 
a state of utter exhaustion on the road miclway to Seh 
B5ib&. Little or no molestation was esyerienced by 
the force until renching Seh B;Tb6, whcn a few shots 
being fired at the rear, thcre was a11 iimmcdinte rush of 
camp-followers to the front, atid thc main boily of the 
44th European solclicrs, who llacl hitherto been mcll iu 
advance, getting mixed up in the crowd, could not be 
extricated by ~vithclmming thctn to the renz; owing to 
the narrowness of the road, whicll now trnvcrscd the 
hills to Barilt-6b. Boclies of thc ncighbouring tribes 
mere by this timc on tllc alert, and fiilcd at  raudom 
from the heights, it being foi%uuatcly too (lark for 
them to aim with prccision; hut tlle pa1~rlic-siric:lten 
cnmp-followers now resemblccl a llcrd of startled ilcer, 
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and fluctuated baclrwards and forwards, en at 
every shot, blocking up the entire road, and fatally re- 
tarding the progress of the little body of soldiers who, 
under Brigadier Shelton, brought up the rear. 
At Barilr-&b a heapy fire was encountered by the 
g' hindmost from some caves neay the road-side, occasion- 
\ ing fresh disorder, which continued all the way to Rattar-Sang, where the advance arrived at  dawn of day, and awaited the junction of the rear, which did 
I not take place till 8 A.M. January lltl~.-The distance from Jagdalak was still 
ten milcs ; the enemy already began to  crowd the sur- 
rounding heights, and it was now evident that the delay 
occasioned by the camp-followers had cut off the last 
chance of. escape. 
&om ICattar-Sang to Jagdalak it was one continued 
conflict ; Brigadier Shelton with his brave little band, 
I in the rear, holding overwhelming numbers i~ check, 
and literally performing wonders. But no efforts could 
avail to ward off the withering fire of jazails, which 
from all sides assailed the crowded column, lining the 
road with bleeding carcasses. About 3 P.M. the advance 
if reached Jagdalak, and took up its position behind some ruined walls that crowned a height by the road-side. 
To show an imposing fiont, the officers extended them- 
selves in line, and Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant- 
General, at the same moment received a wound in  the 
face. ' From this eminence they cheered their comrade. 
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! ' 
under Bligadier Shelton in the rear, as they still ! 
1 ' struggled their way gdantly dong every foot of ground, 
perseverillgly followed up by their merciless enemy, 
j 
until  they arrived at their ground. But even here rest 1 . , 
mas deuicd them; for the Afghfins, immediately occu- j 
pfing two hills which commanded the position, kept up 
a fire froin ~vhich the walls of the incloswe afforded but 
a partial shelter. 
1: [" It lnay interest the reader to peruse the following 
i utterance of General Shelton himself, at Gosport, in  
Jmu;try lR(1.4, on the presentation of new colours to I. the 44th Regiment :- 
["When the Europeans were left to their own 
resources, the men of the &th showed their sterling 
worth;-from that moment I assumed the command of 
the rear-guard) and in going through the Tidn pass, 
1 i
annoyed by a galling and destructive fire from the heights 
on both flanks, and ~vheli crowds of savage Ghalzis 
rushed like n torrent upon the rear) this brave little 
band, obedient to my voice, halted, faced about, and 
repelled the appalling numbers of the enemy under a 
tremendous fiife, with a boldness and determined 
courage that might have extracted admiration from 
1 
I 
the very stones under their feet ; and thongli they had \ 
been now four days and four nights on the snow, these 
noble fellows performed a forced march of tmo days 
and one night, without halting-repelling the incessant I 
attacks of the enemy, under a dest~uctive fire that 
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strewed the whole line of road with the dead bodies of 
thcir comracles, with a constancy and unyielding courage 
that mill command my admiration and respect so long 
as I live; and what I now state, was under my own 
personal observation. No man ever thought of surren- 
der, but all fell gloriously with their arms in t h e i ~  hands, 
fighting to the last, and only sixteen remained of the 
number that marched from ICAbul."] 
Tlle exllaustcd troops aiid followers now began to 
suffer greatly fiom thirst, which they were unable to 
satisfy. A tcmpting stream tricklecl near the foot of 
the hill, but to ventye clown to i t  mas cert8n deatli. 
Some snow that covered tlie ground was cageilly de- 
voured, but increased, instead of alleviating, theh 
suffeiings. Thc ram flesh of three bulloclrs, mllicli had 
fortunately been saved, was servccl out to the soldiers, 
and ravenously swallowed. At about half-past 3 
a messagc having becn brought from M~thalnlnad Alrbar 
to Captain Slrinner requesting his presence, that officer 
promptly obeyed the call, hoping tlierel)y, even cut the 
eleventli hour, to effect some arrangement for tlie pre- 
servation df tliose wlio surviverl. The harassed and 
worn-out troops, in the expectation of a temporary 
truce cluing his absence, tllrcw themselves down to 
snatch a brief repose; but even this much-needed 
luxury was denied them by their vigilant foes, who now, 
from their commanding position, poured into the 
crowded inclosure death-dealing volleys in rapid suc- 
cession, causing the utmost consternation among the 
terrified followers who rushed wildly out in the vain 
hope of finding shelter from the fire. At  this perilous 
juncture Captain Bygrave, with about fifteen brave 
Europeans, d i e d  forth in the full determination to 
drive the enemy from the heights, or perish in the 
attempt. Unflinchingly they charged up the hill, the 
enemy retreating before them in the greatest trepida- 
tion. The respite, however, thus signally gained was 
of but short duration, for the heroic little band had no 
sooner returned than the enemy re-occupied their posts 
of vantage, and resumed their fatal fire. Thus passed 
the time until 5 P.M., when Captain Slrinner returned 
from his interview with Muhammad Altbar, bringing 
a message to the General from that chief, who re- 
quested his presence at a conference, and demanded 
Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson as hostages 
for the evacuation of JallQcibbid. The General, seeing 
no alternative, made over temporary command to Bri- 
gadier Anquetil, and dcparted with the two above- 
named officers under the escort of Muhammad Sh&h 
IChhn. The troops witnessed their departure with 
despair, having seen enough of Afgh&n treachery to 
convince them that these repeated negotiations were 
mere hollow artifices designed to engender confidence 
in their victims, preparatory to a fresh sacrifice of 
blood. The General and his companions were received 




























i d i n  
cession, causing the utmost conatcriiation among the 
terrified followers who rushed wildly out in the vain 
hope of firlcling shcltcr from t?ic RPC. At this perilous 
juncture Capt:ril~ Bygrave, tvith shout fifteen brave 
Euro~)ca~iu, sallied forth in the f~lll dcterlniuation to 
drive tlie cnetny from the hciglrtu, or pcrish in the 
&%tempt. Unllinchingly they charged rrp the hill, the 
enemy retreating l~efore them in tltc greatcut trepiiia- 
tion. Tllc respite, howcver, thus signally gained l v w  
of but sftort duratiotl, for the Iieroic little E~srld 11:d no 
sooner returned than thc enemy rc-occupied their posts 
of vautage, ar~rf rcsumed their fatal fire. Thus passed 
the time until 5 P.M., when Captain Skiriner returned 
from his interview with &Iufietrrrmar3 Akbar, bringing 
a message t o  the General from that chief, wfio re- 
quested his presence at a conference, a i d  demanded 
Brigarlier SIielton and Captain Johnson as hostages 
for thc evacuation of Ja1l:ildbrid. The Gencml, seeing 
no alternative, made over temporary eorxln~and to Bri- 
gadier Anquctil, and cleparted with tfrc two above- 
narnerl officers under the escort of 3luhrtmmad Sh&h 
KhBn. The troops witnessed their rlepclrture 4 t h  
despair, having sccn enough of Afgldn treachery. to 
convince them that these repeated riegotiatiun.ii m r c  
mere hallow &ifices dcsigne.rl, to engender confiiienoe 
in their victims, preparatory to s, frcrak sacrilticc of 
biootl. Thc General and his compsnioris wcrc received 
by the Sirdkr with every outward token of kiradnem, 
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and no time was lost in supplying them with the bodily 
sustenance they so greatly needed; they were likewise 
assured that immediate arrangements should be made 
for the supply of food to the famishing troops, and for 
their safe escort to Jall&lAbAd, after which they were 
shorn into a small tent, to enjoy, for the first time since 
leaving Khurd-KiLbul, a quiet and refreshing sleep. 
January 12th.-Numerous Ghalzi chiefs, with their 
attendant clansmen, flocked in from the neighbouring 
parts to pay their homage to Muhammad Akbar ; and 
about 9 A.M. a conference was held, at which the three 
British officers and all the influential chiefs were 
present. All the latter were loud and profuse in 
their expressions of bitter hatred against the English, 
and for a long time the SirdBr's efforts to conciliate 
them seemed to be unsuccessful; but the offer of two 
lakhs of r6pis appeared at last in some measure to 
appease them, of which sum Muhammad Akbar 
promised to advance one lakh himself, and to be 
security far the other. The day nevertheless wore 
on without anything decisive having been agreed upon. 
The General became impatient to rejoin his force, 
and repeatedly urged the Sirdtir to furnish him with 
the necessary escort, informing him at the same time 
that it was contrary to British notions of military 
honour that a general should be separated from his 
troops in the hour of danger; and that he would 
infinitely prefer death to such a disgrace. ' The Sirddr 
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put him off with promises, and at 7 P.M., firing being led on by Major Thain, Captain Bygrave, and Lieu- 
heard in  the direction of the pass, it was ascertained tenants Wade and Macartney; but again and again 
that the troops, impatient of further delay, had actu- the enemy returned to worry and destroy. Night 
moved off. From the time of the General's de- came, and all further delay in such a place being 
parture the situation of the troops had been in truth useless, the whole sallied forth, determined to  pursue 
one of dark and cruel suspense, unenlightened by one the r o u t e  to Jallhlgbbbd at all risks. 
solitary ray of hope. At an early hour in the morning, T h e  sick and wounded were necessarily abandoned 
before the enemy had yet made their appearance on to the i r  fate. Descending into the valley of Jagdalalr, 
I the hills, Major Thain, accompanied by Captain they ~ u r s u e d  their way along the bed of the stream 
I Skimer, rode out a few hundred paces in the direction 
for abou t  a mile and a half, encountering a desultory 
B of Muhammad Akbar's camp, in expectation of fire f r o m  the Ghalzis encamped in the vicinity, who 
i meeting a messenger from the Sirdk to the last-named B were evidently not quite prepared to see them at such 
officer ; a Ghdzi soldier suddenly made his appearance, an hour,  but mere soon fully on the alert, some fol- 
and, passing Major Thain, who was several yards in lowing up the rear, others pressing forward to occupy 
advance, went close up to Captain Skinner, and shot the pass. This formidable defile is about two miles 
i him with a pistol through the face. Major Thain long, exceedingly narrow, and closed in by lofty instantly returned to camp, and announced this act or precipitous heights. The road has a considerable slope 
treachery. The unfortunate officer was carried inside upwards, and, on nearing the summit, further progress 
the inclosure, and lingered in great pain till 3 P.M. was found to be obstructed by two strong barriers 
In him the State lost an officer of whose varied merits formed of branches of the prickly holly-oak, stretching 
as a soldier and a man it is difficult to speak too completely across the defile. Immense delay and 
higMy. A deep feeling of anguish and despair now confusion took place in the general struggle to  force a 
pervaded the whole assemblage. The extremes of Passage through these unexpected obstacles, which 
hunger, thirst, and fatigue were suffered alike by all ; gave ample time for the Ghalzis to collect in force. 
added to which, the Afghbns again crowned the heights A terrible fire was now poured in from all quarter-, 
and recommenced hostilities, keeping up a galling fire and a massacre even worse than that of Tang6 Thriki 
i; the whole day with scarcely half an hour's intermission. commenced, the AfghAns rushing in furiously upon 
I Sally after sally was made by the Europeans, bravely the pent-up crowd of troops and followers, and com- 
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put him off with promises, and at 7 P.M., firing being 
heard in the direction of the pass, i t  was ascertained 
that the troops, impatient of further clelay, had actu- 
ally moved off. From the time of the General's de- 
parture the situation of the troops had been in truth 
onc of dark and cruel suspense, unenlightened by one 
solitary ray of hopc. At an early hour in the morning, 
before the cncrny had yet made their appearance on 
tllc hills, 3lnjor Thain, accompanied by Captain 
Skinner, rode out a few hundred paces in the direction 
of R!IuIian~mad AkbarJs camp, in expectation of 
rneetiug a, messenger from the Sirdlir to the last-named 
officer ; a Ghalzi soldier suddenly made his appearance, 
and, passing Major Thain, who mas several yards in 
advance, went close up to Captain Skinner, and shot 
him with a pistol through the face. Major Thain 
instantly returned to camp, and announced this act or 
treachery. The unfortunate officer was carried inside 
the inclosure, and lingered in great pain till 3 P.M. 
I n  liinz the State lost an officer of whose varied merits 
as a soldicr and a man it is difficult to speak too 
highly. A deep feeling of anguish and despair now 
pervaded the v-hole assemblage. The extremes of 
hunger, thirst, ancl fatiguc were suffered alike by all; 
&c:d to ~vhicti, the Afgl~iins again crowned the heights 
and recommenced hostilities, keeping up a galling firc 
the whole day with scarcely half an hour's intermission. 
Sally after sally was made by the Europeans, bravely 
led on by Major Thain, Captain Bygrave, and Lieu- 
tenants Wade and Macartney; but again and again 
the enemy returned to worry and destroy. Night 
came, and all further delay in such a place being 
useless, the whole sallied forth, determined to pursue 
the route to JallBgbdd at all risks. 
The sick and wounded were necessarily abandoned 
to their fate. Descending into the valley of Jagdalalr, 
they pursued their way along the bed of the stream 
for about a mile and a half, encountering a desultory 
fire from the Ghalzis encamped in the vicinity, who 
were evidently not quite prepared to see them at such 
an hour, but mere soon fully on the alert, some fol- 
lowing up the rear, others pressing forward to occupy 
the pass. This formidable defile is about two miles 
long, exceedingly narrow, and closed in by lofty 
precipitous heights. The road has a considerable slope 
upwards, and, on nearing the summit, further progress 
was found to be obstructed by two strong barriers 
formed of branches of the prickly holly-oak, stretching 
completely across the defile. Immense delay and 
confusion took place in the general struggle to force a 
passage through these unexpected obstacles, which 
gave ample time for the Ghalzis to collect in force. 
A terrible fire was now poured in from aJl quarters, 
and a massacre even worse than that of Tang6 TAriki 
commenced, the Afghans rushing in furiously upon 
the pent-up crowd of troops and followers, and com- 
19 
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rnitting wholesale slaughter. A miserahlp slndl rem- their confident foe, they were compeiilt~rl to Icave the 
nant managed to clear the barriers. Twelve o6cers,* roa(1, and take up a defcrisive position on it lrvigt~t to 
amongst whom mas Br i~c l i c r  Anrluetif, wcM: killed. the left of it, where they rnatle a, rcant,ltrte stand, 
Upwards of forty t others s~~ecceclcd in ptlslii~lg tllroilgh, deterrniried to sell their lives at the (lcart*ht possible 
about twelve$ of wliom, being pretty wtbll ~nonnted, price. At this time they could only rurtnter about 
rde on of the rcst n-ith t l ~ c  fcsv rremaining > 
twenty muskets. 
cavalry, intencling to m:~ke tlic h t  of their to Some Afgbhn horsemen, approaehitig from the 
~ ~ l l ~ ~ b ; i d ,  Slnall 1):irties of thi* Europc:~us 
i 
direction of Gandrimak, xvcrc  tow 11ec.Bontvl tts, and, an 
marelled on ulldcr diflcrcl~t officers :, tk :  C'ork~~try 
4 atternpi was made by Lieutertant i Ia1 ti, c9utrr rzl>on became more open, alicl ~ u f f c r ~ d  little nlole\fati@n a some pacific c~rra~igerncut. IIo?ctiliticbs vt.rc* fix- n fc;w 
for several lnost of the Uh:xlzr,is bc'i~ig ton busily 8 
minutes suspende(i, a~id, at tllr: in vita tic,^^ of 8 chief, 
engaged in the pluncleririg of the dtb:kd to I)Xl!'Stle 
Slajor Griffiths, the seuior oti.ic.er, :~c.~ct~~ip:l!!ichlf 135' 111'. 
living. But much delay was occbauioncd by the :inxiety Bletvitt to act as interpreter, dcsecl1tIc~i2 tllc jlilI to a 
of the men to bring on their wouu<Icd raoxx1radc~, and 
the rear was muell harassed by s~ldtien onsets s-jeyer:~I iifgf1:inu noxv ascenctetl the ]lt1iglrllt, arnd 
parties stationed on the heights, unrler which the road 
sunled a frielidly tone to.iv:trcl.s tilt. l i t r l t .  thcrr 
t occasiollally On reacllirlg the Silrki'tb river, stationed; I>ut tfie culru tvns of sl1or.r tirtr;erirln, for 
they fourld the enemy in possession of the bridge, and the soldiers, getting provokr~tI at sc~car:~l actcnlptu 
a hot fire was cnc.ountcreil i r ~  crossing the 5irtl below beilig made to  srxatch away tt~lt:ir :rnl?r, n..;tlrucd a 
it, by Lieutonant C:id~t, Ifer l;\lajesty's &l,th, IlostiIc attitude, arid rfrave the irltr~ltl~r-d f i i - l y a t b I y  dUWllt. 
was Billed, together with  sercsl.al plniv:ttcs. 
The (lie .rnw tlow cast, arid their f"iiee sta;lltAti; frlr tjle 
Junuury 13t?/.-TI1c niorning rliinrlecl as they stp- 
e1lcrn~, taking np their ~ r m t  xlrl urk oi,llriqitc: IiiillE 
proached Gan<l;i~;l:lk, rt:veali~~g to the encblkly, t v h 0  frtd marlied oft: rnau after man, o f f i ~ ~ ~ r  :&(" rt,~ji(y*f'l with 
by tElis tilne ir~crc:ist.d. considcr:ifjlg iln thvir Eroxrt and unerring airtl. 1':~rties of :lfgli;itis rttiil$*il 111) ;it in- 
rear, the insigr~ifiv:r~ice of their nuttlerical strength. 
terra13 to eornpfete the work of' c ~ . ~ ; t c ~ r ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ t i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  but 
To avoid the ?~iguruns assaults tbet were now trlaik? by 
1% often driven back bp tirr ?itill FI:LI~ t i t  jil.idflsfldfd 
of' ixlvinciblcs. A t  Icngtlt, uttariy b r ~ i l l g  wwcrunded 
nlcm? or i e ~ g  a find UUset of thc tAfk~l?iy, X ~ S C ~ X Z ~  irt harid, 
mif-tirlg wholrsde siarii.!itc+r. rlni%c3r:t!rjv xrnd! rcm- 
uant nlanngctl tc, c.lka;lr ~!lr"~,;ie.rit~n'.a. 'I'!%! i \ a 1  ~rtiic.c*m,* 
morlgst tvllom FV:LC~ I$ri~:itljt.a. . l ~ i i j i i t a t  i 2 ,  $4 4 . ~ -  Xiiierl. 
up%var(ls of ft~,rty + t ~ t l u~ r \  ~ i t ~ ~ t ~ t * i * t \ t * t ~  i !  !~t~%liii~z ~i rc+\~glk~ 
t l v c a i r c b x  of J V ~ ~ H ~ Y ,  I~t'ix~r [1rtm14y MI"! 11lhc~tit1lt%<l~ 
rwle ahiqld of the- rt~,t: ~ i t i i   tit^' !'I"& r~'11i:biiiitlg 
cBlrti]sy, iIi~r.lkdirlg t o  ~rt;ilir+ t i i t -  I I ~ * * I  t ~ f  thilir w:ay t~ 
J : L l l ~ l ~ & c ~ ~  $izi:gii ~ t r ; k g ~ l i ~ k c  i,:~rth8% t b $  t ! ~ t *  ~ ~ ! I ~ I E ~ I % * $ ~ Z I %  
marcllell 011 urldcr clifilt~rtq~lt ri:tic't-r+; t l i r2  r'trtitktry 
be(talIIC f l l ~ > r ~ ~ ~  crjlpji, :i~~i! tfifay \ t l M t * ~ % ' t !  i ? t ! ~ *  1lbc$lla-t;ati(bfl 
for gcvcral rtl'nlw, ~nct.it uf t f ~ ,  I ;i i ; i l ~ : l  fji-:itg kr r !,in,ily 
engagt.d ill. tfkc 1rlnl~lric.t.inlg c j f  the. r!k*:rri t r r  jfi11I""~ic 
living. 13ut 1 l t i l c * 1 b  itr.l:ry W:i.: t ) t ' t*; i%i?~li i '{f  !!? f ? t t < ; t l l ~ i ~ t ~  
of the men to Iiring ot t  tftc*ii- trrjrtatrla*4l c ~ t r i s r ~ . : a t % t . - i ,  ailad 
the rear was I L I U P I ~  lii~ri~**(*(i h y  r1111t11412 E i ~ s i * ~ ' ~  f ru l t  
parties stationcct otr tlrc freigtrt-, rtcirivr \c I i i i*ir  thc. r r~ad  
occnsiu~~nily wound. ()ti rt*u.!ii?i$ e % i v  rk,; !J rik rsr, 
they fouuil ttlc elielu?; i ~ n  irtr--sv-ic,n iil' t h r *  B~ritlgi*, and 
a hot fire WELY ~ * ~ ~ ( ~ o ~ l t ~ t t * r t ~ t i  i n  ~rt t+ i i !g  ~E114'rti I ~ + l o w  
it, by which Liu~tti~ri:trtt (':uicbt. I- f f g r *  ,\f;,jr1st> 'B t $ t k ,  
was killcct, trtpttltcr witti qc*t.c*r;:l pn.irrrtr'*. 
Junzrary I:3th.-'CE~c ~ ~ ~ o r z ~ i t l g  rl;r\t tipti i i h  tht.9 ap- 
proachcd (ianti;ini:~k, n.re;ilifig tbnt tint' r3raa.ttiv, aflo 313d 
by this tiltle irtrslu:t.\eri ccdasitivr;ilily iil ttiteir frr~tit  srltd 
rear, the inhigr~lfi~*;trlr.c of titisir t i ; ~ r g ~ t * r i i * i e l  ~tr(~~qjr th.  
To avoid the vigu~~cttis u sa~tliln that W ~ * P V  ikc~w titt~die iZ9y 
* Appendix. .t IbicZ, it&. 
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their confident foe, they were compelled to leave the 
road, and take up a defensive position on a height to 
the left of it, where they made a resolute stand, 
determined to sell their lives at the dearest possible 
price. At this time they .could only muster about 
twenty muskets. 
Some AfghAn horsemen, approaching from the 
direction of Gandiimak, were now beckoned to, and an 
attempt was made by Lieutenant Hay to enter upon 
some pacific arrangement. HostiIities mere for a few 
minutes suspended, and, at the invitation of a chief, 
Major Qriffiths, the senior officer, accompanied by Mr. 
Blewitt to act as interpreter, descended the hill to a 
conference. 
Several -4fghhns now ascended the height, and as- 
sumed a friendly tone towards the little party there 
stationed; but the calm was of short duration, for 
the soldiers, getting provoked at several attempts 
t 
S being made to snatch away their arms, resumed a 
B hostile attitude, and drove the intruders fiercely down. 
The die was now cast, and their fate sealed; for the 
enemy, taking up their post on an opposite hill, 
marked off man after man, officer after officer, with 
unerring aim. Parties of Afghiins rushed up at in- 
tervals to complete the  work of extermination, but 
t were as often driven back by the still dauntless handful 
i 
1 of invincibles. At length, nearly all being wounded 
rrlorc or less, a find onset of the enemy, sword in hand, 
terminated the unequal struggle, and completed the 
dismal tragedy. Major Griffiths and Mr. Blewitt had 
been previously led off to a neighbouring fort, and were F 
thus saved. Of those whom they left behind, Captain f 
Souter alone, with three or four privates, was spared, 
i 
and carried off captive, having received a severe wound 
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from Kgbd, which, viewed in all its circumstances,-- 
in  the political and military conduct which preceded 
and brought about such a consummation, the treachery, 
disaster, and suffering which accompanied it,- is, 
perhaps, without a parallel in modern historj .* 
- 
in the shoulder; he had tied round his waist before * A most remarkable historical parallel may, however, be found  
leaving Jagdalak the colours of his regiment, which in Book V. of Casar's Commentaries, in the description there give11 
were thus miraculously preserved. of the insurrection of the Gads  under Ambiorix, wherein the Roman 
general, Sabinns, figures as an exact prototype of Elphinstone, with 
I t  only remains to relate the fate of those few a n  almost identical result in the details of unavailing valour, ending 
officexs and men, who rode on ahead of the rest after in a hollow treaty with treacherous chieftains, a disorderly retreat, 
of the Roman army, and its h a 1  annihilation. 
passing the barriers. Six of the twelve officers, Cap- 
tains Bellem, Collier, Hopkins, Lieutenant Bird, Drs. 
Harpur and Brydon, reached FuthAbibBd in safety, the 
other six having dropped gradually off by the way and 
been destroyed. Deceived by the friendly professions 
of some peasants near the above-named town, who 
brought them bread to eat, they unwisely delayed a 
few moments to satisfy the cravings of hunger; the 
inhabitants meanwhile armed themselves, and, suddenly 
sallying forth, cut down Captain Bellew and Lieu- 
tenant Bird; Captains Collyer and Hopkins, and Drs. 
Warpur and Brydon, rode off, and were pursued; the 
three former were overtaken and slain within four 
miles of JallBLb5d; Dr. Brydon by a miracle escaped, 
and was the only officer of the whole Kfibul force who 
reached that garrison in  safety. 
Such was the memorable retreat of the British army 
tcrmin:klfbd the a~lccll~nl struggle, completed the 
t f i ~ ~ i ~ t r r l  f P ; E ~ , P ~ v ~ ~ F .  >I:!jor C;rifEt'li~ and %xr. Rlemitt had 
her.11 j,ra*vicrtl\iw I ~ t i  t r t f  t i7  it ~~(Gghbourin~ fort, and were 
llattn h;i~t'd.  tho^.^ \\Ii0111 they Icft behind, Captain 
3ot:tr.r. : i f r ) ! t c ' ,  w i t h  t h 1 . 1 ~ ~  or fo~ir privates, Vas spasea, 
111iti ~*: i~ 'r i t* t !  t lfi ' t ' : i l~ f  ivo, 1 1 ~ 1 v i r i ~  received a severe mound 
i n  e t i c .  ~ h t t t ~ i t l t ~ r  ; ht. Il;id, tied ruusld his waist before 
It*:r\ir~g ,l;sg(l:it:kk t l x  etaIuttr?j of his regiment, which 
wtbrtb tI~i~"i~iir;it*ili(t~~hly ~ I ~ ~ ~ S C P Y C ~ .  
I t  r ~ i t l ? ;  rt*mnai~ir to rclatc the fate of those few 
siitie.t~s zrtrtl t12c3i1, tvitu rode on sliead of the rest after 
13"~qnirtg tttic. Iinrrit*rs. Six of thc tvelve officers, Cap- 
tailns B%c*llt.w. Cbllicr, IIopliins, Lieutenant Bird, Drs. 
E ~ Z P ~ I ) I I I  tutti fiy(if<)ll, rcnchcd lkth6bibrid in safety, the 
0 t h ~ : ~  six Jlavixig dropped gradudly off by the way and 
ba+t*e (Er~f ~ y ~ c f .  1)cc~ived by the friendly professions 
nf r;r,nlr peasants ncnr the above-named town, who 
I)r0~1gBit t f i t w  1~1't*:id to cat, they unwisely delayed a 
f t~w tnauicnt\ to satisfy the cra.aings of hunger; the 
iriIle91it:ultli ~trci:tnwllilc. arnlcd themsclves, and, suddenly 
(iiLIlyilig ft )rtI~, callt ctovn Captain Bellew and Lieu- 
tk*arruii IjirtI ; (':ilrtains Collyer and Hopkins, and Drs. 
Ifrtrjsllr Z L I I P ~  l$r?;do~1, POIIC of$ arid were pursued; the 
t l l r c b r *  fc,rgtclr 5yure overtaken and slain within four 
Izlilt+r of' .IsIIAl;ite;itP ; Dr. l3rydoxl by a miracle escaped, 
\$:Is ~I~ptj1iIy  tifli~er of the whole K6bul force who 
2 - a h ; i i r . l i r s r i  ~ ! $ z E  g:rrrisx>n in safety. 
srnc:it ~ t ; t ~ q  tth: mainoral~ie retreat of the British army 
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from Kfibul, which, viewed in all its circumstances,- 
in the political and military conduct which preceded 
and brought about such a consummation, the treachery, 
disaster, and suffering which accompanied it,- is, 
perhaps, without a parallel in modern history .* 
* A most remarkable historical parallel may, however, be found 
in Book V. of Czsar's Commentaries, in the description there given 
of the insurrection of the Gauls under Ambiorix, wherein the Roman 
general, Sabhus, figures as an exact prototype of Elphinstone, with 
an almost identical result in the details of unavailing valoui-, ending 
in a hollow treaty with treacherous chieftains, a, disorderly retreat 
of the Roman army, and its h a 1  annihilation. 
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CHAPTER XIV. 
CAPTIVITY O F  THE HOSTAGES. 
[IN the early editions of this work the account of the 
military operations which ended in the retreat and 
destruction of the British army was followed by  
rough notes made by the author, descriptive of the 
life in  captivity of himself and his comrades. After the 
lapse of so many years it has not appeared advisable 
to the author to encumber the work with details, 
many of them trivial, the interest attaching t o  which 
has long since passed away. The chief incidents of 
a public nature which followed the captivity of the 
ladies and soldiers referred to in the foregoing narra- 
tive will be found related in the following pages 
extracted from a memoir of the career of Sir Vincent 
Eyre, published by the editor in the " Calcutta ReviewJ' * .  
some twelve years ago. The reader will observe that 
the extract begins with the incidents immediately pre- 
ceding the surrender of Eyre, his wife, and thirty-seven 
others as hostages to Muhammad Akbar.] 
THEN came the retreat, with its attendant horrors, 
rivalling those experienced by the French in  their 
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winter march from Moscow. Eyre's wound was still 
intensely painful, and incapacitated him from mounting 
a horse without assistance. To quote his own words : 
" Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain 
with one unspotted sheet of dazzling white, and so in- 
tensely. bitter was the cold as to penetrate and defg! 
t h e  defences of the warmest clothing." The thermo- 
meter stood at several degrees below zero; and men's 
beards were coated with icicles. There was a mingled 
multitude of four thousand five hundred fighting men 
(including seven hundred European soldiers) and 
twelve thousand native camp-followers, with their 
women and children. Their route lay through the 
Khurd-KiLbul pass, "a truly formidable defile, about 
five miles from end to end, shut in  by lofty hills, 
between whose precipitous sides the sun, at this sea- 
son, could dart but a momentary ray." There, half 
concealed behind rocks m d  bushes, eager hordes of 
armed Ghalzis lay in ambush for their prey. The 
scene that ensued may be more easily imagined than 
described. The treachery of the chiefs was but too 
evident. Perched securely on high, the foe defied all 
attempts to silence or dislodge them. It was necessary 
to  run the gauntlet of their fire; and not less than 
three thousand souls perished in the attempt. 
Eyre and his family, consisting of wife and a little 
boy, emerged safely from the gorge; the latter, being 
strapped to the back of a faithful A f g h h  servant on 
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CIXAPTER XIV. 
CAPTIVITY OF THE HOSTAGES. 
:IN tlttb c : L I ' I ~  c*ititio~ls of this work the account of the 
n1iilit:iq ojic~r:itioas rrllich ended in the retreat and 
dc8tra~:tioli of the British army was followed by 
rough IKJ~I*:, 11~:~cIc: by the author, descriptive of the 
life in c:tlbtivity of Ilimsclf and his comrades. After the 
lapse of so niany years it has not appeared advisable - - 
to tltc author to ellcumber the work with details, 
lrtulry trf fj iv1~1 trivial, the interest attaching to  which 
Itas lo~ig since ltasscd away. The chief incidents of 
a ~)~zll,lEcfi ntiturc nf~ieh f'ollol~ed the captivity of the 
Isdies :nnlil holdicrs r e b r e d  to in the foregoing narra- 
tivt: will Zic b'oxmd related i n  the following pages 
tbstracred fkom :L rricsnioir of the career of Sir Vincent 
Eyre, ~ ,u"r ' i ihI~ . r l l~y  the cditor in the " Calcutta Review" 
sorri~ ~ J B . I ~ Y C '  ~ C : I ~ Y  :go. The reader will observe that 
t f l t b  cbstr:icwf, 1,egills with the incideuts immediately pre- 
c.nli~kg r s~rrrct~tIt!r of Eyre, his wife, and thirty-seven 
ctt1tc.r.s :is Itr,stilgt>s to Muhammad Akbar.] 
I '  f  zit.^ I ~ ; I I I I C  the rctrcat, with its attendant horrors, 
ri~aiiirig tliuse crpcrienced by the French in their 
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winter march from Moscow. Eyre's wound was stiU 
intensely painful, and incapacitated him from mounting 
a horse without assistance. To quote his own wbrds : 
"Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain 
with one unspotted sheet of dazzling white, and so in- 
tensely bitter was the cold as to penetrate and defy 
the defences of the warmest clothing." The thermo- 
meter stood at  several degrees below zero ; and men's 
beards were coated with icicles. There was a mingled 
multitude of four thousand five hundred fighting men 
(including seven hundred European soldiers) and 
twelve thousand native camp-followers, with their 
women and children. Their route lay through the 
Khurd-K&bul pass, " a truly formidable defile, about 
five miles from end to end, shut in by lofty hills, 
between whose precipitous sides the sun, at  this sea- 
son, could dart but a momentary ray." There, half 
concealed behind rocks and bushes, eager hordes of 
armed Ghalzia lay in ambush for their prey. The 
scene that ensued may be more easily imagined than 
described. The treachery of the chiefs was but too 
evident. Perched securely on high, the foe defied all 
attempts to silence or dislodge them. I t  was necessary 
to run the gauntlet of their fire; and not less than 
three thousand souls perished in the attempt. 
Eyre and his family, consisting of wife and a Little 
boy, emerged safely from the gorge; the latter, being 
strapped to the back of a faithful Afghhn servant on 
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EYRE, MEIN, AND 8TURT. EOSTAGE~ S W B B ~ D B C E B  T,J ) I i " i l A \ i  Y l l d  . t h l ~ b i a  .I:': 
horseback, had a very narrow escape, owing to the and two ofticers hhtrulri f a t 3  t.irc2zx :!* -' . %  * 
horse falling and throwing them both off when in the 2 and prompt complia~lrc h:.! 1 ~ ~ 1 ' 1 1  Ji: a - 1; ' * 
Very middle of the pass. TO crown the misfortunes of he was not satisfieti. 'cj:rv I l i i l i a r - ,  ~r;;~rr:t .i to*:( b 4 ". 
the day, snow began to fall, and thousands had to pass wounded Of~ccr3 \+yrii 1 1 ~ 7 ~ t  r1~4j1511'1'11 $0 $ 9 '  * 
the night without shelter, food, or fire. Only four to his care, art as>ur;sfice: Ijt~lrrz $I.;< rn ticr r *  . 
small tents were saved, under which some of the that by suctl a nl:gk of ti$ig,ti(ii 811.1' i * ! i r : i r .  . i ! i  
women, children, and wounded found refuge. Eyre be incluced i d ,  ~ t r c ~ k  i i i c ,  Gar ~ Z t t '  PI::SIE* 8 :  " s 
and Lieutenant Mein sat up all night in attendance and to restraiIl tllr>ir fi*i]ii!st.l*- tr131ti : i ~ f  * t. x r z ; q b ?  
on their dying friend Sturt, of the Engineers, who had ~h~ GencraLl hini3a+lf; i r i  ;r. i i i t h ~ ~ i * i r . i l r , i  :.I t'i :.zl ' 1 a 
been mortally wounded in the pass. At her h ~ s b a n d ' ~  subscqucnt~y drtiw t t ~ t ,  t l i t i q  t . k & ~ j . i $ : ~ ~  l i t k  a r i * - i  i r ' b  * 
side his youthful bride also kept watch with them. "1 colnpiictI a ith hi3 a iall,  iaciim~i: ti,.;:, b l q  ' i d  
very com~cllc~~~nc.l t t  uf rit8giii i ; a z a ; i a d  * r 'i r! 1 '.* 1, She was the daughter of the gallant Sale, and well 
worthy of such a sire. To assuage Stert's burning shown the gr~:stc-%t ; i i i b i c 3  ttr !i:e% t I!,?. $as I!: if 1 1  b i  ' l  
thirst, Eyre and Mein were obliged to wander, alter- as hostages, tliiv 1n:irk of' t r i t a t  ~ i h ! z I r b  + In+ if .& .. 
nate l~,  through the camp in search of fire to melt a spending fccling iin Iiirn. '" 
cupful of snow, and often before they could regain E ~ ~ ~ ,  on rcoc.ivinbg ;a vtrls;al r * ~ i i r  P P S *  j e r l  $ *  . 1 " 
the tent the contents had frozen again into a hard the departure of himself al:il i ' a a m r 4 n f j ,  *, >;*:' ".!:* 8 r 8 i - + ,  
mass. Sturt did not survive the night, and was buried in to 1ir:nr it frt~iza I r i %  shavar ?ago. "l 4 -  * r 
at  early dawn. Mein's disinterested devotion to his 
I General $va grsurlg tiinkl.rsn*c~.xl, tw:;i, '%$:air?*:) tlka a* i-," 
wounded friend in hurrying back to save him at the his ha~ld, urgcti Irinr ttt ra r r~ l ia l t  tstril l a g *  siil, "1.w ) I? ,J .  6. 9.. -1st 
I 
risk of his own life, and dragging him through the sent by Muharinlnnd Xkklar WIJW S I I I ~ * : ~ L ~ ~ " & P  I+, '):.at$ , * a 
pass under the enemy's fire, was justly extolled by Sir there seenlect to En+ rro td:r rxjdor:tr . :+J > : t  )i~4 . s ~ a l  
Robert Peel in Parliament, who quoted the scene &bar, although suspcctabrl e r f  tn':aiul,a*r;a', L* as t i i t  * r  ? r . 
ver6atim &om Eyre's book. fessedly our uliy, with w tin~sn ir en-naj c a l s ~ t ~  r l  la p -  
Meanwhile, Muhammad Akbar, like a vulture watch- tilities were therefarc ttt rtai st/$!,  st) I ~ V  srsp !:+ *:%< 
ing his prey, scanned every movement of the force concernetl. It q7il$ gj~t*t~sialt.tl,  t*s: 'Isrr )x."eP,rlr, ti l.. ,@. tb,a* 
from the neighbowling heights. Shortly after the Ghdzi chicf:s can thc: jirtaviarss r i ~ f  t*~vrtt 4 ~ $ 2  vi'iihr!~ .j+ 
retreat commenced, he had demanded that Pottinger in vain to rcstrairr: klit:ir i;rl%c~ae*ra. f bptarsr 5 6. Btr,;! 
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horseback, had a, very nnrrov escape, owing to the 
Ilorsc falling and tlirowillg tlicm both off when in the 
very middle of thc pass. To crown tlic niisfortuxles of 
the day, snow began to fail, and thousands had to pass 
the night witl~out sf~cltc~r, focitl, or fire. Orily four 
small tents wcrc saved, under  hid^ sorilc of the 
worllcn, c.hildl.erl, :uid ~ot11idr.0 founci rufilgc. Eyre 
and I ~ i c t ~ ~ e x i a ~ l t  3Icin sat up a11 11ight ill attendance 
on their tlyi~ip hiend Sturt, of t i ~ c  I:1ig-i1icers, who had 
t,ccl~ rllurtnlly wouncietl i11 tlic pahs. *i t  her husband's 
side his youtllfirl bride :iIso 1ir.pt -cvatcIi wit11 them. 
Shc was tlic d:tu;rliter of tht: pl lal l t  Salo, and well 
wortl~y of such a sirc. To as*uagc Yturt'a liwning 
thirst, Eyre and ,Pleilr were ol~ligcci to ~v:lnder, alter- 
nateIy, through the camp in seurth of fire to melt a 
cupful of suow, and often before tliey cc~tlcl regain 
the tent the coute~tts bad fiuzeri again into a. hard 
masa. Sturt  ditl not burvivc tllc nigllt, and was buried 
a t  early da-n. lleilzss dihinterestcd devotion to his 
~voundcd fiieud in hurrying back to save llinl at the 
risk of Ilia om11 life, and dragging hini through the 
yass u d e r  the enemy's fire, was jtistly extolled by Sir 
Robert Peel in I'arliameut, who quoted thc scene 
verbutim from Ejrc's book. 
BPeaavhile, 3lu2~an1ma(l Akbar, like a. vulture watch- 
ing his prey, r;caulicd ever?; nlovenieiit of the force 
fiunl tllc neigllif-louring lieiglits. Shortly after the 
retreat commerlecd, lrlc had dema~lrled that ll'ottinger 
and two other officers should be given up as hostages, 
and prompt compliance had been yielded. But still 
he was not satisfied. The ladies, married families, and 
mounded officers were next required to be made over 
to his care, an assurance being given to the General 
that by such a mark of confidence alone could the 
chiefs be induced to provide for the wants of the force, 
and to restrain their followers from acts of hostility. 
The General himself, in  a memorandum which he 
subsequently drew up, thus explains his own motives : 
"I complied with his wish, hoping that, as from the 
very commencement of negotiations the Sirdar had 
shorn the greatest anxiety to have the married people 
as hostages, this mnrlr of trust might elicit a corre- 
sponding feeling in him." 
Eyre, on receiving a verbal order to prepare for 
the departure of himself and family, sought the General, 
in order to hear it from his o m  lips. The poor 
General mas greatly distressed, but, warmly pressing 
his hand, urged him to mount and be off, as the escort 
sent by Muhammad Akbar was impatient to start; so 
there seemed to be no alternative. Muhammad 
Akbar, although suspected of treachery, was then pro- 
fessedly our ally, with whom a treaty existed. Hos- 
tilities were therefore at an end, so far as he was 
concerned. It was pretended, on his behalf, that the 
Ghalzi chiefs on the previous day exerted themselves 
in vain to restrain their followers. Captain Nicholl 
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now commanded the artillery i n  person, and Eyre felt 
that his o a n  presence could no longer be of any 
service to the force. His obvious duty was to obey 
the (icneral's wistles at all hazards ; he therefore de- 
parted wi th  the new batch of hostages, consisting of 
sevcu officers, ten Iadics, and twenty-two children. 
Ait~ufig tliem were Ladies JI;tcni~gI~ten and Sale. 
Couiltillg, tlien, scvcn officers left behind at Kiibul, 
aritf tIrrci: made ovcr on the march, the chicfs Iirid now 
gninect ~rossebsion of seventeen British officers, nomi- 
11a11y as iiosi;iger for the fulfilment of the treaty. 
12yrc alld Elis associates in misfortune remained as 
captives in tllc L;rrids of Muhammad Alibar during 
eight inid a, half months, Eyre occupying his leisure 
i rk  recortli~lg, on such scraps of paper as he could collect, 
the strange and stirring incidents which he had wit- 
nessed, while yet they were fresh in his own memory 
and in the minds of his fellow-captives, from whom, 
as ~ ~ u l l  ns from such public and private documents 
as Iiad been saved and mere within his reach, he in- 
duxtrioilsly gleailed many important and interesting 
l)iwticul:brs. His chief object in these labours was to 
~dlace, as far as in him lay, the whole unvarnished truth 
before tlne British public at tthc earliest practicable 
opporturiitp. I-ic thus wrote to a friend: " I feel well 
ah.~~trecl that tlic more my statements are sifted, the 
xtlorrt c'lcvirly will their truth be established in all 
t:sst*atid pui~its. Hewen horns  I would give my 
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right hand that such events as I have described had 
never occurred; but, having occurred, why should I 
conceal them? I s  the loss of an army nothing? Can 
our national interests be advanced by glossing over 
such unheard-of calamities and disgrace ? " I n  another 
letter he thus expresses himself: " I wrote my narrative 
because it was at  the time very doubtful whether any 
of the chief actors would survive, and I felt an anxious 
desire that, should me perish in captivity, the public 
might be able to judge properly of the respective merits 
of all concerned. I can boldly assert that there is not 
a sentence which I do not believe to be strictly true." 
Perhaps few narratives written. under such circum- 
stances have so vell stood the test of time,* or have 
met more general and lasting approval. W e  have 
little doubt that honest old Gascoignes the poet, who 
underwent some similar experiences in his youth 
during the wars in the Low Countries in  the sixteenth 
century, very accurately expresses EyreJs feelings in 
regard to his volume on Krihul in the following stanza 
from the poem entitled " The Pruites of War" : 
Go, little booke ! God greunt thon none offende, 
For so meant he who sought to  set thee forth, 
And vhen  thon commest where soldiers seem to  wend, 
Submit thyselfe a s  writte but little worth. 
* On one occasion, iluring his visit to Enrope in 1855-56, Eyre 
happened to  be looking over the book-shelves of a, bookseller's shop 
in Paris, when he suddenly came upon his own work, translated 
into French. It is impossible to imagine a more pleasing surprise 
t o  an  author then such a discovery. 
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Confesse withal that thou hast bene too bolde 
To speak so plaine of hanghtio hartes in place, 
And say that he which wrote thee couldo have tolde 
Full many a tale of blouds that were not base. 
The story of the captivity was appended to Eyre's 
narrative in the form of a journal, and may still 
be read with interest. We must content ourselves 
with a few of the more prominent episodes. On the 
fourth day after their surrender to Muhammad Akbar 
they were joined by the General himself, wit11 
Brigadier Shelton and Captain Hugh Johnson, and 
learned with profound dismay and grief that the re- 
mainder of the force had been gradually shot down in 
the passes,. the chiefs having played them false eve11 
to the end, notwithstanding all the concessions that 
I had been made. It was evidently Muhammad A k b d s  
game to hold his captives as trump cards wherewith 
to extort from the British Government better terms 
for himself and country than he could well hope to 
obtain by any other means at his disposal. Hence 
they found themselves, on the whole, well treated, 
although their anxieties were kept alive by the fact 
that a small, though influential, section existed among 
the Ghalzi chiefs who made no secret of their incli- 
nation to put the whole party to death; and whose 
debates on this momentous subject were often carried 
on in tones sufficiently loud to be overheard by their 
intended victims. 
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Their first place of confinement was the fort of 
BadifibibBd, in the district of LughmBn, a stronghold 
of! one of these same Ghalzi chiefkains, having walls 
twenty-five feet high, and lofty flanking towers, sur- 
rounded by a faussebraye and deep ditch. Here they 
remained three months, during which they were 
allowed to exchange letters with their friends in Jal- 
1916bBd, where Sale still maintained his defensive 
position. On February 19th they were alarmed by a 
violent rocking of the earth, accompanied by a loud 
subterranean rumbling sound; the lofty parapets 
around them fell in with a thundering crash; the 
dwelling-house waved and tottered like a ship at sea, 
and all within it simultaneously rushed out into the 
central court-yard, to find their terror-stricken Afghhn 
keepers upon their knees, ejaculating loud prayers to 
Allah for protection. It seemed as though the last 
day had arrived. Eyre had a nsrrow escape from 
being crushed to death by a mass of the wall, under 
which he chanced to be standing while tending his 
horse, which he had been permitted to retain. 
The same earthquake levelled in a few seconds the 
walls of defence which Sale's force had, with continuous 
labour, repaired and strengthened at Jall&l&b&d. But 
the Afghans were unprepared to take advantage of 
the chance thus offered. On April 9th tidings reached 
the captives that Muhammad Akbar's camp had been 
surprised by Sale, and his force completely routed, 
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and on the following day they were hurried off 
towards the mountains, after a sharp debate among the 
chiefs on the expediency of destroying them at once. 
Poor General Elphinstone, in his already shattered 
state of health, could ill bear up under the fatigues 
and privations he had to undergo, and died at Tizin 
on April 23rd, " a happy release for him," says Eyre, 
"from suffering of mind and body. Deeply he felt 
his humiliation, and bitterly regretted the day when 
he resigned the home-borne pleasures of his native 
land to hazard the repntation of a proud name in a 
climate and station for which he was physically unfit.', 
The body was forthwith forwarded by Muhammad 
Akl~ar to General Pollock (by that time at JallLlAbAd) 
for honourable interment-a tribute of respect to a 
fallen foe highly creditable to the Afgh&n cbief. 
On the following day Captain Colin Mackenzie was 
despatched on a mission to General Pollock, taking 
with him the first portion of Eyre's narrative. After 
perusal by General Polloclr, it was forwarded by the 
latter to Lord Ellenborough's private secretary, and 
eventually to England for publication. Colin Mac- 
kenzic's ,journeys to and fro proved full of peril, for, 
al t l lo~~gh disguisecl as an Ai'gl-i;in ancl escorted by a 
well-known and popular sort of Rob Eoy, or freebooter, 
named Uutti, in the pay of Mulianlmad Akbar, whose 
knowledge of that wild mountainous country and its 
still. wilder inhabitants stood him in good stead, he was 
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in freqnent and imminent danger of discovery and 
consequent death from parties of wandering Ghalzis, 
whom they unexpectedly encountered, and who per- 
sisted in being unpleasantly inquisitive regarding the 
suspicious-looking traveller, with his face and form so 
closely muffled up in the folds of his turban and large 
sheepskin cloak, leaving his eyes scarcely as visible 
as those of the roughest Skye terrier, and whom it  
was necessary to palm off as a sick chief of Peshawur 
sent by Muhammad Akbar under Butti's escort o 
his native place. One glimpse of the white skin 
beneath his wide Afghhn trousers (which he found it 
next to impossible to prevent from rising above his 
knee) would have been his death-warrant. But Heaven 
protected him. 
The propositions whereof he was the bearer were, 
that the British general should treat with Muhammad 
Akbar as the acknowledged head of the AfghQn 
nation; that there should be an exchange of prisoners, 
including all on each side ; that the British should 
retire from Afghgnistgn; and that General Pollock 
should pay down a handsome douceur in money. In  
case of these arrangements being effected, Muhammad 
Akbar would be glad to enter into an alliance, offen- 
sive and defensive, with the British. This, however, 
was only his public message, but, in secret, Mackenzie 
had been desired to  ascertain if a private arrangement 
could not be made, to the effect that General Pollock 
I 
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nation; that there should be a n  exchange of prisoners, 
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304 SECRET VIEWS OP MUHAMUD AEBAR. THE PRISOXERS SENT TO BAMIAN. 305 
should ensure an amnesty to Muhammad Akbar and ~ t h  Colonel Stoddart, for eighty days, without change 
his followers for the past, and that the British Govern- of raiment. 
ment should bestow on him a large jagir. In this On August 23rd nine officers of t he  Ghazni garrison 
case he would willingly assist Pollock in reconquering joined the KAbul captives. Among them mas the 
AfghAnist An. brave young Nicholson, destiiied to  a brilliant career 
Mackenzie returned from his mission on May 3rd i n  the PanjAb, and a hero's death sixteen years 
without ha*g opened any prospect of release for the later in the moment of victory a t  Delhi. Me now 
captives, although the negotiation, as far as it went, became Eyre's messmate, and beguiled the hours with 
had been of a friendly nature. H e  was immediately ~ animated details of the scenes h e  had witnessed 
despatched a second time with more moderate pro- during the ineffectual defence of tha t  fortress; with 
posals, but again returned with an equally ineffectual him, too, was Dr. Thomas Thomson, since risen to 
result. On May 23rd Muhammad Akbar removed all eminence as a botanist and a traveller. On August 
his captives from the Zaudak valley to a fort in  the 25th all were hui-ried off towards Bgmiiin, en. voute to 
vicinity of KiSbul. Here Mackenzie had nearly died ~ ~ U 1 l l  in Usbeg TBtary, with a threat held out that 
of typhus fever, the result of his recent fatigues and they would be sold into bondage on arrival. Eyre 2nd 
exposure. Muhammad Akbar selected Major Colin I Maclcenzie were both at this time t o  ill to travel 011 
I Troup as his next envoy, and he was absent in that horseback, and were packed into a pair of panniers 
I 
capacity from the 10th to the 27th of July, but brought 
! 1 to  balance each other on each side of a camel, a mode 
1~ baclc no definite reply. Pollock was, in fact, busy in of travelling for invalids which their miserable ex- 
preparing for an  advance on Htibul, with ~ t r i n ~ ~ ~ t  1 perience on that memorable journey did not enable 
instructions from Lord Ellenborough t o  proceed with 
i 
them to recommend for general adoption, except in 
his military preparations without reference to  any cases where the penalty of torture has been incurred. 
negotiations. Meanwhile, typhus fever and dysentery They had a strong escort, consisting of some four 
spread alarmingly among the captives, and, on A U ~ ~ ~ ~  hundred Afghtin soldiers, deserters from the British 
7th, Captain John Conolly breathed his last. His service, under one SBah Muhammad, their former 
brother, the celebrated Arthur Conolly, had but re- subadar. Their route lay over the steep mountain- 
cently been decapitated at Bukh&ra, after having been passes of Sufaid Kt&, Unai, Hiijigalc and Kiillu, the 
confined at the bottom of a dry well, in company 20 
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later in the moment of victory at Delhi. B e  noiv 
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during the ineffectual defence of that fortress ; with 
him, too, was Dr. Thomas Thornson, since r i m 1  to 
eminence as a botanist and a traveller. On August 
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latter attaining an altitude of thirteen thousand four 
hundred feet, whence Eyre describes the view as 
"presenting a boundless chaos of barren mountains, 
unequalled in wild terrific grandeur." The 
valley of BAmiBn, beyond the Indian Caucasus, was 
reached ou September 3rd. 
And now, at the very time when hope began to  
yield to despair in all their breasts, and a life of 
wretched slavery seemed their inevitable lot, aid came 
from an unexpected quarter, and their speedy deliver- 
ance was at hand. Eyre thus tells the story in a 
1 letter to a friend in Calcutta:- 
"On Sunday, September l l th ,  SBah Muhammad, 
having received a positive order from Muhammad 
Akbar for our immediate march to Kulum, our 




with the offer of a bribe for our release. Captain 
Johnson volunteered to be agent in the matter, and 
found him more accessible than was expected. This 
man had hitherto kept aloof from any attempt a t  
friendly intercourse with the prisoners, towards whom 
his manner had been invariably haughty and his 
language harsh. Great, therefore, mas our astonish- 
ment to learn that he had been seduced from his 
anegiance to Muhammad Akbar and bought owr  
to our side. 
" Meanwhile, the rapid advance of the two English 
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armies upon Kgbul, and the probable defeat of Mu- 
hammad &bar, led us to expect that chief's arrival 
among us  as likely to happen at any moment. It 
was, therefore, necessary to be prepared against any 
sudden surprise. The Hazarah chiefs in  the vdley 
were sounded and found favourable to our scheme. 
The men composing our guard were gained over by a 
promise of four months' pay. A new governor was 
set up over the Hazarah province by Major Pottinger, 
t h e  existing governor being too much in  Muhammad 
Akbar's interests to be trusted. 
" On September 16th the country was considered 
' sufficiently safe to admit of our setting out on our 
return towards Kgbul. W e  had only proceeded a few 
miles when a messenger met us wlth the news of 
General Pollock's victory over Alrbar, which cheering 
intelligence was shortly afterwards confirmed by a note 
from Sir Richmond Shakespear, who was hastening 
to  our assistance with six hundred KazilbAsh horse- 
men. O n  the 17th me recrossed the Kith pass, and 
encamped about three miles from its base. We had 
been here about two hours, when horsemen were de- 
scried descending the pass of Hhjigak. Instantly SBah 
Muhammad's men were on the alert and formed up 
i n  line. Judge of our joy when the banner of the 
Kazilb6sh was distinguished streaming in the air, 
and imagine, if you can, with what emotions of delight 
20 * 
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and gratitude we eagerly pressed forward to greet our 
gallant countryman, Sir Eichmond Shakespear, who 
soon came galloping up to where we stood. For the 
first time after nine miserable months of thraldom 
we felt the blessedness of freedom. To God be all the 
glory, for IHe alone could bring i t  to pass ! " 
There was still some danger that Muhammad Alcbar 
might intercept their flight, but at Shakespear's sugges- 
tion Pollloclr despatched Sale's brigade to meet them 
at Kot-Ashrd. All doubt was then at an end; they 
were once morc under the safe-guard of British troops, 
who lined the heights 6f Sufaid KhAlc and who raised 
hearty cheers of welcome as tile procession threaded 
the pass; among them most conspicuous rode the 
gallant Sale, with his long-lost wife and daughter by 
his side. 
On the 21st Pollocli's camp at RBbul mas reached, 
where the Horse Artillery guns fired a salute in houow 
of the event, and tlius happily terminated the tragedy 
of the KBbul insurrection. 
The cvents of those days have still such a thrilling in- 
terest for British readers that we have been tempted to 
linger perhaps too long over that portion of Eyre's 
career in connection with which his name first became 
familiarly known. I t  was his strange destiny to 
witness the " Alpha '' and " Omega " of the downfall 
of the old Sepoy army; for it is now generally ad- 
mitted that the first seeds of the mutiny of 1857 were 
sown in  the K6bul campaign. I n  allusion to this, 
Kaye, i n  his " Sepoy War," declares : "The charm of a 
century of conquest was then broken. The Sepoy 
regiments, no longer assured and fortified by the sight 
3 of that ascendant star of fortune which once had shone 
5 with so bright and steady a light, shrunk from en-  
tering the  passes which had been the grave of so many 
of their comrades. It was too true; the Sikhs were 
tampering with their fidelity. Brhhman emissaries 
were endeavouring to  swear them with holy water not 
to advance at the  word of the English commander. 
Xightly meetings of delegates from the digerent 
regiments were held, and perhaps we do not even 
now know how great was the danger." 
Before leaving KBbul, Eyre, through a strange 
accident, recovered his friend Maule's Bible, on the  
fly-leaf of which the  owner had thus written, as if pro- 
phetically, two days before his murder : " In  case of 
my death I wish this book to be sent to my mother, 
or nearest living relative." No Muhammadan will 
I knowingly destroy the Word of God, and it is re- 
1 markable that  Arthur Conolly's prayer-book, ;wherein 
1 he had entered a touching record of his sufferings 
and aspirations in the well at BukhiLra, was, after 
the lapse of many years, left at the door of his 
sister's house in London by a mysterious foreigner, 
who simply left word that he came from Russia, but 
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my death I wish this book to be sent to my mother, 
or nearest living relative." No Muhammadan will 
knowingly destroy the Word of God, and i t  is re- 
markable that Arthur Conolly's prayer-book, [wherein 
he  had entered a touching record of his sufferings 
and aspirations in the well at  Bukhitra, was, after 
the lapse of many years, left at the door of his 
sister's house in London by a mysterious foreigner, 
who simply left word that he came from Russia, but 
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of whom no trace could be discovered after a most 
diligent search. 
Returning with Pollock's force to India, Eyre was 
posted to the new troop of Horse Artillery, raised to 
replace the old first troop, first brigade, which had 
perished in the Afghjn passes, and with whose 
services at Kgbul he had been so intimately associated. 
I n  his public report to the commandant of the Ar- 
tillery regiment, Eyre, speaking of the siege, thus 
writes : '' The gunners, from first to last, never once 
partook of a full meal or obtained their natural rest:  
of the hardships and privations undergone it would 
be difficult to  convey an adequate idea. Throughout 
the last struggle all eye-witnesses concur in testifying 
to their stubborn valour." 
[The Editor may be pardoned for concluding this 
brief sketch of the captivity, by here extracting from 
the regimental orders of the commandant of the artil- 
lery the opinion expressed by that officer of the conduct 
of the men of that corps employed in Xhbul.] 
EXTRACT FROM R E ~ I M E N T A L  ORDERS BY BRIGADIER W. 
H. L. FRITH, COMMANDANT OB ARTILLERY, dated 
10th March 1843. 
THE total absence of official details on the subject has 
hitherto prevented the Commandant from noticing the 
conduct of the late 1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Ar- 
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tillery during the insurrection a t  and disastrous retreat 
from Ktibul ; he now publishes extracts from a letter 
received yesterday from Lieutenant V. Eyre, late Com- 
missary of Ordaance. as a public record of the high 
state of discipline and determined bravery exhibited 
by t h i s  gallant and devoted Qoop on all occasions. 
It will always be  a subject of sincere gratification 
to  reflect on the noble manner in which they sustained 
the character of the corps under the severest trials, and 
in a climate that multiplied an  hundred-fold the 
difficulties with which they had to contend, whilst 
their fate in  the unequal struggle demands the deepest 
sympathy. 
Extract  from a letter from Lieutenant V. Eyre, 
late Commissary of Ordnance i n  Ktibul, to  Captain 
E. Buckle, Assistant Adjutant-General, Artillery :- 
"It is necessary to premise, that at the commence- 
ment of the rebellion on the 2nd November 1841, a por- 
tion of General Elphinstone's force was sent to occupy 
the Bala Hissar, and the remainder was concentrated in 
the cantonment; to the former, Captain Nichol and 
Lieutenant Stewart were attached with four guns, 
and t o  the latter Brevet-Captain W d e r ,  with two guns. 
On the 9th of November, Captain Nichol, by order 
of t he  General, strengthened Captain Waller's detach- 
ment with an additional gun, and the troop thus 
became equally divided. 
cc  The first active service performed in the field by 
the Horse Artillery was on the afternoon of the 3rd of 
November, when a sally was made under Major S W ~ Y ~ ~ J  
. 
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of whom no trace could be discovered after a most 
diligent search. 
Returning with PollockJs force to India, Eyre was 
posted to the new troop of Horse Artillery, raised to 
replace the old first troop, first brigade, which had 
perished in the Afghfin passes, and with whose 
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THE total absence of official details on the subject has  
hitherto prevented the Commandant from noticing t h e  
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tillery during the insurrection at and disastrous retreat 
from KAbul; he now publishes extracts from a letter 
received yesterday from Lieutenant V. Eyre, late Com- 
missary of Ordnance. as a public record of the high 
state of discipline and determined bravery exhibited 
by this gallant and devoted Qoop on all occasions. 
It will always be a subject of sincere gratification 
to  reflect on the noble manner in which they sustained 
the character of the corps under the severest trials, and 
in a climate that multiplied an hundred-fold the 
difficulties with which they had to contend, whilst 
their fate in the unequal struggle demands the deepest 
sympathy. 
Extract from a letter from Lieutenant V. Eyre, 
late Commissary of Ordnance in Khbul, to Captain 
E. Buckle, -4ssistant Adjutallt-General, Artillery :- 
" It is necessary to premise, that at the commence- 
ment of the rebellion on the 2nd November 1841, a por- 
tion of General ElphinstoneJs force was sent to occupy 
the Bala Hissar, and the remainder was concentrated in 
the cantonment; to the former, Captain Nichol and 
Lieutenant Stewart were attached with four guns, 
andto the latter Brevet-Captain Waller, with two guns. 
On the 9th of November, Captain Nichol, by order 
of the General, strengthened Captain Waller's detach- 
ment with an additional gun, and the troop thus 
became equally divided. 
((The first active service performed in the field by 
the Horse Artillery was on the afternoon of the 3rd of 
November, when a sally was made under Major Saayne, 
--.--- -,-,. ~ .~" .. 
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5th Native Infantry, and a body of the enemy was tude, that excited the unbounded admiration of every 
defeated principally by the fire of the guns. On this e ~ e - ~ i t ~ e s s ,  and filled the heart of every artillery 
occasion Captain Waller was severely wounded, and officer with pride and delight. 
from that date up to the 22nd of November, when I cc O n  the 23rd November, Brigadier Shelton sallied 
was myself disabled, the virtual command of the Horse f o r t h  with about seven hundred bayonets and one gun, 
Artillery detachment in the cantonment devolved upon which  (there being no artillery officer available) was 
me; during this period several severe actions took place i commanded by Sergeant Mulhall. An immense army 
with the enemy, in all of which our arms were more of Afghans poured forth t o  battle, and a terrible 
or less successful. One fort was breached and taken conflict Sergeant Mulhall and his brave gun's 
by assault, another was taken by a coup de main, and, c r e w  Committed great havoc amid the dense masses 
besides several sorties of minor importance, two great of t h e  enemy, exhibiting a very high degree of ~r0fes.m 
actions were fought on the 10th and 13th of November sional skill ; but  their efforts, though partially successf~~l, 
against the collective forces of the enemy, amounting w e r e  imdEectual to repel the overwhelming hosts of 
on each occasion to several thousands of horse and foot, . assailants. Galled by the fatal fire of Afghan rifles, 
in whicl.1 our side mas completely triumphant, and 
of their guns were captured. 
the infantry lost heart and Red, abandoning our gun to 
its fate; staunch to  the last, the Artillerymen stood 
I "Provisions, of which there had been from the by their  charge until they were nearly all exterminated, 
beginning an alarming scarcity, soon began entirely Sergeant Mulhall himself escaping by a miracle, with 
7 to fail. The cold of winter set in with unusual rigour, his clothes perforated with bullets i n  divers places- 
the defence of our long line of low ramparts grievously cc In the report of this day's operations in  the 
harassed the troops, the g m s  placed in battery at the 
several angles of the cantonment required the constant 
'attendance of the Artillerymen by day and night. 
"The gunners, from first to last, never once partook 
field, Brigadier Shelton did ample justice to  the Ax- 
tillery sergeant and his devoted little detachment, but 
" 
the document has, I fear, been lost. 
! cc On the 14th December, a treaty h a ~ n g  been 
of a full meal, or obtained their natural rest ; of the 
i entered upon, our troops were withdrawn from the hardships and privatious undergone it be difficult Bala Hissay, and Captain Nichol, on arriving in can- 
to convey an adequate idea. tonmenis ,  requested me t o  send in  a report of the 
"During the whole of this most trying period, the conduct of his men, which 1 did, but that also was 
behaviour of the Horse Artillerymen was distinguished subsequently lost on the retreat. 
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5th  Native Infantry, and a body of the enemy was 
defeated ~ r i n c i ~ a l l y  b the  fire of the guns. On this 
occasion Captain Waller was severely wounded, and 
from that date up t o  the 22nd of November, when I 
was myself disabled, the virtual command of the Horse 
Artillery detachment i n  the cantonment devolved upon 
me; during this period several severe actions took place 
with the enemy, i n  all of which our arms were more 
or  less successful. One fort was breached and taken 
by assault, another was taken by a coup de mai~z, and, 
besides several sorties of minor importance, two great ' 
actions were fought on the 10th and 13th of November 
against the collective forces of the enemy, amounting 
on each occasion to several thousands of horse andfbot, 
in  which our side was completely triumphant, and two 
of their guns were captured. 
'CProvisions, of which there had been from the 
beginning an alarming scarcity, soon began entirely I 
to fail. The cold of winter set i n  with unusual rigour, 
the defence of our long line of low ramparts grievously 
I 
harassed the troops, the guns placed in battery a t  the 
splr-ral angles of the cantonment required the constant 
tdance of the Artillerymen by day and night. 
'he gunners, from first to last, never once partook 
1 meal, or obtained their natural rest; of the I 
IPS and privations undergone it would be diEcult 
to convey an adequate idea. ! 
"During the whole of this most trying period, the  I 
behaviour of the Horse Artillerymen was distinguished 
by a degree of patience, cheerfulness, zeal, and forti- 1 I 
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tude, that excited the unbounded admiration of eveiy 
eye-witness, and filled the heart of every artillery 
officer with pride and delight. 
"On the 23rd November, Brigadier Shelton sallied 
forth with about seven hund~ed bayonets and one gun, 
which (there being no artillery officer available) was 
commanded by Sergeant Mulhall. An immense army 
of Afghans poured forth to battle, and a terrible 
conflict ensued. Sergeant Mulhall and his brave gun's 
crew committed great havoc amid the dense masses 
of the enemy, exhibiting a very high degree of profes.. 
sional skill ; but their efforts, though partially successful, 
were ineffectual to repel the overwhelming hosts of 
assailants. Galled by the fatal fire of Afghan rifles, 
the infantry lost heart and fled, abandoning our gun to 
its fate; staunch to the last, the Axtillerymen stood 
by their charge until they were nearly all exterminated, 
Sergeant Mulhall himself escaping by a miracle, with 
his clothes perforated with bullets in divers places. 
cr I n  the public report of this day's operations in the 
field, Brigadier Shelton did ample justice to the Ar- 
tillery Sergeant and his devoted little detachment, but 
the document has, I fear, been lost. 
'( On the 14th December, a treaty having been 
entered upon, our troops were withdrawn from the 
Bala Hissar, and Captain Nichol, on arriving in can- 
tonments, requested me to send in a report of the * 
conduct of his men, which I did, but that also was 
subsequently lost on the retreat. 
cc That the Horse Artillery sustained their high fame 
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to  the last is well known. On the retreat of the army 
from Kfibul, owing to the starved condition of the 
horses, which disabled them from pulling the guns 
through the deep snow and rugged mountain-passes, 
the guns were, one by one, spiked and abandoned. 
In the Khurd-Ktibul pass a whole gun's crew perished 
rather than desert their charge. On nearing Jagdallak q 
some Horse Artillerymen, headed by Captairl Nichol, 
acting as Dragoons, charged and routed a party of the 
enemy's cavalry. 
"Throughout the last struggle up to GandAmak 
all eye-witnesses concur in testifying to their stubborn 
valour. They died like true soldiers, selling their lives 
dearly. 
"Only three men escaped with life, being taken 
prisoners. Two others, who were left behind with the 
detachment of wounded at K&bul, also survived. 
I (True Copy.) "E. BUCKLE, A.A.G.A." 
.L- 
A handsome Monument has been erected by the 
Artillery Corps at Durn Durn to the memory of all those 
of the Service who fell in Afghanistan, with the 
inscription which appears on the next page :- 
Sacred to the of Memory 
CAPTAIN THOMAS NICHOL, 
LIEUTENANT CHAELES STEWART, 
SERGEANT MULHALL, 
and the 
Non-commissioned Officers and Men of the 
1 s t  T'roop, 1 s t  Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery, 
who fell in the performance of their duty 
during the  insurrection at, and retreat from, Cabd, 
in the Months of 
November and December 1841, 
and 
January 1842, 
o n  which occasion of unprecedented trial 
22 Officers and Men 
upheld 
in the"most noble manner 
the character of the Regiment to which they belonged. 
This gallant band formed the oldest Troop in the 
BENGAL AXTILLERY. 
It had previously been distinguished 
on numerous occasions, 
having served 
in Egypt, in the Maratta and Nepaul Wars, 
and in Ava. 
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the guns were, one by one, spiked and abandoned. 
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prisoners. Two others, who were left behind with the 
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handsome Monument has been erected by the 
lery Corps at Dum Durn to the memory of a11 those 
of the Service who fell in Afghanistan, with t h e  
inscription which appears on the next page :- 
Sacred to the of Memory 
and the 
Non-commissioned Officers and Men of the 
1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery, 
who fell in the performance of their duty 
during the insurrection at, and retreat from, Cabul, 
in the Months of 
November and December 1841, 
and 
January 1842, 
on which occasion of unprecedented trial 
22 Officers and Men 
upheld 
in the most noble manner 
the character of the Regimeut to which they belonged. 
This gallant band formed the oldest Troop in the 
BENG.AL AKTILLERY. 
It had previously been distinguished 
on numerous occasions, 
having served 
in Egypt, in the Maratta and Nepaul Wars, 
and in Ava. 
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Sacred 
also to the Memory of 
who perished 
in command of a detail of Shah ShoojaJs mountain train, 
and whose gallant conduct emulated that 
of his comrades. 
Also 
to the Memory of 
LIEUTENANT RICHARD MAULE, 
Artille~y, 
who mas killed at the outbreak of the 
Affghalz insurrection, 
November 1841, 
and likevise of 
LIEUTENANT A. CHRISTIE, of the same Regiment, 
killed in the Kyber Pass, 
on the return of the victorious army 
under the command of 
MAJOR-GENER-4L SIR GEORGE POLLOCK, G.G.B., &c. 
of the 
BENGAL ARTILLERY. 
As a Tribute of 
Admiration, Regard, and Respect, 
This Monument 
is erected by the 
ARTILLERY REGIMENT. 
Fortis cadere eedere %on potest. 
A P P E N D I C E S .  
LETTER FROY CAPTAIN @OLIN . & , ~ A C ~ N Z I E  TO 
I 
LIEUTENANT V. EYRE. 
(2e;ferrecl to  at pcqe 89.) 
MY DEAR EYRE, 
As you wish for an accoulzt of the manner in 
which P was besieged in  the hcla-i-Nishan Khan, in 
the breaking out of the Gab~11 insurrection, I comply, 
although unwilling to appear so often in the first 
person, as I necessarily must, iii order to give you a I 
clear idea of the fatal n a t u ~ e  of the blunder committed, 
I in n o t  sending me assistance from cantonments. I 
have by me a copy of some notes, wliich I made at the 
request of the late Major Tilain, then hide-de-Canlp 
to our lamented chief, General Elphinstone. You are 
aware that the fort, in which I chanced to be liting, 
J contained the godowi~s of the Shah's commissariat; 
and that in one part the quarters of Rrigaclirr 
*nquetil vere situated. For tlre defence of tllese, 
a guard of one hauildar, two naicks, and eighteel1 
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Sacred 
also to the Memory of 
LIEUT. CRARLES ALEXANIDEH. GREEN, B.A., 
who perished 
in command of a detail of Shah Shooja'a mountain train, 
and whose gallant conduct emulated that 
of his comrades. 
Also 
to the Memory of 
LIEUTBNANT R I C H A ~ D  MAULE, 
htillel.y, 
who was killed at the outbreak of the 
Affghan insurrection, 
, November 1841, 
and likevise of 
LIEUTENANT A. CHRISTIE, of the same Regiment, 
killed in the Kyber Pass, 
on the return of the victorious army 
under the command of 
MAJOR-GENERBL SIR GEORGE POLLOCK, G.C.B., kc. 
of the 
BENGAL ARTILLERY. 
As a Tribute of 
Admiration, Regard, and Respect, 
This Monument 
is erected by the 
ARTILLERY REGIMENT. 
Fortis cadere cedera non potest. 1 
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A P P E N D I C E S .  
LETTER FROM CAPTAIN COLIN MACRENZIE TO 
LIEUTENANT V. EYRE. 
(Referred to  at pctge 88.) 
MY DEAR EYRE, 
As you wish for an account of the manner in 
which I mas besieged in the Bela-i-Nishan Khan, in . 
the breaking out of the Cabul insurrection, I comply, 
although unwilling to appear so often in the first 
person, as I necessarily must, in order to give you a 
clear idea of the fatal nature of the ldunder committed, 
in not sending me assistance from cantonments. I 
have by me a copy of some notes, which I made at the 
request of the late Major Thnin, then Aide-de-camp 
to our lamented chief, General Elphinstone. You are 
aware that the fort, in which I chanced to be living, 
contained the godoms of the Shah's commissariat; 
and that in one part the quarters of Brigadier 
Anquetil were situated. For the defence of these, 
a guard of one havildar, two naicks, and eighteen 
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sepoys had been assigned. The fort itself lies between 
that quarter of Cabul called the Moorad Khanah and 
its most western suburb, the Deh-i-Affghan. The 
Cabul river flows between the fort and the Kuzzilbash 
quarter (the Chundoul), to the south. Close to it, to 
the north, divided by a narrow road and a high wall, 
is a large grove of mulberry trees, known by the namc , 
of the Yaboo Khanah, in  which thc Yaboos of the 
Shah's commissariat used to be kept; but from which 
towards the end of October, 1841, they had fortu- 
nately been removed into camp at Seeah Sung. I n  
this Yaboo Khanah was a guard of six suwars ; and, b j  
chance, a detachment of a jemadar and ninety-five rucu 
of Captain Ferris's Juzailchees ; as also another of the 
Shah's sappers, consisting of one jemadar and fifty- 
nine men, including havildars and naieks. These last 
were encumbered with a host of women and childreu. 
brought up from their native country with them by 
the express orders of the Supreme Government. The 
house of Captain Troup, late Brigade-Major of the 
Shah's force, built so as to be capable of a tolera1.l~ 
defence, is about forty yards to the east of the f o ~ t ,  
across a narrow canal ; and the large tower, occupied 
by the late Captain Trevor and his family, lies across tIlc 
river to the south-east, distant about seven hundrcd 
yards. This also, at the tirne, mas perfectly defensible. 
You will easily perceive that, with these posts in oul. 
possession, and commanding, as we did, the ope11 
space between us, i t  was IL point of importance to 
maintain our ground until the arrival of what we 
hourly expected, a regiment from the cantonment, 
whose presence would have immediately decided the 
wavering Kuzzilbashes in our favour, and would have 
cut off all communication between the insurgent 
populatioll of Deb-i-Affghan and their rascally brethren 
in the Moorad Khanah. Spreading far beyond the 
Yahoo Khanah, in the direction of cantonments, and 
circling round the west of the fort down to the river's 
edge, are walled gardens and groves, which afford 
excellent cover to a lurking enemy, who were enabled 
t o  come, without much danger, to within a few yards 
of my  defences. 
Early on the morning of the 2nd of November, 1841, 
as I was preparing to go into cantonments with my 
baggage, intending to accompany the Envoy on the 
following day down to Pesha~~rur, it was reported to me 
that an alarming riot had taken place in the town. 
Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup had gone O L I ~  
on their usual morning ride, not supposing the dis- 
turbance was of the importance it has since proved to 
be. I waited for the return of the above two officers 
for about an hour, previous to adopting decided mea- 
sures, either for  defence or retreat,-at the same time . 
causing all the guards to stand to their arms. Sud- 
denly a naked man stood before me, covered with 
blood, from two deep sabre-cuts in the head, arid five 
musket-shots in the arm and body. H e    roved to be 
a suwar of Sir W. Macnaghten, who had been sent 
with a message to Captain Trevor, but who had been 
intercepted by the insurgents. This being rather a 
strong hint as to how matters were going on, 1 imme- 
diately gave orders for all the gates to be secured, and 
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whose presence would have immediately decided the 
wavering Kuzzilbashes in our favour, and would have 
cut off all communication between the insurgent 
population of Deh-i-Affghan and their rascally brethren 
in the Moorad Khanah. Spreading far beyond the 
Yaboo Khanah, in the direction of cantonments, and 
circling round the west of the fort down to the river's 
edge, are walled gardens and groves, which afford 
excellent cover to a lurking enemy, who were enabled 
to come, without much danger, to within a few yards 
of my defences. 
Early on the morning of the 2nd of November, 1841, 
as I was preparing to go into cantonments with my 
baggage, intending to accompany the Envoy on the 
following day down to Peshalvur, it was reported to me 
that an alarming riot had taken place in the town. 
Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup had gone out 
on their usual morning ride, not supposing the dis- 
turbance was of the importance it has since proved to 
be. I waited for the return of the above two officers 
for about an hour, previous to adopting decided mea- 
sures, either for defence or retreat,-at the same time 
causing all the guards to stand to their arms. Sud- 
denly a naked man stood before me, covered with 
blood, from two deep sabre-cuts in the head, arid five 
musket-shots in the arm and body. He proved to be 
a suwar of Sir W. Macnaghten, who had been sent 
with a message to Captain Trevor, but who had been 
intercepted by the insurgents. This being rather a 
strong hint as to how matters were going on, I imme- 
diately gave orders for all the gates to be secured, and 
personally superintcarlect t l te  rc~nov:tl of tiit. dct:ie'ti- 
rrlerits in the l'a1)oo KIt;i~t;di, wit11 tlrcbir + i ~ i v v x  anrl 
f:mlilies, illto fi,rt. A t  thca s:une lirlit* I c.:rat>oti 
lo~p-llolcs to he t>cjrecl in tliru rkppcbr t~:111.: ntf'(':ij:r:riri 
rl'r(>up'~ house, in whic:li wu;crc :i n:\ic8k :\titi tc l i  st'&~#l;s. 
'CIThilst so employctri, t hc. :~riiicti ~ ) i ~ ~ r ~ i l ; ~ t i c , l i  of I )i*h-i- 
Affgll:~ll C:II~C p011~illg d o ~ v l t  t i ~ ~ o ~ ~ g h  t 1142 K : L ~ ' ~ C ' I ~ = - ,  : l ! i ~ i  
(:omnicncurl firin;?; otl us. I i l~rcw o u t  shirl~li?ilit~l.s ; 
?,nt, it, ot.tltbr to s:~vc th6' I~c.Iplcsx folEt~\rc~rs, wc rzacnrc 
ol)ligctl to :J~:u~clo~t ttlc tcaitts :ttttl b:~pg:tg(*. I i i  is( tax.- 
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personally snperintended the removal of the detacll- 
ments in the Yaboo Khanah, with their wives and 
families, into the fort. At the same time I caused 
loop-holes to be bored in  the upper walls of Captain 
Troup's house, in  which were a naick and ten sepoys. 
Whilst so employed, the armed population of ID&-i- 
Affghan came pouring down through the gardens, mld 
commenced firing on us. I threw out slrimishers; 
but, in order to save the helpless followers, v e  were 
obliged to  abandon the tents and baggage. In cover- 
ing the retreat, one of my men was ldlcd, a d  one 
badly wounded; while about five of the enemy wcre 
lcilled. The whole of the gardens were then occupicd 
ly ~ a t c h e d ,  that one of 
ecided rneusrcres 
on the part  of the British would justqy them in openly 
taking our part .* 
Trevor despatched my requisition, for ammunition 
at least, if not for more effectual assistance, into canton- 
ments, where i t  arrived safely, the distance not being 
more than  one mile and a half. Shortly after, our 
spirits were raised by the apparent approach of a heavy 
cannonade, and volleys of musketry from tile direction 
of the  Moorad Khanah, and by the flight throiigh the 
gardens of the multitudes who were assailing me, 
towards Deh-i-Affghan, from which quarter crowds of 
women and children began to ascend the hill, evidently 
i n  expectation of an  assault from our soldiery. But 
these cheering sounds died away, and it was in vain 
that we strained our eyes, looking for the glittering 
bayonets through the trees, and round the corners of 
the  principal street leading from cantonments. My 
besiegers swarmed back with shouts, and i t  required 
much exertion on my part to prevent despondency 
* During the expedition into Kohistan, under General M'Caskill, 
I accompanied it, having been placed by General Pollock in charge 
of Shahzadee Shapoor and the Kuzzilbash camp. In  my frequent 
communications with Khan Shereen Khan, some of the late Kuszil- 
bash leaders, and with other chiefs of the Knzzilbash faction, all 
t h e  oircurnstances of the late insmrebtion were over and over 
again recapiinlated, one and all declaring positively that the 
sl ightest  exhibition of cuergy on our part in the first instance, morc 
especially in reinforcing my post and that of Trevor, wonld a t  once 
hove decided the Knzzilbashes, and all over whom they possessed 
any influence, in our favour. Khan Shereen also confirmed the idea, 
th& an offensive movement on the opposite side of the town by 
Brigadier Shelton, had it been made in the early part of the fatal 
2nd of November, wonld a t  once have crushed the insurrection. 
0 1  
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amongst my people, which feeling had been strongly In the  middle of this day (3rd November), to my 
excited by the confirmation of the rnmour of the murder great grief, I saw the enemy enter Captain Trevor's 
of Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother, and Captain tower; and a report was brought to us by two of his 
Broadfoot ; by the sight of the smoke from his burning servants, who escaped across the river, that he and his 
house; and by the intelligence that the treasury of family had  all been killed, which, though it afterwards 
Captain Johnson, also i n  the town, had been sackcd, and proved t o  be untrue, had a bad effect on my men, 
the guard slain. I n  the evening I servccl out pro- whose ammunition had now become very scarce, in 
visions from the Governme~lt stores. The attacks con- 
tinued at intervals during the night, and we had most 
disagreeable suspicions that the enemy were uuder- was evident from our ramparts; and the enemy, taking 
mining our north-west tower, or bastion. At early possession of the top, which overlooked my defences, 
dawn we sallied out to ascertain this, but were driven pitched their balls from their large juzails with such 
in again, after finding our apprehensions too well accuracy, as to clear my western face of defenders; 
verified. There is much dead ground about all Affghan and it was o ~ ~ l y  by crawling on my hands and knees 
forts, on which it is impossible to bring musketry to  u p  a small flight of steps, and whisking suddenly 
bear; and the towers can always be undermined, in through the door, that I could ever visit the tower 
the absence of hand-grenades on the part of the  be- that had been undermined. The guard from Captain 
sieged. To meet this attempt, we sunk a shaft inside Troup's house now clamoured for admittance into the 
the ground-floor of the tower, and I placed four resolute fort; and as Mr. Fallon, that gentleman's writer, 
men on the brink, ready to shoot the first man who called out  to me that they were ready to abandon their 
should enter. The extent of the fort requirecl all my post, I let them in, barricading my own door with sacks 
men to  be on duty at the same time, and some now of flour. Against the door and small wicket, on Bri- 
began to  wax weary. The cheerfulness of the re- gadier Anquetil's side, I had already piled heaps of 
inainder was not improved by the incessant howling of stones and large timbers. 
the women over the dead and dying, As a trait  indi- I n  the  afternoon the enemy brought down a large 
cative of the character of the Affghan juzailchees, I wau-piece against us, the balls from which shook the 
lnust mention, that whenever they could snatch five 
minutes to refresh themselves with a pipe, one or 
other of them would twang a sort of rude guitar? as an 
accompaniment to some martial song, which, mingling 
with the above notes of war, sounded very strangely. 
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:~rnongst my pcopIe, which feeling had been strongly 
excited by the confirmation of the rnmour of the murder 
of Sir  Alcsa~zder Burnes, his brother, and Captain 
t3roadfoot ; by the sight of the smoke from his burnipg 
lionse; ancl by the iritelligence that the treasury of 
Captain .J'otinsort, also in the town, had been sacked, and 
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~.isiolls from the Qovernmeut stores. The attacks eon- 
rirlucti at  intervals during the night, and we had most 
t2isagrec~rblc suspicions that the enemy were under- 
rrti~~ing our north-west tower, or bastion. At early 
dawn wc sallied out to ascertain this, but were driven 
ir i  agztin, after finding our apprehensions too well 
verified. Ti~ere  is mrlcli dead ground about all Affghan 
forts, on which it is impossible to bring musketry to 
hear; and the towers can always be undermined, in  
the absence of hand-grenades on the part of the be- 
sieged. To meet this attempt, we sunk a shaft inside 
-floor of the tower, and I placed four resolute 
le brink, ready to shoot the first man who 
er. The extent of the fort required all my 
be on duty at  the same time, and some now 
to wax tvcary. The cheerfulness of the re- 
mas rlot improved by the  incessant howling of 
11 over ttie dead and dying, As a trait indi- 
he character of the Affghan juzailchees, I 
mentiou, that whenever they could snatch five 
tes to refresh themselves with a pipe, one or 
m would twang a sort of rude guitar, as an 
~~kpaui rneut  to some martial song, which, mingling 
tl the above notes of war, sounded very strangely. 
I n  the middle of this day (3rd November), t o  my 
great grief, I saw the enemy enter Captain Trevor's 
tower; and a report was brought to us by two of his 
servants, who escaped across the river, that he and his 
family had all been killed, which, though i t  afterwards 
proved to be untrue, had a bad effect on my men, 
whose ammunition had now become very scarce, in 
spite of my having husbanded it with the greatest care. 
The scene of plunder now going on in Trevor's house 
was evident from our ramparts; and the enemy, taking 
possession of the top, which overlooked my defences, 
pitched their balls from their large juzails with such 
accuracy, as to clear my western face of defenders ; 
arid i t  was only by crawling on my hands and knees 
up a small flight of steps, and whisking suddenly 
through the door, that I could ever visit the tower 
that had been undermined. The guard from Captain 
Troup's house now clamoured for admittance into the 
fort;  and as Mr. Pallon, that gentleman's writer, 
called out to me that they were ready to abandon their 
post, I let them in, barricading my own door with sacks 
of flour. Against the door and small wicket, on Bri- - 
gadier AnquetilJs side, I had already piled heaps of 
stones and large timbers. 
In  the afternoon the enemy brought down a large 
wall-piece against us, the balls from which shook the 
upper walls of one of our towers, alarming the juzail- 
chees much, who dread the effect of any species of 
ordnance. This disposition to despair was increased 
by the utter failure of ammunition, and by the Affghans 
bringing down quantities of fire-wood and long poles 
21 " 
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with combustible matter at the ends, which they de- 
posited under the walls of the Yaboo Khanah, i n  readi- 
ness t o  burn down my door. Some suwars who were i 
stationed on Brigadier Anqueti17s side of the fort, now i 
broke into a sort of half-mutiny, and began pulling E i 
down the ,barricade against his gate, to  endeavour to 
save themselves by the speed of their horses. This 
I quelled, by going down amongst them with a double- 
1 
barrelled gun, and threatening to shoot the first man 
who should disobey my orders. I n  the evening I was I 
quite exhausted, as were my people; having by that 
time been fighting and working for nearly forty hours 
I 
without rest. Indeed, on my part, it had beenswith- 
out refreshment, as eating was impossible from excitc- 
ment and weariness; and my absence for five minutes 
a t  a time from any part of the works disheartened tlle 
fighting men. Added to this, my wounded were 
dying for want of medical aid. I therefore yielded 
t o  the representations of my juzailchee jemadar, and 
of Mr. Fallon, from both of whom I received valuable 
assistance during the whole affair, and prepared fi)r 
a retreat to cantonments. This pcre determined should 
take place during the early part of the night, a t  which 
time, i t  being then the fast of the Bamazan, we calcu- 
lated the enemy would be at their principal meal. I 
ordered the juzailchees to lead, and to answer all i 
questions in case of encountering a post of the enemy. 
The wounded were placed on what yaboos I possessed, 
abandoning everything in the shape of baggage ; these, 
with the women and children, followed next in order ; 
and I myself proposed to bring up the rear with my 
few regulars, who, I fondly imagined, would stick by 
me in case of a hot pursuit. We were to avoid the 
town, and to follow the course of the small canal above 
mentioned, and afterwards to strike off by lanes, and 
through some fields, in the direction of cantonments. 
A night retreat is generally disastrous, and this proved 
I 
no exception to the general rule ; but, notwithstanding i 
my strict order that all baggage should be left behind, i 
it being very dark, many of the poor women contrived I 
to slip out with loads of their little property on their I 
shoulders, making their children walk, whose cries 
added to  the confusion and to the danger of discovery. 
On going among the women to see that my orders 
for leaving all their property were obeyed, a young 
Ghoorka girl of 16 or 13, who had girded up her loins 
and stuck a sword into her kummerbund, came to me,. 
and throwing all that she possessed at my feet, said, 
"Sahib ! you are right; life is better than property." I 
She was a beautiful creature, with fair complexion I 
and large dark eyes, and, as .  she stood there with her I 
garments swathed around her, leaving her limbs free, 
she was a picture full of life, spirit, and energy. I 
never saw her afterwards ; and fear she was either killed 
or taken prisoner on the night march. 
Before we had proceeded half a mile, the rear 
missed the advance, upon whom a post of the enem 
had begun to fire. All my regulars had crept ah 
with the juzailchees, and 1 found myself alone wi 
chuprassee and two suwars, in the midst of a help 
and wailing crowd of women and children. Rid 
a on by myself along a narrow lane, to try and pick 
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with combustible matter at the ends, which they de- 1 few regulars, who, I fondly imagined, would stick by 
posited under the walls of the Yaboo Khanah, in readi- i 
i 
me in case of a hot pursuit. We were to avoid the 
ness to  burn down my door. Some suwars who were 1 town, and to follow the course of the small canal above stationed on Brigadier AnquetilJs side of the fort, now mentioned, and afterwards to strike off by lanes, and 
broke into a sort of half-mutiny, and began pulling through some fields, in the direction of cantonments. 
down the .barricade against his gate, to endeavour to A night retreat is generally disastrous, and this proved 
save themselves by the speed of their horses. This no exception to the general rule ; but, notwithstanding 
I quelled, by going down amongst them with a double- my strict order that all baggage should be left behind, 
barrelled gun, and threatening to shoot the first man it being very dark, many of the poor women contrived 
who should disobey my orders. I n  the evening I was I to slip out with loads of their little property on their 
shoulders, making their children walk, whose cries 
added to the confusion and to the danger of discovery. 
On going among the women to see that my orders 
for leaving all their property were obeyed, a young 
Ghoorka girl of 16 or 18, who had girded up her loins 
from any part of the works disheartened the and stuck a sword into her lrummerbnnd, came to me, 
and throwing all that she possessed at my feet, said, 
" Sahib ! you are right; life is better than property." 
She was a beautiful creature, with fair complexion 
and large dark eyes, and, as she stood there with her 
whole affair, and prepared for garments swathed around her, leaving her limbs free, 
nts. This we determined should 
she was a picture full of life, spirit, and energy. I early part of the night, at which 
never saw her afterwards ; and fear she was either killed 
fast of the Ramazan, we calcu- or taken prisoner on the night march. 
Before we had proceeded half a mile, the rear 
missed the advance, upon whom a post of the enemy 
had begun to fire. All my regulars had crept ahead 
with the juzailchees, and I found myself alone with a ing in the shape of baggage; these, 
chuprassee and two suwars, in the midst of a helpless nd children, followed next in orcler ; 
and wailing crowd of women and children. Riding posed to bring up the rear with my 
on by myself along a narrow lane, to try and pick out 
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the road, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a 
party of Affghans, whom at first I took to be my own 
juzailchees, and spoke to them as such. They quickly 
undeceived me, however, by crying out, "Peringhee 
hust," '(Here is an European," and attacking me with 
swords and knives. Spurring my horse violently, I 
wheeled round, cutting from right to left, for I, for- 
tunately, had my own sword drawn previous to  the 
surprise. My blows, by God's mercy, parried the 
greater part of theirs, and I was lucky enough to cut 
of£ the hand of my most outrageous assailant. I n  
short, after a desperate struggle, during which I re- 
ceived two slight sabre-cuts, and a blow on the back 
of my head from a fellow, whose sword turned in his 
hand, which knocked me half off my horse, I escaped 
out of the crush, passing unhurt through two volleys 
of musketry from the whole picket, which, by that - time, had become alarmed and had turned out. They 
pursued me; bnt I soon distanced them, crossing 
several fields at  speed, and gaining a road which I 
perceived led round the western end of the Shah's 
garden. Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror, 
I perceived my path again blocked up by a dense 
body of Afghans. Retreat was impossible; so, put- 
ting m y  trust in God, I charged into the midst of 
them, hoping that the weight of my horse would clear 
my way for me, and reserving my sword-cut for the 
last struggle. It was well that I did so, for by the  
time I had knocked over some twenty fellows, I found 
that they were my own juzailchees. If you ever ex- 
perienced sudden relief from a hideous nightmare, 
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You may imagine my feelings for the moment. With 
these worthies, after wandering about for some time, 
and passing unchallenged by a sleepy post of the 
enemy, I reached the cantonments. During the night 
many stragglers of my party, principally followers, 
dropped in. During the whole business, from first to 
last, including the retreat, I had under a dozen killed, 
and about half that amount wounded, nearly half 
the former being followers; whereas about thirty of 
the enemy had bitten the dust, and gone to their place. 
I cannot close this letter to you without remarking 
that, amongst other lamentable errors which led to ow 
heavy downfall, that of omitting in the first instance 
to strengthen my post was, next to SheltonJs refusal 
to pour his brigade into the town, while the rioters 
yet amounted to barely two hundred men, the g r e ~ t s t .  
But the whole blame cannot, in this paiticular in- 
themselves to me rem 
the last. Numbers of th 
few departed to their 
APPENDIX A. 
the road, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a 
party of Affghans, whom at first I took to be my own 
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you may imagine my feelings for the moment. With 
these worthies, after wandering about for some time, 
I 
and passing unchallenged by a sleepy post of the 
enemy, I reached the cantonments. During the night 
many stragglers of my party, principally followers, 
dropped in. During the whole business, from first to 
last, including the retreat, I had under a dozen killed, 
and about half that amount wounded, nearly half 
the former being followers; whereas about thirty of 
the enemy had bitten the dust, and gone to their place. 
I cannot close this letter to you without remarking 
that, amongst other lamentable errors which led to our 
heavy downfall, that of omitting in the first instance 
to strengthen my post was, next to SheltonJs refusal 
t o  pour his brigade into the town, while the rioters 
yet amounted to barely two hundred men, the greatest. 
But the whole blame cannot, in this particular in- 
stance, be attributed to  our poor friend General 
Elphinstone. He had not been sufficiently informed 
as to the importance of my position, nor as to the 
facdity with which a strong reinforcement could have 
reached me. That he was specially anxious personany 
as to my safety there could be no doubt, as was shown 
by the warmth of his reception of me. 
I need not remind you of the devoted heroism dis- 
.a 
played tlnoughout the siege by Hussain Khan, the 
; 
juzailchee jemadar, and the handful of brave men 
I ' 
who accompanied him, and who personally attaching 1 
themselves to me remained under my command to 
! 
the last. Numbers of them fell ; others were disabled; 
a few departed to  thek  own homes on the day when 
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I was taken prisoner and Sir W. Macnaghten was 
murdered ; and, I believe, nearly the sole survivors 
are some ten or fifteen men, who, with their brave 
leader, Hussain Khan, are now with us in camp. 
These proceed with the rest of the juzailchee corps 
under Captain Ferris to Ferozepore, where, we hear, 
ihey are to be disbanded, and sent back to their own 
country, to be destroyed by their blood-thirsty country- 
men as a reward for their fidelity to us ; and yet 
these were the men wl~o, during the period I was be- 
leaguered in the fort of Nishan Khan, at a time when 
I was quite unlrnown to  them, not only refused to 
listen to  the repeated propositions of the Affghans out- 
side to  deliver me up to their vengeance, their own 
safety being thereby insured, but who, during the 
siege of cantonments, laughed to scorn the most 
tempting offers on the part of AmeenooIah Khan, 
Mahorned Alcbar, and other Affghan chiefs, t o  induck 
them to  join the general cause of Islam against the 
I Kaffirs, invariably bringing the letters, in which they 
were conveyed, for my inspection and perusal.* 
Yours very sincerely, 
C. MACKENZIE. 
Camp, Rawul Pindee, 
En route to Ferozepore, Nov. 19, li 84.2. 
* They were disbanded a t  Jhelum, in the Punjab, each of the old 
soldiers receiving a donation of twelve months' pay, and the rest s, 
,patuity in proportion to the length of their services, with which 
they a11 seemed very well satislied.-V. X. 
-.- .-- . 
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No. 1. 
DESPATCH FROM M A J O R - G E ~ ~ ~  ELPHINSTONE, AD- 
DRESSED TO TEE S E ~ R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  TO THE GOVERN- 
MENT. 
Buddeeabad. 
Sl~,--With the deepest regret, I have the honour to 
forward, for the information of the Right Honourable 
the Governor-General in Council, the annexed memo- 
randum of occurrences preceding and during the 
insurrection at Cabul, up to this date. 
The state of my health and mental sufferings pre- 
vious to, and consequent on, the unfortunate oc- 
currences, render me little competent to furnish such 
complete information as I might have done, had it not 
been for the total destruction of my entire staff and 
all official documents and memoranda; and I have 
only been able to remedy the deficiency through the 
k i d  of Major Pottinger and Captain Law- 
rence, n~~ having aided me with facts and dates, I tmst, 
however meage the account may be, that its tenor is, 
upon the whole, perfectly correct. 
I beg to be allowed to express my sense of the 
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gallant manner in which the various detachments sent 
out were led by Brigadier Shelton, and of the in- 
variably noble conduct of the officers on those occa- 
sions, particularly of those who fell leading their men; 
viz. Colonel Mackrell, Captains Swayne, Robinson, 
MCCrea, and Lieutenant Raban, Her Majesty's 44th 
a 
Foot; Colonel Oliver and Captain Macintosh, 5th 
Native Infqntry ; Captain Westmacott and Lieutenant 
Gordon, 37th Native Infantry ; Captain Walker, 4th 
Local Worse, and Lieutenant Laing, 27th Native 
Infantry. 
I hope I may also be permitted to record my sense of 
the zeal and exertions of my lamented Aide-de-camp 
Major Thain,'and my acting Quartermaster-General Cap- 
tain Paton, both of whom were severely wounded, as also 
Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant-Generd, and my 
Aide-de-camp Captain Airey. I had inadvertently 
omitted Captain Bellew, Assistant Quartermaster- 
General, who, at the storm of the Rika-bashee and 
Mahomed SherreePs fort, evinced the greatest gallantry 
and volunteered to carry the powder-bags. 
From Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the Shah's 
force, and Colonel Chambers, commanding the cavalry, 
I on all occasions received the most cordial assistance ; 
and I take this opportunity to record the ever-ready 
f 
zeal and gallant conduct of Captain Troup, Major of 
Brigade, Shah Shooja's force. 
Throughout the whole siege the utmost zeal was 
manifested by Lieutenant Sturt, Engineers, and by 
Lieutenant V. Eyre, Commissary of Ordnance, who, 
in consequence of the paucity of artillery officers, on 
all occasions volunteered his services, and was unfortu- 
nately wounded. 
Captain Colin Mackenzie, Assistant Political Agent, 
Peshamr,  volunteered to take charge of a body of Ju- 
zailchees, an$ was engaged in every affair, his and 
their canduct being most conspicuous. 
The manner in which the soldiers, European and 
Native, bore up without a murmur against all privations 
and very harassing duty, at a most inclement season, 
was highly creditable to them, and more particularly 
the Horse Artillery, who on all occasions upheld the 
character of that distinguished corps. 
Among the many valuable and promising officers 
who have fallen in the recent retreat, I would espe- 
cially mention Captains Skinner and Hay, 6lst and 35th 
Native Infantry; Lieutenant Le Geyt, Shah's 2nd 
Cavalry ; and Lieutenant Bird, Shah's 6th Infantry ; the 
latter officer distinguished himself in the assault and 
capture of the Rika-bashee Fort. 
Of the surviving officers, my thanks are due to 
Major Eldred Pottinger, C.B., Political Agent, and 
Captain George St. P. Lawrence, Military Secretarp to 
the late Envoy and Minister, for their cordial assist- 
ance and co-operation till the death of their lamented 
chief ; and ' to Captain Anderson, Shah's 2nd Cavalry; 
and Captain Bygrave, Paymaster, for their zeal and 
alacrity in the performance of their duty, amid trials 
and d.ifficulties almost unprecedented. 
I have the honour, &c. 
W. K, ELPHINSTONB. 
To the Secretav to Government. 
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No. 2. 
The following extracts from a memorandum of 
Major-General Elphinstone deserve attention, both as 
supporting some of the Author's statements, and 
exhibiting in some degree the udortunate General's 
disadvantages, as enumerated by himself.-EDITOR. i 
* * * * * * 
"I was unlucky in the state of my health; as, 
during the whole siege, I was not able to move with- 
out difficulty, except on horseback, and then not 
easily. On the evening of the 2nd) going round the 
guards, I had a very severe fall, the horse falling on 
me. I was obliged to return home therefore. I then 
asked Captains Paton and Grant if they thought all had 
been done, and told them to see that Brigadier Anquetil 
made the arrangements in the Mission Compound; 
and it was a great loss to me that, shortly aafter his 
coming into cantonments, he was taken ill, by which I 
was deprived of his assistance, which he would cordially 
have afforded me. The extent of the cantonment-the 
unfinished state of everything i n  i t - i t s  indefensibie 
position, commanded as it  was on every side-ar- 
titularly the facilities aforded for the a~proach of 
matchlocks-added much t o  our dz$icuZties. The troops 
were on half rations, and the whole of them on duty 
every night, and often all day, from threatened attacks. 
The want of artillery officers, notwithstanding Captain 
(Lieutenant) Eyre's volunteering, Captain Waller being 
wounded early in the business.-On the 9th, not find- 
ing myself equal to the duties, particularly a t  night, 
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when I could not get about on horseback, I recalled 
Brigadier Shelton from the Bala Hissar. . . . . 
I was unlucky, also, in not understanding the state of 
things, and being wholly dependent on the Envoy and 
others for information." - . . . 
No. 3. 
The passage next quoted clearly shows that it was in 
obedience to the General's order that the married 
officers, as well as their wives and children, resigned 
themselves to Mahomed Akbar. This is, of course, a 
point of peculiar interest to those officers, especially 
as misrepresentation upon it has gone forth.- 
EDITOR. 
Extract from *a Memorandum by Major-General 
'W. K. Elpkinstone, C.B., of the Events preceding 
and during the Insurrection at Cabul. 
"On the 9th (January) the march was ordered at 
10 A.M., but, consequent on a message from the Sir- 
dar, requesting us to halt till he could organize an 
escort for us, and promising supplies and fire-wood, it 
was countermanded. But a similar scene of confusion to 
that of the day before had taken place, and it was 
past mid-day before anything like order was restored. 
rr Captain Skinner returned to the Sirdar, by whom 
he was again sent back with a proposal that the married 
people and their families should be made over to him, 
promising honourable treatment to the ladies. I com- 
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and children, after the horrors they had already wit- 
nessed, from the further dangers of a camp, and hoping 
that, as from the very commencement of negotiations 
the Sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the 
married people as hostages, this mark of trust might 
elicit a corresponding feeling i n  him. 
"(Signed) W. K. ELPEINSTONE, 
" Major-General." 
S APPENDIX 6. 
MEMORANDUM of Released Captives who joined General 
Pollock's camp at Ktibul in September 1842. 
Officers . 35 
Soldiers . 51 
Civilians . 2 
Officers' Wives . . 10 
Soldiers' Wives . . 2  
Children . . 22 - 
Total . . 122 
Among the present survivors (besides the author) are 
Lieutenant-General Sir George Lawrence, K.C.S.I., 
C.B., Lieutenant-General Colin Mackenzie, C.B., Lieu- 
tenant-General Sir I. Talbot Airey, K.C.B., Major- 
General J. Haughton, C.S.I., Colonel G. Mein. 
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